

BAUER

THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES

OTTO

AND

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Ephraim J. Nimni, Volume Editor

Translated by Joseph O'Donnell

Foreword by Heinz Fischer

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and Social Democracy

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University of Minnesota Press
Minneapolis • London

The University of Minnesota Press gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of the Humanities Research Program of the University of New South Wales for the publication of this book.

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Published by the University of Minnesota Press
111 Third Avenue South, Suite 290
Minneapolis, MN 55401-2520
<http://www.upress.umn.edu>

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bauer, Otto, 1881-1938.

[Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie. English]

The question of nationalities and social democracy / Otto Bauer ; translated by Joseph O'Donnell ; foreword by Heinz Fisher.

p. cm.

Includes index.

ISBN 0-8166-3265-0 — ISBN 0-8166-3266-9 (pbk.)

1. Nationalism. 2. Socialism. I. Title.

JC311 .B3813 2000

320.54'01—dc21

00-011383

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

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It was usual for leaders of the Austrian Social Democratic Party to abjure their native religion and become *konfessionslos*. But this Otto Bauer never did. He remained on the record of the Vienna Jewish Community and paid its taxes. When challenged by a non-Jewish friend to explain his continued confessional status, he replied that leaving the Jewish community was one thing he just could not do, adding: “You cannot understand that, since no one ever muttered ‘dirty Jew’ behind your back.”

—Hannah S. Decker, *Freud, Dora, and Vienna 1900*

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Foreword

Heinz Fischer

In the first half of the twentieth century, Austrian Social Democracy produced two figures who achieved a significance that extended well beyond the borders of their own country: Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. Born on 5 September 1881 in Vienna, Otto Bauer was often regarded as Renner's adversary within the Social Democratic movement, as indeed he was—at least on certain issues—above all during the period from 1920 to 1933.

Although born into a solidly middle-class family, Otto Bauer became acquainted with the thought and the leading figures of Social Democracy and Austro-Marxism while still in his youth. Following the introduction of general male franchise in 1907, he worked in the secretariat of the Social Democratic parliamentary party and, after the collapse of the monarchy, was appointed foreign minister in the Renner government, which held office from 1918 to 1920. From then until 1933, Bauer was regarded as the intellectual leader of Austrian Social Democracy. He established a reputation as a brilliant political analyst, but also as less pragmatic in his approach to certain political issues than Karl Renner. As a result, Renner came to be perceived as the spiritual leader of Austrian Social Democracy's right wing and Otto Bauer as the leading figure of its left wing—a distinction which, it must be said, represented a considerable oversimplification of the two men's actual roles.

In 1933 and 1934, Austrian democracy was put to its most crucial test when "Austro-Fascism" and civil war led to the suspension of the parliamentary constitution. The task that faced Otto Bauer, who had been shaped by the humanist tradition and who was at heart a highly sensitive individual, was one to which he ultimately proved unequal. Adopting offensive measures to counter the advance of authoritarian and antidemocratic forces was something that, as he himself put it, he could not reconcile with his responsibility to "the mothers of this country." Instead Bauer retreated step by step, searching for compromises with the authoritarian Right. As a consequence, when civil war broke out on 12 February 1934 the Austrian Social Democrats were already fighting a losing battle. Otto Bauer had failed. He was forced to flee abroad and died in Paris in 1938, a lonely and embittered emigrant, before

reaching his sixtieth birthday and without living to see the revival of an independent Austria and the reestablishment of democracy in 1945.

The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy, which appears here for the first time in an English translation, was written while Otto Bauer was still a young man and is today regarded by a number of historians, sociologists, and political scientists as a masterpiece. The following provides an overview of the context from which this work emerged.

The Russian Revolution of 1905 fascinated the twenty-six-year-old Otto Bauer, who at the time was still completing his university studies in law. It was not only the revolution itself that interested Bauer, but also its possible consequences for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Among the monarchy's most difficult problems was that of resolving the nationalities question, an issue that was also proving increasingly problematic in both practical and theoretical terms for the young Social Democratic movement.

Otto Bauer successfully completed his final doctoral work in January 1906 and was awarded the title of doctor of jurisprudence on 25 January that year. The following day, 26 January 1906, Bauer wrote a letter to Karl Kautsky in which he discussed the dangers that could threaten the Socialist movement as a result of the intensification of the national struggle between the Germans and Czechs. This problem so fascinated him that in February 1906 he began work on a book on the nationalities question, one that he had already completed by the end of the same year and that ran to 576 pages in its first edition.

In May 1907 a parliament was democratically elected for the first time in the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire. The Social Democratic parliamentary party was made up of eighty-seven deputies drawn from the German, Czech, Polish, Italian, and Ruthenian Social Democratic movements. A secretariat was established that was charged with the coordination of this significantly expanded parliamentary party, the members of which represented five different nations, and Victor Adler, the leader of the Social Democrats, entrusted the role of parliamentary party secretary to the twenty-eight-year-old jurist Dr. Otto Bauer, who had just completed his work on the nationalities question and whose political career was now beginning.

Seventeen years later, in the spring of 1924, a second edition of *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy* was published, including a new preface by Bauer in which he sketched the political and social developments that had taken place between 1907 and 1924. Bauer admitted frankly here that much had taken place since the book's initial publication which he had been unable to anticipate in 1907. However, in his preface he maintained the validity of the book's central thesis, and in particular the definition of the nation he had elaborated at that time.

During the period of National Socialist dictatorship and the Second World War, which Bauer had already predicted in 1933, and in the decade following the war, which was dominated by economic necessities and global political

conflicts, interest in the work of Otto Bauer decreased both within and outside Austria. The problems of the time were seen as requiring “pragmatists” rather than intellectuals inquiring into first principles, who during that period were devalued as “ideologists.”

It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that there was something of an “Otto Bauer renaissance” in Europe, one that not only led to the publication of Bauer’s collected works in nine volumes by the Europa-Verlag (Vienna 1975), but also to a renewed preoccupation with various aspects of his thought, above all in the Romance-language countries. However, this renewed interest placed little emphasis on his work regarding the nationalities question, which during the sixties and seventies no longer seemed of particular relevance.

It is precisely this situation that has changed since the collapse of Communism and the revival of old forms of nationalism and the emergence of new forms. Not only the events in a number of the republics of the former Soviet Union and in former Yugoslavia, but also problems emerging in Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and other parts of central and eastern Europe have led to an increased interest in the so-called nationalities question.

Bauer’s central argument in his study of the nationalities question is that modern nations are to be understood as communities of character (*Charaktergemeinschaften*) that have emerged out of a communities of fate (*Schicksalsgemeinschaften*) and that, as a consequence, a more differentiated approach to the concept of the nation is required than that offered by the criteria of common language or common origin. National identities are thus conceptualized in Bauer’s study not as “naturally given” and invariable, but as culturally changeable. Such an understanding would seem to represent a fundamental prerequisite for an approach to national conflicts that operates within a democratic framework and in a spirit of mutual tolerance rather than in “biological” terms.

The fact that a problem whose effects were as dramatic and decisive as those of the conflict between national groups and the question of national rights at the beginning of this century is again assuming a decisive role even before the twenty-first century has begun is in itself justification for republishing one of the most original and thorough works written on this subject.

Of course, time has not stood still, and today it would certainly not suffice when addressing this issue to refer back to the analyses and conclusions elaborated at the beginning of the twentieth century. But anyone seeking to build the Europe of the future must be cognizant of the Europe of the past and the problems that have so significantly burdened a number of peoples and influenced their ability to live together in a single state.

In this sense, a passage such as the following, written by Bauer in 1907, can be read today as a vision of a united Europe that has achieved social and national equilibrium:

Just as the development of capitalist commodity production linked the manorial estates and the towns isolated during the Middle Ages to form the modern state, so too will the international division of labor create in socialist society a new type of social structure above the national polity, a *state of states*, into which the individual national polities will integrate themselves. The *United States of Europe* will thus be no longer a dream, but the inevitable ultimate goal of a movement that the nations have long begun and that will be enormously accelerated by forces that are already becoming apparent.

In this spirit I welcome the publication of an English-language edition of Otto Bauer's book on the nationalities question and wish this book a favorable reception among a new generation of readers.

Vienna, February 1998

Translator's Note

Joseph O'Donnell

My main goal in this translation has been to produce a text that is both readable and faithful to Otto Bauer's style, which, it must be said, varies between scholarly detachment and the enthusiasm of a political activist. Whether the end result has achieved this synthesis is for the reader to judge.

Bauer's style, although somewhat tortuous in places, is essentially quite modern. Although certain central concepts such as "community of fate" (*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*) may strike the English-speaking reader as having an old-fashioned ring, such terms—as a colleague in Vienna pointed out to me—are still part of contemporary discourse. Here it is important to note the pains to which Bauer went to define his own usage of such a term, which is historical in meaning and does not refer to some preprogrammed future destiny—a meaning given to the concept by a certain Dr. Frick, the German minister of the interior, in an article appearing in *Nature* on 24 February 1934. Similar caution is advisable when interpreting what Bauer was referring to when he linked the terms "national" and "socialist" in the latter part of the work.

This translation is based on the 1924 edition of *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, which included an important new preface. Where I have felt it necessary, I have added explanatory footnotes for the English-speaking reader, and I am particularly grateful to Claudie Weill for permitting me to use the French translation as a guide to where footnoting might be appropriate.

Bauer's work incorporates an extensive range of scholarship, and in places, particularly where he was dealing with the natural sciences, it seems that the young writer did not always have a comprehensive grasp of the field—a point he himself referred to when introducing the work. However, this is not to excuse any blunders of interpretation for which I myself may be responsible.

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Introduction for the English-Reading Audience

Ephraim J. Nimni

In the introduction to his important book *Multicultural Citizenship*, Will Kymlicka argues that ethnic and cultural diversity is the norm for most contemporary states. This diversity, Kymlicka contends, gives rise to some important and potentially divisive questions related to issues such as language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, educational curricula, land claims, and, last but not least, immigration and citizenship.¹ Although Kymlicka is aware of the historical dimensions of ethnic diversity, other “postnational” writers with short memories argue instead that the internationalization of labor markets, decolonization, and expansion of the discourse of human rights that have occurred since World War II have made diversity the hallmark of our period, the characteristic of an era when the politics of difference overrides classical forms of nation-state citizenship.² In a similar vein, Delanty argues that the success of nationalism results from the lack of a compelling postnational and cosmopolitan counter ideology from the left, a new postnational argument that curiously resembles the ill-fated optimism of key leaders of the Second International before the first World War. But is this really the case? As Calhoun argues, nationalism has been big news on and off for two hundred years.³ Many problems that are perceived today as novel and sometimes intractable were in fact systematically discussed when nationalism previously made big news. This was the case, for example, during the period of the apogee of the nation-state and the period coinciding with the disintegration of Imperial Austria. A reexamination of the nationalities debate in Austria during this period reveals surprising analogies to contemporary liberal democratic debates on minority rights, and multiculturalism. At the time of its publication and over subsequent years, the book introduced here was considered a very important contribution to the Austrian debate on nationalism, minority rights, and the state. For this reason, and despite important differences in time and circumstances, Bauer’s *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy* has something important to offer to the contemporary debate in Western liberal democracies on ethnic rights, citizenship, migration, and multiculturalism.⁴ Given its theoretical

and empirical importance as a problem that continues to beset contemporary states, it is indeed difficult to understand, as Eric Hobsbawm argues, why this book has not been translated into English in its entirety before now, a serious theoretical oversight according to Nicolao Merker, the editor of the Italian translation.⁵ The work was translated into Spanish 1978, into French in 1988, and into Italian in 1999. The English translation makes the book available in all major Western languages.

Otto Bauer was born in Vienna on 5 September 1881 and died at the age of fifty-seven, exiled in Paris on the eve of World War II. His father was a prosperous Jewish industrialist who counted among his friends the father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud. Bauer's sister Ida was Freud's famous patient referred to by the pseudonym Dora in his infelicitous study of hysteria, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria."⁶ As a young man Bauer studied Hegel, Kant, and Marx and wrote impressive articles and pamphlets on Marxist theory. Friederich Adler reports that when the father of German Marxism, Karl Kautsky, met Bauer, with whom he had previously corresponded, he said, "This is how I imagine the young Marx."⁷ Bauer was an Austrian army officer in World War I and was taken as a prisoner of war to Russia, where he was freed after the Bolshevik revolution with the help of the Social-Revolutionaries. On his return to a dismembered Austria, he assumed the leadership of his party's left wing and became Austria's foreign minister at the end of the war. He was obliged to resign after signing a secret *Anschluss* agreement with Germany, but he remained his party's guiding theoretician for the next two decades. In this capacity he wrote many articles and influential books, including *Bolschewismus oder Sozialdemokratie?* in 1920, *Die österreichische Revolution* in 1923, *Sozialdemokratie, Religion, und Kirche* in 1927, and *Zwischen zwei Weltkriegen?* in 1937.⁸ He also developed an important theory of Fascism.⁹ A member of the Austrian National Council from 1929 to 1934, he went into exile with the onset of Nazism in 1934, first to Czechoslovakia, then to France, where he died in 1938 a disillusioned man. There is no biography in English. The most important biography in German is by Leichter.¹⁰

This book was initially written as Bauer's doctoral dissertation at the University of Vienna when he was twenty-six. With the first publication of the work in 1907, Bauer was propelled at a very young age to the forefront of theoretical and historical discussions of nationalism. Given that the book represented one of the most important works written in the field, it is perhaps surprising to discover that Bauer was initially very reluctant to take on the project at all. The protracted ethnic conflicts in the collapsing Habsburg Empire had paralyzed the "normal" activities of the Socialist Party. Karl Renner and Bauer undertook to tackle the thorny issue, although this was not because they felt any sympathy for nationalism and national causes; on the contrary, they approached the task with gritted teeth, resenting their "bad

luck” to be located in Austria where circumstances required that “far more important” socialist issues be set aside (see foreword to this translation).¹¹ Apart from writing a new introduction for the 1924 edition and engaging in an important debate with Kautsky that followed the publication of this book, Bauer never returned to a systematic discussion of nationalism.¹² Nevertheless, the book is widely considered his most important work.

Ananiadis and Merker cite a fascinating letter from Bauer to Kautsky in 1906 (when Bauer was twenty-five years of age), in which he expressed fears that the relationship between Germans and Czechs could well harm the workers’ movement, adding “I might indeed commit myself to writing a few articles or a pamphlet on national troubles” despite being “much more interested in other matters.”¹³ This “regrettable side-track” resulted in one of the most significant treatises on the theory of nationalism, one that certainly out-lived anything Bauer wrote on the other “interesting” matters.

Early twentieth-century Vienna, like contemporary London, Paris, Berlin, Toronto, and Sydney, experienced an influx of noticeably diverse ethno-national communities. Much in the same way as contemporary differential development has generated the “North-South” divide and pushed many ethnically diverse migrants into metropolitan centers, differential development in late Imperial Austria pushed many different ethnic groups into Vienna and to the more affluent and predominately German-speaking areas of the Empire. Much in the same way as there is a reaction against “alien” migration in Paris, Berlin, Rome, and Sydney today, there was a strong reaction in Vienna.

Much in the same way as the contemporary challenge of accommodating diverse ethnic cultures within one territorial unit has proved fertile ground for novel interpretations of democratic politics (politics of difference, multiculturalism), the conflict over nationalities in late Imperial Austria generated novel and daring attempts to redefine democratic politics and accommodate ethnic diversity. One of the most daring and original models was Bauer and Renner’s project of national cultural autonomy.

In recent years, the term *multiculturalism* has been invoked as a possible remedy to the nation-state’s quandary of whether to assimilate or integrate its minorities. If contemporary multiculturalism is a by-product of the need to accommodate ethnic diversity and if the contemporary politics of identity is an assertion of minority distinctiveness, so too was Bauer and Renner’s model of national-cultural autonomy. However, multiculturalism is a neologism; the *Oxford English Dictionary* traces it back to the 1960s, and its origins lie in Quebec. But as Raz asks, does it designate a new idea?¹⁴ If contemporary multiculturalism is concerned with including, recognizing, and representing ethnically diverse social segments in one political unit, it is surely not wrong to see Otto Bauer and Karl Renner as the precursors of multiculturalism. They were, however, operating in an environment far more hostile than ours

to the political expression of ethnic diversity. This was the “golden age” of the nation-state, a time when the ideology of the nation-state reigned supreme, when the optimal political unit was understood to be a monocultural nation-state. This was a time when J. Stuart Mill’s famous motto “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities” was a truth taken for granted by both liberal and illiberal nationalists.¹⁵

As Bauer and Renner eloquently showed almost a century ago, at the very least in theory, the nation-state and the political representation of ethnic diversity are diametrically opposed. However, their period was a time when the ideology of the liberal democratic nation-state had the status of an uncontested hegemonic principle, a period when the nation-state and liberalism were inextricably linked. It was the great merit of Bauer and Renner to foresee the enormous cost in loss of life, economic ruin, and displacement that the carving out of national states for aggrieved minorities would cause.¹⁶ Winston Churchill argued, “There is not one of the peoples or provinces that constituted the Empire of the Habsburgs to whom gaining their independence has not brought the tortures which ancient poets and theologians had reserved for the damned.”¹⁷

By contrast, in the contemporary world the idea of the nation-state has lost a great deal of its former shine, and, considering the example of the European Union, the idea of transnational political organizations is no longer a distant utopia. Yet the problem of ethnic and national minorities is as agonizing as it was when Renner and Bauer wrote their thought-provoking pieces nearly a century ago. Maybe the time has come to have a new look at the old idea of nonterritorial national cultural autonomy and to adapt it to contemporary circumstances. In some ways, the work of W. Connolly is pioneering the idea of a nonterritorialized polity.¹⁸ For one, the European Union could benefit greatly from such a scheme. As Hurst Hannun argues, self-determination should be concerned primarily with people, not territory.¹⁹

However, to attribute to Bauer and Renner the role of precursors of multiculturalism misleads by oversimplification. As persuasively has been explained by Yuval-Davis, multiculturalism in contemporary liberal democracies is subject to limits, many of which Renner and Bauer would have found unacceptable.²⁰ These limits result from the supremacy of the model of the nation-state. For example, national sovereignty, the predominance of existing national languages, the legitimation of ruling cultural practices, and the hegemony of official political cultures constrains the scope of multiculturalism and defines its limits. In sharp contrast, such barriers did not limit Bauer and Renner’s theories. Renner specifically demanded the recognition of national communities as autonomous corporations within the multinational state. The idea was not to subordinate these communities to some undivided sovereign power, but to legally sanction the inviolability of the areas of competence of national corporations. For Renner, the principal problem was how

to break with the limitations of liberal democracy and the territorial principle of the nation-state, or, as he put it, how to organize ethnic communities as juridical entities.²¹

Bauer and Renner's argument is more comprehensive than most contemporary liberal discussions of multiculturalism, as they ventured into areas that remain untouched in the contemporary debate. In contrast to contemporary liberal theorists whose interpretation of multiculturalism is based on their observation of the undesirable cleavages created by the presence of minority ethnic and cultural groups in homogenizing nation-states, Otto Bauer attempted to go beyond that specific observation, common enough in his contemporary Austria, to produce a theory of nationhood and nationalism in multinational and multiethnic states. His idea was to overcome the very notion of majorities and minorities by guaranteeing collective representation of sovereign corporations with specific and exclusive competences within the administration and governance of the multinational state. Whether he succeeded, or whether this model is even plausible, is for the reader to judge.

The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy also includes the elaboration of a significant theory of the nation. Much of it is expressed in language that is seen as dated and problematic today (social Darwinism, excessive emphasis on evolutionary paradigms), yet it also represents a highly accomplished theory of national formation, as will be outlined in this introduction. In a reference to Bauer's introduction to the 1924 edition of the work, Stargardt argues that the greatest merit of Bauer's theory of the nation was that it was sufficiently sophisticated and meticulous to explain the failure of its own practical program.²²

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The aim of the present publication is not only to make the work available to historians of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (many of whom are able, of course, to consult the work in the original German), but also to show readers not familiar with Austrian history the relevance of Bauer's arguments to contemporary discussions of multiculturalism and minority rights. It may therefore be useful to review briefly the historical circumstances in which the work was written, thus providing a background to the ideas, theories, and political models that Bauer developed.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Austria was a dual monarchy with a total population of fifty-three million made up of more than fifteen different nationalities, occupying an area smaller than South Australia, Texas, or the Iberian Peninsula.²³ After Prussia militarily defeated Austria in 1866, the empire was divided into a dual monarchy through the Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867, which remained the constitutional basis of the multinational empire until its dissolution in 1918. The two parts of the empire

had separate parliaments and a significant degree of autonomy, even though foreign affairs, defense, and finance were common concerns. This peculiar arrangement cemented the hegemony of the most powerful nation within each part, respectively the Austro-Germans and the Magyars (Hungarians). The main compromise was followed by minor "compromises" between different ethnic and national communities and some unusual class alliances to protect local interests. These compromises resulted in a complicated mosaic of group coalitions, which, according to Bauer, amounted to an understanding among the ruling classes of the large nations (Germans, Magyars, Poles, Croats) that maintained their advantage over the mass of their disenfranchised fellow nationals and the newer nations—Czechs, Slovenes, and Ukrainians in Austria and Slovaks, Serbs, and Romanians in Hungary. Although the Austro-Germans and the Magyars were the most numerous national communities in their respective parts of the Empire, by no means did either constitute the majority of the population in its half.²⁴

As the Austro-German rulers needed a working majority in parliament, they granted to the Polish nobility administrative autonomy, which included important linguistic rights and which alienated the other minorities. This concession to the Poles antagonized the Czech nationalist leadership in particular, because the main demand of their movement was to recover for Bohemia the status of a historical kingdom with a significant degree of autonomy. The parliamentary coalition between the Austro-Germans and the Poles effectively neutralized the political influence of the Czech deputies. In Bohemia, the part of the empire that the Czech nationalists considered Czech, there was a significant German-speaking minority. At the same time, the process of differential development fueled migration within the empire, and many Czechs resided outside the historical boundaries of Bohemia. This situation resulted in the Czech nationalists' resenting the German presence in Bohemia and Pan-Germanic nationalists' resenting the presence of Czechs in the German part of the empire. The Czech nationalists often blocked legislation in the Austrian parliament, and the Pan-Germans were equally bent on obstructing the provincial diet in Prague.²⁵

In Vienna, the changes due to internal migration were dramatic. The population of the capital increased more than four times in fifty-three years. With the migration of peoples from all four corners of the empire, Vienna was converted into a lively and cosmopolitan city, much like London, New York, Sydney, and Toronto today. The city experienced a level of intellectual and artistic development not often equaled in the history of European culture. One need only recall the names of Strauss, Schoenberg, and Mahler in music, Gustav Klimt and Oskar Kokoschka in painting, Otto Wagner and Adolf Loos in architecture and town planning, Stefan Zweig and Robert Musil in literature, and Sigmund Freud in psychiatry. But turn-of-the-century Vienna also witnessed the erosion of the values that had paved the way for

this extraordinary cultural renaissance. The development of the multiethnic and multicultural environment that made this cultural and intellectual development possible was deeply resented by conservative Pan-Germans. This resentment generated protracted controversies over schools' instructing in languages other than German (particularly Czech), bilingual notices, and place names. Victor Adler, the veteran socialist leader and founding member of the Socialist Party, was moved to say that in Austria, the question of the names of railway stations had become one of principle of the most important kind.²⁶

The Austrian Socialist Party was one of the very few multinational organizations in Austria at the turn of the century that more or less survived intact the tense atmosphere of ethnic and national confrontation. To avoid the ever-present threat of ethnic and national disintegration, the Austrian socialists had to invest considerable intellectual and political effort in overcoming national and ethnic mistrust. This was done first within the framework of the Socialist Party, and subsequently by drafting programmatic proposals that attempted to maintain the unity of the Austrian state while giving maximum institutional, political, and cultural recognition to national and ethnic diversity. The problem has a clear contemporary resonance, and the protocols of several congresses of the Socialist Party not only make fascinating reading, but also prove how little we have advanced in the last hundred years on the question of ethnic and national minority representation. For example, the main themes of the contemporary debate initiated by Charles Taylor's seminal work on the politics of recognition are already present in the protocols of the convention of the Austrian Socialist Party in the Moravian city of Brno (Brünn) in 1899.²⁷ For many delegates to the Socialist convention, the recognition of the equal value of minority cultures in the public domain was a key political demand, something that later became the central theme of Taylor's seminal piece. The objections these delegates encountered were surprisingly similar to the objections to Taylor's important essay.²⁸

In comparing this debate with contemporary discussions on nationalism, Fred Halliday concludes that contemporary debates have not only not advanced the subject, but, on the contrary, gone backward.²⁹ Whatever one thinks of the present state of the study of nationalism, the study of late Habsburg history can help us understand the difficult relationship between ethnic and national identity, how to secure multi-nation-state identities, ethnic politics, ethnicity, and political democracy. All these issues have not lost their contemporary significance.

The work of Bauer and Renner, then, must be understood against the backdrop of this very pressing problem for the Austrian Socialists. In the German-speaking areas of Austria, the socialist movement grew out of the *Arbeiterbildungsvereine*, or societies for the cultural improvement of the working class. This characteristic of the embryonic socialist movement had, according to Rabinbach, a profound impact on the subsequent development

of the party, since it never abandoned its pedagogical and educational role.³⁰ As will be explained later, the present book was published as part of a series designed to educate the Austrian working class on the problems of the day, even though the work is often written in abstract theoretical language.

The process of rapid industrialization in Austria and the growing urban working class provided the conditions for the emergence of the socialist movement, which was from the beginning deeply affected by national divisions. Several socialist organizations emerged among Czech and other non-German communities, but these initially remained independent and suspicious of the German socialist organization. Finally, in 1889, thanks to the intense efforts of Viktor Adler the socialists became a single organization, initially named the “All-Austrian” (*Gesamtösterreichische*) Socialist Party and later referred to as the “Gesamtpartei” (whole party).³¹ The name was carefully chosen to suggest the multinational character of the organization. Bauer repeatedly referred to the party by this name. The distinguished historian of Austria, Robert Kann, argues that this is the only example in Austrian history of the emergence of a major political party that came into existence beyond national loyalties.³² The Socialist Party became an important parliamentary force after the abolition of restrictive ordinances and the establishment of universal male suffrage in 1907.³³

However, the party had to come to terms with complex ethnonational divisions within its ranks. For example, Czech Socialists resented the high profile of the Germans within the party and demanded the establishment of their own trade union commission.³⁴ In these circumstances, party cadres recognized that the resolution of the national question could not be postponed until “the victory of the working class” and that there was a need to clearly establish the position and program of the party in relation to this question.³⁵ Here something interesting occurred that again has contemporary echoes. The difficult problem of nationalities in late imperial Austria impelled the Socialist Party to relinquish the simplistic and misleading formulae that prevailed in most turn-of-the-century socialist parties. The slogan simply stated that “the advent of socialism will resolve the national question.” The Austrian Socialists were obliged to evaluate and assess difficult questions of minority rights and ethnic political representation in detail and were compelled to adopt more nuanced positions that displayed greater sensitivity to national demands.

This issue underlies similar debates within contemporary liberalism. In the same way as doctrinaire socialists of the Second International were dismissive of national and ethnic identities in their struggle for social emancipation, so are doctrinaire liberals (Rawls and Habermas, for example), contemporary and not so contemporary, in Taylor’s words, inhospitable to ethnic difference in their normative assertion of individual freedom.³⁶ Much in the same way as a new generation of liberal thinkers is affronted by the inability

of the liberal tradition to politically recognize and accommodate ethnic diversity, a group of Austrian socialists was affronted by the inability of the socialist tradition to politically recognize and accommodate ethnic and national diversity. Much in the same way as Will Kymlicka argues today that the liberal idea of “benign neglect” of minority cultures is not benign, but incoherent, and reflects a shallow understanding of the relation between states and nations, Bauer and Renner criticized the well-established socialist truth that the nation-state is a necessary and unavoidable stage in the development of the socialist revolution and that minorities should assimilate and embrace democracy as compensation.³⁷

In 1897 the biennial congress of the *Gesamtpartei* was held in the Wimberg Hotel in Vienna. Following Czech demands, the party decided to transform itself into a federative organization of six national parties (Ukrainian, Czech, Polish, German, Italian, and Slovene) with a common executive committee.³⁸ This new organizational arrangement gave way to an intense and prolonged discussion of theory and strategy in regard to the question of nationalities, which culminated two years later in the historic 1899 congress in the Moravian city of Brno (Brünn). The peculiarity of the Austrian Socialist Party was that deep-rooted national confrontations within the dual monarchy and their paralyzing impact on Austro-Hungarian political life, as well as the profound impact of nationalist ideals on large sections of the socialist rank and file, forced the leadership to move beyond the “traditional” socialist terrain of the political dimension of the class struggle and into the national arena, which represented a hitherto unexplored issue in both theoretical and political terms. This was a step taken reluctantly, judging from the utterances of many leading Austrian socialists, including Bauer. There was a kind of impatience, almost an angry reaction to their “bad fortune” in comparison to the fate of other “more fortunate” socialist parties, particularly in Germany. The Austrian Socialists deeply resented the fact that they were obliged to devote their precious intellectual and revolutionary energies to a problem that, as they saw it, had little to do with the stated goals of working-class politics.³⁹

There is a profound irony in this situation. From the Austrian Socialist Party’s reluctant engagement in an intellectual and political debate with nationalism and from its no less reluctant but concerted effort to come to grips with nationalism and ethnic diversity, a theoretical and political analysis of unparalleled sophistication emerged. The political nightmare of the national struggles in the collapsing dual monarchy resulted in some of the most sophisticated discussions of nationalism and ethnicity ever produced in the socialist tradition. This situation was not the result of unqualified support for the national causes, as the Bolshevik detractors were quick to argue; there was, in fact, no love lost between the Austrian Socialists and nationalist movements. It was rather the case that the Socialist Party of Austria (*Gesamtpartei*) realized that without tackling the national question head on, without

developing a thorough political and intellectual understanding of the national phenomenon—an understanding that was so conspicuously absent in the classical Marxist tradition—it would be condemned to political paralysis and oblivion in the face of the rising tide of nationalism.⁴⁰

Here again one encounters parallels with the contemporary liberal debate. It is the challenge to classical liberalism of the politics of difference and the inability of classical liberalism to respond to the challenge that has pushed Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, Will Kymlicka, and Yael Tamir to question the alleged “procedural neutrality” of liberalism and its “benign neglect” of ethnic questions. Like Bauer and Renner in relation to Marxism, they aim to make liberalism more sensitive to ethnic and national diversity, and, like Bauer and Renner in relation to Marxism a century ago, they have been strenuously rebuked by doctrinaires. In both the case of Bauer and Renner and that of these contemporary theorists, the development of these ideas involves a confrontation with the conceptual limits of Marxism and Liberalism, respectively. And in both cases, the attempt to break out of normative straitjackets results in an original and sophisticated discussion of nationalism and ethnicity.

A few years after the Brno Congress, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner were recognized as the leading Austrian socialist theoreticians on the national question and nationalism. Bauer’s theoretical stance was perceived to be located on the “left” of the Socialist Party, whereas Renner was seen as a spokesman of its “right” wing. Although the accuracy of such demarcation may be open to question, it is certainly true that the two men did not see eye to eye on a number of key political issues, including those relating to their understanding of nationhood. However, despite their conceptual differences, they complemented each other very well in the discussion of the national question, even if, as Marramao argues, Bauer’s “constructivist” definition of the nation as a community of fate has to be contrasted with Renner’s understanding of the nation as a juridical subject.⁴¹ Renner was first and foremost a constitutional jurist, whereas Bauer’s main strength lay in his ability to grasp the theoretical implications of a wide range of issues.⁴² It was Renner who first sketched the concept of national cultural autonomy. Bauer then adopted this concept and integrated it into his sophisticated theoretical discussion of national formation (discussed later in this introduction), arriving at an ingenious and coherent model that drew on the ideas of both men in spite of their alleged differences.

THE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE VERSUS THE CENTRALIST-ATOMIST MODEL

The model for nonterritorial national cultural autonomy is rarely discussed nowadays. As Coakley argues in a very informative article, it is often wrongly

associated with premodern and sometimes racist models of political organization.⁴³ The model of cultural-national autonomy proposed by Bauer and Renner dispels this erroneous interpretation. It is based on the premise that ethnic and national communities can be organized as autonomous units in multinational states without considering residential location.

The singularity of this model can be understood when contrasted to most other theories of national autonomy. In most conventional theories, national autonomy requires a territorial base for the autonomous national community, or at least the intention to build some kind of “autonomous homeland” that will serve as the territorial base. Bauer and Renner’s theory, however, rests on the idea of “nonterritorial national autonomy.” This means that autonomous communities are organized as sovereign collectives, whatever their residential locations within a multinational state. As in the millet system in the Ottoman Empire, peoples of different ethnic identities can coexist in the same territory without straining the principle of national autonomy. The crucial difference of Bauer and Renner’s system from the millet system is, however, that the autonomous communities are organized democratically and are based on individual consent to belong and on internal democracy. The analogy used by Renner was that of religious communities. Much in the same way as Catholics, Protestants, and Jews could coexist in the same city, Renner argued, so members of different national communities could coexist with their own distinct institutions and national organizations, provided they did not claim territorial exclusivity. The model of national-cultural autonomy acknowledges that national communities require recognition of their specificity and difference in the public domain, and this is achieved through the existence of legally guaranteed autonomous and sovereign corporations. Unlike more conventional forms of autonomy and self-determination, it rejects the idea of ethnically or nationally exclusive control over territory.⁴⁴

Bauer and Renner agreed that the central issue was how to convert a decaying empire of squabbling national communities into a democratic federation of national communities. In their view the solution lay in the model of national-cultural nonterritorial autonomy, or the “personality principle.” The term is derived from the work of the leading German historian Friedrich Meinecke, who was influential in shaping Renner’s ideas. In his work *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (Cosmopolitanism and the national state), he criticized the notion of the sovereign state as the embodiment of ethical values and of *realpolitik* as justifying the breaking of moral laws. Renner specifically cited Meinecke when he argued that “personality is not only the highest form of autonomy, but that it is also the highest level of personal autarky and the harmonic unity of all forces and qualities.”⁴⁵ Drawing on Meinecke, Renner called the system he envisaged the “personality principle” because it referred to the widest personal choice of its members to partake in a particular national association.⁴⁶ This system was contrasted by Renner with the

“territorial principle,” which is characteristic of the modern nation-state. The territorial principle is described by Renner in the following way: “If you live in my territory you are subjected to my domination, my law and my language.”⁴⁷ This, according to Renner, suggests domination and not equality of rights. It suggests the dominance of the ethnic majority over the ethnic minority, the dominance of settled populations over immigrants, the dominance of settlers over indigenous peoples.

The model proposed by Renner and Bauer is well suited to minorities that demand significant autonomy but for a variety of reasons cannot have separate states. A prime example of such minorities are indigenous peoples in liberal settler societies. Indigenous groups rarely demand separate nation-states. It is far more often the case that, faced with a state ultimately based on an alien and violent intrusion into their ancestral homelands—an intrusion that made them scattered minorities in the first place—indigenous peoples demand national autonomy and public recognition of their way of life. Renner’s proposal would certainly meet most if not all of their needs. This form of recognition of cultural rights enables different ethnic and national communities to have a form of organic sovereignty and their identity publicly acknowledged and affirmed in the basic institutions of the state. In an argument that closely resembles Bauer and Renner’s ideas, James Tully argues that the political recognition of diversity is one of the most important ways to ensure constitutional allegiance in culturally diverse states.⁴⁸

Over a hundred years after this principle was first discussed, the issue has not gone away. On the contrary, the contemporary revival of the politics of difference invites further debate on the topic. The question of recognition and autonomy is today central to key debates on minority rights, but unfortunately Renner and Bauer’s arguments concerning national-cultural autonomy are conspicuously absent from the discussion. It is hoped that this translation will facilitate access to these arguments and give contemporary liberal thinkers a greater opportunity to seriously engage with the challenge presented by these thought-provoking ideas.

Renner was fond of comparing ethnic conflict with the religious wars that plagued early modern Europe, when absolutist German states imposed a particular religion on its subjects in the wake of the Peace of Augsburg. Here the organizational principle *cuius regio illius religio* (in such region that religion, or who governs the territory decides its religion) decided religious beliefs and led to countless wars. This problem was settled, according to Renner, when religion was separated from territorial sovereignty and the right of religious groups to coexist side by side became the norm. In the modern nation-state, however, Renner argues, the organizational principle is *cuius regio illius lingua* (in such region that languages, or who governs the territory decides the language). The personality principle, according to Renner, would separate the

question of governance from the issue of protecting national and cultural identities, just as religious freedom separated church from state.

The model of national autonomy proposed by Renner requires that all citizens declare their nationality when they reach voting age. Members of each national community, whatever their territory of residence, would form a single public body or association endowed with legal personality and sovereignty and competent to deal with all national-cultural affairs. For example, these corporations would organize the educational systems of their members, as well as the legal systems, and would decide on all other issues that are national in character.⁴⁹ The idea here is to eliminate competition between national communities by ensuring a strict separation of competences. Renner and Bauer do not clarify, however, how the model would deal with issues that concern bilateral relations between national communities and how litigation would be dealt with in the case of parties belonging to different national communities. There are also many ethnic or national communities that do not wish such a broad range of autonomous competences, but may wish to exercise only a few of them. The problems are not insurmountable, but require a careful balance of different cultural and political priorities and criteria. This model is based on the premise that the most controversial issues in the relationship between ethnic and national groups are issues concerning language, education, and the recognition of cultural rights in the public domain. Here networks of communication across cultural boundaries are crucial because the model recognizes both communities and individuals as legitimate interlocutors. Change is a constant feature of cultural practices. A continuous dialogue within and between communities and between individuals of different communities is the only way to secure and formalize a negotiated public space across community boundaries.⁵⁰ However, political struggle must also recognize continued differences of interest and positioning within and between communities; otherwise any notion of solidarity will be inherently racist, sexist, or classist.⁵¹

In an interesting recent study on Bauer, Forman argues that Bauer's (and Renner's) position has deep roots in the liberal tradition that proposes the free association of persons as the basis for common social and political life.⁵² However, the national-cultural autonomy model is controversial, not because of its conventional radicalism (many Catholic-conservative politicians in Austria supported this model even if it was originally conceived by socialist thinkers), but because it calls into question the main assumptions of the contemporary world of nation-states. Forman calls the model "complex and counterintuitive."⁵³ The "intuitive" assumptions challenged by Bauer and Renner are that sovereignty is unitary and indivisible, that self-determination of nations requires the constitution of separate nation-states, and that nation-states are the only recognized international players. On the other hand, the model addresses a key weakness of other models of territorial autonomy:

national territorial boundaries always create minorities and propensities for ethnic discrimination. Contemporary Western European experience shows that, in a world of migration and differential development, territorial boundaries are porous, and population movements tend to upset neat schemes for fortress states. This situation inevitably results in ethnic and national minorities' constituting unwelcome pockets in any autonomous or sovereign territories. The second advantage of the model is that it does away altogether with the idea of national minorities and the need for specific minority protection. As argued earlier, the status of national minorities is the by-product of a national state that has a sovereign national majority. In Bauer and Renner's model, even if a citizen inhabits a territory where the majority belongs to a different national group, on questions of national and ethnic interest citizens of different ethnicity he or she is not subject to the cultural practices of the majority, but can rely on citizen's own transterritorial national organization, which has the status of a public corporation with sovereign areas of competence.⁵⁴ This is an important advantage of the Bauer-Renner model over contemporary liberal theories, as it obviates the need to pursue complex and invidious discussions on the rights and wrongs of minority communities and, more important, it obviates the need for patronizing and controversial special cases.

Some social democratic groups among national minorities in pre-Soviet Russia adopted the model for national-cultural autonomy. The most prominent of these was the Jewish Bund, and the intellectual leader of the party, Vladimir Medem, articulated the relevant principles. This issue contradicted Bolshevik policy on state centralization and led to concerted attacks by Lenin and the nationalities commissar—a young Georgian by the name of Joseph Stalin—on Medem, Bauer, and Renner.⁵⁵ Bauer, however, in contradiction to his theoretical stance, enigmatically advocated Jewish assimilation (see the section in chapter 4 headed "National Autonomy for the Jews?"). Bauer attributed the persistence of a Yiddish-Jewish national community in Eastern Europe to the relative "underdevelopment" of that part of the world, particularly when compared with Western Europe, where Jews no longer constituted a national community because they had lost a common language and therefore had in many cases become "assimilated" through a greater interactive relationship with the national communities with which they lived. Although Bauer's description of the differences between Eastern and Western European Jews is correct, it does not follow, particularly in view of his own insightful conceptualization, that the Yiddish-speaking Eastern European Jews should, in theory, experience the same developmental path as the Western Jews and cease to be a national community. This characterization of Jewish national life in Eastern Europe should, of course, be carefully confined to the geographical area and the period under consideration. To include the predominately urban Jewish communities of Central and Western Europe—let alone

Jews from other parts of the world with vastly different ethnic and national backgrounds—in a single national community represents a transcendentalist equivocation of the process of national development. This equivocation is, in essence, the Zionist position.

THE CENTRALIST-ATOMIST PRINCIPLE AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM

The work of Renner contains a very interesting and powerful critique of the contemporary notion of liberal democratic sovereignty, one that certainly echoes and complements contemporary debates about national sovereignty and minority rights. This critique was adopted by Bauer, who argued that the liberal democratic state is organized according to the “centralist-atomist” principle. The centralizing principle was initially developed by the absolutist state, and the progressive centralization of the state that followed had the effect of reducing society to its smallest parts, in Bauer’s words, atoms—that is, to single individuals. Bauer then argued that this idea was inherited by liberalism and taken by it to its logical conclusion. Following its victory, liberalism swept away the last remnants of ancient autonomous associations of individuals. According to Bauer, in this respect there was no difference between Rousseau and Hobbes. The state and society in contemporary states are all-embracing centralized totalities. In liberal democracies, there are two recognized politico-juridical entities. One is the individual, and the other is the sovereign will of the undivided collective. This is what Bauer and Renner called the centralist-atomist structure of modern nation-states. This totalizing tendency fails to acknowledge important and meaningful intermediate locations, such as the ones occupied by ethnic and national minorities.

The atomist approach easily relates to the Western idea of the democratic nation-state. The inhabitants of the state are nationally identified with the state through habitation and citizenship, irrespective of ethnic affiliations. States are thus seen as nation-states whether they are ethnically homogeneous or not.⁵⁶ In the liberal nation-state the cultural practice of the dominant nation (the official ethnicity of the state) is disguised by a procedural practice that claims neutrality but is derived from the cultural experiences of the dominant national community. Furthermore, a liberal view of culture is by definition grounded in liberal theory and cannot avoid seeing every culture from a liberal angle. This creates, in most cases, serious distortions.⁵⁷ This is why in liberal democracies multiculturalism is always limited by the hegemony of the dominant nation, and why contemporary liberal theories find it very difficult, if not impossible, to construct a multiethnic and multinational state out of the practice of liberal democracy. As Parekh perceptively argued in another context, the liberal response to the cultural pluralism of nation-states does little more than carve out a precarious area of diversity on

the margins of a predominantly assimilationist structure.⁵⁸ Atomist states, however much consideration they might show for individual democratic rights and however equalitarian their practices, are by definition adverse to recognizing intermediate and constitutionally enshrined entities.⁵⁹ On this subject, the liberal silence is deafening. It is understandable, however, why defenders of liberal nationalism have ignored this issue; it puts them in a major bind. If liberal nationalists consider that it is desirable for states to be nation-states, a multination state faces two ugly options: to split the state along national lines or to enable the larger national group to assimilate the weaker ones.⁶⁰ Both strategies have been tried in the West with equally catastrophic results.

The example from Quebec explored in Charles Taylor's seminal essay clarifies the problem.⁶¹ Here the issue is Quebec's government directive that compels children of French speakers and immigrants to study in French schools. If Quebec was a nation-state, it would have been seen as normal to compel citizens to study in the "national" language (French) in much the same way as Anglo-Canadian citizens study in English and citizens of the French Republic study in French. Here there is no violation of the liberal principle. Procedural equality is established within the framework of the dominant culture of the nation-state. If, however, the *autonomous* Quebec government compels migrants and Francophone citizens to study in French, at the very least there is considerable discussion as to whether this violates individual rights. What the nation-state does as a matter of fact is perceived as a violation of human rights if carried out by an autonomous national government within a larger state. The discriminatory absurdity of the centralist-atomist principle is thus shown. Because of the paralyzing effect of the centralist-atomist principle, the liberal democratic nation-state is caught in a theoretical dilemma; how should it adapt to national and ethnic minority demands for differential rights while sustaining the principle of procedural equality of rights and obligations for all citizens?

Bauer also argued that in a federal state where the territorial principle is consistently implemented, the centralist-atomist organizational model also applies. National minorities can ensure satisfaction of their cultural needs only if they gain power in the legislative and administrative branches of the province or state. However, they are always excluded from power precisely because they are minorities (otherwise the principle of majority rule would not apply). The territorial principle *exaggerates* the significance of ethnic diversity and assumes the eventual assimilation of minorities. From this Bauer concluded that if the territorial principle is applied consistently, minorities will be at the mercy of the majority, with all the ambiguities that the idea of toleration implies.

The condition of being an ethnic or national minority is dependent on the presumption that sovereign national or ethnic majorities rule nation-

states. Without this comparative referent, the proper name *minority* is meaningless. Equally, the term *minorities* has a numerical referent that confuses the issue, for the key difference is cultural, not numerical.⁶² National (and ethnic) minorities are collectivities that possess attributes of nationhood, but do not possess an independent state.⁶³ Often the same principle that legitimizes the existing nation-state, the principle of self-determination, is then used by disaffected minorities to demand a state where they could become a majority. Thus, many contemporary nation-states are threatened with dismemberment by the very same principle that sustains their claim to independent existence. Often it is not practical or possible to dismember existing national states, or, where this might at least be considered, the territorial mix of populations makes it impossible for disaffected minorities to build territorial states that will enable them to become majorities. Under these circumstances, the principle of national autonomy can provide political recognition for the demand of cultural-national and ethnic minority groups for self-determination. To counteract the damaging effects of the centralist-atomist principle, Bauer and Renner suggest a careful decentralization of state sovereignty, one that leads to the juridical implementation of the “personality principle.”

In tackling the complicated problem of nationalities, Austrian Socialism prepared the ground for the development of a theory of the nation in the work of Otto Bauer—a theory of the nation that transcended the political and intellectual limitations of the immediate circumstances of the decaying Habsburg monarchy to become a key Marxist contribution to the understanding of nationalism and one of the most accomplished contributions to the general theoretical discussion of nationalism. As Bauer pointed out in his introduction, the difficulty of explaining nationalism with the conceptual tools provided by nineteenth-century Marxism, compelled him to break with the accepted Marxist doctrine on the national question. In his own words, the problem required venturing “beyond our narrow disciplinary boundaries.” A significant influence here was the then-emerging “Austro-Marxist” tradition and its debate with neo-Kantianism.

THE IMPACT OF AUSTRO-MARXISM

The North American socialist Louis Boudin first coined the term “Austro-Marxism,” and Bauer located the emergence of the Austro-Marxist tradition in the response developed by a young generation of intellectuals and political activists to the theoretical criticism of classical Marxism in Austria around the turn of the twentieth century.⁶⁴ Austro-Marxism must not be confused with the ideology of the Austrian Socialist Party (*Gesamtpartei*). After the death of Friederich Engels, the most respected figure in the Marxist movement was Karl Kautsky. His orthodox interpretation of Marxism shaped the position of socialist parties of the period, including that of the Austrian

party.⁶⁵ The emergence of Austro-Marxism as a distinct intellectual approach was in part a generational reaction against Kautsky's orthodoxy, in part a critical reaction to Bernstein's revisionism and the intellectual critique of orthodox Marxism formulated by the neo-Kantian "ethical socialists" of the Marburg School. It was also a response to the criticism of Marxist economic theory coming from the Viennese "marginalist school" of economics. The leading Austro-Marxists began their political life in the socialist student movement based at the University of Vienna. They subsequently affiliated with the *Gesamtpartei* and operated as an influential theoretical and political group within it until World War I.⁶⁶ Bauer described the group as a "group of young Austrian comrades active in scholarly research," adding that they "were united not so much by a specific political orientation as by the particular nature of their scholarly work." In debating the ideas and coming to terms with the impact of the humanism of the neo-Kantian tradition, Bauer further argued that they had to "apply the Marxist conception of history to very complicated phenomena that defied analysis by any superficial or schematic application of the Marxist method."⁶⁷ One of these phenomena was nationalism, the most burning political issue of the period.

Here again, and in spite of the considerable difference in circumstances, there are interesting parallels that can be drawn with contemporary debates in the liberal tradition. What Walzer calls "liberalism two" and Taylor defines as his version of a liberalism that is "hospitable" to difference are in fact criticisms of traditional liberal orthodoxy (liberalism one), which, in Walzer's opinion, is committed in the strongest possible way to individual rights and to a rigorously neutral state.⁶⁸ What Walzer and Taylor are saying, and Kymlicka puts even more emphatically, is that the prevailing liberal orthodoxy cannot explain or accommodate the political exercise of difference and that the liberal tradition must be reworked to accommodate the political expression of minority cultures. This is, *mutatis mutandis*, what the Austro-Marxists were saying in relation to orthodox Marxism and what Bauer set out to do *specifically* in the work introduced here.

In 1903 Max Adler and other members of the Austro-Marxist group formed—in the educational tradition of the Austrian Socialist Party—the *Zukunft-Verein*, an educational academy for workers. In 1907 Bauer and Renner founded the journal *Der Kampf* to give expression to the innovative views of the group. The publication of *Der Kampf* also denotes a political and theoretical distancing from the editorial policies of Kautsky and the more orthodox *Neue Zeit*, since all members of the group had been regular contributors to that journal. This distancing was later reflected in Kautsky's polemics with Bauer over the national question. But above all, it was in the *Marx-Studien* series, edited by Max Adler and Rudolf Hilferding, that the most influential works for the theoretical development of Marxism were published.⁶⁹ Volume 1 contained Max Adler's *Causality and Teleology* and Karl Renner's

Social Functions of Juridical Institutions, volume 2 Otto Bauer's *The Question of Nationalities*, volume 3 Hilferding's *Finance Capital*, and volume 4 Max Adler's *The Marxist Conceptualization of the State*.⁷⁰

Austro-Marxism attempted to engage in a serious debate with non-Marxist political and philosophical schools, such as the Austrian marginalist school of economics and the neo-Kantian philosophical tradition. It also rejected the dichotomy of reform or revolution as exhausting all categories of political activity. Many discussions of Austro-Marxism understand its intellectual heritage as building a strategy of a "third way" between Social Democracy and Marxist-Leninism.⁷¹

BAUER'S THEORY OF THE NATION

Bauer's theoretical analysis of the nation is rich, complex, and full of ideas that invite detailed discussion. Since it is impossible to do the work as a whole justice here, I shall instead review some of the most salient arguments in what is necessarily a selective and abbreviated discussion. This review quite consciously downplays the Marxist dimension of Bauer's ideas. This is not because this aspect was not important to Bauer or that I wish to pass over in silence the democratic socialist elements of Bauer's work. On the contrary, when writing the book its author saw it as above all a contribution to a Marxist educational enterprise and a Marxist debate. Indeed, *The Question of Nationalities* generated the most comprehensive polemic on nations and nationalism ever witnessed in the Marxist tradition. However, orthodox and dogmatic Marxists criticized Bauer severely. Lenin specifically commissioned the only book written by Stalin to discredit Bauer's ideas.⁷² In a recently published book, the Trotskyite writer Michel Löwy repents his earlier severe criticism of Bauer. Although the Marxist debate and the polemical intellectual context in which Bauer wrote his work has very considerable historical value, it has little relevance to contemporary discussions on nationalism and political theory, and it will be ignored here.⁷³

As Ananiadis argues in a fine and unfortunately unpublished work, the bulk of Bauer's book consists of a theoretically informed set of historical analyses.⁷⁴ The aim of the work is to concretely develop a number of theoretical and historical arguments that implicitly validate the multinational state as a superior form of political organization. In the struggle of nationalities for supremacy in late imperial Austria, Bauer estimated that there could be no winners, and that without some form of political recognition of the sovereign rights of the various national communities of the empire, the state would be condemned to constant paralysis or worse.⁷⁵

Also of significance here is the fact that the vibrant milieu of late imperial Vienna was at the forefront of the intellectual and philosophical debate of the period, and the young Bauer was exposed to lively philosophical and political

debates that cut across the boundaries of established theories and disciplines. One such debate was that between Austro-Marxism and neo-Kantianism. This debate was decisive in generating the analytical categories that permitted Bauer to achieve his original conceptualization of the nation. At the center of Bauer's argument was a clear distinction between nation and state and a refusal to support the model of the nation-state as a solution to national conflicts. This view was highly unusual for his period. Given that today we are seeing a renewed challenge to the legitimacy of the institution of the nation-state, it may well be worthwhile to reconsider Bauer's forgotten work.

Max Adler's *Causality and Teleology*, the first volume of the *Marx-Studien* series, was centered around an epistemological debate with neo-Kantians and was crucial in shaping Bauer's view of nationalism.⁷⁶ To contextualize Bauer's theoretical arguments, it is necessary to briefly sketch Adler's critique of neo-Kantianism.⁷⁷

In defending his argument about the irreducibility of the forms of the social, Adler argued that an "absolute prerequisite" in conceptualizing "man's existence, preservation, and development" is the existence of a human community.⁷⁸ Adler's concepts of "socialized humanity" and "social association" are to be understood in the neo-Kantian fashion as being "transcendentally given as a category of knowledge."⁷⁹ The neo-Kantian distinction between *is* and *ought* was refuted by Adler through a strict reference to relations of causality, thereby rejecting any teleological inference. The "iron laws of necessity" of classical Marxism were also rejected using the same logic, because they postulate unacceptable forms of metaphysical essentialism. Adler believed that relations of causality are to be identified by way of what we today recognize as a strict "deconstruction" of social phenomena and not through ontologically privileged relations of determination.⁸⁰

Adler's *Causality and Teleology* engaged with the neo-Kantians of the Marburg and Baden Schools as well as the orthodoxy of classical Marxism. Following the demise of orthodox Marxism in its various forms, the second point has only historical value and is not discussed here. Adler criticized the idealist transcendentalism of the neo-Kantians by sustaining the nonreducible specificity of social processes. He argued that the fundamental neo-Kantian concepts of "truth" and "value" are meaningless outside an "a priori" socialized existence.

In his debate with neo-Kantians of the Marburg and Baden Schools, Adler contended that every essentialist definition of the social arena, be it "materialist" or "spiritual," is arbitrary and teleological, because neither "matter" nor "spirit" in themselves can be known outside the realm of socialized experience. In a direct rebuff to neo-Kantianism, Adler argued that experience is not an "a priori," because it is unthinkable outside socialized existence and is therefore "causally dependent" on social relations. Adler turned the neo-Kantian accusation of Marxism as "philosophical monism" against the neo-

Kantians themselves by maintaining that they fell into the very forms of essentialism they criticized in Marxism when they tried to separate the problem of “objective validity” from the “reality of experience.”

Adler saw social experience as a condition of human existence because it is based on a form of human cognitive capacity, the “formal existence” of which is not amenable to causal explanations. A nonsocialized individuality is meaningless because individuals always require social referents to assume autonomous existence. “Forms of individuality” are inherent to the “form of the social,” and the formal relation between the two cannot be deduced causally, in the same way that no causal explanations can clarify general notions of time and space.⁸¹ In the analysis of the social arena, the point of departure for Adler was neither “abstract individuals” nor “society,” which he considered “empty abstractions,” but what he called “socialized men”; here we see the idea that the basis for all socialization is to be found in “individual consciousness.”⁸² Adler thought that if human consciousness manifests itself only in the I-form, this implies that consciousness as such is not-I. The totalizing effect of consciousness in general is possible only through this self-conscious difference in consciousness. It is the bifurcation between the I and content that encounters the I as an object.⁸³

It was from Adler’s *Causality and Teleology* that Bauer derived the notion of the irreducibility of the forms of the social. Bauer argued that the process of common reciprocal interaction lived in a permanent reciprocal relation generates a national community and expresses itself in an intersubjective bond that shapes each “individual national identity.” Bauer’s purpose in embarking on his detailed analytical discussion was to try to understand the national community as a discrete unity, one that results from a complex and multidimensional ensemble of social forces. His aim was to elaborate a theory that he believed could be argued from a Marxist standpoint and was capable of comprehending nations as a dynamic process of transformation and continuous change.⁸⁴ In Mommsen’s view, the most innovative aspect of Bauer’s analysis lay in the attempt to develop an analytically sensitive and politically practicable theory of the national question, a theory that Bauer himself characterized as a “social morphology” (*soziale Formenlehre*).⁸⁵

Otto Bauer attempted to explain national characteristics and differences as resulting from complex processes of differentiation and integration of cultures. The nation is considered by doctrinaire Marxists and rational liberal individualists as illusory and by doctrinaire nationalists as natural. Bauer wished to dispel both misinterpretations by regarding nations and ethnic groups as historical and social constructs.⁸⁶ He argued against those liberals and Marxists who are insensitive and inhospitable to the politics of difference, meanwhile polemizing with equal vigor against nationalists and ethnicists who see nations and ethnic groups as essentialized and primordial.

Bauer began from what he considered to be the “concrete expression” of

the existence of the national community in each individual member of the nation. This is what he called the "national character." The concept of national character does not, according to Bauer, exhaust all the possibilities of grouping human beings. Besides national characteristics, all human beings share an awareness of being human and belong to classes, professional groups, interest groups, oppressed groups, and so on. All have common characteristics that transcend national differences. He also argued, in the spirit of Marxism, that ties of solidarity unite workers from different nations, but he carefully differentiated this solidarity from the concept of "national character." Bauer believed that the question of cultural bonds between the working class and the bourgeoisie of any given nation is not connected with the question of the attitude of workers to their own bourgeoisie or to the workers of other national communities.

Bauer recognized that one of the main difficulties with the evasive concept of national character is that the term has been monopolized by ethnocentric and racialist theories, converting it into a metaphysical essence. To avoid what Bauer considered "transcendentalist distortions" in the usage of the concept of national character, he argued that it is always necessary to locate this notion in a historical perspective. National character has been ascribed a transcendental durability that, according to Bauer, must be refuted by historical evidence. Bauer understood national character as a historically modifiable characteristic that links members of a national community over a given historical period. What links one generation with another is not the handing down of an immutable national spirit, but the fact that contemporary generations do not operate in a vacuum; they enter a social arena shaped by the circumstances of previous generations. The national character can be *modified* by historical forces, but also by contemporary experiences, which can result in changes to the culture of the group. For this reason it cannot simply be referred to the experience of previous generations. The intersection of both dimensions, the historical and the contemporary, is the central ingredient in determining the present configuration of the national character. The national character, then, is a discrete unit of contemporary and historical forces, neither of which can be seen in isolation as a determinant factor, since both are always present in forming national identities.⁸⁷ An important misinterpretation of the idea of national character is that even explanations that accept the historical relativity of the term refer to it as a causal explanatory concept. Bauer claimed that when he described a national character he was not explaining the causes of given actions, but merely accounting for their characteristics.

National character is not the determining factor in national existence, but, on the contrary, the concrete, descriptive expression of the latter. It is not the point of departure for the analysis of the nexus of factors that link the national community, but the concrete expression of such a nexus. It is not an explanation, but the very element that must be explained. Communities of char-

acter do not constitute the cultural specificity of national communities, but are merely a concrete, empirical expression of the nation. Once these characteristics are identified, the task of trying to understand what constitutes a national community begins. Bauer thought that national character is always contextual.⁸⁸

One immediate problem is that Bauer did not show the difference between “national character” and what we call today ethnic or national identity. What Bauer referred to could be called a kind of “subjective selectivity,” but this is not an “identity” in the sense of a subjective positional definition. Bauer’s attempt to relativize “the national character” was not yet sufficient to explain its fluidity. It was also important to recognize the permanent unfixedness of relations between national existence, national identity, and national character and the likelihood of an autonomous configuration of the elements involved. This included the need to redefine the relation between the elements in a way that permits the development of an analytical logic that transcends the originally defined relations of causality.

So Bauer believed that the common national character is not what constitutes the national community, but only its concrete expression. The national character is one of the expressions of a “societalized” existence, the expression of the representation of “social reality” in each national subject. What marks a national community is that the identity of its members is constituted as the result of the same historical forces operating in each individual member of a given “society.”⁸⁹

Once the national character had been identified, Bauer argued that it must be explained in terms of the social and historical conditions that lead to its emergence. To do this Bauer narrowed the descriptiveness of the term by arguing that the national character is a determining factor in the sphere of what he calls “will” (*Wille*). For Bauer, will is exteriorized in every cognitive process through which subjects commonly perceive certain characteristics of a given observable phenomenon, attaching importance only to commonly perceived characteristics and ignoring or giving secondary importance to others. Will is the concrete expression in every subject of the “societalized” quality of human experience. This means that human subjectivity is constituted out of social forms of existence (interaction). In this sense, individuality is strictly unthinkable outside the social arena.

This is an interesting concept, rich in associations with Wittgenstein’s psychology and with the poststructuralist (Lacanian) notion of liminality. In interpreting Wittgenstein’s ideas on perception and interpretation, Budd argues that Wittgenstein believed that seeing an aspect is subject to the will, as an object can possess a number of aspects.⁹⁰ It is precisely because seeing an aspect, like forming an image, is subject to the will that it does not teach us something about the external world. This Wittgensteinian idea encapsulates with surprising accuracy Bauer’s idea of will as a cognitive process that is at

the center of his theory of the nation. For Wittgenstein, “seeing an aspect” is always a socialized reaction. This argument sits comfortably with Bauer’s idea that will is the societalized expression of human existence. Connolly, too, articulates a similar idea when he argues that in sharing culture we share, albeit variably and imperfectly, a set of preliminary understandings that infiltrate the structure of perception, judgment, and decision.⁹¹ Bhabha also argues that complex strategies of cultural identification and discursive address function in the name of the people or the nation and make them immanent subjects and objects of social narratives.⁹²

Bauer linked his idea of *Wille* with the Kantian notion of “apperception,” which implies the original unity of consciousness as a condition for all objective experience.⁹³ Yet there is here a transcendental dimension of consciousness that is precisely what Adler (and Bauer) criticized the neo-Kantians for. Adler and Bauer resolved the issue by strictly contextualizing apperception and making it the product of the historical circumstances of each society. Consequently, they historicized what was previously a transcendental Kantian concept. Here, then, *Wille*, or “national apperception,” was seen as a liminal volitive orientation that is conditioned by the historical circumstances of every national community. Ananiadis also suggests that Bauer’s use of the notion of national apperception was related to the psychological theories of Johann Friedrich Herbart. Herbart thought that apperception is “the process by which a new experience is assimilated and transformed by the residuum of past experiences of an individual to form a new whole.”⁹⁴ This idea may well provide the link between Bauer and Wittgenstein’s psychology, as Herbart was influential in the Viennese University milieu that nourished both Wittgenstein and Bauer. There is also in Bauer’s work a curious anticipation of contemporary arguments about “hybridity” and the “third space.”⁹⁵ While discussing the case of an individual that participates in two or more nations to an equal degree, Bauer argued that such individuals do not completely belong to any nation, but are an “in-between” category. This is because these individuals not only possess the culture of two or more nations, but are something distinct—“cultural hybrids,” as it were. Bauer further warned the reader not to be misled by the aversion to such individuals, because often individuals of the greatest stature, including scholars such as Karl Marx and great artists, have been impacted by the cultural spheres of several nations. The argument was not, unfortunately, developed any further.

Once the definition of the sphere of “will” had been established, Bauer proceeded to conceptualize the notion of “national character” in a less descriptive manner. The notion that the national character is the set of physical and spiritual dispositions that characterize conationals was then enlarged by the idea that the mechanism that permits the presence of the national character in every member of the national community is a common orientation of “will.” Consequently, the empirical generalization called “national character”

by Bauer is the tangible expression of what Gramsci would call a “collective will” resulting from the historical experience of the national community and exteriorized in each member through a societalized selective perception of external reality. This, according to Bauer, is what explains the fact that different national communities have different criteria of perception and develop different forms of morality and law, different aesthetic criteria, different notions of “beautiful” and “ugly,” different ways of perceiving religion, and even different ways of understanding scientific thought.

In the new introduction he wrote to the 1924 edition, Bauer finally broke away from the neo-Kantian residues in his work, describing them as a “childhood malady,” and expanded this notion of the perceptual differences of different national communities. After arguing that it is not difficult to understand the “strong resistance” that his use of the notion of national character had generated in the Marxist tradition and beyond—given the abusive and “shameful” use made of the concept by nationalists during the war—Bauer went on to justify the use of the concept with a number of examples. For this purpose he heavily relied on what he described as a “highly stimulating” book by the antirepublican, devoutly Catholic, conservative French philosopher of science Pierre Duhem.⁹⁶ Duhem compared the way in which the most important “English” (British) and French physicists conducted their research, and found, in Bauer’s words, “remarkable national differences.” In a way that statement exemplified Bauer’s argument. Bauer then defined his main task as being to explain and derive national specificities from the very history of the national community. Bauer’s aim was to remove from the idea of national character its essentialized appearance by showing that “national character” is nothing but a precipitate of past historical processes that will be further modified by subsequent historical developments. As Claudie Weill argues in her excellent introduction to the French translation of this book of Bauer’s, with this argument and an unshakeable faith in a socialist future, Bauer hoped to debunk nationalist myths.⁹⁷

National character, then, is similarity in the orientation of will. The national character is a commonality of “volitive orientation” that results from societalized subjectivity. Under a variety of historical conditions, differing forms of social organization as well as the diverse geographical and physical conditions of existence are linked together to produce the specificity of national existence. However, the national community is not only the discrete result of the historical determination of its conditions of existence. It is also a form of “common” and “community” experience emanating from these conditions. Here Bauer introduced a second conceptual element to his definition of the nation. To capture the contemporary dimensions of historical legacies that have shaped the various national communities, he introduced the idea that the nation is a “community of fate” (*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*). Bauer did not invent this concept; it was used by Nietzsche and by the philosopher of

the unconscious Eduard von Hartmann.⁹⁸ In Nietzsche and Hartmann it denoted a series of events not actively sought or desired, but which take place outside or beyond the willful action of subjects who are nevertheless influenced by its outcome.⁹⁹ For Bauer, the term had a related meaning; it implied the liminal presence of historical circumstances that precede and influence awareness and is consequently “given” to subjects. These subjects can, however, exercise some form of transformative control that results from their contemporary experiences.

Having discussed the path of historical determination and its projection into the future, it is necessary to discuss the somewhat idiosyncratic use of the term “community” in order to clarify the link with contemporary experience. Bauer sharply distinguished two related concepts, that of community and that of similarity (*Gleichartigkeit*), illustrating the difference with a historical example.¹⁰⁰ In the nineteenth century, England and Germany underwent similar processes of capitalist development. The same historical forces crucially influenced the collective experiences of both national communities, but despite similar experiences England and Germany remained separate national communities. The term “similarity of fate” implies that a set of social agents has been subjected to the same historical forces without necessarily interacting with each other. Bauer used the example of the working class to clarify this point. Wherever the capitalist mode of production becomes dominant, an industrial proletariat emerges that experiences *similar* conditions of exploitation under capitalism regardless of national location. But in this case it is the similarity of fate and not the community of fate that generates the common character.

A class is not, in Bauer’s terminology, a community of fate. Being part of a community of fate is not the same as being subjected to the same fate. A community of fate signifies not only the experience of the same historical circumstances, but the experience of those circumstances in a situation of common reciprocal interaction. This idea was derived, as Bauer acknowledged, from Kant’s Third Analogy of Experience, the principle of community: All substances so far as they coexist, stand in thoroughgoing community, that is, in mutual interaction.¹⁰¹ The Kantian influence as well as the impact of Max Adler’s ideas on this crucial aspect of Bauer’s work—the definition of community—is clear, and Bauer still sustained the validity of this Kantian terminology in the introduction to the 1924 edition of his book, where he described the neo-Kantian influence as a childhood malady.

A national community is a form of community life that has a specific configuration, where the interactive relation of its members constitutes the identity of the collective, which is then replicated in individual characteristics. The element of “interactive reciprocity” is what distinguishes a “community of fate” from any other form of communitarian life. Agnelli and Garcia-Pelayo argue that the concept of *Gemeinschaft* Bauer used was of Kantian ori-

gin, denoting two different dimensions of community life.¹⁰² One of these dimensions is the existence of “common homogeneous characteristics,” which is best denoted by the Latin term *communio*, meaning an attribute of equality of circumstances. The other, which can be denoted by the term *commercium*, is the existence of a dynamic process of interaction. Bauer believed that the nation is to be understood as a community of character in that it is not born out of a similarity of fate, but out of a community of fate. This concept also underlies the significance of language for the nation. As Bauer wrote, “With the human beings with which I am in closest communication I manufacture a language and with the human beings with which I have a common language I am in the closest communication.”

This unusual way of understanding the concept of community was influenced by Adler’s claim that social links logically precede the existence of “individuality” and “society.” Consequently, it is the process of interaction that determines the configuration of the social arena as well as the constitution of subjective identities. Bauer argued that the process of common reciprocal interaction lived in a permanent reciprocal relation generates the national community and expresses itself in an intersubjective bond that shapes national characteristics in each individual.

For Bauer, the question of how the boundaries between national communities come into existence was quite different from the question of how the national community is constituted. Historical or political circumstances can link or separate groups of people, and the explanations for this are to be found in a more comprehensive analysis of the historical conjuncture, not in the theory of the formation of nations. The ensuing discussion also shows that Bauer’s use of the concept of “community” was substantially different from the way in which it is used in mainstream sociology following Tönnies. In his usage of the terms “community” and “society,” Bauer explicitly follows Adler’s critical discussion of Stammler’s neo-Kantian legal terminology. Stammler thought that “the essence of society” is the process of cooperation of human beings under an external formal convention (*äussere Satzung*). In sharp distinction, however, the “essence of the community” (in the sense of *commercium*) is that the individual, in his or her “physical and spiritual being,” is the product of many interactive relations with other individuals, and therefore expresses in his or her individuality concrete manifestations of the “communitarian character.” Consequently, what distinguishes the nation from all other communities of character (in the sense of *communio*) is that the nation does *not* exist as a mere similarity of fate, but comes into existence and develops only as a *community of fate* (in the sense of *commercium*). Bauer immediately qualified this statement by arguing that communities of fate cannot emerge unless a given “external formal convention” delimits their boundaries. This is to say that an external framework sets the boundaries of the national community and that the explanation of how that external framework comes

into existence is distinct from the explanation of what constitutes a national community. The separation, however, is not as clear cut as Bauer appeared to suggest. Bauer believed that language is not a determining factor in the formation of national communities. In most cases it becomes the communicative medium through which the national community is constituted, but language alone is not an indicator of the presence or absence of a national community.¹⁰³

BAUER'S DEFINITION OF NATIONAL COMMUNITIES

Having considered several aspects of the process of national development in Bauer's theory, it is possible now to see how the various dimensions of the problematic of national formation are put together in Bauer's definition of the nation. It is important to remember that the aim of the earlier work of Adler in the *Marx-Studien* series was directed toward rejecting the forms of essentialism present in both classical Marxism and the transcendentalist essentialism of the neo-Kantians. Bauer strongly emphasized that his understanding of the formation of the national community is as an ongoing and unfinished process, not as a classification derived from what he calls the "materialist" or the "spiritualist" theories of history.

Refusing to accept any essentialist principle in his conceptualization of the national question, Bauer opened the way for a multidimensional understanding of the national community. This is perhaps another important reason why Bauer's theory has been so consistently misinterpreted. A superficial reading of the theoretical chapter of his voluminous work is not enough to allow one to understand the intellectual aim of his analysis. There are no clichés and ready-made formulae that are applicable to every circumstance. Bauer's definition of the nation as "the totality of human beings bound together through a community of fate into a community of character" is meaningless if one does not follow the painstaking process of reviewing the different dimensions of the complex and not well-understood process of the formation of nations.

Bauer located his work in direct opposition to the three main currents of thought that dominated the conceptualization of the national question at the time. The first he called the "metaphysical theories," under which he included "national materialism" and "national spiritualism." The second current of thought he called the "psychological theories." This term refers to those theories "that seek to discover the essence of the nation in the consciousness of, or the will to, solidarity"—Renan's theory, for example. These are the so-called "voluntaristic" theories of the nation with which Bauer is often mistakenly associated. The third group of theories that Bauer analyzed and rejected are the "empirical" theories—that is, the theories that theoretically enumerate the essential elements of a nation and determine the validi-

ty of concrete national communities according to the presence or absence of the enumerated elements.¹⁰⁴

Discussing these theories, Bauer argued that “common descent and common culture” are basically derivative categories of the notion of “common history” in the process of constructing the national character. A common territory is an important condition only as far as it allows interactive relationship to take place. Territorial separation disrupts the unity of the national community because the intersubjective process required to develop the community of fate cannot take place. However, “in the age of printing, the post, telegraph, and steamships, this is much less the case than formerly.” Given the contemporary expansion of all means of communication, it is possible to infer from Bauer’s argument that the territorial dimension is even less important.

A common language is “a second-order means” for the development of the national character. The common language is the medium through which the community of culture is imagined, recreating the national community in each subjectivity through common interaction. However, in an interesting footnote, Bauer qualified this understanding of the role of language to dispel any possible interpretation that language is a “neutral medium,” arguing that language is not simply a means of transmitting culture, but is itself also an element of culture.

His critical review of the different theories that attempt to explain the nature of the national community allowed Bauer to present the originality of his argument. The nation cannot be understood by enumerating a set of categories or by referring to some essential quality. The national community is the end result of a process in which different dimensions are brought together through a common historical development in dialogue with the main facets of contemporary experience. This is the meaning of Bauer’s definition of the national community as “the totality of human beings bound together through a common fate into a community of character.” Subjective positionality is the expression of societalized existence, and the content of societalized existence results from the structural linkage of a process of “common reciprocal interaction” and a process of historical development.

Bauer thought that the national community exists independent of national consciousness. National consciousness is, however, the result of an awareness of the existence of other nations, since the subject becomes conscious of his or her national dimension by comparison with others. This is why national consciousness became a generalized perceptive mechanism only as a result of the process of “modernity.”

What, then, is the significance of Bauer’s work? Does it help us to understand burning contemporary issues related to ethnic and cultural diversity? Few will disagree that this is a significant work in the history of the study of nationalism. It develops with meticulous scholarship a historically informed

theoretical model. Few will disagree with the claim that it tackles a problem that is central to contemporary concerns. Also, few will disagree with the idea that the language of the book is dated, that parts of the work have significant historical value but are not meaningful to contemporary discussions of nationalism. Few will disagree that the work relies excessively on evolutionary models and on a model of “scientific” knowledge that is at best questionable in relation to today’s dominant paradigms.

No doubt there will be debate as to the relevance of Bauer’s conceptual argument and programmatic suggestions for contemporary discussions of nationalism, the nation-state, and minority rights. In supporting the idea that Bauer’s book can help illuminate some difficult contemporary problems, I shall briefly enumerate them. There is in Bauer’s book a critique of liberal theory, but not a wholesale rejection of all its postulates. To be sure, Bauer started by assuming individual choice in defining affiliation to organized national communities (the personality principle), but the idea of individuals’ rationally and reasonably deciding their national identity is incompatible with Bauer’s argument. Bauer would (rightly) dismiss this argument as an essentialized transcendental *a priori*. The very notion of individuality in Bauer and Adler is a historical construct that results from the interactive relation between the individual and the community. National (ethnic) culture is a matter not of choice, but of social insertion, without which there are no individuals. The multidimensionality of this argument finds echoes in Nira Yuval-Davis’s thought-provoking work.¹⁰⁵

Bauer’s centralist-atomist argument provides a devastating critique of liberal democratic sovereignty. It shows the impossibility of achieving a significant multiethnic and multinational state without recognizing national and ethnic communities as sovereign intermediate categories (“corporations” in Bauer’s words) with legal rights and guarantees. This idea is incompatible with the procedural equality of all individuals in contemporary liberal democracies. It requires instead differential rights for ethnonational communities complementing individual rights.

Bauer’s personality principle provides a powerful critique of the doctrine of the nation-state and a suggestion as to how to overcome its crucial deficiencies. This is not a rejection of nationhood, ethnicity, and nationalism. On the contrary, it is a concrete way of sustaining Giddens’s argument that national identity can be of benign influence if it is tolerant of multiple affiliations.¹⁰⁶ Bauer developed an incipient theory of multicultural nationalism that incorporates nationalist concerns for the well-being of the nation and recognizes the importance of national sentiments. It equally recognizes the concerns of ethnic and national minorities to protect and nourish their community life and their desire for public recognition. But there is also a sharp critique of the nation-state on the grounds that it protects only the dominant nation. In contrast, Bauer’s multicultural nationalism is nonterritorial and

therefore affords similar protections to majorities and minorities, rendering the very terms *majorities* and *minorities* unnecessary. The model of national cultural autonomy echoes Taylor's "politics of recognition" in that it affords equal value to national majorities and ethnic minorities and vindicates democratic politics based on individual free choice and self-determination.

Bauer suggested a theory of nationhood and ethnicity that integrates historical sentiments, cultural specificity, and contemporary circumstances. Here Bauer and Smith were in complete agreement: nations (*ethnies*) and nationalism are likely to be here for some time to come.¹⁰⁷ The nation-state is a completely different matter. It is now for the reader to judge.

Sydney, London, and Berlin, December 1998 and August 1999

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Acknowledgments

Ephraim J. Nimni

This was a very long project based on a lifetime obsession with Bauer's theory of nationalities and his critique of the nation-state. The difficulties encountered along the way were not insignificant. There were a number of false starts, and hopes were dashed on a number of occasions. My initial assumption that it would be relatively easy to find a publisher for the first complete English translation of what is generally considered the most important Marxist work on ethnicity and nationalism proved surprisingly misplaced. The fact that this project is now coming to fruition owes much to the wisdom and vision of the University of Minnesota Press and to the help of a large number of institutions and individuals. True to its commitment to support the study of multiculturalism, the Australia Research Council provided the bulk of our financial support through its grant to the project, titled "The Political Evaluation of Ethnicity in the Work of Otto Bauer." We are grateful to the Research Office of the University of New South Wales for their logistic help in obtaining and managing this grant. We are also grateful for the financial support for the translation provided by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research and the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Historical and Social Research. Gerhard Botz, chair of Contemporary History at the University of Vienna and director of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute, made the Austrian help possible and provided us with valuable contacts within the Austrian government and academia.

Wolfgang Maderthaner from the Verein für die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Vienna gave us access to important archival material along with valuable advice and organizational assistance. Erich Froeschl and Maria Messner from the Dr. Karl Renner-Institut in Vienna provided us with important academic and bibliographical assistance. We are also grateful to the Österreichische Gesellschaft für Literatur and the Dr. Karl Renner-Institut for their financial support during the period of research in Vienna.

In the fine tradition of Austrian Socialism, Dr. Heinz Fischer, president of the Austrian National Assembly, provided us with his enthusiastic support and kindly agreed to write the foreword to this translation. We are also grateful

to the Austrian Socialist Party, the copyright holders, for allowing us to publish this translation.

I am also grateful to the Centre d'Etudes Ethniques, Université de Montréal, Canada, and for the support of my colleagues at the School of Political Science at the University of New South Wales. This project was completed at the European Institute of the London School of Economics, and I wish to thank Anthony Smith and Howard Machin for their support and encouragement.

Claudie Weill supported this project from the beginning and kindly allowed us to use a number of footnotes from the excellent French translation of this book.

We wish to thank the following individuals across many nation-states for their assistance and support at the various stages of the development of this project: Gregoris Ananiadis, Adam Blauhut, Gill Bottomley, Benedikte Brincker, Conal Condren, Laurence Davis, Eduardo de la Fuente, Michael Freeden, Pablo Gaiano, Peter Gran, Reinhard Grosspietsch, Rune Gustafsson, Ulf Peter Hallberg, Fred Halliday, Kim Hilton, Ann-Christine, Jan, and Charlotta Jansson, Gurutz Jáuregui, Danielle Jureau, Peter King, Gavin Kitching, Ernesto Laclau, Maike Leffers, Alana Lentin, Klaus-Jürgen Liedtke, John Milfull, Chantal Mouffe, Saul Newman, Aletta Norval, Ian O'Donnell, Brendan O'Leary, Ivar Oxaal, David Pitt, Joachim Prehm, Winfried Rothbart, Norbert Rozenich, Nicole Schabus, John Schwartzmantel, Tanya Serisier, Elektra Tselikas, Andrian Widmann, Elke Winter, and Nira Yuval Davis. I also wish to thank my students in the seminar Theories of Nationalism at the School of Political Science of the University of New South Wales in Sydney for their inspirational discussions on Bauer.

This publication was made possible by a publication subsidy from the Humanities Research Program of the University of New South Wales.

Finally, I wish to thank Joe O'Donnell, the translator, who under very difficult and uncertain conditions carried out the enormous task of translating this book with enthusiasm, zeal, and dedication.

This project resulted from the cooperation of individuals and institutions across the boundaries of nation-states. It was conceived on a hot summer afternoon at the European University Institute in Florence, it took shape in Sydney, Australia, and it was supported by Australian, Austrian, British, and Canadian universities and institutions. Research for it was carried out in Sydney, Melbourne, Florence, Montreal, Berlin, Vienna, and London. It is being published in the United States. An Australian of Irish descent who resides in Berlin carried out the translation, and the project was coordinated by an Argentinian Jew with British citizenship who resides in Sydney. Otto Bauer would have approved.

The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy

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Preface to the First Edition

In all the states of the European cultural sphere, the position of the Social Democratic Worker's Party on national questions is at the center of political discussion. In Austria and in Russia, the national question represents one of the most intractable problems of domestic policy. But in the nation-states of Western and Central Europe, too, Social Democracy is finding itself unable to evade the discussion of the relationship between the national community and the state; after all, national questions are inseparable from the problems of foreign policy that are acquiring a growing significance for the working classes of all nations by the year.

An investigation of the evolution of the Social Democratic policy on nationalities requires that we locate the forces that are acting upon millions of workers and thousands of trade unionists and, in the process, are shaping the consciousness of the working masses and determining their resolutions in all questions of national life. Locating these forces enables us to comprehend the Social Democratic policy on nationalities from the standpoint of the working class within bourgeois society, to comprehend the national question as a social problem. This project entails the application of Marx's method of social research to a new field of investigation; it is in this sense that my work is to be understood as a *Marx-Studie*.¹

The national community is one of the most complicated of all social phenomena, a complex of the most diverse social manifestations. Anyone wishing to investigate how the bond of membership in a national community determines the will of the working class in its struggle must therefore approach this problem from different angles. Such a task entails the risk of venturing beyond the limits set by disciplinary boundaries, of here and there taking somewhat unfamiliar paths. I myself would have preferred to continue my usual work within my own narrow field of inquiry rather than deal—with the aid of unfamiliar and often incomplete research—with a problem the diversity and intricacy of which confronts the labor-power and the knowledge of a single individual with a task that can never be completed. However, it does not follow that the struggling working class should simply do without

an argument formulated today on the grounds that it may prove incomplete in the coming years. And for those still perplexed in the face of the struggles of the classes and parties, the compilation of the material and the ordering of the arguments presented here, however inadequate, will prove welcome as a basis for further research.

I bear sole responsibility for the conclusions and demands presented here. I am aware that many of my party comrades are of a different opinion regarding some of the problems of the Social Democratic policy on nationalities. No fair-minded opponent will make the whole party [*Gesamtpartei*] responsible for the views of a single party member.²

The major part of the book I am handing over to the public today was written and printed in 1906. External circumstances have delayed its publication.

Vienna, 24 May 1907

Preface to the Second Edition

The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy was written in 1906. At the time of writing, the Russian Revolution of 1905 was still in progress, and my hope was that its further development would accelerate and influence the internal development of the Habsburg monarchy. When I was writing the book, the conflict between the dynasty and the Hungarian upper house had still not been settled; I hoped at the time that under the pressure of the Russian Revolution, which was radicalizing the monarchy's Slavic nations, the conflict between the emperor and the Hungarian coalition would lead to an internal restructuring of the empire.

It very soon became clear that my hopes had been founded on false premises. Just a few weeks after my book had been published, Stolypin's coup d'état brought the first Russian Revolution to an end, and the following decade saw Russia dominated by the forces of reaction. The Habsburg dynasty now no longer needed to fear the effects of the Russian Revolution. It now believed that it could exploit the fact that Russia had been weakened by both the war in the Far East and the revolution for the purpose of furthering its expansionist policies on the Balkan Peninsula. As a result of its subsequent annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1908, the antagonism of Serbia and Russia exerted a decisive influence on all the monarchy's policies from this time onward. In this way, the conflict between the dynasty and the empire's Slavic nations was exacerbated, with the consequence that the former was thrown back into the arms of the ruling classes of the historical nations: the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary. The crisis that had threatened the empire in 1905 was thus eliminated: in the month in which Bosnia was annexed, the emperor abandoned the concept of general suffrage in Hungary by granting a preliminary sanction to Andrassy's electoral reform bill.¹ As a result, all hopes that a "revolution from above" would solve the Austro-Hungarian nationalities problem were buried. From my own point of view, it already seemed probable in the winter of 1908–1909 that the situation would develop in a way quite different from that which I had expected in 1906: that the tendency was toward war and through war toward revolution

and that the revolution would put the old nationalities principle back on the agenda and result in the breakup of the old multinational state much sooner than I had thought probable in 1906. From 1909 onward, I presented these hypotheses in a series of essays in *Der Kampf*.² And when in 1914 war actually came, and in its wake the second Russian Revolution of 1917, it became clear to me that thenceforth only the dissolution of the empire could provide a solution to the Austro-Hungarian nationalities problem. The conclusions I drew from this realization were presented in January 1918 in my proposals for a *Nationalities Programme of the Left*.³

This entire process of development, which took place after 1907—and thus after the publication of *The Question of Nationalities*—and which led to a revision of my own view of the developmental tendencies of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, was subsequently described in the first four paragraphs of my book *The Austrian Revolution*.⁴ The latter therefore constitutes not only a supplement, but also a correction to the conceptions advanced in *The Question of Nationalities*.

The empire whose internal conflicts I had hoped to influence with my book in 1907 now no longer exists; and as early as 1909 I began to revise my evaluation of these conflicts, which ultimately brought the empire down. Nevertheless, the book, which has long been out of print, is still requested in bookshops. However, it was not until *The Austrian Revolution* had been published that I could agree to the publication of a new edition of *The Question of Nationalities* without fear of misunderstandings. It can now be published without alteration to the original; the necessary supplementation and correction can now be found in the first section of *The Austrian Revolution*.

The political program I advocated in 1907 as a solution to the Austro-Hungarian nationalities problem has been passed over by history. However, my historical account of the genesis and development of the problem has been strengthened rather than corrected by subsequent events and research. The seventeen years of history separating this and the first edition of this book have, in particular, confirmed my contention that the *awakening of the nonhistorical nations* [*Erwachen der geschichtslosen Nationen*], which I described in this book for the first time as one of the most important concomitants of modern economic and social evolution, is in fact one of the forces of radical change at work in the world today.

The same is true of some aspects of my 1906 analysis of the developmental tendencies of modern imperialism, which have since been confirmed by the most drastic of events. Admittedly, my theoretical derivation of capitalist expansionism from the phenomenon of the capitalist process of circulation would be somewhat different were I to formulate it today. In 1906, under the influence of the work of Tugan-Baranovski, I overestimated the effect of the temporary removal of released money capital from the circulation process; this error has since been corrected by Rudolf Hilferding in *Finance Capital*.⁵

However, the core of the book is constituted by my attempt to grasp, by means of the Marxist conception of history, modern nations as communities of character [*Charaktergemeinschaften*] that have grown out of communities of fate [*Schicksalsgemeinschaften*]. This aspect of my book seems to me as relevant today as it was then.

The Question of Nationalities was written toward the end of my student days, a time at which I was under the spell of the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. As a result, Kant's epistemology influenced my formulation of the conceptions of sociological method that form the basis of my theory of the nation. I presented these conceptions in the *Neue Zeit* of 1908 in my defense of this theory against Karl Kautsky's critique.⁶ It was only in the context of later studies that I learned to grasp critical philosophy as itself a historical phenomenon, thereby overcoming my Kantian childhood malady and at the same time also revising my methodological viewpoint. Were I to present my theory of the nation today, I would consequently modify the form of the account and express some ideas differently. However, this would entail changing only the way in which the theory is presented, not the theory itself.

My definition of the nation—as a community of character that has grown out of a community of fate—has encountered strong resistance in the Marxist camp due to the Marxist school's mistrust of the concept of national character. Such mistrust is not difficult to understand considering the misuse that nationalism has made of the concept, most ignominiously during the war. And it is this mistrust that makes it necessary to explain here the significance of the concept of the national community of character within my theory of the nation and the function it performs.

In his highly stimulating book *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory*, the French physicist Pierre Duhem compares the research methods of English and French scientists.⁷ Referring to the work of the most significant physicists of both nations, he demonstrates a number of curious differences. For the French, the focus is on unity, consistency, and clarity; their need for comprehension is not satisfied until they have succeeded in transforming their basic hypotheses through conclusive deduction into experimentally verifiable laws. In the case of the English, there is no such need. On the other hand, their imagination is satisfied only once each complex of empirical laws has been illustrated by a mechanical model; the fact that the hypotheses upon which they have based the construction of the individual model have no relationship to one another, the fact that these hypotheses may even contradict one another, does not disturb them. The two nations attempt to satisfy quite different psychological needs in their construction of an exact natural science: the French intellect seeks order and clarity, whereas the English imagination seeks understandability, comprehensibility, concreteness. Moreover, quite different abilities are brought to bear on the construction of physical systems: the French are superior in abstraction and generalization, the

English in their ability to clearly visualize complex constellations and to represent them pictorially.

Duhem observes these differences precisely where the layman would least expect to find them: in the use of mathematics in the construction of physical systems. For the French, Duhem argues, physical theory is a logical system, and algebraic calculation is only a subordinate means of representing as simply as possible the chain of conclusions leading from the basic hypotheses to the final conclusions. It is therefore important for them that in every phase of the train of thought it remains possible to replace calculation with logical deduction, the former being the abbreviated expression of the latter. They therefore endeavor to achieve the strictest correspondence between the hypotheses and the equations in which these hypotheses are expressed, between the phenomena and their algebraic symbols. In the case of the English, there is no such need. For them, algebraic calculation plays the role of a mechanical model: it illustrates the phenomena in the sense that the changes undergone by the symbols in the process of calculation emulate the laws of movement governing the observed phenomena. English physicists do not spend time trying to establish the strictest correspondence between the concept and its algebraic symbol; building a bridge between the two is left to intuition. Instead, the English exercise their superior ability to use condensed calculation methods, grasping even highly complicated combinations quickly and concretely. Whereas the French favor the operations of classical algebra, which knows only a few elementary operations, the English enthusiastically employ the newer algebraic symbols, an approach that avoids the many intermediate calculations of classical algebra, but that involves dealing with a large number of different symbols and the highly complex rules governing their use.

At this point Duhem himself asks whether these differences in the construction of physical theories demonstrate a difference between the intellects of the two nations that can also be observed in other branches of intellectual life. And indeed he discovers the same difference when he compares English philosophy since Bacon with French philosophy since Descartes. He also finds a very similar difference in the realm of literature when he compares Corneille and Shakespeare. "Take one of Corneille's heroes," he writes, "Auguste, hesitating between revenge and mercy, or Rodrigue deliberating between his filial piety and his love. Two feelings wage a dispute for his heart; but what a perfect order there is in their discussion! Each takes the floor in turn, like two lawyers before the bar expounding in perfectly finished briefs their reasons why they will win the case, and when the reasons on both sides have been clearly expounded, the will of man puts an end to the debate through a precise decision, resembling a judicial decree or a conclusion in geometry."⁸ Duhem then compares these two figures with Lady Macbeth and Hamlet. Here there is no conceptual analysis that divides the human being into his

elements. Here we find the human being in all his contradictions, in his harrowing indivisibility, his irreducibility!

Finally, Duhem discovers a related difference when he compares French and English law. In France, the law is compiled in several statute books, systematically ordered, based upon clearly defined abstract concepts; in England, legislation is a prodigious mass of unconnected, contradictory laws and customary rights piled on top of each other over centuries, never codified, never systematized, but continuously developed in the practice of the courts in accordance with the needs of the time. Here, as in the realms of physics, philosophy, and literature, Duhem finds in the French case the need for the systematic, for strict deduction from clearly defined abstract concepts, for order without contradiction. In the English case, he finds the superior ability to grasp that which has become organic in all its contradictory diversity, the ability to orientate oneself easily within the most complicated of combinations without the need to simplify or reduce them, the ability to make the contradictory itself serve practical necessity.

Modern capitalism has reduced the differences between the material contents of the different national cultures. Nevertheless, national particularities continue to exert an effect on the way in which the same material contents of culture are appropriated, represented, combined, utilized, and developed. The same theory of relativity has become part of the study of physics in all nations; however, in Germany the theory has to overcome intellectual inhibitions that are quite different from those in England, and it is placed in a quite different intellectual context by German thinkers and therefore represented in a different way. The same current of literary fashion flows through the poetry of all countries, but the Russian expressionist narrates the same event differently from the French expressionist. The same workers' movement has emerged in all industrial nations, but the Italian working class reacts to the same facts of capitalist exploitation differently from the Scandinavian working class. This is what I have in mind when I speak of national character. I do not mean those lies perpetrated by nationalistic demagogy that find only heroes in one's own people and only hucksters in the other. I rather mean those differences that are accessible only to a much more precise psychological analysis: differences in the fundamental structure of the mind, in intellectual and aesthetic taste, in the form of reaction to the same stimuli, differences that we notice only when we compare the intellectual life of different nations, their science and their philosophy, their poetry, music, and visual arts, their political and social life, their lifestyle and their habits.

The nationalistic portrayal of history depicts national characters as composed of different essential substances and their attraction and repulsion as fashioning the actual content of history. This nationalistic conception of history cannot be overcome by challenging the incontestable fact of national specificities, the incontestable fact of differences between national characters.

It is only by stripping the national character of its substantive appearance, by showing that the respective national character is nothing but a precipitate of past historical processes that will be further altered by subsequent historical processes, that we will be able to overcome the nationalistic conception of history. The task of deriving national specificity from the history of the nation—it is this and only this that is meant by my definition of the nation as a community of character that has emerged from a community of fate. Let us try to illustrate this task in an example! How can we, for example, derive the difference between the English and the French national character of which Duhem has made us aware from the history of both nations?

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the royal court in France was the model of custom and the arbiter of taste for the educated upper strata of the nation. The court noble, whose life was bound by the rigid although pleasing forms of court etiquette a world apart from the labor of the people, and who lived a life of refined pleasure without himself taking part in the daily work of public administration, exercised at that time the strongest influence on the development of French culture. The culture of such a court society can be a high culture only of form: the beauty and stateliness of the language, the humor and grace in the mode of expression, the elegance of representation, the clarity and order of thought—these things are what such a culture finds pleasing. The tastes of the powerful and resplendent court influenced the culture that initially became the common property of the French nobility and later the intellectual heritage of the French bourgeoisie.

In England, on the other hand, the royal court did not have such a dominant influence on the development of lifestyle and taste, even under the Tudors, and far less so during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The representatives of English culture were the landed aristocracy and the urban patriciate. The landed gentry, the descendants of the usurpers of dismembered Church and feudal estates, living in their country seats and engaging relatively early in agriculture organized along purely capitalist lines and in the aristocratic self-government of the counties, necessarily developed an aesthetic taste quite different from that of the French court nobility. Not bound by the strict forms of court custom and given to much rougher pleasures, the landed gentry of England could not sustain a high culture of form such as that suited to the French court. On the other hand, being closer to nature, they could vividly comprehend nature and human beings in their individuality. And being accustomed to dealing with economic and administrative matters, they developed a far stronger sense of the practical. Besides the landed gentry, however, the urban patriciate—merchants, bankers, ship owners, seafarers, factory owners—acquired an increasingly stronger influence on the intellectual development of the nation. “The industrialist,” writes Duhem, “has very often an ample mind; the need to combine machinery, to deal with business matters, and to handle men has early accustomed him to see clearly

and rapidly complicated assemblages of concrete facts. On the other hand, his is nearly always a very shallow mind. His daily occupation keeps him removed from abstract ideas and general principles.”⁹ Are we not now already in a position to comprehend the difference between what is specific to French and English intellectual life in our time as deriving from the fact that, during the early capitalist epoch, the tastes of different kinds of classes fashioned the cultures that then became the heritage of the two nations in the epoch of modern capitalism?

In the great struggle between royal power and the class of feudal landlords, the latter triumphed in England, the former in France. In England the institutions of estate parliamentarianism and estate local administration were never destroyed. That which the barons wrested from the Plantagenets was later inherited by the gentry, the bourgeoisie, and finally the working class. Rather than destroying preexisting institutions, each newly ascendant class took over these institutions and adapted them. This continuity in the development of the English state explains English traditionalism: along with the preexisting institutions each ascendant class has taken over, it has also inherited their traditions. The situation in France is quite different. There, royal power violently destroyed the feudal institutions and erected the absolutist monarchy upon their ruins. For precisely this reason the bourgeois revolution in France had to violently destroy the existing state and erect a quite different one on its ruins. In England new tenants have always moved into the old house and furnished it after their own tastes; in France the old house has always been torn down and a new one built from the ground up. For this reason the successive class struggles in England and France are reflected quite differently in the intellectual life of the two nations: in England, where the class struggle dissolved into a struggle around individual regulations and reforms, the ideology of each ascendant class associated itself with the preexisting ideology. The fact that this synthesis of the old and the new necessarily included contradictory elements did not lead to any unease as long as the new ideology served the needs of the newly ascended class and proved worthwhile in practice. In France, on the other hand, where the opposing classes entered into an all-round conflict with one another, abstract principle opposed abstract principle, one closed system opposed another. In this way the histories of the two nations cultivated different capacities: on the one hand, the capacity for the sober registration of concrete facts without reducing their individual character or their diversity, and on the other, the inclination toward abstraction, generalization, the systematic, and logical rigor.

In France, absolutism defeated the Reformation. In England, the Reformation triumphed. In France, intellectual development remained under the influence of the Catholic Church, with the grandiose unity of its doctrinal system and the aesthetically satisfying splendor of its rituals. In England, intellectual life came under the powerful sway of Puritanism, which was mistrustful

of the aesthetic and orientated to the practical worth of professional life. In France, the struggle of the bourgeoisie for intellectual emancipation could be waged only in the form of a struggle against the claim of the Catholic Church to intellectual hegemony. The closed system of church dogma had to be opposed with the equally closed systems of an Enlightenment philosophy completely liberated from traditional Christianity. England had already gained religious tolerance within Protestantism in the seventeenth century; individual emotional needs could seek fulfillment in different Christian churches and sects; the individual could easily combine modern science, which satisfied the need for knowledge, with a personally styled, undogmatic Christianity that fulfilled his emotional needs. In France, modern science during the period of its emergence was forced to join the struggle over world views against Catholic dogma. Its attention was thus focused on the most extreme and general of abstractions and hypotheses, on systems promoting a world view. In England, where the need for a systematic confrontation with the less dogmatically demanding forms of Christianity found there was weaker and less widespread, science could focus much more on acquiring knowledge of the empirical laws of nature, knowledge that accomplished the task of mastering nature at a practical level. It was thus able at a much earlier stage to comprehend general abstractions and hypotheses as mere means of representing and summarizing the empirical laws of nature.

Are we now in a position to comprehend the intellectual difference between the two nations of which Duhem has made us aware in terms of the difference between their histories? Not quite. We would have to go much further back into the history of the two nations and develop a much more detailed analysis to acquire a complete understanding. However, that is not our task here. My aim here has merely been to give an example of how we must proceed in order to explain the community of character as having developed from the community of fate. It is surely clear now what my definition of the nation means. It is nothing more than a methodological postulate. It aims to set scholarship the task of comprehending the phenomenon of the nation by explaining everything that constitutes the specificity, the particularity of the individual nation and distinguishes it from other nations in terms of the particularity of its history, and thus by demonstrating the nationality of the individual to be his historical aspect, the historical within him. It is the task of grasping the specificity of each nation, the national components in the specificity of individuals by means of the Marxist conception of history, and of thereby dissolving the deceptive appearance of the substantiality of the nation to which all nationalistic conceptions of history succumb.

Karl Kautsky has contested my definition of the nation in two publications.¹⁰ The modern nation, Kautsky argues, must be understood not as a community of fate, culture, and character, but as a community of language. This concept requires closer scrutiny. A people of hunters and herdsmen

splits into several branches, which then settle separately and begin to practice agriculture. The community of fate of the people becomes fragmented: each of the tribes into which it has disintegrated now leads a separate existence without any close contact with other tribes. With this disintegration of the former community of fate begins a process of cultural differentiation: over a period of several centuries the customs of the tribes, their forms of dress, and the types of construction they use for their farmhouses develop pronounced differences. And one manifestation of this overall cultural differentiation is found in the sphere of language: after several centuries the vernaculars of the tribes, which once spoke a common language, have become distinctly differentiated. Each of these tribes now develops its own narrower community of fate and, within this process, its own cultural and linguistic community. Now begins the transition to commodity production, to the money economy. This, in turn, facilitates a process of integration: villages inhabited by different tribes gravitate to the same marketplace and interact with one another. The new community of fate to which they are now linked by the money economy facilitates an increasing similarity in their customs and modes of dress; and hand in hand with this cultural integration comes linguistic integration.

Through interaction in a common market, different vernaculars progressively lose their distinctive characters and ultimately merge into one dialect. However, above the peasant masses in the social hierarchy are the dominant classes: the nobility and the urban bourgeoisie. Their interaction, exchange of cultural assets, and political community transcend tribal boundaries. Their community of culture, which extends beyond tribal boundaries, also demands a community of language that has to overcome the differences between dialects. These dominant classes of the different tribes initially develop a common written language for literary use, which subsequently merges with the dialects or replaces them in the context of daily usage. It is finally modern capitalism that extends this process to the popular masses, increasingly tearing down the tribal divisions that separate them. In the villages, too, it increasingly dissolves differences in regard to forms of work, custom, and dress; it integrates the popular masses, previously divided along tribal lines, into a community of culture. Here, too, cultural integration is accompanied by linguistic integration: the common written language penetrates the language of the popular masses via the school, the pulpit, and the public authority, merges with the dialects, and breaks down the differences between them even more. The nation is now the community of tribes linked by a common written language. However, this written language establishes itself only insofar as the community of fate and culture gives rise to the need for a common language. Within the one people, tribes that live in economic, cultural, and political isolation do not adopt the written language common to other tribes, but formulate their own. Only those tribes (or their dominant classes) that are integrated into the community of culture and fate are members of the linguistic

community. Therefore, splinter groups of three German tribes did not adopt the German written language, but created their own particular form: the Dutch written language. Therefore, the Illyrian movement among the Croatian intelligentsia was strong enough in the first half of the nineteenth century to ensure that the Stokavic dialect, which was also used by the Serbs, was adopted as the basis of the Croatian written language.¹¹ The Slovenes, on the other hand, separated from the Croats by a state border, were less influenced by the Illyrian movement and created their own particular written language. Analogous examples can be found in the later differentiation of the written languages of the Russians and Ukrainians and of the Danes and Norwegians.

The community of language is thus the product of highly complicated processes of differentiation and integration. The dissolution of the community of fate leads to cultural and thereby linguistic differentiation, the integration into a community of fate to cultural and thereby linguistic integration. The community of language is a partial manifestation of the community of culture and a product of the community of fate.

Modern linguistics has described the process of linguistic division. It has shown how the different Romance languages developed from vulgar Latin and how the languages of the Anglo-Saxons and the Frisians developed from common roots and became differentiated. In the context of such historical processes, the same sound in different languages is transformed in different directions. The once common [a:] shifts in one language toward [i:], in another toward [u:]. How can this difference between the sound shifts in different languages that have grown from the same roots be explained? In the first place, this is without doubt due to the mingling of languages. The differentiation of Anglo-Saxon and Frisian can certainly be attributed in part to the fact that the Anglo-Saxons mixed their language with that of the other peoples they encountered in their new home.

However, this linguistic mingling does not in itself completely explain sound-shift phenomena. These require that we extend the scope of our explanation. A people living in the open, such as the Neapolitans, adopt habits of articulation different from those of a people working in enclosed spaces. A people of seafarers and fishermen adopts different habits from those of a people living in the interior, a people of factory laborers different habits from those of a peasant people; different habits of articulation lead to different sound shifts. Every form of work has its particular rhythm. Where singing accompanies work, the rhythm of the work influences the rhythm of the language; different language rhythms lead to different sound shifts. Several of the most important and widespread sound-change phenomena have been derived by Wilhelm Wundt from the acceleration of spoken language.¹² An accelerated speech tempo gives rise to particular phonetic changes. Now, the tempo of speech is without doubt dependent on social structure: a merchant people speaks more quickly than a peasant people living in a natural econo-

my. The phonetic content of the vocabulary of each community of language reflects the way of life, the professional activity, and the social structure of bygone generations, from which the language has been inherited. Where linguistic differentiation has divided one people from another, this differentiation is itself the result of a difference in terms of the way of life, professional activity, and social structure, that is, a difference in terms of the culture, the history, and the fate of different peoples sharing common historical roots.

The differentiation of languages is followed by the process of integration, which, through the bond of a common written language, links linguistically distinct tribes to form the modern nation. These modern standard languages are, however, initially spoken by the educated, the aristocratic, the rulers. The habits of articulation of the economically, politically, and culturally dominant classes have shaped the phonetic content of the vocabulary of these standard languages. The written language is passed on to the popular masses via the school, the pulpit, and the public authority, and in the process the people learn to imitate the articulatory habits of the ruling classes. It is these articulatory habits that determine the sound shift. Leo Jordan illustrates this in the following example:

In the speech act the Englishman pushes the lower jaw somewhat forwards; this explains the relaxed lip position which has come to be regarded by the English as a mark of good character, and which the German describes appropriately as the “w-mouth.” By imitating this position one realizes immediately that the English sound colourings, above all the constant detonation of all vowels by closing them off, is a natural consequence of this forced position. The Frenchman does exactly the opposite. He spreads the lips for [e:] and [i:] as if he wants to touch his ears with the corners of his mouth, and rounds them for [o:] and [u:] (or more precisely [ø:] and [y:]) as if he were pouting. One observes a Frenchman articulating *un pot-au-feu* or *c'est ici*: his face is in intense mimic movement, all the work being concentrated on the frontal musculature visible to the listener. It is therefore not surprising that all vocalism has been shifted forwards: [a:] has become [e:], [o:] has become [ø:], and [u:] [y:].¹³

Where do these different linguistic habits originate? Jordan maintains: “It is evident that the Englishman strives in speaking to adopt a mask of imperturbability. It is just as evident that the Frenchman wants to clearly display his emotions mimetically. The gesture which the Englishman represses as much as possible is emphasized by the Frenchman: his lips work convulsively. The Englishman plays the imperturbable one because this imperturbability is his social ideal, his method of doing business, in short the convention according to which he models himself. And the Frenchman? Is he as open, as frank as his lively facial expressions appear to show, or is he not also revealing here centuries of socialization, the ideal of which seems to be the vivacious, uninhibited conversationalist? The Frenchman desires to have an effect and

plays to the gallery!" Is it not the case that there is a close relation between this difference and the difference between the intellectual specificities of both nations that Duhem has demonstrated in the fields of science, philosophy, literature, and law? Do we not see here the different intellectual specificities of both nations, their different national characters, also manifested in language itself, in the mouth position, lip movement, and the articulation of sounds? Is it not the case that the community of character reveals itself in the community of language?

How could this difference between ways of speaking have developed? Building on a concept introduced to the study of linguistics in Hermann Paul's classic work,¹⁴ Jordan answers: "In historical terms, the passage of events is of course to be understood as one in which those individuals who used the articulation forms described initially became models for the populace as a whole." Going beyond Paul, he adds: "The model status group was probably in most cases the decisive factor." This idea represents the bridge from Paul's obviously Darwinian influenced concept—linguistic development through a process of selection from individual variations—to a Marxist conception of the problem: the difference between articulatory habits is to be understood in terms of the different ways of speaking employed by the classes that were attributed exemplary status by their respective nations and that were as a consequence imitated by their nations. For example, if we conceive of the French way of speaking as a legacy of the way of speaking cultivated by the nobility in the court of Versailles and the English way of speaking as a legacy of the Puritan-minded merchants of London, the national differences between articulatory habits become at least in part comprehensible as having developed from the fundamental differences between those classes that were for a time regarded as national models and that thus exerted the strongest influence on the way of speaking adopted by their nations.

The difference between the respective processes of historical development of both nations explains why during the same period different classes exerted the strongest influence on the national lifestyle, customs, and taste, and indeed why later generations in both countries adopted quite different cultural heritages. This difference between cultural heritages explains the difference between the intellectual specificities of the two nations, which is revealed in their different ways of speaking and therefore also in their different languages, just as it is in the differences found in the fields of science, art, and law. The national community of language is thus understood here as one of the expressions of the national community of character, one of the partial manifestations of the national community of culture, which is itself one of the products of the community of fate.

The nation is a community of language, says Kautsky. This is undoubtedly true. But can we be satisfied with this statement? Is all inquiry into what we want to understand about the nation exhausted when we conclude that

the Englishman and the Frenchman are different from each other because one speaks English and the other French? This seems to be simply too little by way of explanation. We want to understand the community of language itself as a historical phenomenon, language itself as within the flow of historical development. We must therefore comprehend the linguistic community as emerging from the community of culture and fate, the specificity of the individual linguistic community as emerging from the specificity of the community of culture and character. This is why it seems to me inadequate to regard the nation as a community of language, and why I have attempted to derive the linguistic community itself from the community of fate, culture, and character. Only by means of these links can we establish a connection between the development and specificity of the national language and the development of the forces and relations of production that fashions the fate of the nation; that is to say, only by means of the Marxist conception of history can we grasp the phenomenon of the nation.

The focus of my theory of the nation in fact lies not in the definition of the nation, but in the description of the process of integration out of which the modern nation has developed. If my theory of the nation can claim to make any contribution, it is due to the fact that this theory for the first time derives this process of integration from that of economic development, from the changes in the social structure and in the class structure of society. I have shown that during the feudal and early capitalist eras it was only the ruling classes that this process of integration could link together in a national community of culture, and that during these epochs such integration could therefore not be achieved at all among those peoples living under the yoke of foreign ruling classes. I have also shown how it was the further development of capitalism that first facilitated the inclusion of the popular masses in this process of integration. For the historical nations this meant that the community of culture, which had previously been constituted only by the dominant classes, was broadened and that the popular masses now took their place in the national cultural community. But for the nonhistorical nations living under the yoke of foreign ruling classes, it meant the initial emergence of the national community of culture—the *awakening of the nonhistorical nations*. Furthermore, this derivation of the process of national integration from the process of economic and social development appears to me to be of not only theoretical, but also practical interest for us.

The workers' movement is itself one of the most powerful levers of the expansion of the national community of culture and the inclusion of the popular masses within it. The greater the share of cultural wealth won by the working class, the more this class is influenced by the particular cultural heritage of each country, by its particular cultural tradition. In each country, socialist ideology is wedded to that country's particular cultural tradition and thus becomes differentiated along national lines. The intellectual specificity

of the nation shapes the specificity of socialism in each nation. In spite of the uniformity of its leadership in Rome, the closed and rigid character of its doctrinal system, and its use of Latin as a standard language that creates a linguistic link between its clergy throughout the world, the Catholic Church has in fact acquired a marked national specificity in the different nations. In the same way, international socialism cannot escape the process of national differentiation. Anyone who compares German Marxism, English Laborism, and Russian Bolshevism cannot avoid the conclusion that in each nation inherited national characteristics are giving international socialist ideology a particular national form. Just as in its historical praxis the working class in every country must increasingly adapt its methods of struggle to the particularities of the national terrain of struggle the closer it comes to power, so too does the socialist ideology of the working class establish an increasingly closer relationship with the particular cultural heritage of the nation the more it absorbs that culture. We cannot overcome this national differentiation within socialism by subjecting the workers' parties of all nations to the dictatorship of one national workers' party that dictates the method of struggle to all other parties without regard for the national diversity of the terrain of struggle and imposes its ideology as a canonized doctrinal system on all other parties without regard for the particularity of their cultural traditions. For this is merely the utopian attempt to impose one species of socialism, which is itself the product of a particular national history, of particular national characteristics, on workers' movements with entirely different histories, entirely different characteristics. The international socialist movement must rather comprehend the national differentiation of methods of struggle and ideologies within its ranks as the result of its own internal and external growth. It must learn, on the basis of this national diversity developing within the International, to teach its nationally differentiated troops to coordinate their efforts in the service of common goals and to combine their forces in a common struggle, in spite of the national particularity of their practical methods and their theoretical frameworks. It is not the leveling of national particularities, but the promoting of international unity within national diversity that can and must be the task of the International.

Vienna, 4 April 1924

1. The Nation

THE NATIONAL CHARACTER

Until now scholars have almost entirely left the nation to poets, newspaper columnists, and speakers at public gatherings, in the parliament and the alehouse. In an era of great national struggles we barely have the beginnings of a satisfactory theory of the essence of the nation. And yet we are in need of such a theory. After all, we are all affected by national ideology, by national romanticism; few of us would be able even to say the word "German" without its resonating with a peculiar emotional overtone. Anyone seeking to understand national ideology or to criticize it cannot avoid the question of what it is that constitutes the essence of the nation.

Bagehot argues that the nation is one of those many phenomena that we understand as long as we are not questioned about them, but that we cannot in fact concisely explain.¹ But scholarship cannot content itself with this; if it wants to speak about the nation, it cannot avoid the question of the concept of the nation. And this question is not as easy to answer as a cursory glance might suggest. Is the nation a community of persons of common descent? Surely the Italians are descended from Etruscans, Romans, Celts, Germanic tribes, Greeks, and Saracens, the present-day French from Gauls, Romans, Britons, and Germanic tribes, the present-day Germans from Germanic tribes, Celts, and Slavs. Or is it the community of language that unites human beings as a nation? Surely the English and Irish, the Danes and Norwegians, the Serbs and Croats, although in each case both speak the same language, do not therefore constitute one people; the Jews do not have a common language and yet they are a nation. Is it, then, the consciousness of a common bond that unites the nation? Should the Tyrolean peasant not be regarded as a German because he has never become conscious of his common bond with East Prussians, Pomeranians, Thuringians, and Alsatians? And furthermore, what is the German conscious of when he thinks of his "Germanness"? What makes him a member of the German nation, what connects him with other Germans? Surely an objective

feature of this common bond must first be present before one can become conscious of it.

A systematic approach to the question of the nation must begin with a conception of *national character*. If we take any German to a foreign country, if we place him, say, among the English, he will immediately be conscious of the fact that he is among people different from himself, people with a different way of thinking and feeling, people whose reactions to the same external stimuli are quite different from those he finds in his usual German environment. For the moment, we will call the complex of physical and intellectual characteristics that distinguishes one nation from another its national character. Over and above these differences, all peoples share certain characteristics that identify us as human beings. On the other hand, classes, professions, and individuals within each nation exhibit distinctive qualities, particular features that distinguish them from one another. But the fact remains that the average German is different from the average Englishman, although they may well have much in common as human beings and as members of the same class or profession, and that the English share with one another a range of characteristics, however much they are distinguished from one another by individual and social differences. For those who wish to deny this, the nation can have no meaning; does the Englishman who lives in Berlin and speaks German thereby become a German?

Explaining the differences between nations in terms of their different fates, struggles for existence, and social structures does not represent a rejection of the concept of national character. When Kautsky, for example, seeks to explain the obstinacy and tenacity of the Russians in terms of the fact that the bulk of the Russian people consists of peasants and that agriculture everywhere produces ponderous but also tenacious and obstinate natures, he is not thereby denying the existence of a specifically Russian national character.² On the contrary, he defines the national peculiarities of the Russians and attempts to explain them.

However, the fact that there are many who hasten to explain the genesis of national character without pausing to consider the concept itself has resulted in misinterpretation. Above all, the national character has been unjustly attributed a *continuity* that can be historically refuted. It is undeniable that the Germanic tribes at the time of Tacitus shared many characteristics that distinguished them from other peoples, such as the Romans of the same period. And it is equally undeniable that the Germans of our own time exhibit certain shared character traits that distinguish them from other peoples, regardless of how these traits may have developed. Nevertheless, no educated person would therefore deny that the Germans of today have much more in common with the other civilized nations [*Kulturnationen*] of their own time than with the Germanic tribes of Tacitus's time.

The national character is *variable*. A community of character links the

members of a nation together in a particular era, but it by no means links the nation of our era with its ancestors of two or three thousand years ago. When we speak of a German national character, we are referring to the characteristics shared by the Germans during a particular century or decade.

It has also often been unjustly overlooked that alongside the national community of character there exist a number of other communities of character, of which those of class and profession are by far the most important. The German worker shares certain characteristics with every other German; these characteristics link the Germans together as a national community of character. However, there are also characteristics that the German worker shares with his class comrades in all other nations: this is what makes him a member of the international class community of character. The German compositor indisputably shares certain characteristics with compositors of all other nations, and in this sense he belongs to an international professional community.

It would be pointless to ask whether the class community of character is stronger than the national community of character or vice versa. There is no objective standard for the measurement of the strength of such communities.³ However, the concept of national character has been compromised even more by the uncritical approach that argues that a particular way of acting that is observed in a nation can be explained in terms of the national character itself. An example of this can be found in the belief that rapid constitutional change in France is explained by the fact that the French, like their Gallic ancestors, as Caesar claimed, always "strive for innovation."

Caesar observed a great number of the different actions performed by Gallic clan-groups [*Völkerschaften*] and individual Gauls: the manner in which they changed their domicile, altered their constitutions, and entered into and dissolved friendships and alliances. In each of these concrete actions, observed at a particular time and place, the observer recognized something that he had seen in previous actions and emphasized this common factor when he said, "They constantly strive for innovation." This assessment is not a causal explanation, but a mere generalization, the emphasizing of a common characteristic on the basis of a variety of concrete actions. When we describe the national character, we do not thereby explain the causes of a number of given actions, but merely that which constitutes the common characteristic of a great number of actions of the nation and its members. Some nineteen centuries later a historian observes the rapid constitutional change in France and recalls Caesar's conclusion that the Gauls "constantly strive for innovation." Has he thereby explained the history of the French Revolution in terms of the national character of the French allegedly inherited from the Gauls? By no means. He has merely ascertained that the actions of the present-day French exhibit a common characteristic and that this characteristic is the same as the one Caesar observed to be a characteristic common to the actions

of the Gauls of his time. The issue here, then, is not one of causal explanation, but of the *recognition* of a common characteristic of different individual actions, which has already been observed at an earlier point in time. Why the Gauls strove for innovation and why the French rapidly altered their constitution is, of course, not explained. The attempt to explain an action in terms of the national character rests on flawed reasoning; the observation of a characteristic common to different individual actions is unjustifiably transformed into a causal relationship.

The same flawed reasoning is found in the belief that the actions of the individual can be *explained* on the basis of the national character of the people to which the individual belongs. An example is found in the "explanation" of the way of thinking and the wants of the individual Jew in terms of the Jewish national character. Werner Sombart argues that the Jews exhibit a particular predisposition to abstract thought and an indifference toward all qualitative determination. This is expressed in the Jewish religion just as it is in the thought of the Jewish scholar and the appreciation of money as a value released from all qualitative determination.⁴ On this basis one might believe that it is possible to explain the behavior of the Jews Kohn and Mayer in terms of the Jewish national character. In fact, this is not the case. Sombart has observed countless actions of individual Jews known to him from history or through personal acquaintance and emphasized a characteristic he sees in all of them. If we now observe the individual Jew and encounter this particular predisposition to abstract thought, we do not thereby explain the behavior of the individual Jew, but merely recognize in it the characteristic that Sombart has already observed in the actions of other Jews. But this tells us nothing about where this correspondence comes from.

The nation is a *relative community of character*; it is a community of character because, in any given era, a range of corresponding characteristics can be observed among the great majority of the nation's members, and because, although all nations share a number of characteristics by virtue of their humanity, there is nevertheless a range of characteristics that are peculiar to each nation and distinguish it from other nations. The nation is not an absolute, but only a relative community of character, because the individual members of a nation, although they share the characteristics common to the whole nation, also have individual characteristics (and local, class, and professional characteristics) that distinguish them from one another. The nation has a national character, but this national character merely indicates a relative commonality of the characteristics of individual behavior; it is not an explanation of this behavior. Rather than constituting an explanation, the national character itself needs to be explained. With its diagnosis of the diversity of national characters, scholarship has not *solved* the problem of the nation; it has merely *formulated* it. How each relative community of character develops, how it comes about that, in spite of all their individual differ-

ences, fellow nationals share a range of characteristics and, despite the physical and intellectual similarity of all human beings, differ from the members of other nations—this is what scholarship must seek to understand.

The task of explaining in causal terms this relative community of character of a nation's members is avoided, not solved, if one attempts to explain the actions of a nation and its members in terms of a mysterious "spirit of the people" [*Volksgeist*] or "soul of the people" [*Volksseele*]. The spirit of the people is an old love of the Romantics. It was introduced to scholarship by the "historical school of law" [*historische Rechtsschule*], which argues that the spirit of the people within individuals generates a community of juridical conviction that is already in itself the law or is the force that constitutes law.⁵ This informed the later belief that not only the law, but all actions and all the fates of the nation, could be comprehended as the manifestation or embodiment of the spirit of the people. According to this belief, the spirit of the people, the soul of the people, is the substratum, the substance of the nation, that which is permanent amidst all change, the unity within all individual differences, whereas individuals themselves are merely *modi*, mere appearances of this spiritual substance.⁶

It is clear that this *national spiritualism* is also based on flawed reasoning. The phenomena of my psyche—my representations, feelings, and wants—are the object of my immediate experience. The rational psychology of former times interpreted these phenomena as appearances of a permanent and particular object, as the activities of my soul. However, the powerful critique formulated by Kant proved everything that rational psychology believed itself capable of saying about this object to be the result of a fallacy. Since then we have no longer had a rational psychology that seeks to grasp psychological phenomena as appearances of the substance of the soul, but have had only an empirical psychology that describes the psychological phenomena directly given by experience—representations, feelings, and wants—and that seeks to comprehend them in terms of their interdependence.

Whereas the phenomena of my own psyche are directly given by my experience, the psychological phenomena of others are something I infer. I do not see the representations, feelings, and wants of others. I only see these others act: speaking, in movement and at rest, fighting, and sleeping. However, because I know from my own experience that for me physical movements are accompanied by psychological phenomena, I infer that this is also the case for other people. The physical movements of others appear to me inevitably as the expression of their wants as determined by their representations and feelings.

Rational psychology interpreted the psychological phenomena of others as the product of a particular object, just as it interpreted the phenomena of my own psyche as the activity of my soul. It was thus confronted with the problem of how the individual soul entered into a relation with the soul of another.

This problem was resolved either in *individualistic* terms, by interpreting the empirical relations between individuals as the appearances of the interrelations between the soul and other homogeneous, simple, and permanent beings, or in *universalistic* terms, by constructing a general soul, a spiritual totality, that merely appears in the individual soul. The spirit of the people, the soul of the people as conceived of by national spiritualism, is also a descendant of this general spirit, which merely appears in the individual soul.

Since Kant's critique of reason, however, we no longer recognize the existence of a substance of the soul, the activity of which could be understood as constituting the psychological event. Now we recognize only empirical psychological phenomena, which are understood in terms of their interdependence. As a result, we no longer understand the relations between people as the relations between these simple substances of the soul or as appearances of the one substance of the world spirit that reveals itself in the individual soul. Now our psychology recognizes its only task as that of understanding our own directly experienced representations, feelings, and wants and the indirectly experienced representations, feelings, and wants in terms of their interdependence. Since Kant's critique of the concept of the soul, the "spirit of the people" has become nothing more than a romantic ghost.

For instance, I notice that the behavior of a great number of Jews shares some feature. National spiritualism attempts to explain this correspondence by constructing a particular uniform and enduring substance, the spirit of the Jewish people, and to understand the similarity of Jewish actions as the result of every Jew's being an embodiment of this spirit of the people. But what is this spirit of the people? Either it is an empty word without any content, capable of explaining nothing, least of all concrete phenomena such as the behavior of a certain Mr. Kohn, or, if I want to give it content, this content must include that which is common to all Jewish actions. But if the spirit of the Jewish people is the abstract predisposition of persons named Kohn, Mayer, and Löwy, and whatever other names the individuals whose actions the concept seeks to explain may have, as a concept it has certainly not fulfilled its task. For what follows from this is, on the one hand, that Kohn and Mayer think in abstract terms because the spirit of the Jewish people manifests itself in them and, on the other, that the spirit of the Jewish people is the predisposition to abstract thought because Kohn and Mayer think in abstract terms. The explanation in terms of the spirit of the people thus becomes a tautology, an analytical judgment: that which is to be explained is itself part of the alleged explanation, the alleged cause being nothing more than an abstraction of the effects that are to be explained.

The spirit of the people cannot explain the national community of character because the spirit of the people is itself nothing but the national character transformed into a metaphysical essence, into a ghost. However, as we already know, the national character itself is not an explanation of the behavior of

any given individual, but merely the recognition of the relative similarity of the behavior of the members of a nation in a particular era. It does not constitute an explanation—it requires explanation. It is this explanation of the national community of character that is the task of scholarship.

THE NATION AS COMMUNITY OF NATURE

That children resemble their parents physically and intellectually and that siblings resemble one another is an age-old observation. Modern science attempts to illuminate this fact by drawing on our knowledge of the reproductive process. Fertilization consists of the union of two cells originating from a male and a female individual. The child resembles the father and the mother because it develops from the union of a paternal and a maternal cell. Siblings resemble one another because they have been produced from the union of cells from the same organisms.

Since Hertwig succeeded in observing the developmental stages within the egg of the sea urchin, we have had a more precise understanding of the process out of which the new life form develops. A spermatozoon penetrates the ovum and sheds its flagellum; the head of the spermatozoon then forms a small vesicle within the ovum, the sperm nucleus.⁷ The new sperm nucleus and the nucleus of the ovum drift toward one another. They meet in the center of the ovum, place themselves tightly against each other such that the contact surface is flattened, lose the membrane wall that separates them, and finally form a common nucleus. In this way the nuclei of the sperm and the ovum combine to form a simple germ nucleus.

Age-old experience, based on innumerable individual observations, teaches us that the child resembles the parents. Observation of the fertilization process in a range of organisms has shown that the offspring develops out of the fusion of two cells, one from a paternal and one from a maternal body. Science concludes, therefore, that the specificity of each organism is determined by the quality of the sperm and ovum nuclei from the fusion of which the organism has developed.

How is it, then, that the nuclei of the sperm and the ovum come to be the bearers of the characteristics of the individuals from which they derive, that they are capable of transferring the characteristics of one organism to another organism developing out of their fusion? At present science is still not capable of answering this question on the basis of precise observations, and we must therefore rely on hypotheses.

Darwin assumed that all tissue in the body sheds minuscule gemmules, which accumulate and join together in the sexual cells. Consequently, it is the entire body of the father and of the mother that indirectly produces the child, since each part of the paternal and the maternal body produces one of these tiny germs. These then join together in the sexual cells, constituting, on

the one hand, the spermatozoon and, on the other, the ovum. And it is from the fusion of the nuclei of sperm and ovum, through growth and cell division, that the child develops. The paternal and maternal bodies thus produce the germs from which the child develops. This constitutes Darwin's "provisional hypothesis of *pangensis*."

Modern scientific research no longer supports this conjecture. Darwin's hypothesis of pangensis, according to which the sexual cells are formed from the germs produced and thrown off by the tissue of the body, has been replaced by the hypothesis formulated by Weismann of the *continuity of the germ plasm*.⁸ The child develops from the germ nucleus produced from the fusion of the sperm and ovum nuclei. The germ plasm, the substance of this germ nucleus, then splits into two parts: one part, the *active* germ plasm, is subject to a range of only partially understood changes, ultimately leading to the development of the child's body. The other part, however, the *inactive* germ plasm, remains qualitatively unchanged; it forms the sexual cells of the child. According to this hypothesis, then, the sexual cells of the child are developed not from its own body, but directly from the parental sexual cells. The active germ plasm constructs the body of the child, is gradually used up and dies. The inactive germ plasm, on the other hand, is transmitted from the parents to the child, and maintains itself in the sperm or in the ovum of the child: it is immortal. The fact that over the ages one generation resembles another is explained by this hypothesis as the result of every generation's being the product of the same substance, of the germ plasm, which survives unchanged in the sexual cells and is transmitted from the parents to the child.

What are the consequences of the doctrine of heredity, then, for the task of determining the essence of the nation? Let us first take the simplest case: a nation that is descended from one human couple, as is claimed by the legends of origin among the majority of peoples, or at least from one clan or horde. The problem of the community of character is confined in this case to the similarity between siblings: it is based solely on the inheritance of the same qualities from common ancestors. The nation thus acquires a *material substratum*: the germ plasm becomes the bearer of the nation. From the standpoint of Darwin's hypothesis, it is the continual process of germ formation from the body tissue and of body tissue from the germs that links the members of a nation to their most distant common ancestors and thereby to each other. An even simpler representation of the body as bearer of the national character is provided by Weismann's standpoint. In this case it is the unchanged germ plasm transmitted from generation to generation in the sexual cells that acts as the bearer of national peculiarities. Accepting this view as satisfactory would mean opposing the national spiritualism that we have already examined with a *national materialism*.

The fact of national character, the commonality of character among the members of a nation, is obvious from experience; scholarship aims to explain

it. National spiritualism represents the nation as the embodiment of a mysterious "spirit of the people"; national materialism, however, sees the substratum of the nation in a precisely organized material, in the germ plasm transmitted from generation to generation. From the standpoint of national spiritualism, the history of the nation is nothing more than a manifestation of the progressive development of the spirit of the people according to its own internal laws. For national materialism, on the other hand, the history of the nation is the manifestation of the transformations of the germ plasm. The whole of world history thus assumes the form of a mere reflection of the fate of the germ plasm. The ability of the race to bear and beget determines the history of the people. The maintenance of the purity of blood, the mingling of the germs of different communities of descent—these are, then, the truly great world historical events that manifest themselves in the fates of individual human beings and those of entire nations.

It cannot be denied that national materialism has reached a higher stage in the development of our knowledge of the essence of the nation than national spiritualism. For, as we have already established, the "spirit of the people" is not an explanation of the national community of character, but a metaphysical reinterpretation of it that is based on the replacement of a causal relationship by a tautology. National materialism, on the other hand, is based on an empirical fact, the physically mediated bequeathing of parental characteristics to children. The superiority of national materialism to national spiritualism is ultimately based on the fact that natural science cannot do without the concept of matter, the concept of a permanent substratum of the natural object as the condition of the causal relationships constituting the event, whereas psychology since Kant's critique of reason has been able to completely eliminate the concept of a spiritual substance. National materialism is based on the concept of matter, which still remains indispensable for our natural sciences, whereas national spiritualism is based on the concept of the substance of the soul, which has been abandoned by psychology. In spite of this, national materialism cannot suffice for us either.

This is because national materialism is based on a concept of causality that has been superseded in the course of the development of the modern natural sciences. From a historicopsychological point of view, the concept of cause and effect has its roots in the immediate experience of the active human being. When I throw a stone, I have produced this action. I am the cause, the action, the effect. I, the cause, live on, whereas the action is completed in that moment. Ancient thought pictures every relationship of cause and effect according to the model of this immediate experience. Behind every event is an invisible living being—a god, a nymph, a satyr—that produces the event. Gradually human beings outgrow this *mythological* concept of causality. However, even if it is no longer always a living being that is seen as necessarily present, it still remains the case that some sort of objective and permanent

entity is regarded as the cause of the unique, transitory action. This is the *substantial concept of causality*: the external objects are bearers of forces that cause everything that occurs. The sun has a force that illuminates and heats, the stone a force of gravity, the earth a force of attraction—forces that are permanently linked to a certain and permanent entity, a certain substance.⁹

It is now clear that national materialism is also based on this concept of causality. It is content as long as it has located a material substratum, a primary cause in the germ plasm transmitted from generation to generation. This curious substance is the permanent element in all change, the common element in all difference; it contains the mysterious power to produce from itself individuals with particular characteristics. Once materialism has located a primary cause and invested it with a permanently effective force, the product of which appears as everything that is becoming and that is, it is content. However, for modern science this concept of causality has long been obsolete. First, mechanics has given the concept of force a new meaning. It is now no longer regarded as a mysterious being concealed in a certain substance, like the dryad in the tree and the naiad in the stream of childish popular belief, but is regarded as a complementary concept to that of mass. And both lose their mythological character in that they are observed as mere quantities. Force is the acceleration exerted on a mass of a specific magnitude. Mass is the resistance of a body to a force of a specific magnitude. The force is measurable in that it is compared with another force working on the same mass. Mass is measurable in that it is compared with another mass on which the same force works. On this basis, phenomena of movement are quantitatively comparable. A mechanics founded on these principles has now become the foundation of all natural science. Now we no longer look, as was the case at the stage of the substantial concept of causality, for substances endowed with particular properties that, as the bearers of mysterious forces, produce the phenomena of heat, sound, light, and electricity. Rather, we now seek to trace heat, sound, light, and electricity back to processes of movement in the same material substratum, to grasp qualitative differences through their relationship to quantitative changes. We thus no longer enquire into substances as bearers of forces, no longer into primary causes, but comprehend every event as a transformation of energy.¹⁰

We do not have a permanent, immutably effective substance on the one hand and, on the other, its changing effects; rather, the phenomenon that is produced as an effect itself immediately produces new phenomena, which in turn give it the appearance of a cause—and so on in an endless chain. Our psychology no longer recognizes an effective capacity of the soul, but studies the successive psychological phenomena in terms of their interdependence. Natural science no longer inquires into substances that, as bearers of mysterious forces, are the constant conditions of change. Rather, it searches for the laws according to which one natural phenomenon follows from another (al-

though, of course, the distinction remains that psychology has completely eliminated the concept of the soul as substance, whereas, in the case of natural science, all movement ultimately remains movement of an ultimate uniform material, to which the concept of substance has been reduced).

The replacement of the essential by the *actual concept of causality* also delineates our own task. In what follows we shall not content ourselves with discovering in the germ plasm the material bearer of national specificity, discovering in its mysterious power to determine the individuals emerging from it the force that produces the nation. Rather, we shall locate this substance within the system of events in which every cause is at the same time also to be understood as an effect. The qualitatively determined germ plasm cannot be regarded as a mere cause; we must also understand it as an effect. If a particular material is the material substratum of the national community of character, we must enquire further as to the causes that in turn determine the quality of the material connecting the successive generations. How are we to understand in causal terms the specificity of the germ plasm that constitutes a material connection between fellow nationals? The theory of natural selection formulated by Darwin offers us one possible way here.

The fact from which Darwin's theory proceeds is *individual variation*. Children of the same parental pair resemble each other, but are never identical. The larger the circle of individuals related by descent that we observe, the further the genealogical tree of a family branches out, then the more conspicuous are the individual differences between persons related by blood. The physical and intellectual features that distinguish consanguineous persons from one another are in part *acquired* characteristics; the individuals are different because their environments, their upbringings, their ways of life, their fates have been different. These variations do not include only those acquired by humans subsequent to birth; rather, individuals are already differentiated due to the fact that the conditions of life as experienced by children in the womb are never identical. However, it is certain that the individual differences between persons related by blood can never be completely explained on the basis of the differences between their experiences in the womb and following birth. Besides acquired differences there are also *inherited* individual differences. If individuals related by blood resemble each other but are never identical, this is because the germ cells from which they have developed were not identical. Modern science attempts to explain this phenomenon through the examination of the nature and effects of *amphimixis*, through the observation of the reduction process, and ultimately on the basis of the assumption that the germ plasm is always formed by numerous elements of varying nature with different formative powers. It is not necessary here to go into the details of this hypothesis; individual variation is an empirical fact that, however it is explained, cannot be denied. This individual variation is the precondition of natural selection.

Let us consider, for example, a nomadic people who live from hunting and rearing livestock. As long as plentiful pastures are available, the people's possibilities for obtaining food are unlimited; however, should this pastoral people and the pastoral peoples around it increase in number, the area available to each people will become too small, and a bitter and incessant conflict will develop between them over pastures and hunting grounds. In such conflicts it will obviously be those individuals who by chance—as a result of individual variation—are particularly suited to combat who will have the greatest chance of surviving and reproducing. The cowardly and the lethargic, those whose fists are too weak and whose eyes are not sharp enough, will be the first to perish in the ongoing struggles with the neighboring peoples; they will have the least chance of producing offspring. Those individuals who are best suited to combat will survive and reproduce their own type; those less suited to combat will perish. Important here is the fact that the type constituted by the father is passed on to the son. If the individuals best suited to combat have a greater role in the reproduction of the people than those less suited to combat, the greater part of the coming generation will be made up of individuals suited to combat. If the conditions in which the people live remain unchanged, the entire people will ultimately be made up of individuals suited to combat; those less well suited will almost completely disappear due to their continual elimination in combat.

Darwin has compared the effect of the struggle for existence, as represented in this example, with the conscious strategies of the animal breeder. If, for example, an animal breeder uses only roosters with long tail feathers for breeding and excludes those with short tail feathers from reproduction, whole generations with progressively longer tail feathers will subsequently be bred. A variety of the Japanese-Korean rooster with six-foot-long tail feathers is bred in this way. This artificial selection achieved through the conscious application of breeding methods is mirrored in nature, where the effects of the struggle for existence operate without the agency of a conscious will—as a result of natural selection. In the case of the hunting and pastoral people, the conditions under which its members must maintain their existence have over time preferentially bred the variety best suited to combat and eliminated those less well suited, just as if some breeder had supervised their reproduction and allowed only those suited to combat to reproduce the species. The effects of natural selection are amplified by sexual selection. Among the nomadic peoples, for example, the men who particularly distinguish themselves in battle will enjoy the most prestige. It will be these men who enjoy the best reputation within the people as a whole to whom the women most gladly give their favors—again, those best suited to combat. For this reason too, those best suited to combat will have good prospects of reproducing their own type.

Thus, if we know how to utilize Darwin's fertile idea of natural selection, the theory of heredity takes on a quite new significance. National materialism

has contented itself with the observation that this or that nation exhibits this or that character trait because of heredity—and ultimately because all the members of a nation have developed from the formative plasm that is the bearer of this or that characteristic. But if we know how to utilize Darwin's idea of natural selection, the situation becomes even clearer. The fact that this or that people is particularly suited to combat may indeed be based on physiologically determined heredity. But why is this ability to fight transmitted? Perhaps because centuries ago the ancestors of this people had to lead a warlike, nomadic existence, because those less suited to combat were increasingly eliminated from the process of reproduction and only those suited to combat could reproduce their own type.

A people's inherited capacity for warfare is thus the precipitate of its history over previous centuries, the result of the conditions under which it has secured its means of existence. The transmission of character traits from parents to children is only a means by which the conditions in which a people seeks, labors, and struggles for its livelihood continue to exercise an effect on later generations. The theory of the transmission of such character traits does not contradict the so-called *materialist conception of history* of Karl Marx, but gives it a new meaning. The conditions in which a people produces its means of existence regulate selection. Those best adapted to these conditions survive and reproduce their type, thereby transmitting their character traits to later generations; given the same conditions of production over a longer period of time, those who are less well adapted will be gradually eliminated. The conditions of production of earlier generations are thus mirrored in the inherited character traits of later generations.

These conditions of production, however, are not a material of a particular type, but the embodiment of various social phenomena. These phenomena are described by history, understood by the social sciences as particular cases of general laws, and explained in terms of their interdependence. National materialism is content to interpret the history of the nation in terms of the efficacy of a qualitatively determined material invested with mysterious powers, the germ plasm. It believes it can explain the varying event by discovering the permanent substance within it. For us, however, natural heredity is only a means by which the varying fortunes of ancestors determine the character of all their descendants, and thereby bind these descendants together in a community of character, in a nation. For this reason, the national community of character is no longer merely the expression of the mysterious power of the substance from which all members of the nation have developed and that lives in all of them. Rather, it is regarded as being situated within the overall chain of events in which every cause is itself understood as an effect and everything that was initially an effect itself becomes a cause.¹¹

We have assumed until now that selection from among the different inherited individual variations within a people occurs in the form of natural

and sexual selection. That natural selection as described here decides which characteristics are passed on is certain. On the other hand, the question of whether characteristics that are not congenitally inherited but *acquired* through a particular way of life are transmitted to subsequent generations is still a matter of dispute.

At the time when our nomadic people was engaging in incessant combat with its neighbors as a result of population expansion, it consisted of persons who were either more or less suited to combat. These differences were congenital, having emerged in the play of cell reduction and amphimixis. There can be no doubt that, given certain conditions, the capacity for combat inherited by certain individuals in this way becomes an advantage in the struggle for existence, and that therefore, through this struggle for existence itself, a people suited to combat is bred as a consequence of the selection of those best adapted to the people's conditions of existence. However, Lamarck and Darwin assumed that an increased capacity for combat developing as the result of a way of life was also transmitted to the descendants. They thus argued that later generations would be better suited to battle than previous ones not only because the less well suited would be gradually wiped out and eliminated from reproduction, but also because fathers would transmit to their offspring the strategic ability and boldness practiced, acquired, and strengthened in numerous battles, the sharpened eyes and strengthened arms—that is, characteristics acquired through their way of life and not by virtue of the individual variation of the germ cell. If this were correct, the effect of particular conditions on the inherited characteristics of the descendants would of course be much more rapid and significant than if only the inherited characteristics were transmitted and the regulation of this process were left to the elimination from reproduction of those less well adapted to the specific conditions in which a people lives.

It is clear that certain acquired characteristics are not passed on. We know from everyday experience, for example, that the scars a father or mother has from a wound are never transmitted to the child. But it is equally clear that certain characteristics that are acquired in life rather than inherited are transmitted to one's descendants, namely those having a direct influence on the germ cell. Thus, a condition acquired through alcohol use is undoubtedly transmitted to one's children because the alcohol poisons the liquid that nourishes the germ cells and thereby the germ plasm itself. On the other hand, the argument has still not been settled as to whether physical changes are passed on that are not acquired through a single chance event, but through a lasting influence, and that do not directly affect the nourishment of the germ plasm.

Whatever the outcome of this debate, in principle it changes nothing regarding our view of the significance of natural heredity for the essence of the nation.

The inherited characteristics of a nation are nothing but the precipitate of its past, its *solidified history* [*erstarrete Geschichte*], so to speak. The conditions

under which the ancestors live have an effect on the following generations *in any case* due to the fact that in the course of natural selection it is these conditions that decide which characteristics are passed on and which are eliminated. The effect of natural selection is *perhaps* increased by the transmission to later generations of characteristics acquired by their ancestors as a result of the particular conditions in which the latter live. Be that as it may, the inherited character is determined by nothing other than history, by the ancestral past. The members of a nation are thus physically and intellectually similar because they are descended from the same ancestors and have thereby inherited all those ancestral characteristics cultivated by the struggle for existence by way of natural and sexual selection, and perhaps also those characteristics acquired by their ancestors in striving to secure their livelihood. We thus understand the nation as a product of history. Those who aim to study the nation as a natural community cannot content themselves with interpreting a particular material—for instance, a germ plasm transmitted from parents to their children—as the substratum of the nation. Rather, they must study the history of the ancestors' conditions of production and exchange and attempt to comprehend the inherited characteristics of the descendants on the basis of the ancestors' struggle for existence.

Today we of course still know very little about which characteristics can be passed on and how quickly the effects of changed living conditions express themselves in inherited characteristics. For this reason, we will always first attempt here to explain the actions of a nation on the basis of its contemporary habits, the effect of which cannot be denied. Only when this approach does not yield results will we look at the effects of the conditions of ancestral existence, which, by way of heredity, also have an effect on the descendants. The fact that such effects exist, however, that the history of the ancestors is alive in the inherited nature of the descendants, is beyond doubt.

What is true of nations descended from one parental pair, one clan, or one horde is also true of peoples in whose veins the blood of different peoples is mingled. Thus, the French have inherited certain characteristics of the Gauls, the Romans, and the Germanic tribes. But this means nothing more than that the characteristics cultivated in these three peoples as a result of the nature of their struggle for existence reappear in the character of the French, that the history of these three peoples is still alive today, still effective in the character of each individual Frenchman. The conditions under which the ancestors labored and struggled for their means of existence determine the inherited characteristics of the descendants.

COMMUNITY OF NATURE AND COMMUNITY OF CULTURE

Let us assume that some immense catastrophe wipes out the German people, sparing only a few very young children. Let us further assume that, along with

the people, this catastrophe also destroys all German cultural treasures—all workshops, studios, schools, libraries, and museums. However, fortunate circumstances make it possible for the children of this unfortunate people to grow up and to establish a new people. Will this people be a German people? Of course, these children will have brought with them into the world the inherited natural predispositions of the German people, and they will not lose these. However, the language that they will slowly have to develop will not be a German language; through a slow process of development the new people will have to elaborate custom and law, religion and science, art and literature anew for itself, and the individuals living under such completely changed conditions will exhibit character traits quite different from those of Germans today.

This example, which I have taken from a lecture given by Hatschek, clearly shows that we have not fully grasped the essence of the nation if we comprehend it merely as a natural community, as a community of individuals linked by descent.¹² The specificity of the individual is never determined only by inherited predispositions, but also by the relations within which he himself lives: by the manner in which he must seek his livelihood, by the quantity and type of goods that his labor brings him, by the customs of the people among whom he lives, by the law to which he is subject, and by the influences of the worldview, literature, and art that affect him. Individuals with the same inherited predispositions, if subject from earliest childhood to other cultural conditions, would become a different people. The nation is never only a community of nature, but also a *community of culture*.

But there is more to this: the rigorous demarcation of national individualities cannot be comprehended on the basis of the community of nature alone. For every community of nature is dominated by the tendency toward continual differentiation. Moritz Wagner has pointed out how geographic separation leads to the emergence of new species.¹³ The German tribes, for example, certainly originated from a common ancestral people. However, through the process of migration, the descendants of this ancestral people spread out over a wide area. The conditions in which the individual tribes lived thus became quite distinct from one another—those of the Alpine inhabitants differed from those of the lowland inhabitants, those of the inhabitants of the mountains bordering the Bohemian plateau differed from those of the “Waterkant” inhabitants.¹⁴ Different conditions cultivated different specificities and thus different characters in the tribes. These differences remained because the geographic separation of the tribes prevented intermarriage. Given these conditions, one might suppose that distinct peoples would have necessarily developed out of the different tribes and that the inherited specificities of these peoples would have also ultimately become quite distinctive. As in ancient times the Celts, Germanic tribes, and Slavs emerged from a common ancestral people, the German people would have necessarily disintegrated into a

number of independent peoples, who would immediately have been subject to a further process of differentiation and in turn divided over the centuries into smaller groups quite distinct from one another. However, history teaches us that this process of differentiation is counteracted by a contrasting process of unification. Thus, it is undoubtedly the case that the Germans of today constitute a nation in a quite different sense from that, for instance, of the Middle Ages. Today the Germans of the Baltic coast have much more in common with the Germans of the Alpine regions than was the case, for instance, in the fourteenth century. This unification of tribes to form a single people cannot be comprehended on the basis of the facts of natural heredity. These explain only the separation of groups from one people, never the emergence of a nation from different tribes. This process can be grasped only on the basis of the influences exerted by a *common culture*. In what follows, the emergence of the unitary nation from different tribes living under different conditions and not linked by intermarriage will be discussed in detail.

If we regard the nation, on the one hand, as a community of nature and, on the other, as a community of culture, this does not mean we are considering different causes that determine the national character. The character of human beings is never determined by anything other than their fate; the national character is never anything other than the precipitate of a nation's history. The conditions under which humans produce their livelihood and distribute the fruits of their labor determine the fate of every people. On the basis of a particular form of production and distribution, a particular intellectual culture also emerges. However, the history of a people determined in this way has a twofold effect on the descendants of that people. On the one hand, there is an effect in the form of natural heredity, which entails particular physical characteristics' being cultivated by the struggle for existence and passed on to the descendants. On the other hand, particular cultural elements are created and handed down to the descendants by way of upbringing, custom and law, and the effects of social interaction. The nation is never anything other than a community of fate. However, the effect of this community of fate is realized, on the one hand, through the natural bequeathing of qualities cultivated by the common fate of the nation and, on the other, through the handing down of cultural elements, the specificity of which is determined by the fate of the nation. Thus, when we consider the nation as a community of nature and then as a community of culture, we are not considering different causes that determine the character of human beings. Rather, we are identifying the *different means* by which the same causes—the conditions of the ancestral struggle for existence—exert an effect on the character of the descendants. The fortunes of the ancestors determine the character of the descendants, on the one hand, through the natural transmission of certain characteristics and, on the other, through the handing down of certain elements of culture.

Considering the nation as a community of culture or, in other words, considering how the national character is determined by the shared tradition of cultural elements passed down from earlier generations provides us with a more solid foundation than did the attempt to explain the origins of the national community of character on the basis of the natural transmission of physical characteristics. Whereas in the case of heredity we were limited to less certain observations and in general forced to rely on hypotheses, in the case of culture we have the firmer foundation of human history. We will attempt, as extensively as possible within the given framework of this study, to illustrate the essence of the nation as a community of culture with an example, namely that of the emergence of the cultural community of the Germans.

However, the aim here is not to ascertain how the German national character with its determinate content has come into being. That is to say, the aim is not to investigate which characteristics constitute the German national character and then to examine how each of these characteristics emerged in the history of the Germans. Rather, using the example of the German nation, we intend to show how the national character in general—whatever its nature—can be determined by the transmission of historically developed cultural elements. This approach is analogous to that employed in the discussion of the nation as a natural community, where our goal was not to explain the emergence of a certain national character by way of selection and heredity, but only to shed light on the emergence of the national character in general through the natural transmission of characteristics cultivated in the struggle for existence. Rather than explaining the emergence of a particular national character, our task entails bringing to light the means by which the transmission of cultural elements is able to produce a national community of character in general. We are concerned here not with the derivation of a particular national character and its determinate content, but with the formal process of the emergence of the national character out of a community of culture.

THE GERMANIC NATIONAL COMMUNITY OF CULTURE IN THE ERA OF CLAN COMMUNISM

The basic unit of the Germanic social structure was the *clan* or *kin group* [*Sippschaft* or *Magschaft*].¹⁵ During the period in which the Roman authors, whose work constitutes the oldest detailed descriptions of the Germanic communities available to us, recorded their observations, the clan consisted of a large number of persons who were related by blood and whose line of descent was traced via the male lineage back to one man.

The clan was above all the basic unit around which the economy of the Germans was organized. At the time of their struggles against Caesar, the Germans had reached the economic stage of nomadic agriculture. Rather than cultivating the same area of land year in and year out, they still pursued

the practice of taking new land each year; this was made possible by the fact that free, uncultivated land was plentiful. The chiefs of the clan groups [*Völkerschaften*] annually allocated land to the individual clans, which then proceeded to cultivate it.¹⁶ The clan was thus the unit that annually took an area of land as its own; during the early phase of agricultural development, the members of the clan cultivated this land together.

The clan was also the basis of Germanic military organization. The men of each clan fought alongside their fellow clan members in battle. It was also the clan that provided protection for the individual. If one German injured or killed another, the perpetrator was pursued by the clan of the victim. The perpetrator himself was in turn provided with protection by his own clan. As a consequence, every violation of the peace resulted in a feud between the two clans. This feud ended with the establishment of a reconciliation treaty. The clan [*Sippe*] of the perpetrator paid a fine to the kin [*Magen*] of the victim. And when later the freely concluded reconciliation treaty between the clans was replaced by a treaty concluded before a court, the plaintiff and the accused both appeared before the court with their kin, who attested to the credibility of those under oath.

Such clans formed the groups that constituted the small communities into which the Germans divided. The clan group [*Völkerschaft*] had no fixed relationship to the land; it was not a territorial unit, that is to say, not a unit made up of all those settled on a particular piece of land—this would not have been possible at a time when the Germans had not yet fully developed beyond the cultural stage of nomadism—but a unit made up of clans allied with one another. Even the units we find within the clan group—the centuries and millennia that constituted the army and became the basis of the legal constitution that gradually grew out of the feuding between the clans—were not territorially defined, either in terms of juridical or military levy districts. Rather, they were associations of persons [*Personenverbände*], narrower associations of clans within the clan group.

The clan groups did not have any association that bound them together. They were independent political units, independently waging war and forming alliances or feuding with one another like independent states. Where is the nation to be found in this era? Of course, we cannot hope to find the nation-state here; the clan groups were not united by any common political force. Where, then, do we find the nation?

Above all, it was common descent that constituted the Germans as a nation in this era. Common origin still formed the foundation of all social groupings: the clan was the fixed basis of every social unit. A number of related clans formed the clan group, and all the clan groups together constituted the nation; the nation appeared as the clan group of the people, so to speak, as the unit constituted by all clan groups descended from the one Germanic ancestral people. Germanic people also conceived of themselves in this way. “In

time-honored songs," Tacitus tells us, "their only form of historical record, they celebrate the god Tuisto, the son of the earth, and his son Mannus as the founders of their people."

Of course, the Germans were also linked with other Indo-Germanic peoples by descent. Their nearest relatives were probably the Celts and the Slavs. The point at which the Celts broke away from this common ancestral people lies too far back in time to be clearly identifiable. It seems that the Germans separated themselves from the Slavs much later and initially inhabited the land between the Oder and the Vistula on the edge of the Baltic Sea. A great many centuries must have passed before the clan groups observed by Caesar and Tacitus emerged from this Germanic ancestral people.

But common descent produces a common culture. All the different Germanic clan groups that gradually developed out of the original ancestral people shared the same language passed down from their ancestors, the same concept of the moral and the immoral, the same law, the same religious ideas, the same inherited forms of production. The fate of the ancestral people of the Baltic coastal region produced a particular culture that became the heritage of all these clan groups. For life within these clan groups was tightly circumscribed by tradition. Only slowly did the law change among peoples to whom legislation was unknown and to whom inherited law appeared as a gift from the gods, not created by human beings, but merely uncovered by the members of the assembly of able-bodied men. Only slowly did the art of cultivation and of working materials change among peoples who did not employ a methodical science to find effective means of mastering the forces of nature for human purposes, but who rather relied on the son's learning simple techniques from the father or maternal uncle. In this way, the entire culture of these people was passed from generation to generation; and in the inherited elements of the cultures of all these clan groups—already living completely separated from one another, experiencing different fates in different regions—all of the common cultural elements passed down from the time of the common ancestral people remained dominant.

For this reason, all Germans were of a similar character. Just as, according to Tacitus, they were physically similar, with powerful bodies, sandy hair, and blue eyes, so too were they similar in terms of their representations, thoughts, feelings, and wants. We may surely speak of a Germanic national character in this era: it was produced by the common fate of the common ancestors. The shared fate of the ancestral people produced a common character, and this character was bequeathed to all Germanic kinship groups [*Magschaften*] and clan groups. It was bequeathed naturally, in the sense of the resemblance between child and parent, but also through the transmission of the culture of the ancestral people, which provided the foundation of the culture of all its descendants. Just as the Germans of this era constituted a *community of nature*, the character of which reflected the fate of the ancestral people in all the

clan groups as a result of the transmission of germinal material from parents to child, so too were they a *community of culture*. In the culture of all these clan groups the culture of the ancestral people still survived. For this reason all these peoples led an existence circumscribed by similar forms of work, similar social relations, similar laws, similar religious ideas, similar languages, and similar customs. Common descent and a culture that had been passed down from the same ancestral people produced among all of them the community of character that made them a nation. Thus, the community of character of the Germans rested firmly on their common descent, which influenced every individual, bringing forth similar natural predispositions and forming the character of each individual through the same process of cultural transmission.

And this cultural transmission was indeed common to all Germans of the time: common first in the sense that within the clan group no one was excluded from this culture and all shared in it equally. For the clan group, based on the common property of the clan, did not recognize any social differences that could have led to cultural differences: every member took part in the *Thing*, the people's assembly, which decided on war and peace, on migration and settlement. Each took part in the judicial assembly that arbitrated in the feuds between the clans according to ancient inherited principles, the origins of which lay in the distant past and which could thus be attributed to divine intervention. All Germanic people learned the same art of cultivation, the same methods of cattle breeding, cloth making, and hunting from their parents in the same way. Whether the same clan had from time immemorial provided the clan group with its king or whether it was the boldest in this or that clan who was elected duke [*Herzog*], all had a share in the primitive culture of the nation, all were affected by the inherited elements of the culture. These elements operated with the same force in every individual, producing his entire constant being, his character.

Moreover, a national Germanic culture existed in this era in yet another sense. At this time there were still no fixed borders separating the tribes that were later to become the ancestors of the modern German people from the other Germanic tribes. To speak of a *German* people in this period would be to transpose the results of much later developments onto the period of clan communism. The cultural community during this period, based firmly on common descent, still constituted all Germanic communities as a nation.

Of course, every such nation, whose unifying bond is constituted by common ancestry and a culture based on shared traditions inherited from an ancestral people, carries within it the seed of its own decay, the tendency for an originally unified people to split into different nations. This is a general law: every nation whose cultural community is based exclusively on common descent faces the threat of differentiation.

We can illustrate this by turning again to the example of the family. The

children of the same father and mother recognize each other as siblings. They resemble one another physically, and their character is determined by the same experiences in the family home, by the same parental influences, by similar fates. In the next generation the community may well remain intact: a number of similarities may emerge among the siblings' children by virtue of their being related by blood and subject to similar influences. But with each new generation this similarity progressively disappears. The German language in its present form no longer even includes a word with which the grandchildren of siblings can describe their bond with one another. And who of us still recognizes the community of blood that links us with a stranger we encounter due to the fact that in the sixth or eighth or tenth generation of our family trees we share a common ancestor? The case is very similar among nations insofar as they are united by nothing more than common ancestry, irrespective of the fact that this might be manifested in a common cultural heritage as well as a common biological origin.

Initially it is the community of nature itself that gradually becomes less cohesive. In the case of the ancestors of the ancient Germans, the same fate had produced the same characters. In the struggle for existence, those who had not adapted to the conditions in which that people lived did not survive; thus similar conditions favored the survival of similar individuals and produced the similarity of their descendants. Thus, a particular type emerged and was passed on. This particular type was passed on among the Germans on the North Sea coast as it was among those on the upper Rhine. However, different forces now began to take effect on the geographically separate clan groups. The external conditions of existence under which they lived had become different; the struggle for existence continued to exert an effect, but there was a difference between the effect among the Frisians living on the coast and the effect among the Chatti or the Cherusci, between the effect in the west and that in the east, between the effect among the Germanic communities who had to survive frequent battles with the Romans and the effect among clan groups that were protected from the Roman legions by vast forests. In this way the natural predispositions of the clan groups became differentiated: from century to century their children became progressively different from one another. And since wide stretches of land now separated the Germanic tribes from one another, these differences could no longer be counteracted through intermarriage.

Moreover, that which applied to the transmission of natural predispositions applied to an even greater extent to the transmission of culture. Over the course of centuries, the influences acting on the culture of the clan groups had become infinitely varied. A common core, passed down over centuries, necessarily remained. But increasingly the centuries undermined this core, shaping new cultural elements among the clan groups in an almost imperceptible process of continual development, elements that were no longer ho-

mogeneous, but differentiated. There was no interaction between the Chatti and the Frisians, and their experiences and their fates were quite distinct. Was it not inevitable that the language of the Chatti gradually became increasingly different from that of the Frisians? Was it not inevitable that the ways in which they worked, their legal constitutions, their ideas, customs, and religious conceptions became more and more dissimilar? The unitary Germanic nation was thus threatened with disintegration: the further the Germanic groups expanded their territory and the more they turned to settled agriculture and became more closely bound to the soil, the more community, interaction, and intermarriage between them ceased; the greater the difference between the ways in which their fates were shaped, the more their characters changed. The greater the differences between the external influences acting upon them, the greater the stretches of land separating them, the more differentiated their language also became, with the result that they gradually lost the tool of their interaction. The Germanic nation was thus threatened with disintegration into a number of independent nations.

These nations into which the Germanic nation began to disintegrate were not, however, the innumerable Germanic communities constituted by the clan groups, but the *tribes*. Clan groups that predominantly shared the same origin, lived close to each other, and were not separated by large rivers or mountain ranges were affected by the same cultural influences; they became increasingly similar due to the fact that they to some extent shared the same fate, frequently interacted with one another, and, in particular, formed bonds through intermarriage. Such groups developed a similar *tribal character*. A common language was maintained through continual interaction; a community of blood was established through ongoing intermarriage; the settlement of the same land, the struggle with the same enemies—that is, the same fate—created similar characters. Continual interaction transmitted the experiences of related and closely situated clan groups from one to the other and thus increasingly shaped a unitary tribal culture. Although the bond that linked all Germanic people became progressively weaker, the tribe now emerged in the form of a community of clan groups sharing the same origins and the same ethos and increasingly separate from its neighboring tribes. The Germanic people now became Alemanni and Franks, Saxons and Bavarians, Goths and Vandals.

The differentiation of the tribes was initially an effect of the diversity that developed within the Germanic people as a whole, promoted by the transition to settled agriculture and by the territorial isolation of the clan groups and increasing from generation to generation. It was fostered by a significant change in political organization, which, at the same time, was primarily caused by radical economic changes. The old Germanic form of political organization was transformed by two major historical phenomena: on the one hand, the transition to settled agriculture and, on the other, the Germanic

hunger for land in the face of the mounting pressure exerted by the peoples of the east and by their own population growth.

In Tacitus's time there was still no shortage of land: "Et superest ager," said Tacitus—land is available in abundance. However, with the growing population the arable land available gradually petered out; the form of extensive cultivation in use at this time was unable to exploit the old land enough to feed the growing population. No wonder, then, that a hunger for land was awakened in the tribes, who were already accustomed to war. And where could it have been easier to conquer land than in the large regions of the Roman Empire now weak with age, whose rotten border fortifications were unable to withstand the barbarian onslaught? However, the individual clan groups were too weak to fight the Romans. As a result, the clan groups linked by common blood and the same culture joined forces, initially as a military alliance, which then progressively formed itself into a lasting community. In this way Germanic communities emerged in the form of tribes ruled by tribal kings. In the case of those not forced to join in the process of tribal unification by the struggle with the Romans, it was the new settled form of existence that necessitated the combining of clan groups to form tribes. For it was now no longer possible for all able-bodied men to go to war, as had been the case during the nomadic period. Work in the fields now required a part of the male population to remain behind, and this fact rendered the clan group too weak in military terms; in order to triumph in battle against its enemies, it was now forced to combine with neighboring clan groups to form a politically unified tribe. Militarily weakened by their settled form of existence, the clan groups formed alliances from which grew the tribe as a political community. Around the year 350, the Alemanni were under the rule of at least ten kings; a century later they were establishing themselves as a unified community. A short time later the Frankish king Clovis, combining force and cunning, eliminated the leaders of the clan groups and founded the tribal kingdom ruled by his dynasty.¹⁷

The turmoil of the great migrations led to an increasing consolidation of these tribes. Shared fortunes in these warlike times gradually blurred the boundaries between clan groups within the tribe, constituting the latter as a unitary nation. At the same time, the shared Germanic cultural identity was rapidly being lost. The tribes that successfully conquered the collapsing parts of the old Roman Empire and came under the influence of this old superior culture soon became completely estranged from the tribes that remained in their home territories. But these tribes, too, due to their having adopted a settled form of existence, were being separated by an ever widening gulf. It is in this era that the phonetic shift began to separate Upper and Low German, with the result that a linguistic gulf split what remained of the nation in the old home territories into two parts, a gulf that has still not been bridged today. What could more clearly signify the growing estrangement of the

tribes, the complete lack of any community of interaction, than linguistic disunity? During this period, when the Germans were being increasingly split by the establishment of a settled form of existence and the shared culture of a feudal ruling class had not yet developed, the Germanic nation had ceased to exist, but a German nation had not yet emerged. The old nation had been split into a number of increasingly estranged tribes, the children of which rapidly developed different predispositions as a result of the different fates of their fathers and distinctive cultures inherited from their parents, which seldom intermarried with other tribes, which were no longer linked within a community of interaction and, as a consequence, soon developed their own distinct tribal languages. The old community of culture, based on common descent from the Germanic ancestral people, no longer sufficed to constitute the tribes we understand today as the forefathers of the German nation as a national unit. Before this formation of a nation could be possible, a new community of culture had to be established, and it was the *feudal system* that provided its foundation.

THE CULTURAL COMMUNITY OF THE KNIGHTS IN THE AGE OF FEUDALISM

On a hill stands a castle, and surrounding it the land of the lord of the castle. Some distance away lies a peasant village. The peasants are obliged to work the land of the lord without remuneration—a practice called *socage* or *Robot*—and to pay dues to the lord at regular intervals and in the case of death or marriage; the lord of the manor passes judgment on the peasants in the manorial court of justice; he himself or his representative, the bailiff, regulates the use of the common land, the forest and the pastures; and he calls the local community to arms when an enemy invades the territory. This is a general picture of the feudal system which formed the basis of the German social structure during the Middle Ages.

The feudal system was based on unpaid labor, on the exploitation of the peasants. Admittedly, this was a restricted form of exploitation, for as a rule the grain cultivated by the peasant for the feudal lord on the lord's land and the cattle that the peasant provided were not sold. At this time there was still no market for agricultural products, and each person still produced his own grain. Thus, the peasants did not need to work for the lord any more than was required to provide the latter with food for himself, his family, and his servants. "The stomach walls of the feudal lord were the limits of the exploitation of the peasants."

In return for the labor of the peasants, the seignorial class also assumed responsibility for a particular social task, namely the defense of the land. This was closely tied to the radical change in the organization of military force brought about by the increasingly closer ties between the peasant and the soil

on which he had lived since the transition to settled agriculture. We have seen that this change already proved a driving force in the banding together of clan groups to form tribes. The more intensive the cultivation, the more difficult it became to call the peasants to arms for military campaigns. Thus, in this era the peasant no longer went to war, but instead provided labor and thereby nourishment for the lord and his servants, who went to war in the peasant's place. The old military structure had been broken down by the new economic structure. Now it was only if the enemy actually invaded the territory that the peasant himself took up arms. The offensive army, however, was no longer made up of foot soldiers, as was nearly always the case with the Germanic army in the time of Tacitus. Indeed, how would it have been possible in this era, which had few means of transport, for the feudal lords and their servants throughout the extensive empire of the Carolingians, stretching over France, Germany, and Italy, to travel by foot and assemble to fight against their common foes? Just as their enemies—Arabs, Avars, Magyars—took to horse, so did the army made up of feudal lords and their retinues become a mounted army. Thus, the typical features of their respective ways of life divided the people into two parts: on the one side the peasants, long since settled and bound to the soil, and on the other the seignorial knights and their retinues, whose sole social function was the defense of the land against the enemy. The class of the knights was of course the dominant class; by entrusting it with the bearing of arms, the peasant also placed the tools of power in its hands and submitted to its domination.

We are not interested here in the long historical process in which the feudal system, with its differentiation of knight and peasant, developed out of the Germanic social structure. We are also not concerned with the changes undergone by the feudal system itself during the Middle Ages. The only question that concerns us here is this: where in the age of feudalism is the nation?

We must be wary here of continuing to look for that which binds the nation together in the principle of common descent. For by this time the territorial separation of the tribes and the absorption of foreign elements had long since destroyed the old natural community upon which the Germanic cultural community had still been based.

It was among the peasants that the effect of *territorial isolation* was strongest. Peasants in different regions and of different tribes were no longer linked by a bond of interaction. Their blood was no longer mixed through intermarriage. Natural selection took effect differently in each region, where the situation, the fate, the struggle for existence of the peasants now took on diverse forms, and the resulting differences were not counteracted by interbreeding. Thus, the peasants of virtually every different valley developed into a separate race, in that the struggle for existence brought forth a distinctive type that was not interbred with the neighboring people. For centuries, the diversity of descent from different tribes and parts of tribes that had long

been leading an independent existence, cut off from the peasants of other regions, had exerted a far stronger effect than had common descent from one ancestral people. What did the Upper Frank, for instance, have in common with the Saxon, or indeed even with the Lower Frank?

Territorial isolation, then, increasingly differentiated the tribes and brought about the emergence of numerous smaller peoples from the one people, with the differences between them including those of descent and natural predisposition. Added to this was a second factor, that of interbreeding with foreign peoples, which inevitably blurred the character of the ancient natural community, particularly since this interbreeding was highly diverse across the different parts of Germany.

Apart from the Germanic people, the first people to contribute blood to that of the modern-day Germans were, as far as our historical records can tell us, the Celts. Research into the oldest contacts between Celts and Germans struggles with the obscurity of this period of history; grave finds have shown that Germanic people exchanged all kinds of weapons and household tools with the Celts and learned various crafts from them, in particular the art of processing metals. Even the Germanic communities in the far north came under the influence of Celtic culture, as the finds at Hallstatt and La Tène have shown us.¹⁸

The comparative analysis of languages has also shown that many Celtic words must have been absorbed into the Germanic vocabulary at an early stage. However, the relations between the two peoples became much closer once the Germanic people began to make their way into Celtic territory. The area between the Oder and the Vistula was in all probability the first area of settlement of the Germanic people. From here they advanced slowly into the land between the Rhine and the Oder and soon across the Rhine itself. However, this land was not unoccupied; the Celts had already been living there for a long time. We do not know what form relations between the two nations originally took. We know only that the Germanic people ultimately became the Celts' masters. This fact may be connected with the great Celtic migrations: into Italy in the fourth century B.C., and in the third century B.C. into Thrace, Macedonia, Greece, and Asia Minor.

It is thus probable that as a result of being weakened by the departure of the greater part of the people then living in modern-day western Germany, the Celtic clan groups were subjugated by Germanic settlers. Caesar also reported that Germanic domination in Germany had been preceded by a time in which the Celts were militarily and politically superior to the Germans.¹⁹

How, then, did the movement of the Germans into Celtic land come about? There is no doubt that Germanic groups frequently moved into areas that the Celtic peoples had previously abandoned. Thus, in present-day Württemberg and Baden, Germanic settlers found unoccupied land that had once belonged to the Helvetii; similarly, the Belgae migrated at the time of

Germanic settlement. However, it is clear that Germanic groups also conquered Celtic areas in which at least a part of the Celtic people had remained and that they forced these Celts into various types of dependent relationships. The survival of Celtic names for places and rivers leads us to suppose that the land occupied by Germanic groups was not void and without form, but inhabited by Celts. Moreover, Celtic origins are recognizable in the forms of settlement and land distribution.

What, then, was the fate of the Celts when Germanic people moved into their land? Can it be assumed that Germanic clans interbred with the Celts? In later times, particularly during the periods of migration, this certainly occurred. In the army of the Cimbri there were numerous Celtic troops. The east Germanic clan groups that destroyed the Roman Empire all had foreign, often Celtic, elements within their ranks. In cases where the Celts did not merge with the Germanic clans, they initially lived separately as unfree or semifree.²⁰ Settled on the land, they paid tribute to the Germanic clans and were under the authority of the Germanic community. The semifree and unfree that Tacitus wrote of undoubtedly included many Celtic elements. This is important for our knowledge of the origins of the Germans, since these semifree and unfree were later completely integrated into the German people. Where the complete absorption of these Celtic elements did not occur during the Germanic period or during the era of the great migrations, the great process of class formation in the Middle Ages completed their total assimilation with the integration of the unfree into both social classes—the knights and the peasants. And in fact the unfree, including the Celtic element, found their way into both classes: both that of the peasantry and that of the knights.

The formation of classes in the Middle Ages completed a process that had begun with the Germanic settlement of the Celtic lands and the interbreeding with foreign peoples during the great migrations: the complete assimilation of the Celtic element. It should be added that among the unfree there were undoubtedly other elements besides the Germanic and the Celtic, although their numbers were certainly far smaller. Roman prisoners of war were also forced into servitude by their Germanic masters; Roman veterans who settled in the border regions of Germania also gradually came under Germanic domination. The elements that were forced into servitude by the Germanic communities and that gradually intermingled their blood with that of the latter were indeed diverse, for the Roman legions during the imperial age were drawn from all the peoples of the Mediterranean Basin. And all these elements, if they had not already been assimilated, were certainly incorporated into the German people by the process of class formation in the Middle Ages.

In the Middle Ages, these foreign elements were augmented by yet another element that was likewise incorporated into the blood of the German

people, namely the Slavic element. This augmentation was connected with the settlement of eastern Germany by German knights and peasants. It was through the great process of the colonization of the east and the south that the German people came to absorb large masses of people of Slavic descent.

The entire history of the German people from the time when, as Tacitus tells us, land was available in abundance until the last centuries of the Middle Ages was characterized by the slow, tenacious extension of their own land. During this period, the slow progress in the area of agricultural technology allowed for only the limited division of the peasant's hide [*Hufe*] if the peasant was to be able to survive with his family from the little land he had. The peasant's son, unable to inherit, was nevertheless at first able to establish new farmland in the region of his birth by cultivating abandoned or uncultivated seignorial land. However, the available land in the home region was gradually exhausted, with the result that the sons of the peasantry began to migrate in large numbers into the northeast and the southeast, a movement that resulted in the seizure of no less than three-fifths of the land that is today part of Germany. This colonization was for the most part led by the knight-nobility. It first subjugated the Slavic clan groups militarily, obligated them to pay dues, and imposed the German county structure upon them. Under the protection of this nobility, the sons of German peasants (and later also urban dwellers) then gradually moved into the land. The extensive communal forests were taken from the Slavs and cultivated. Gradually the numbers of German colonists increased beyond those of the Slavic inhabitants.

Now began the process of assimilation through which the Slavic nature was ultimately integrated into that of the Germans. The most important tool of the transmission of Germanic culture to the Slavs was the church. The conversion of the Slavs to Christianity at this time signified the triumph of German custom, and the presbyteries became the focal point of a gradual Germanization. The conversion of the heathen Slavs to Christianity, their subjection to Germano-Christian influences, gradually made them more like their German colonizers. Intermarriage also linked the two peoples. Thus, in the March of Thuringia, in the Margravate of Meissen, in the whole of the present-day Kingdom of Saxony and in the territories on the River Main once controlled by the Wends, the Slavic was absorbed by the German.²¹ The course of colonization was not very different in Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Silesia, or the border regions of Bohemia, except for the fact that in these cases the indigenous Slavic princes had actively summoned the German colonists. And even where the Germans took possession of land already under cultivation, driving the Slavs from their farmlands and appropriating them, the Slavic element was never completely eliminated. Even in Brandenburg, where almost as quickly as the Wends could establish new farmland the Germans took it from them and, through severe repression, certainly wiped out a substantial proportion of the Slavic inhabitants, a part of the

Slavic population, albeit a small one, was absorbed into the ranks of the German conquerors. The result was that throughout the northeastern and southeastern parts of Germany the German element was mixed with Slavic blood.

Medieval German colonization thus repeated the pattern already established by the Germanic conquest of Celtic territory: the previous settlers of the land, banished only in part by their Germanic conquerors, were initially subjugated, then gradually outnumbered by the new settlers, before finally merging with them. The two became mixed to such a degree that today no sensible person would attempt to distinguish between the proportions of Germanic and foreign blood. All later ethnic mingling with the German people that came with the bourgeois era was insignificant in comparison with these two great historical processes that wove the Celtic and the Slavic element into the tissue of the German organism. A survey of four million Prussian and Bavarian elementary schoolchildren revealed that only 35.47 percent of the children in Prussia and 20.36 percent of those in Bavaria were of the pure Germanic type—pale skin, blonde hair, blue eyes. However, what interests us here is the fact that this great process of the absorption of foreign elements necessarily had a differentiating effect, that it necessarily destroyed the old unitary German community of descent. For the foreign element was different in different parts of Germany, and where it was the same in more than one place, the respective impacts were different.

And just as the origin of the Germans in the different parts of Germany became increasingly diverse, so too did mores necessarily become increasingly heterogeneous. To be sure, the cultural historian still finds elements in the medieval culture of the Germans that testify to the common origins of their culture among an ancestral people. However, a great many generations separated the German peasants of the Hohenstaufen era from these common roots.²² More and more, that which had been commonly inherited was obscured by new cultural elements gradually emerging in different regions. The Middle Ages were characterized by a radical process of differentiation, of cultural particularism. Our legal sources show us how a wealth of locally distinctive laws increasingly grew out of the uniform system of law; language had long become differentiated into numerous dialects; living habits and customs differed almost from one feudal domain to another, from valley to valley. And yet it was precisely during this period of differentiation that the unitary German nation emerged! The unifying moment that linked the nation together, however, was no longer that of a common culture handed down from a common ancestral people, but that of a new community of culture, one that united not all Germans, but only the class that ruled over all Germans. It was a cultural community of the knights that initially united the dominant classes of the Germans and that first welded the Germans into a nation.

From the time of the transition to settled agriculture the peasant had been

securely bound to the soil, and, since close ties now linked him with his fellow villagers and fellow peasants within the district [*Mark*] or estate, he was no longer tied to a broader national community. On the other hand, within the knighthood of the tribes constituting the German people there developed a close *community of interaction* [*Verkehrsgemeinschaft*].

The knighthood was first and foremost the army of the empire. Emperor and empire called the imperial princes, vassals, and liegemen to arms. And the imperial princes and imperial vassals in turn called their own vassals and ministerials.²³ The army thus brought together knights from throughout the empire. In the same way, a large part of the knighthood was brought together in an earlier period by the military assembly on the Field of May and later by the imperial diet.²⁴ But apart from the opportunity for interaction among the knighthood presented by the workings of the feudal state, there was also a degree of voluntary interaction unifying this social sphere. Feuds and factions rapidly produced different alliances and leagues among the knights. The regional diets of the great feudal lords brought members of the knighthood from across large areas together at the one court, usually at the time of the great church festivals. Social intercourse linked castle with castle, neighbor with neighbor, more or less as it does in the countryside today, where the residences of the high nobility still living on the land are linked through social intercourse, whereas the peasant knows only his village neighbor. Thus, the lifestyle of the knights provided incomparably more opportunities for different forms of interaction across narrow regional borders. New ideas and customs spread rapidly from castle to castle, whereas the peasants, confined within the narrow borders of the small local community, were completely under the spell of tradition.

However, it was not only interaction between individuals, the personal contact that took place on diverse occasions, that established a close community within the knighthood of the tribes that were developing into the German people. The high *intellectual culture* of the period was already proving to be a unifying bond.

The history of high intellectual culture, of science, art, and literature, is a history of *leisure*. The peasant, tightly fettered to the heavy work of agriculture, could not have a high intellectual culture. Thus, in the period in which the people had already made the transition to settled agriculture, but before the development of the feudal system had produced a large class of those devoted to leisure who could enjoy the art of the knightly poet, the entire intellectual culture lay in the hands of a foreign power, the church. The monasteries and bishoprics were wealthy feudal estates at an early stage, with hundreds of peasants obliged to pay dues and provide labor service. Thus, the monasteries themselves were freed from heavy physical work. The study of the Latin language provided them with the tool for understanding—albeit in rudimentary form—the inherited intellectual treasures of antiquity. The Church thus

preserved these treasures and safeguarded them for a better time in which the people themselves—or rather the ruling classes of the German people—could take possession of them. It is in the monasteries and courts of the bishops that we must search for the beginnings of German literature. Monastery schools are the oldest schools in Germany. The Wessobrunn Prayer originated in a Benedictine monastery. A monk in the monastery of Weissenburg was the author of the oldest German version of the Gospel. The Ludwigslied was first sung by a monk in a Flemish cloister. Saint Gallen saw the birth of Ekkehard's Waltharilied, and it was also there that Notker Labeo translated the Psalms into German.²⁵ A nun from Gandersheim appears to have been the first German poetess. However, these achievements represent only the beginnings of the development of German intellectual culture.

The development of a German literature and art first required the existence of a numerous class to enjoy works of art and to produce authors from its ranks. It required a class able to lead an autonomous intellectual life, a class that, unlike the church, was not dominated by foreign, in particular Italian, influences. The development of German intellectual life was therefore connected with the development of the feudal system and with the development of a numerous class of knights on the basis of this system. The first German poetry was *chivalric poetry*. The epic songs into which the ancient Germanic myths of the gods were recast during the period of the great migrations had been preserved by the wandering minstrels who moved from village to village. However, these songs were first developed into the form of the *epic* as we know it during the period in which the knightly poet moved from castle to castle, rewarded with the benevolence [*milte*] of the lord and brightening the idle hours of the knights and ladies with his songs. The knightly poet soon presented his audience with a new art form, one that was no longer tied to the period during which the people as a whole constituted a cultural community irrespective of rank. This new art form, which was constituted by the *chivalric poem* and the *courtly epic*, grew out of the customs, joys, and sufferings particular to the knighthood: it was not limited to a particular locality, and it spread from castle to castle throughout the German territories.

The entire knighthood was thus linked by intensive interaction. The military campaign and the imperial diet, the regional feudal court and alliances, as well as social intercourse, brought the entire knighthood closer together in a directly personal sense. The shared pleasure in the verses of the same poet traveling between castles and courts formed an invisible bond between the knights. However, no close interaction is possible without a common language. Thus, a tendency began to emerge—at first only within the class of the knights—that worked against the tendency toward an increasing differentiation of local dialects, which had at this stage been exerting itself for centuries.

Of course, this tendency never established a completely uniform language of the court, a "curiale" spoken by all knights throughout the German terri-

ories. However, close interaction inevitably established a much greater similarity between the languages of the knights than was the case for the dialects of the peasants, who lived isolated lives, bound to the soil, secluded in their localities and no longer linked by a community of interaction. As a result, the languages of courtly literature are much less distinctive from one another than those of traditional folk songs. And since the chivalric age reached its fullest bloom in the Hohenstaufen era, when the leadership of the German tribes was assumed by the Swabians, it was from Swabian roots—albeit with a Franconian influence—that the courtly language of the chivalric age developed in Upper Germany. It was this courtly language in which the poets of the age of chivalry spoke and sang, in which the oldest German documents were written, and that even the poets from the Low German tradition attempted to speak. Its influence is revealed in the fact that the Low German dialects absorbed some of its vocabulary and structures. In this case the language clearly reflects the fortunes of the people. From the time of the disintegration of the German ancestral tribe into clan groups, the once common language had from century to century increasingly split into numerous and ever more divergent dialects. Now the community of interaction and the culture of knightly society began for the first time to work against this differentiation and to provide a common language for all German tribes.

And just as the emergence of a community of culture of the knighthood established the tendency that led to the formation of a common German language, so did it initiate the development of a *German common law*. The Middle Ages was in general a time of particularistic law development. The laws of the individual regions became increasingly different, and it is only with some effort that researchers are able to recognize what constituted common Germanic law amongst the diversity of individual regional laws. In particular, the specific laws of the peasant class exhibited a particularistic development. The compendiums that have been passed down reveal an increasing divergence of laws from region to region, valley to valley, and feudal estate to feudal estate. In light of this, it is all the more significant that over and above local divisions, the class of the knights gradually created a system of law that, although subject to a certain degree of diversity in the individual regions, nevertheless by and large came to constitute the national system of German law. Although in the medieval period the Germans were no longer governed by a common Germanic system of law and did not yet recognize a uniform system of German law in the areas of rural law, town law, liege law, and manorial law, there was a clearly unitary development in the sphere of law formation that most directly concerned the knighthood, that of fief law [*Lehensrecht*].²⁶

However, much more significant than this centralist tendency in the legal system of the knighthood was the emergence of a uniform German *code of chivalry*. To be sure, at first glance this does not seem to have been the case. It

is certainly correct that life in the Middle Ages was dominated by habits and customs that formed a conventional etiquette that was observed in German knightly society everywhere. But the claim that knightly discipline [*zucht*] had a national character is arguable. For the German knighthood had adopted many of these customs from foreign knights, particularly the French, who without doubt heavily influenced the German knighthood at the time of the Crusades. However, the foreign origin of German knightly customs makes no difference in terms of their significance for the emergence of a unitary German nation.

Perhaps we can best illustrate this point at the level of the individual. Let us take two completely different individuals, different in terms of descent, upbringing, sensibilities, and knowledge. And let us take them on a journey together, subjecting them to the same experiences and influences. No doubt they will see the same things, the same landscapes and the same cultural monuments. The content of their consciousness, the impressions they absorb, will be the same. But will they thereby become the same people? Not at all. For just as the human organism does not simply absorb physical nourishment, but assimilates and digests it, so does no new idea enter human consciousness from the external environment without being altered. It is absorbed, assimilated, digested, *apperceived*. Thus, the two travelers will see the same things, absorb the same impressions. But because the absorbing, assimilating consciousness of each of the two is quite distinctive, they will assimilate the absorbed impressions in quite different ways. Each of them will learn something different on this journey; each will remember something different from the things they have seen; the same impressions will affect each of them differently. Seen purely in terms of its content, the increase in the size of the sphere of impressions in each case may well be identical. However, in its effect on the consciousness as a whole, on thoughts and emotions and wants, its effect in each of the two cases will be quite different.

The effect is very similar when the same cultural contents are absorbed by different nations. Therefore, the content of knightly customs might not have greatly differed between the Germans and the French, but the German knight who absorbed French habits and conventions was a different person from the Frenchman due to his origins and his cultural traditions. He did not simply adopt the French code, but incorporated it into his being; it had to be wedded to the previously established content of his consciousness. Thus, French custom in the context of Germany became something other than French custom. There was necessarily a difference in the cultural development of the same etiquette among the German and the French knights. The wedding of the German mode of being to French custom necessarily produced a new form of knightly existence, which rapidly separated itself from its French counterpart. Among the Germans themselves, however, the new form of knightly existence was more or less identical in all cases: it became

predominant in all German castles, affecting the whole character, the whole mode of being of men and women in the same way everywhere. Thus, it was precisely the adoption of this foreign element by the German national character and its assimilation by the German being that produced a powerful means of binding the nation together, a uniform German code that exercised a uniform effect on the character of the then dominant class of the German people and united this class over and above all previous differentiation.

The German knighthood could not avoid becoming conscious of this national common bond as soon as the opportunity presented itself to compare its own cultural community with that of foreigners. This consciousness speaks clearly from Walter von der Vogelweide's famous poem:

Many lands have I seen,
For the best I sought everywhere,
May evil befall me,
If my heart ever let itself be convinced,
That the customs of other lands please it:
If I were to lie, what would it bring me?
Nothing can equal German ways.²⁷

Lamprecht has correctly pointed out that it is "not a general, but a national consciousness tied to the conventions of the knightly profession that speaks in verse through Walter's mouth"—a consciousness of the distinctiveness of German *courtly* discipline in relation to foreign customs.²⁸ However, it seems that Lamprecht is suggesting here that the nation at this time became conscious of its specific national quality only to a limited degree. The wrong formulation of the question prevents him from drawing the whole conclusion from the wealth of material he has gathered precisely for the purpose of writing a history of the emergence of the German nation. The question is not one of how the nation gradually became conscious of its specific quality, but rather one of how the nation as such emerged at all. National consciousness can be understood only on the basis of national being and not the other way round. Lamprecht is certainly correct in arguing that national consciousness in the Hohenstaufen period was tied to knightly convention. However, the advance of national consciousness beyond this stage cannot be grasped in terms of the immanent development of a national consciousness that necessarily advances according to laws internal to the consciousness of all peoples everywhere from lower to higher stages. Rather, it can be grasped only as the reflection of a transformed national being. In the Staufen era, the nation existed only in the form of the cultural community of the knights, which united the knighthood—free and unfree—of all the German tribes and, at the same time, distinguished the German knighthood from all foreign peoples. If another form of German national consciousness was to emerge, this could occur only if the German nation emerged as a nation in another sense. The

explanation for the later development of the national consciousness of the German people beyond the stage described by Walter von der Vogelweide lies not in some developmental law of psychological being, but in the development of *commodity production*.

We are now in a position to understand how the German nation emerged. Its roots do not lie in the fact of common descent from the original Germanic people, nor in the shared cultural tradition inherited from this people. For the old community had by this time long been destroyed by interbreeding with other peoples and by territorial isolation. The diverse fates of the individual segments of the people had had a physically and intellectually transforming effect on their inherited characteristics. In the same way, cultural transmission in the spheres of technology and language, custom and law had become increasingly differentiated. The common Germanic tradition had long been masked by a thick layer of later cultural forms that were different in the case of each segment of the Germanic people. It was not common descent, but rather a newly emerged common culture, that united the Germans as a nation and placed limits on the tendency toward differentiation among the German tribes, differentiation that would ultimately have made them into quite different peoples. This culture was, however, initially the culture of a ruling class, the culture of the knighthood. The uniform national character cultivated by the homogeneity of this cultural influence was the character only of a national class.

This culture of the knightly class was, of course, based on the exploitation of the peasants. The peasants, however, had no part in the knightly culture. Courtly and village existence had long been separated. The peasant appeared to the dominant class as raw and ignorant and became an object of ridicule by court poets, who made fun of the rustics [*Dörper*] and their annoyance at the fact that the Junker chased the village beauties. Thus, a wide cultural gap already separated knight and peasant. In all that unified the nation, the peasant had no part. Although the courtly language unified the knights, peasant dialects became increasingly differentiated; although courtly custom constituted a unifying bond among the German knighthood, peasant customs differed from region to region; although the knighthood produced a uniform fief law, peasant farm law developed in an increasingly particularistic fashion. Thus, at this time, the peasants did not form the nation at all. Rather, they were merely the *tenants of the nation* [*Hintersassen der Nation*].²⁹ The nation existed only by virtue of the community of culture. However, this was limited to the ruling class; the great mass of the population, whose labor fed this ruling class, was excluded. This is a concept of the national community of culture to which we will return. For even if the proportion of the population having a share in the nationally unitary culture that unifies tribes and regions and separates one people from another is now much greater than in the Staufeu period, it is still fundamentally the case today that the national cul-

ture is the culture of the ruling class, that the great mass of the population still does not belong to the nation, which can still only be understood as a community of culture. Rather, the masses are merely the tenants of the nation and their exploitation provides the foundation for the proud edifices of national culture, whereas they themselves remain excluded from it.

COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE BOURGEOIS COMMUNITY OF CULTURE

Neither the feudal lord nor the peasant in the Middle Ages was a commodity producer, that is, neither of them produced goods for the purpose of exchange, of sale. The grain the peasant took from the soil was used to nourish himself, his wife, and his child. The flax he made into linen he grew himself, and it was spun and woven by his wife and servant girls during the long winter evenings. The grain that the peasant cultivated for his master on the lord's land and brought to the lord's storeroom was not sold, but used to provide food for the lord and his servants. Only the small surpluses of agricultural production were occasionally sold, and, with the money thereby gained, the peasants and the feudal lords purchased the few foodstuffs that they could not produce themselves. Commodity production and commodity exchange thus played only a limited role in the first half of the Middle Ages. This corresponded to the limited significance of the commodity producers—the artisans—and of the intermediaries of commodity exchange—the merchants—in the people's existence as a whole. The few thinly populated towns that existed all but disappeared in the ocean of feudal estates and rural communities. The medieval world had not yet witnessed the effect of the forces in the small cities that would one day topple the society founded on the feudal system. It still classified the burgher as the member of an estate [*Stand*], as it did the clergy, the knighthood, and the peasantry. The urban burghers had still not elaborated their own culture, but merely participated, insofar as they met the requirements of the cultural code, in the knightly community of culture. The patricians of the cities, the old lineages with inherited property, were often related to the knightly lineages in their region. The patrician lineages in the southern German towns, for instance, often established brotherhoods that adopted and imitated the chivalric code. Among the great poets of the courtly epic, we also find a burgher who enthused over the knighthood, Meister Gottfried von Strassburg.³⁰

The gradually increasing significance of commodity production, and with it that of the town, was tied to the rise in agricultural productivity. The peasants progressively increased their yields both in their native land and above all in the large agricultural areas in the newly conquered colonial territories. As a result, the tendency developed for a part of this yield to be exchanged for other goods. But it was not only the increasing productivity of labor, but also

the distribution of its products, that proved advantageous to the development of commodity production. The age of colonization, which opened up the wide pastures in the east to the peasants, alleviated the pressure exerted by the feudal system in their native land. The economic sphere of the feudal lord remained limited to the system of traditional dues, and, as a result, the growth in agricultural yields above all benefited the peasant. Whereas previously the peasant had adopted the role of commodity purchaser to only a small degree and the feudal lord to a considerable degree, the thirteenth century saw a class of prosperous peasants emerge who were ready to exchange a not inconsiderable surplus from their yield for commercial products. This development directly benefited the German merchant. And the number of German merchants and the extent of their activities grew all the more when a significant level of intermediate trade was added to the growth in indigenous demand. The northern towns mediated the exchange between east and west, between the highly developed Netherlands and England on the one hand and the Scandinavian and Slavic lands to the east on the other. The towns of southern Germany mediated the trade between the northern lands and the Italian cities, where capitalism developed at an early stage—a trade that brought the treasures of the East to Europe. The role of the German merchant thus became more significant due to the early capitalist development of the Italian cities. However, it was not only the merchant, but also the artisan, who gained from this development. The period in which the sons of the German peasantry were settling the Slavic regions to the northeast of Germany also saw the beginnings of the movement from the countryside into the towns. However, these immigrant sons of peasants now became artisans. The former apprentice became a journeyman, the former journeyman a master. There had not yet developed a class that was condemned to a lifetime of wage labor. The high wages earned by a journeyman enabled each to save the limited capital required by the independent master. Furthermore, this slowly expanding class of artisans had a guaranteed market for its wares among the increasingly wealthy merchants of the town and the affluent peasants in the countryside.

Up to this point, the development of the town remained fairly uniform. Of course, the time we are speaking of was also the period of the great struggle for political power in the towns between the craft guilds and the old lineages owning inherited property. Nevertheless, the cultural separation between these two levels of the urban population should not be imagined as a profound one. The town was dominated by the artisans; the cultural distance between the master craftsmen and the patrician families was not a great one. It was a period of limited differentiation within urban culture, a period based on simple commodity production, in which the means of production belonged to the producer.

However, a further development gradually began to take hold. The “great

larder of the German people," the still uncleared land, was gradually exhausted and the agricultural population found itself pressed ever closer together. The hide, the old measure of land worked by the peasant family, was increasingly subdivided. In many areas the quarter hide had already become the norm in the fifteenth century. In addition, a class of cotters established itself from the numerous ranks of the later-born peasant sons. In many cases the peasant family's small piece of land no longer secured enough food. Two possibilities presented themselves to the peasant as a way of supplementing the all too meagre sustenance provided by his own land.

Initially the peasant began utilizing his and his family's labor power during the hours of previous inactivity. The peasant was already skilled in some areas of commercial work; for centuries he has been accustomed to "doing everything himself," to spinning his yarn, weaving his cloth, and sewing his clothes in the home. What could be more obvious than to offer these skills, until now employed only in the time-honored tasks of the home, as services to a capitalist in order to earn money and thereby supplement the inadequate yield of his small piece of land? As a result the *capitalist putting-out system* developed in the countryside; this system involved peasants' and cotters' working in their homes in the service of a capitalist distributor [*Verleger*] above all employing established skills such as spinning and weaving.

However, even where the peasant utilized his own and his family's labor power in the service of the distributor, he was still unable to feed his numerous sons on a farm that had grown too small. And for the peasant's son who had no inheritance, there was no longer the possibility of settling on abandoned land in the east. He therefore moved to the town. From year to year the ranks of peasants' sons finding their way to the town swelled. The increase in the numbers of immigrants following the end of colonization in the east alarmed the established artisans in the towns, who saw the new arrivals as potential competitors. The artisans soon began to complain:

Where now the peasants have sons
They make them all artisans—
Who will hoe and clear?³¹

As a result, their organizations, the guilds, began to make access to the craft professions and to the qualification of master increasingly difficult. Now not every peasant's son who departed for the town could hope to one day become an independent master. This had a twofold effect. On the one hand, the journeymen in many cases now no longer felt themselves to be future masters; they became conscious of their opposition to the masters and a belligerent journeymen's movement emerged. On the other hand, the numbers of proletarians excluded from the crafts began to grow in the outlying areas of the town; these laborers had to sell their labor power merely to survive. In the latter half of the fifteenth century, 20 percent of the population of Hamburg

and 12 to 15 percent of the population of Augsburg were classed as proletarians. The capitalist—the merchant, the moneylender, and the property owner grown wealthy through the rise in urban ground rents—quickly realized this and hired these people as workers in capitalist workshops. It was in the southern German towns that the *capitalist manufactory* first emerged.

However, the growth of the towns now also began to affect the situation in the countryside. For now an extensive market for agricultural products had developed. Soon the town had to turn to the countryside in order to meet its meat and grain needs; the capitalist manufactory had to buy flax and wool there. Large profits beckoned the feudal lords if they were in a position to increase the yield of their land to such an extent that they could sell large quantities of grain, cattle, flax, and wool. For this purpose, they required two things: first, more land, and second, more people, more labor power. Consequently, the lords began to take over the land of the peasantry. They first enclosed the ancient common land:

By force claim princes as their own
Water, forest, field, and stone.³²

Not content with this, they subsequently began to seize the peasant's land, [*Bauernlegen*], driving him with wife and child from the inherited house and farm where his ancestors had lived for centuries. The lords thus expanded their lands; fewer peasants now resided there, and those remaining consequently had to perform more service in socage on the lord's expanded estate. Thus, the old feudal system [*Grundherrschaft*], which served only to satisfy the needs of the lord, was transformed into a modern system of landed proprietors [*Gutsherrschaft*] who produced commodities, agricultural products for the purpose of sale, and, as such, gave new capitalist content to the old feudal form. The expelled and displaced peasants initially took to the country roads as beggars, robbers, and thieves, against whom bloody penal legislation was instituted in vain in the era of the *Carolina*.³³ Gradually, however, the society forced them into the towns—driving them into crime, prostitution or, at best, new forms of exploitation. For in the towns the capitalist was waiting for them: there the son of the dispossessed peasant became the capitalist's worker.

What changes are signified by the development that we have fleetingly sketched here? In place of the small, thinly populated towns inhabited by artisans and merchants engaged in craft-related commerce, early capitalist development gave rise to towns characterized by sharp social distinctions. On the highest rung of the urban hierarchy were the capitalists—not only merchants and moneylenders, but also, even at this early stage, those capitalists whose wealth was derived from the exploitation of the urban workers in the manufactory or of the cotters laboring as homeworkers in the putting-out system. These were followed by the guilds, their doors firmly locked against

any new influx from outside. Under them were the journeymen, engaged in continual struggle with the masters. Below them were the workers of the urban manufactories, and finally a large unemployed lumpenproletariat, which vacillated between work and criminality. The change in the countryside was no less drastic: the putting-out system brought the country closer to the town. The miner and the weaver brought the peasant, who until now had lived in rural seclusion for centuries untouched by any external cultural influences, into close contact with the world of new thought and new desires borne of the new urban age. And the peasant himself, whose forefathers had seen such happy times in the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century, now avidly adopted the new values, faced as he was with the initial beginnings of change in the landholding system. The peasant's master, previously bound by the strictures of the feudal system, now placed the peasant under greater pressure. In many places the lord seized the peasantry's common land and endeavored to extract more dues and socage. Early capitalist development thus initiated a revolution of enormous dimensions in both town and country.

However, this transformation assumed even more significance in that it not only indirectly changed the nature of social relations in town and country, but also directly produced the modern *state*. The medieval community was based on the system of feudal ties. Enfeoffment with the office of count was inherited by the son. However, the count's income—above all the dues paid by the peasants—benefited only the count himself, not the realm. The count was under obligation to attend the imperial diet and to take part in imperial military campaigns; his duties extended no further. He resided in his district not in the role of a government official, but in that of an irresponsible viceroy. How could the situation have been otherwise in an age that had no modern means of transport, no news service, no army other than the army of feudal vassals, no other remuneration for imperial service than that of enfeoffment with imperial property? The fact that public office became hereditary broke up the unity of the old empire. The chief concern of the princes was to combine in their own person the most significant powers in their region. In the prince's view, no one other than he himself was to exercise country powers within his region: no feudal lord was to have power over the knights residing there, no liegeman was to have power over the ministerials, no landholder was to have power over the peasants. Thus, previously diverse rights were unified in one person as the territorial authority. Gradually the diverse origins of all the different powers of this authority were forgotten. A uniform body of law emerged, to which all knights, burghers, and peasants residing in the region were subject; regional authority was replaced by *territorial sovereignty*, and the empire disintegrated into a large number of territorial states. It was these territorial states that now began to utilize the development of commodity production, for this development provided the state with instruments of

power unknown in the feudal era. Commodity production made possible for the first time an administration and an army that were not based on feudal ties.

During the Middle Ages, wealth consisted of use values—grain, wool, flax, and cattle. The development of commodity production placed *money* in the hands of every member of the population: above all, in the hands of the urban commodity producers, but also in those of the landed proprietor and the peasant. The territorial ruler was able to share in this new wealth through a *tax*, which brought a considerable portion of the financial income of all classes into his coffers. And this tax provided him with a highly effective instrument of power: with money he could remunerate an official whose position could be revoked at any time and who was therefore far more compliant toward the territorial ruler than the count had once been toward the realm that awarded him the office of count in the form of a hereditary fief. Money made it possible for the sovereign to recruit proletarians and peasants' sons for his army by offering a wage for their services and, at the head of a mercenary army, to make himself completely independent from the feudal hierarchy of the old army of the knighthood. The modern state also assumed immense significance for the development of the national community of culture. In the first place, it created a class that provided intellectual labor power in return for wages: the *bureaucracy*, the new civil service; in establishing the mercenary army, the state at the same time struck at the very root of the existence of the old dominant class, the knighthood. The state could do all this on the basis of its taxation system, which was founded on the monetary economy, itself a phenomenon of expanding commodity production, which, following Marx, in the form of *capitalist* commodity production increasingly became the general form of social production.³⁴

For the knighthood the development of mercenary armies was naturally catastrophic. The decrease in its income during the period of colonization weakened it economically, and the development of territorial sovereignty resulted in its having to bow to princely power. The development of mercenary armies meant the loss of military power as well. The consequence of all this was also a decrease in the significance of the knighthood for the national community of culture. However, to the same extent that the significance of the knighthood decreased, the size and prosperity of the urban bourgeoisie increased. It was into its hands that the cultural leadership of Germany now fell.

The roots of chivalric culture lay in the leisured existence of a knighthood freed from the necessity of work as a result of the exploitation of the peasantry. By contrast, it was precisely the work of the bourgeoisie that constituted the foundation of the culture of the bourgeoisie. As a consequence, this culture had from the beginning a fundamentally different character from the one preceding it. Its elements were not courtly custom, but, in the first place, the knowledge and ability required by the merchant and the artisan for their professions. Thus, the foremost requirement of education now became the

ability to read, write, and calculate. These arts were foreign to the knight-hood. Even Wolfram von Eschenbach confessed:

[O]f what is written in books
I have remained ignorant.³⁵

It was unusual for a knight to be so praised:

[A] knight was so educated
that he could read in books.³⁶

The bourgeoisie, however, could not do without these skills. Consequently, bourgeois development was marked by the concurrent development of the education system. Secondary schools were founded in which the children of the urban merchants learned not only reading and writing, but also Latin, which was at this time still the *lingua franca* where communication had to transcend local linguistic differences: the language of documents and of commercial correspondence. It enabled the sons of the urban lineages not only to pursue commerce over a wide area, but also to conduct the administration of the towns and to communicate with the chanceries of the princes. But this period also saw the establishment of German elementary schools, where the children of artisans learned to read and write German.

The ability to read now became the basis of high intellectual culture. Even before the development of the art of printing, writing rooms run on capitalist principles were established where paid scribes duplicated the old manuscripts. As early as the fifteenth century, writing rooms already existed where scribes working for a wage copied manuscripts on a large scale. Some of these were organized on a cooperative basis, such as the writing rooms of the Brethren of the Common Life [*Brüder vom gemeinsamen Leben*], others on a capitalist basis, such as the writing rooms in Hagenau attached to the publisher Diepold Lauber, who was already distributing his publishing catalogue throughout a large area of Germany.³⁷ The art of printing subsequently made possible the cheap production of books, which could now find their way into the broad mass of the population. Luther's translation of the Bible cost only one and a half florins. Moreover, cheap printing also created the possibility of reaching a broad sector of the population using the placard and the pamphlet, which were embellished in many cases using woodcuts.

The age in which the bourgeoisie was still differentiated only to a small degree, in which artisan and merchant were still separated only by a narrow cultural gap, also saw the beginning of bourgeois art and literature. Poetry moved beyond the walls of the castles of the knights and was established in the form of the "songs of the guild master" [*Meistersang*] among the artisans. The struggles of the small bourgeois world were reflected in the satire, which was closely connected with the beginnings of the bourgeois drama. Craft production rapidly took on an artistic character and ultimately became genuinely

artistic work. Intellectual culture as a whole was poorer, more modest than the form cultivated by the knighthood; however, it was no longer restricted to this particular dominant class, but had become the property of a broad section of the urban population.

However, just as capitalist development rapidly split the socially uniform bourgeoisie of the age of simple commodity production into the classes of capitalists, master craftsmen, journeymen, capitalist wage laborers, and lumpenproletariat, so too did bourgeois culture now become increasingly differentiated. The upper bourgeoisie created a high culture for itself. The culture of what was at this time the most developed nation, Italy, began to have an effect on the upper strata of the German bourgeoisie; the *Renaissance* and *humanism* found their way into Germany. Capitalist-developed Italy had experienced a revival of the high culture of classical antiquity among capitalists and among the courtly and bureaucratic strata that had been created by the already highly developed modern state. This culture now began to have an effect on the upper strata of the bourgeois world in Germany. The Latin school, the school of the prosperous bourgeoisie, became the mediator of this high culture. The new art of Italy began to influence the art of this bourgeois stratum. Classical scholarship, detached from all medieval tradition, was also taken up by prosperous German bourgeois circles. In the face of this higher culture, which was adopted by the upper strata of the bourgeoisie, the less sophisticated culture of the crafts disappeared: within the town a distinction developed between the *educated* and *uneducated*, between those who had a share in the culture transplanted to Germany from Italian soil and those excluded from this culture by hard physical labor and economic need.

It is not our task here to describe this new culture of the German bourgeoisie. What interests us is only the fact of how this culture became a link that bound the German nation together. Commodity production brought people closer together. The merchant moved from town to town in order to sell his wares. The artisan also soon began to appear at markets outside his home town. The weaver from Cologne sold his fabric at the Frankfurt Fair. The journeyman wandered over large parts of Germany. Wars took the professional soldier from place to place. Capitalism also began to reveal its capacity to violently and rapidly relocate people. The development of the capitalist mining industry populated the newly established mining districts within the space of a few years with a mixed population drawn from many regions. The peasant, too, now came into close contact with the town dwellers: he visited the town markets; he sold the burgher a portion of his produce; he was already familiar with the urban capitalists as moneylenders; he was employed in the putting-out system by urban capitalists. The events in the town thus affected him now in a manner quite different from before.

However, more effective than these directly physical relationships, so to speak, were the invisible intellectual bonds between the Germans, and above

all between the members of the German bourgeoisie. The newly developed German literature affected the broad masses who had learned to read in the "German schools." How would the extensive and rapid intellectual transformation of the Reformation have been possible without the radical power exercised by the book and the low-cost pamphlet over the great urban masses and even indirectly over a section of the rural folk. Added to this trend was the fact that the new state developed, initially for its own purposes, a regular postal service, which it soon made available to the public. Now, for the first time, extensive and regular interaction through correspondence became possible, and it was now that a German press began to develop. As early as the sixteenth century we find agents in the large German towns who received news from all over the world and distributed it by letter. Following the development of printing, this news was printed and duplicated, thereby becoming cheaper and penetrating to wider levels of the society. Reports from the latter half of the sixteenth century tell us that such printed news volumes were already appearing on a half-yearly basis, and this was soon increased to a monthly basis. In this manner, large sectors of the people were pulled out of their narrow local isolation and brought into close communication with other parts of the land through book and pamphlet, through letter and newspaper.³⁸

Just as the close interaction among the knighthood in earlier centuries had produced a unifying tendency within the German language, so now did the incomparably closer interaction in the era of commodity production and the modern state necessarily bring forth this tendency anew with much greater force. It was the overcoming of local barriers that gave birth to the New High German *uniform language*. This did not model itself on the Middle High German language of the court, which had been forgotten with the economic, political, and military collapse of the knighthood. If the heyday of chivalric literature had clearly exhibited the tendency toward a uniform German courtly language, the centuries marked by the disintegration of the knighthood saw once again a pronounced differentiation of German dialects. Not until the development of commodity production did an entirely new unifying tendency in the language emerge. The linguistic fragmentation of the Germans represented a severe impediment for the state and town chanceries that entered into contact with one another, for the merchants whose commercial correspondence linked the farthest corners of Germany, and for the writers who wanted their works to reach Germans above and beyond all local and tribal borders. This state of affairs contributed more than a little to the widespread use of Latin, which acted as a substitute for a uniform German language.

However, the more German culture took on a bourgeois character and the larger the masses wanting to take part in this culture, the more difficult it became for Latin to serve as the sole means of linking the German towns and territories. As the bourgeoisie took on a more dominant role, so too did the

German language; thus, in the thirteenth century it came to dominate the legal sphere. From the town chanceries the territorial princes adopted German as the language of their chanceries and documents. The political agitator needed the German language if he wanted to reach the masses. Thus wrote Ulrich von Hutten:

I used to write in Latin,
Which was not known to all;
Now I cry to the Fatherland,
The German nation in its own tongue,
To avenge these things.³⁹

The agents of this unifying movement in the language were in the first place the German commercial letter and the language of German chanceries. The effort to reduce linguistic differences was necessarily pronounced within the chanceries of the larger states, which unified regions with distinctive, almost mutually incomprehensible dialects and which had to enter into contact with towns and states in quite different tribal regions. Thus, the Luxemburges, who simultaneously dominated areas in Lower, Central, and Upper Germany, developed a chancery language that deviated from each of the particular dialects. In 1330 the archiepiscopal chancery in Trier abandoned the indigenous dialect. In the middle of the century the chancery of the archbishop in Magdeburg did the same. The Habsburg Frederick III sought to rid his chancery of its linguistic particularities. From the time of Maximilian I, imperial chancery documents employed the same language irrespective of which part of Germany they came from. In the fifteenth century the language used by the chancery of the elector of Saxony changed to more closely resemble the imperial form.⁴⁰ Initially, the chanceries of the larger territories developed an artificial written language that was then willingly adopted by German writers eager to reach Germans in all regions. Thus wrote Martin Luther: "I do not have my own particular language in German, but rather use the common German language in order that those in both Upper and Lower Germany may understand me; I speak using the language of the Saxonian chancery, which is followed by all princes and kings in Germany. All the cities of the realm, all the princes, and all the courts write in the manner of the Saxonian and our prince's chancery; for this reason it is the most widespread German language." The language of Luther became the language of the writer. Based on Luther's translation of the Bible, the first German grammarians developed the laws of the German language. Thus, one of the first German grammars bears the title *Grammatica Germanicae linguae M. Johannis Claji Hirtzbergensis: Ex Bibliis Lutheri Germanicis et aliis eius libris collecta* (Leipzig, 1578). This grammar was used in schools and became the basis of later textbooks for the teaching of the German language.⁴¹ The language of Luther soon became the language of chanceries in the other German regions,

for example, in Schleswig-Holstein in 1560. It became the language of schools, the language of writers, the language of the church sermon. From around 1600 onward, preaching throughout Lower Germany was done in New High German. At around the same time New High German became dominant throughout German literature.⁴² This language of the school, the chancery, literature, and the commercial letter thus necessarily became the uniform language initially spoken by the *educated* of the German nation.

The fact that the written form of the German standard language follows the language of Luther's translation of the Bible already points to the significance of the Reformation for the development of the nation. For it was in the Reformation that all the forces driving the process by which the Germans merged into a nation first fully revealed themselves—forces created by commodity production and the modern state that produced a community in which shared cultural experience in a framework of continual interaction gave rise to a common national character in each individual member of the nation.

Italy was the country that first experienced extensive capitalist development, that first created a modern state and produced within capitalism and the state the modern upper stratum of the classically educated. It was because of this that Italy was also the first country to experience a major break with Christianity—not merely with Catholicism, but with Christianity in general. Christianity, as it had been shaped from generation to generation in the Middle Ages, was the faith that suited the peasant, bound to his plot, cut off from all relationships to the wider world. The peasant, held fast in tradition, had no doubt about what constituted the truth. This was not so for the new type of individual found in Italy's capitalist society, who came into contact with people of other religions—with Byzantines and Mohammedans—and who reexamined the writings of the classical philosophy of antiquity. It was thus in these circles that a questioning of tradition first emerged. Thus, Christianity became a doctrine that was subjected to comparison with other religions and philosophical systems and examined in regard to the truths it claimed to offer. Tradition was no longer sacred for this new type of individual, before whose eyes a process of economic and political revolution was taking place within an unbelievably short time span. From day to day this revolution was tearing down the old world and bringing a new world into being. Such people were faced with a world in which they could measure everything against reason, their reason. What could the traditional worldview of Christian dogma mean to those who were investigating, guessing, devising with youthful impetuosity definitions of "what it is that holds together the world at its deepest level"? What meaning could the traditional moral framework of Christianity have for these individuals, living from the products of immense exploitation and indulging in the unrestrained enjoyment of all their culture had to offer? Thus, since the time of Christianity's conquest of

the Occident, there had never been a less Christian society in terms of thought and lifestyle than that of the princes and courts, the prosperous capitalists, the scholars, artists, and poets of Italy during the Renaissance. Nevertheless, Italy never attacked organized Catholicism. With good reason! The Catholic faith was one of the instruments of exploitation that alone made Italy's advanced economic and intellectual culture possible. How else would the splendor of the court of Leo X have been possible if the Christian peoples of the Occident had not sent their millions to Rome for the sake of their spiritual salvation? How else could one have justified the unbridled exploitation of the subjugated peoples in the Italian colonies on the Mediterranean, if not with the claim that Christian rule over Mohammedans and heathens was imperative? And how else could one have prevented one's own oppressed, economically exploited people in Italy from rebelling against their oppressors, if not with the pious doctrine of Christian humility?

The case of Germany was quite different. The economic and political development of Germany lay far behind that of Italy. The intellectual revolution in Germany was thus also incomparably weaker than that in Italy. How could even the most splendid German courts be compared with the pomp of the Medician pope, the splendor of Medician Florence, or the radiance of Venice? And just as the Germany of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had not produced the prosperous, capitalist-courtly upper stratum freed from all tradition that was the bearer of Italian Renaissance culture, so too had Germany never experienced a complete break with traditional Christian doctrine. Nevertheless, even if Germany could not produce a heathen humanism, here too capitalist development had changed all inherited relations to a sufficiently radical extent to generate a revolution. Here too the urban commodity producer had had to learn to shape his destiny according to his own wants. His horizon had also expanded; he too had overcome local restrictions; he had experienced radical changes to the whole of social existence, which had torn him out of the chains of tradition. For him, traditional Christian doctrine was thus no longer something sacrosanct beyond the reach of his reason. And, in the context of the close contact established between a wide range of sectors in the population by the new means of intellectual interaction, how wide must have been the response to every critique of the status quo within those social strata that were the casualties of this process of radical change: among the guild artisans oppressed by the capitalist, among the journeymen and workers already engaged in social struggle, among the knights in the countryside whose former splendor had been taken from them by the new order of things—the humanistic influence of which at the same time made them receptive to new forms of thought—and even among the peasants who had been made more receptive to all things new through closer contact with the town and who were experiencing more harshly than their forefathers the demands of the lord who was now becoming a commodity producer. How all these groups must have

absorbed the news brought to them by literature, pilgrims, merchants, and mercenaries from Italy of the profane, ostentatious, and depraved behavior at the papal court. And the Germans knew full well from where the wealth came that made the splendor of Rome possible. "See there," wrote Ulrich von Hutten, "see there the barn of the globe: in there everything that is robbed and plundered from other lands is heaped together, and at its center that insatiable weevil, devouring immense mounds of fruit, surrounded by his numerous companions in gluttony, who have first sucked out our blood, then gnawed away the flesh and have now reached the marrow, crushing the innermost bones and smashing what remains."

In the case of Germany the challenge to all traditional dogmas could not end in a heathen indifference toward religion. Here this challenge necessarily led to an open break with the papacy. For although the heathen Italians had to remain Catholic because they could not do without Catholicism as an instrument of their exploitation of other peoples, in Germany the revolutionary mood inevitably led to an open break with the papacy, because it was Germany that bore to a great extent the cost of Italian prosperity. The economic interests of Germany were responsible for the process of radical change resulting in a break with Catholicism, just as the opposing economic interests of Italy prevented the much more far-reaching intellectual revolution there from coming to this conclusion.

Germany thus found itself confronted with a question of far-reaching dimensions, one that necessarily shook the whole people insofar as it shared in the national culture. As a consequence, the forces that created a bond of community, of communication, of interaction throughout Germany had now to be animated. German book production now increased its capacity extremely rapidly, and the printed pamphlet now reached a wide public; now the religious, political, and social agitator moved from region to region. The secondary school now became a tool of religious struggle and was organized and extended, on the one hand, by the Reformers, and, on the other, by the Jesuits. How often has the complaint been made that the Reformation split the nation into Catholics and Protestants and thereby promoted the nation's political fragmentation? And yet it was in the upheavals of the Reformation that the Germans first really became a community of culture. For the first time the enormous cultural significance of party formation was revealed in the German context, compelling the parties to fight for every man, using all available resources in order to influence every individual, and, since the same cultural influence was felt by the individual from both sides, producing for the first time a national community.

Capitalist commodity production and the development of the modern state created the means by which large sections of the population could be linked together through indirect and direct intellectual interaction to form a community of culture; but in order for this means to be fully exploited, in

order for the culture of the nation to be compelled to affect, to influence, and to fight for every German man, a great struggle was required, one that shook the entire nation. The significance of the Reformation for the emergence of the nation does not lie in the decline of the Italian papacy, nor in the emancipation of the German church, nor in the fact that the Reformation heightened the consciousness among Protestants of the difference between German and foreign natures. Rather, this significance lies in the fact that the great struggle—precisely because it was a struggle that split the Germans into opposing parties—forced each of the parties to exploit the gamut of cultural resources created by the new circumstances and thus to create a German community of culture quite different from any that had preceded it. What could more clearly illustrate this than the fact that it was the Reformation that helped a uniform German language to triumph and that first forced Catholics and Protestants to extend the school system—albeit initially only the secondary school system. It was the Reformation that forced both parties to extend their influence through their orators to the broad mass of the population and forced both parties to use the book and the pamphlet as new means of struggle.

However, the fact that the Reformation filled this role also shows, of course, that it was by no means the entire people who came to constitute a national community of culture. To be sure, social critique, initially in the form of the critique of traditional religion, penetrated large sections of the population. However, the broad mass of the population could not understand the language of the classically educated Reformers. Thus, the Reformation necessarily took a different form in the hands of the peasants, the urban proletariat and small-scale artisans, and the homeworkers in the countryside from that which the Reformers themselves had envisaged. Thus, when these classes now wanted to make “their” revolution within this immense process of radical change, the spokesmen of the Reformation had to turn against them.

No one raged more dreadfully against the rebellious peasants than Martin Luther. “Stab, strike, strangle here who can!” he wrote as the peasants rose against their tormentors. “Hail you who fall and die; you cannot meet a more blessed death. For you die in obedience to the divine word and in the service of love to save the next.” And still later he boasted: “I, Martin Luther, have struck dead all peasants in revolt, for I called for them to be killed: all their blood is on my hands. But I lay it at the feet of Almighty God; he ordered me to speak!” And in a no less dreadful and uncomprehending manner did Luther oppose the social revolutionary and communist sects that the proletariat and the small-scale artisans in the towns and the miners and weavers in the countryside formed for the purpose of revolution.

Luther was a man of the princes, who used the Reformation to turn the wealth of the church to their own ends; and, by virtue of his education, he was

also a man of the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie. What a wide cultural abyss separated him from the peasantry and the proletariat! It was also this upper stratum that disseminated and unified the culture of the Reformation. It was for this stratum that Reformers and Jesuits wrote their books; it was for this stratum that both founded their schools; it was the cultural life of this stratum that was reflected in the intellectual life of the new Protestant Church, as it was in that of Tridentine Catholicism and the Jesuit order. This restrictedness alone, the fact that a still comparatively weak social group was made the bearer of the national culture, made the Counter-Reformation possible. How could it ever have been possible for the prince to decide which religious confession his subjects were to adopt if the conflict over confession had really been a matter of the whole people, of the broad mass of the peasants!

This clearly illustrates the limits of the bourgeois community of culture. It encompassed the courtiers of the prince and the court nobles, chancery officials, the prosperous bourgeoisie, and the newly emerged independent urban professions. It excluded not only the proletarian, but also the peasant, the coarse, ignorant peasant whose whole existence revolved around hard work and who was the object of bourgeois mockery:

The ox's load the peasant bears,
But on his head no horns he wears.⁴³

Early bourgeois development certainly drew a broader section of the population into the community of culture than had been the case during the age of chivalry. However, it still divided the people into two large groups only one of which was in possession of the national culture and bound together as a national community by virtue of shared cultural influences. The working classes, on the other hand, upon whose exploitation this high culture was based, were themselves excluded from this culture. As a consequence, they were not reached by its creative force and were not influenced by it. They spoke dialects that were becoming increasingly differentiated and therefore no longer understood each other, whereas the educated already had a uniform German language. They were not united by the book or the pamphlet since they could not read; they had no access to the nation's schools and education. They did not constitute the nation, but were still, like the peasantry of the feudal system, nothing more than the *tenants of the nation*. To be sure, it was their labor that alone made the national culture possible; however, it made this culture possible not for them, but for the classes that exploited and oppressed them.

THE CULTURAL COMMUNITY OF THE EDUCATED CLASSES IN THE EARLY CAPITALIST ERA

It is a peculiarity of the history of the development of the German nation that its early capitalist era does not present an image of uniform ascent, but is

instead arrested by a curious regressive movement. In Germany, the process of early capitalist development that we have already described began relatively early, but, as a consequence of a period of great economic upheaval, a reaction very soon set in that characterized the face of the national community of culture from the latter half of the sixteenth century until the middle of the eighteenth century. This reaction set in with the great shift in the trade routes.

The first people to experience rapid capitalist development, the Italians, were also the first to experience the impetus inherent in all capitalism to continuously extend its sphere of exploitation. It was the Italians who ushered in the great age of discovery. As early as the fifteenth century, the Genoese discovered the Canary Islands; it was also the Genoese who first attempted to find the sea route to the East Indies. And later, when the peoples on the Atlantic Ocean undertook their voyages of discovery, it was the Italians to whom they turned. The discoverer of America "Christopher Columbus himself is but the greatest of a long list of Italians who, in the service of Western nations, sailed into distant seas."⁴⁴ Among the peoples on the western coast of Europe, the Portuguese were the first to undertake bold voyages of discovery with success. In 1484 they discovered the Congo coast, and in 1498 they finally found the long-sought sea route to the East Indies. With this began the displacement of world trade from the Mediterranean coast to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. The leadership of the capitalist nations was wrested from the Italians and passed in turn into the hands of the Portuguese and the Spanish, the Dutch, the French, and the British.

We know that the capitalist development of southern Germany was based in no small measure on the fact that it dominated the intermediate trade in the riches of the Far East between Italy and the lands of the north. Now, however, the Portuguese, in a series of wars, destroyed the trade routes leading from India over Arabia to Italy. Rather than being taken over the land route via the Near East, foreign goods were now to reach Europe via the sea route. Lisbon now took the place of the great cities of Upper Italy as the center of trade with India.

The great trading houses of southern Germany were initially able to adapt to the new circumstances. They soon established themselves in Spain and Portugal, and, despite the shifting of the trade routes, Indian trade also initially remained in their hands. Thus, the Fuggers conducted the Moluccan trade from Lisbon, and the riches of America, which had been opened up by the Spaniards, also initially served German capital. The Welsers exploited Venezuela, and Welser and Ellinger leased the copper mines of San Domingo. The Indian spice trade was in German hands from 1576 until 1580, and the Negro slave trade was also temporarily monopolized by the pious Germans. However, German capital's rich share in Spanish domination and exploitation merely delayed rather than prevented the decline of German

capitalism. In 1575 the Spanish state declared bankruptcy. The claims of foreign creditors on the Spanish king were declared null and void. Apart from the Italians, those most affected by this development were the Germans, with immense amounts of German capital lost.

Thus fell the proud edifice of Upper German capitalism. The year 1611 saw the bankruptcy of the proud trading house of the Welsers, and in 1653 the Fuggers dissolved their Spanish business. In 1581 a preacher described the economic decline of Upper Germany in graphic terms: "Wherever one goes, one hears from all sides of misfortune after misfortune among the merchants and in financial circles, and one sees daily among traders, artisans, councillors, patricians, counts, and noblemen that countless numbers who were of high rank, wealthy, prosperous, and prestigious are impoverished and ruined."⁴⁵

The decline of southern German commerce was matched almost simultaneously by a pushing back of the North Germans who had for so long mediated English and Dutch trade with the Scandinavian and northern Slavic countries. Henry VII had already attacked the privileges of the Hanse in England to the advantage of English merchants. Although in 1491 the Hanse was still able to claim its English privileges, it could do so only on the condition that it allowed England access to the Baltic and, above all, free trade with Danzig. What Henry VII began was completed under Elizabeth. In 1550 the Hanse still had a considerable advantage in fabric export, annually exporting some forty-three thousand pieces of raw fabric as well as wool, lead, and tin, and carrying wax, cloth, canvas, tar, and the products of the south to England. In 1567 the merchant adventurers, at that time the pioneers of English foreign trade, succeeded in establishing themselves in Hamburg. They were soon given notice and had to leave the city, but England responded by canceling the Hanseatic merchants' privileges in England. At the same time England attacked the Hanse fleet. Within a short time the English had seized sixty Hanseatic ships under the pretext that they were to have delivered war contraband to Spain. When in 1598 the German Empire forbade the presence of the merchant adventures on German soil, the English responded by expelling the Hanseatic merchants from their long established guild hall in London. This expulsion of the Germans remained in force even after 1611, when the English merchants were allowed to return to Hamburg and the city became the gateway for the movement of English commodities into Germany.

Along with the English, the Scandinavians, too, became incensed over their exploitation at the hands of the Hanseatic merchants. As a consequence, the profitable trade with the Scandinavian countries passed out of the hands of the German merchants and into those of the Dutch. The Netherlands, however, were no longer German. The sudden displacement of the trade routes, which damaged the whole of German commerce, temporarily provided the

Netherlands with the status of Europe's most highly developed capitalist country. A close community of culture linked the inhabitants of the present-day Netherlands, who had emerged from three different German tribes; their prosperous economic situation constituted the foundation of their distinctive political and religious development, their national scientific and artistic traditions, and their own uniform language, which was different from the standard German form and which acted as a tool of their close community of culture. They were thus separated from the body of the German nation, becoming not only an independent state, but indeed an independent nation. Their economic gain, which resulted from the new development in world trade, could thus be of no benefit to the German nation.

The ruin of large-scale German trade, the destruction of large stocks of capital, and the fall in trading profits were quickly felt by all those sectors of the German population connected with commodity production. The development of mining and of the putting-out system in the countryside was inhibited; the artisans saw their best customers taken from them. A number of other events contributed to this situation. The development of the new states based on the monetary economy initially led to a large number of devastating wars throughout Europe. The victims of these wars were above all those peoples who remained territorially fragmented, in contrast to the peoples of the West, which had already established large nation-states. Italy fell under foreign domination, and Germany became a theater of war in which the large states of Europe pitted their armies against one another. Above all, it was the devastation of the Thirty Years War that restricted the development of Germany. In addition, the violent implementation of the Counter-Reformation in some regions drove precisely those sectors of the population with the most capital and the greatest commercial ability out of the country.

All these events, which restricted the capitalist development of Germany and in fact led to a temporary return to an agricultural economy, narrowed the community of culture and transformed its nature. On the highest rung of the national community of culture were the princely courts and the nobility. For the nobility, the changed circumstances were by no means unfavorable. On the contrary, the radical changes wrought by the Counter-Reformation and the horrors of the Thirty Years War presented the nobility with the possibility of increasing the exploitation of the peasantry to an unheard-of extent, of annexing deserted peasant land to its domains, and of extending the duty labor of the defenseless peasants beyond all previous limits. Nevertheless, the political development of the state was unfavorable to the nobility. Its former military significance was now irretrievably lost, and the princes, backed by their strong mercenary and later conscripted armies, continually suppressed the political power of the nobility, which was once again concentrated in the estates [*Stände*]. The noble could no longer maintain the status of an independent feudal lord; now he had to be content with the means of domina-

tion provided to him by the new state, which reserved for him the highest ranks in the bureaucracy and the army.

Rather than constituting an independent force based on his own economic and political power—as in the Middle Ages—in opposition to the state, the noble was now able to exercise power only through the state. In cultural terms this constituted an immense difference. For the new culture of the noble now became courtly in character; throughout the land the nobility imitated the customs of the court of the prince; every whim of the prince became mandatory in castles throughout the land. These courtly customs of the small German states necessarily found their model in the practices of the nobility in what was then the most highly developed absolutist state, in the opulent court of the king of France. Thus, French customs and French fashion, French frivolity and French art were brought into Germany, destroying all that once constituted the German nature. A sojourn in France came to be considered the most indispensable element of the young nobleman's education. The French language completely superseded the German language in courtly and noble circles. Even Frederick II once confessed to Gottsched: "From the time of my youth I have never read a German book and speak German like a coachman; and now I am an old fellow of forty-six years and have no more time to learn German."⁴⁶ The changing fashions of the French nobility rapidly found their way into Germany. The *homme du monde* became the ideal of education in noble circles. And the way in which this also transformed the nobility internally, in terms of its entire intellectual nature, did not go unnoticed by contemporary commentators:

À-la-mode the garments, à-la-mode the mind,
As without it changes, within there's change in kind.⁴⁷

Apart from the courtly nobility, there was a second element of the *educated classes* during this era that was constituted by the stratum of independent professions, by those who had received a *humanistic education*. Its focal point was constituted by the bureaucracy developed by the modern state; to the members of the bureaucracy were added the clergy, the teachers in secondary schools, and medical practitioners. They were no less subject to outside influences than the nobility, except that in their case the French influence was less pronounced than the influence of humanistic education. The secondary schools did not foster the German language. The school regulations of the Electorate of Saxony actually forbade the use of the mother tongue in secondary schools. Special supervisors had the task of ensuring that the students spoke only Latin even with each other, and use of the German language was punished. Fluency in Latin and knowledge of the authors of classical antiquity—whereby the historical interest, to be sure, lay far behind the philological—were the ideals of this "humanistic" education. All of the scholarly literature as well as the *belles lettres* used in schools were in Latin.

Apart from the nobility and the independent professions, the participation in the national cultural community of the bourgeoisie involved in production and trade was far too limited for the bourgeoisie to be initially able to establish its own national system of education. Whoever wished to belong to the "educated," to "society," had to therefore attempt to absorb elements of the French culture of the court and Latin scholarship. This was in fact the aspiration of the relatively few patricians in the large German towns of Hamburg, which had gained its wealth from trade with England, and Leipzig, the prosperity of which rested on trade with the Slavic countries, and in the Swiss towns, which benefited from France's prosperous development.

Beneath these strata of *educated society* lay the great mass of artisans, peasants, and workers. No bond of a common national culture united this mass. Its members grew to adulthood with almost no school education at all. They did not take part in public life. Poetry and art did not penetrate to them or, if at all, only in the vulgar form of the tragicomedies [*Haupt- und Staatsaktionen*] and the harlequin shows of the German theater of the time.⁴⁸ No tidings reached them of the events of the wider world, of the economic and political revolutions taking place in the West, of the great advances in the fields of natural and political science.

Only slowly did German capitalism recover from the heavy blows inflicted on it by the transformation of the world economy and the horrors of the Counter-Reformation and the Thirty Years War. That it managed to do so was due to the direct support provided by the state. The modern state developed on the foundation of commodity production. It could not develop or continue to exist without having a portion of the product of the population's labor provided in monetary form as tax for its use. With this tool the state created and maintained its two great instruments of power, the bureaucracy and the army. The state had to ensure the further development of commodity production. However, commodity production could become the general form of social production only in the form of capitalist commodity production. Thus, it became a necessary task of the state to promote the development of capitalism. This aim was served by the *mercantilist* policy. Of course, the breadth of mercantilist policy known to the large states of the West was not possible in the case of the small German territories. Nevertheless, these territories understood the importance of promoting capitalist development. The development of industry was supported by import duties on industrial products and export duties on raw materials. Commercial legislation sought to prevent the guilds from restricting capitalist development. Agrarian legislation sought to make it impossible for landholders to restrict the shift of agricultural workers into industry. From time to time shabby brutal measures were employed to create artificial demand for industrial products. Foreign capitalists and foremen were summoned in an attempt to accelerate development. In order that the covetousness of the worker should not prove bother-

some for the capitalist, maximum wage levels and minimum working hours were set and every attempt by the workers to secure humane conditions was punished severely. The territories thus promoted the development of capitalism with all the means available to them.

With this support, German capitalism underwent a gradual recovery; the number and wealth of German merchants grew; manufacture and the putting-out system expanded once again, and the mining industry was regenerated. And with the growth of the bourgeois sector, there was also once again a growth in the numbers and prosperity of those whose presence always accompanies capitalist development, the elite white-collar workers and the independent professions. A German bourgeois society was once more coming into being. The self-confidence of the burgher grew. Whereas Louis of Baden had written to the emperor that "to appear timorous and fainthearted is a sickness found among all burghers,"⁴⁹ only a few decades later the opinion of Gottsched's weekly *Der Biedermann* was already that "a hawker of repute and standing has without doubt far greater honor and possesses much more of true nobility than does the unruly, extravagant Junker."⁵⁰

This bourgeois society also gradually created its own culture. The German language began once again to win ground over the French of the nobility and the Latin of the jurists and theologians. In 1730 publications in Latin constituted only 30 percent of overall book production, whereas in 1570, 70 percent of all books printed in Germany were in Latin. From approximately 1680 onward the German language predominated in poetry; in 1687 Thomaeus gave the first university lecture to be held in the German language; under the influence of Christian Friedrich Wolff, philosophy began to make use of the German language, as did medicine.⁵¹ The jurists adhered to their beloved Latin the longest. Only in 1752 did the number of works of law published in the German language exceed the number published in Latin. This new use of the German language meant in fact a conquest of the German language, the formation of a uniform language for fields of knowledge for which such a language had not previously existed. However, the growing number of substantial bourgeois strata of the population wanting to have a share in the cultural community of the nation necessarily led not only to the German language's superseding foreign languages, but also to a change in the content of intellectual culture. Neither the culture of the courtly nobility nor that of the narrow academic stratum of the population could be the culture of the ambitious upper stratum of the German bourgeoisie. This fact is clearly reflected in our literature.

Even during the worst period of foreign influence, German literature had not deteriorated completely. However, even this literature combined elements of the courtly culture of the nobility and those of philosophical scholarship. Although it may have used the German language, its superficial imitation of French and classical poetry, its didacticism, placed the poetry of Opitz, for

example, firmly in line with the writings in French and Latin of his time.⁵² The public for which these German authors intended their work was referred to by Weckherlin (1584–1650) in terms as clear as they were naive:

Neither for nor of all men I write,
And my verses, skilled and worthy,
Should only please the scholarly,
And (as they do) give wise princes their delight.⁵³

A German literature could first flourish only when the bourgeoisie slowly began to recover from its decline. The tastes of the broad bourgeois sections of the population had first to be cured of the vulgarization they had undergone due to the influence of the bombastic novels and the uncouth plays on the German stages of the time. German literature was thus initially compelled to adopt classical French literary forms, thereby creating a greater demand for artistic form. However, as soon as the bourgeoisie was strong enough to create its own art, it abandoned the crutch needed for the first steps and created its own art independently. The new art was conscious of its bourgeois origins. The fact that this art could emerge only in the context of a struggle with the courtly and scholarly culture that preceded it still has an effect on today's historians of German literature, for whom it is not easy, in the face of the harsh judgment directed by our classics at their immediate predecessors, nevertheless to be fair to the latter and to allocate to them their due historical place.

As the strengthening bourgeoisie became conscious of their opposition to the culture of the princes and the nobility, so too did the poetry of *Emilia Galotti*, of *Götz*, and of Schiller's youthful dramas throw down the gauntlet to the princes.⁵⁴ The fact that this German art was conscious of its bourgeois origins is witnessed clearly in Schiller's famous poem:

No Augustan century
No propitious Medici
Smil'd the German art when young
Glory nourish'd not her powers,
She unfolded not her flowers
Princes' fav'ring rays among.

From the mighty Fredrick's throne
Germany's most glorious son,—
Went she forth, defenseless, spurn'd;
Proudly Germans may repeat,
While their hearts more gladly beat,—
They themselves their crown have earn'd.⁵⁵

It is the proud self-confidence of the German bourgeoisie that here sings the praises of the culture that the bourgeoisie itself has created.

And what an intellectual transformation is represented by this rise of the bourgeoisie! During the period in Germany of domination by the culture of the nobility, with its annually changing fashions from France, the German bourgeoisie remained tightly bound to tradition. The son lived, thought, and felt just as the father had lived, thought, and felt. If we look for a poet during this time who expresses not courtly, not scholarly, but simply bourgeois thought, we find him tightly bound in the omnipotence of tradition—such as the simple North German Hans Laurenberg, who died in 1658:

By olden times will I remain,
higher up I shall not strive,
My father's ways are also mine.⁵⁶

This tone became quite different as the bourgeoisie regained strength. Now the nobility, which opposed bourgeois development, became conservative. The bourgeoisie, however, began again to apply the knife of its reason to everything; it began—albeit only in terms of thought—to transform the traditional world, to remodel traditional culture according to its own world view. It was the age of the *Enlightenment*, and custom and the way of life, traditional religion and the traditional state now had to submit to its critique. Countless monthly and weekly publications disseminated ideas of “natural religion,” “natural morality,” and the “natural state” among the educated strata throughout the whole of Germany. Secret societies based on Enlightenment ideas united the influential sectors of the educated Germans. This Enlightenment may seem limited and narrow-minded to us in comparison with the liberal development of France and England, the great works of which were able to influence a wider German public only in diluted form, but it was precisely in its limited nature, arising from the slower and short-winded development of the German bourgeoisie, that the Enlightenment became just as much the unifying bond of a national community of culture as did our classical poetry, which was closely tied to it. With this development of our literature, the triumph of the uniform German language was completed. Shortly before the revival of German literature, one could speak in Switzerland of the need to be emancipated from the “dictatorial audacity” of Upper Saxony, which wanted to force its language on the whole of Germany. This was now no longer discussed. For to cut oneself off from the community of the New High German uniform language would have meant robbing oneself of access to the great treasures of our art and philosophy.

Let any scholar of today try to eliminate the influence of our classic poetry from the development of his personality, to eliminate the moment in which the youth first read with glowing cheeks Schiller's *Robbers* [*Die Räuber*]. Let him try to eliminate the day on which the young man first pondered with Faust the mysteries of the world. Or felt one with Werther in his first anguish of love. That which our classics have created has become for each and every

one of us our own personal experience, our own possession. They have contributed to our very being and indeed played a part in the formation of every German's being. Thus, an invisible bond links us all. That which became mine also became the other's; all of us come under the same influences, and these transform us into a community. It is this which makes us all Germans. It must be understood here that the issue at hand is not one of what significance the classic poetry of the Germans has for our national consciousness. We are not concerned here with the fact that we think of Lessing and Schiller, of Kant and Goethe in relation to having pride in things German. Rather, we are concerned here with the fact that our classic poetry has helped weld together a unitary character of the German nation by becoming an experience shared by all Germans, a determining element in their fate.

And what is true of our classic poetry is no less true of the German Enlightenment. In fact, perhaps the effect here is even stronger precisely because in most cases we do not perceive it as clearly as the influence of German poetry. And yet, whoever takes any German newspaper in his hand today, whoever listens to any given sermon or any country schoolmaster—whether or not the newspaper is socialist, the clergyman orthodox Catholic, and the schoolmaster a Prussian conservative—he hears again and again what has been heard since the era of the Enlightenment, reproducing itself from generation to generation and still influencing us all today more strongly than we realize. The form that the German bourgeoisie of the time devised and fused with foreign elements has remained our heritage to this day. This culture was produced by the economic development of the eighteenth century; however, once it had emerged, this culture became a living element that, in shaping later generations in the same way and affecting every individual separately, unites the nation as a *community of culture*.

To be sure, German bourgeois culture today still does not affect the whole people with its full force. Its full effect is still felt only by the propertied and dominant classes. And this is hardly to be compared with the situation in the eighteenth century! What meaning could the bourgeois Enlightenment and bourgeois art have for the German peasants, whose lives were dominated by the excessive demands for work by the landholder? What meaning could they have for the German artisans, who had already begun to complain about the competitiveness of advancing capitalism? What meaning could they have for the German workers, who were at this time at the mercy of capitalist exploitation to a greater degree than had previously been or was subsequently the case? One needs look only to the education system of the time in order to understand how narrow the circle still was that the new bourgeois culture bound together as a nation.

The secondary school, which emerged as a result of the Reformation—in Protestant regions for the most part under state influence and in Catholic regions under Jesuit influence—never fell into complete decline. With the ad-

vances of the bourgeois community of culture, it experienced a revival. The case of the elementary school was quite different. Capitalism in the period of the manufactory and the putting-out system had no use for the elementary school. The workers in the manufactory, who performed the same simple manual tasks year in and year out, required practice and dexterity for their work, but no knowledge at all. The work of the cotter working in the putting-out system required just as little educational background. Indeed, more than a minimum education for the peasant was already regarded by the landowning class of the time as dangerous. In the words of Frederick II, “[I]t suffices in the countryside when they learn to read and write a little; if they know too much they go to the cities and want to become secretaries and the like. Therefore in the countryside one must conduct the education of the young people in such a way that they learn what is necessary for what they have to accomplish, but in such a way that they do not leave their villages and keep their place.” The state at this time was also quite content with the provision of an extremely limited measure of general elementary education: “The schoolmaster must ensure that the people retain their devotion to religion and educate them to the point where they do not steal or murder.” The state required no more than this at a time when military divisions marched into battle as one man and war made no claims on the common man’s ability to make decisions, at a time when administrative tasks were carried out by educated bureaucrats or landholders and therefore did not require the participation of the great mass of the population. The elementary education system of the time was consequently wretched.⁵⁷

The local sexton, whose task it was to sweep the church, also organized the school lessons. The villages lacked school buildings, and, as a consequence, the lessons were usually conducted in the house of a different parishioner each week. The parishioners also took turns in providing board and lodging for the teacher, who received an annual wage of between three and twenty thalers.⁵⁸ “If the schoolmaster,” proclaimed the *Principia regulativa* of Frederick William I of Prussia, “is a craftsman”—it was common for tailors to work as schoolmasters as a sideline—“then he can already subsist; if he is not then he is allowed to work in the harvest for six weeks on a daily wage.” In order to provide for those invalided during his campaigns, Frederick II wanted to appoint them as schoolmasters. “If some are found among the invalids who can read, calculate, and write and are suited to the position of schoolmaster in the countryside and are otherwise proper, then they should be employed in particular in those places where the King provides a salary for the schoolmaster.” It is indicative enough of the quality of elementary education at the time that, when the royal order was implemented, only sixty-nine invalids out of four thousand were found who could read and write adequately. Furthermore, the condition of the education system was always better in Protestant regions than in the Catholic ones.⁵⁹

Thus, the apparently glorious development of the German community of culture still reveals the sad picture with which we are already familiar. The national community of culture was still the community of culture of a class, that of the educated bourgeoisie; the vast majority of the population had no part in it. Peasants, artisans, and workers were still, as in the era of the Hohenstaufen, not members of the nation, but its mere tenants. The further expansion of the national cultural community could occur only through a vast unfolding of the forces of production, a task that was carried out by modern capitalism.

MODERN CAPITALISM AND THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY OF CULTURE

Early capitalist development had transformed the old system of feudal landholdings [*Grundherrschaft*] into a manorial system with both feudal and capitalist aspects [*Gutsherrschaft*], a hybrid form that served the capitalist pursuit of profit within the juridical framework of the seignorial system. Modern capitalism, however, completely stripped the large agricultural concern of its feudal form, thus completely eliminating the seignorial system that had constituted the structure of German agriculture for over a thousand years. That which innumerable peasant uprisings had failed to achieve—the elimination of their exploitation at the hands of the feudal lord—was accomplished by capitalist development. The absolutist state had already placed limitations on the manorial system; the bourgeois revolution eliminated it. The manorial system rendered early capitalist development an indispensable service in that the seizures of peasant land by the landlords ensured the emergence of an army of proletarians. This process of expropriation, however, established its own limits. The lord was able to expand his own domain at the expense of the peasants only to a certain extent; a number of peasants had to be spared due to the lord's need for labor power. At this point the lord recalled that the peasant was bound to the soil and that it was the peasant's destiny to serve only him, the hereditary lord, and not, for instance, the foreign capitalist in the city. From this point onward we no longer hear of the seizures of peasant land, but of the cruel persecution of the peasants who, by fleeing the countryside, sought to avoid the exploitation that had now grown unbearable. The manorial system now became an impediment to capitalist development. In that it bound the peasants to the land, made the choice of a profession for the peasant's son conditional on seignorial approval, and obliged the children of the peasant to perform bonded service for a period it impeded the enlisting of industrial labor power. In that it compelled the peasant to provide labor services and prevented him from cultivating the land intensively, it impeded inclusion of the peasants in the sphere of commodity purchasers, restricted the market for industry, and essentially limited capital to the luxury industries that produced for the needs of the landowners.

However, the manorial system conflicted not only with the interests of the bourgeoisie, but also with its ideology. Newly emerged in an old world, in conflict with all traditional forms of power, the young bourgeoisie had no taste for historical legal titles; the time-honored and the traditional commanded no respect from this class, which evaluated every institution using the measure of its class reason. The manorial system found no favor here. The only justification for its existence in legal terms was the fact of its historical emergence, and it now no longer served any existing need. It was thus rejected by the bourgeoisie, which demanded the liberation of the peasantry. In voicing this demand, the bourgeoisie found its primary ally in the state, which saw the peasant as its taxpayer and soldier, but the landed noble as the opponent of centralized state authority, an opponent who resisted the will of the princes in the estates diet, whose land was not subject to taxation, and whose jurisdiction over his tenants made centralized bureaucratic administration impossible. Thus, already prior to the bourgeoisie's rise to power, the manorial system faced an opponent in the absolutist state, which moderated the exploitation and bonded serfdom of the peasants, albeit without eliminating them. It was the bourgeois revolution that actually destroyed the old feudal legal framework. It made the peasant a free citizen, liberated him from all personal ties to the lord, placed him under the direct authority of state courts and state administrative bodies, made him a free owner of his land, and liberated him from labor services.

The elimination of the juridical framework of feudalism removed all the obstacles that until now had countered the influence of capitalist forces on the rural population. However, in the meantime these forces had changed in nature, had increased their offensive capacity through the transformation of the forces of production at their disposal. The capitalist concern had now progressed from the era of cooperation, the simple pooling of workers engaged in the same work, the stage of the manufactory, the workshop based on the division of labor among artisans, to the era of the factory, with its utilization of the machine. The spinning machine, the mechanical loom, and the steam engine became tools of industrial capital. Armed with these new weapons, capital now embarked on a transformation of all social relations in the countryside.

The modern factory in the first place destroyed the old forms of domestic industry practiced by the peasants. The spinning jenny brought domestic spinning to an end in a matter of decades, and the mechanical loom reduced the amount of weaving done in the home. The supplementary activities performed by the peasant family during the winter months, and thereby also its supplementary income, were now taken away. The peasant increasingly became a pure farmer, to whom capitalist industry left no supplementary commercial activities. The old remains of the self-sufficient domestic economy disappeared; the old proverb that it is only a fool who gives to the blacksmith what he himself can earn was forgotten; rural production became pure

commodity production, with the peasant now having to sell his products in order to purchase the products of capitalist industry.

Within a few decades, the development that had begun with the emergence of the modern factory received a new stimulus. Modern means of transport, the railway and the steamship, now provided capitalism with its most powerful tool. Cheap transport created the possibility of using agricultural and livestock products from foreign countries to feed the peoples of Europe. The fertile virgin soils of America, Russia, and Siberia and the extensive pasturelands of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa were utilized to serve the needs of Europe. Instead of producing the grains and livestock they required themselves, the peoples of Europe transferred a part of their agricultural production to other parts of the globe and exchanged their industrial products for the agricultural products of the young colonial lands.

As a consequence, European agriculture had to improve its production methods if it was not to be undercut by its new overseas competitors. The machine was now introduced into agriculture, albeit in a more limited capacity than in industry. In Germany steam-driven threshing machinery was soon annually achieving a capacity equal to twenty million human working days.⁶⁰ The necessity for artificial fertilizers, the transition to intensive cultivation, and the closer connection with agriculturally based industries all increased the capital requirement of agriculture. Large capitalist concerns affiliated themselves with agriculturally based industries such as spirit distilling and sugar production; the peasants similarly sought to gain advantage by forming agricultural cooperatives. All these developments brought about an increasing inclusion of the rural population in the sphere of commodity production. Even the Tyrolean peasant no longer gave his milk to his farm laborers for their meal break, but sent it to the cooperative dairy for treatment and sale, providing his laborers instead with bought schnapps.

Together these immense changes brought about, on the one hand, a complete geographical and occupational restructuring of the population and, on the other, a fundamental change in the agricultural situation and thereby the psychology of the peasant. The peasant's son no longer had a place on the land. His father could no longer use him in the autumn to thresh the grain, since it was now threshed in the field using the steam-driven threshing machine; he could no longer use his services at the loom in the winter, since the mechanical loom had brought an end to domestic industry. The peasant's son therefore left the land and moved to the large industrial regions. The size of the agricultural population did not increase, whereas there was a rapid rise in the numbers engaged in industry and commerce. Immense numbers of people gathered in the great cities and the large industrial regions. The peasants who had remained on the land now became pure farmers. They no longer used the products of their labor for themselves, but put them on the market, and used their financial return to buy the industrial products that they needed.

Must we not now demonstrate what all this represents for the national community of culture? The rural population has been uprooted by capitalism, torn from the soil to which it was tied since people first took up a settled existence, and drawn beyond the narrow boundaries defining the village and the land attached to it. Its sons have moved to the cities, where people from every part of the country encounter one another, influence one another, marry and reproduce. There the traditional, the unchanging rhythm of peasant existence governed by the seasons is replaced by the pulsating life of the city, which destroys all traditional conceptions—a new and ever-changing world. Those who are part of the modern urban workforce are flung here and there depending on changes in the economic situation.

How great the difference is between, for instance, the modern metalworker, who today works on the Rhine in the pay of the great iron magnate and tomorrow is dispatched by a wave of industrial changes to Silesia, who courts his wife in Saxony but raises his children in Berlin, and his grandfather, who spent his life from birth till death in a remote Alpine village, seeing the provincial town perhaps twice a year on the occasion of a fair or one of the great church festivals and not even acquainted with the peasants from the neighboring village due to the fact that a mountain range impeded interaction between villages. But how different is also our metalworker's brother, who has inherited the paternal holding in our mountain village. The traditional form of agricultural production has now been replaced by continual change, continual experimentation under the influence of agricultural cooperatives, touring training courses, agricultural fairs, and the like; he has become a businessman, who can calculate the price of his wares, negotiate with urban merchants over their prices, and take advantage of the competition between merchants. He has become as much a commodity producer and a commodity seller as the merchants and producers in the city; he is linked with the urban population by all the ties of commercial interaction, and for a long time now he has ceased to be beyond the reach of its cultural influence. Perhaps he rides to the city on his bicycle to haggle with the buyers, wearing not the traditional peasant garb, but an urban style of dress he has purchased in the town, the cut of which is, if not in the latest fashion from Paris or Vienna, then the previous season's.

These psychological changes produced by capitalist development have changed our whole system of education, just as they themselves would in turn not have been possible without the development of our education system. The school has become a necessary tool of modern development; better popular education was required by modern capitalism in order for the complex administrative apparatus of the large industrial concern to function; it was required by the peasant, since without it he could never have developed into the modern farmer; it was required by the modern state, which could never have established the modern administration or the modern army without it.

The nineteenth century thus saw an impressive development of the popular education system. We do not need to point out what it meant for the national community of culture that the same reader used by the worker's child in East Prussia as by the Tyrolean peasant's child conveyed the same educational elements, the same elements of our intellectual culture, in the same uniform language.

What the school began was continued by our army. The system of conscription reached its logical conclusion in compulsory military service. On the battlefields where the French Revolution defeated the absolutist powers of the old Europe, the modern army was born—a popular army, not yet in terms of its goals or its form of organization, but in terms of its composition. Military service took the peasant's son out of the narrow world of the village and brought him into contact with comrades from the city and from other regions and exposed him to the influence of the population of the garrison environment. Our military system thus quite unconsciously brought about a psychological revolution. It is no accident that the character in Gerhart Hauptmann's *Weavers* [*Die Weber*] who fans the spark of rebellion into a flame is a soldier newly returned home from the city.

The effect initially exercised by the school on the child and by compulsory military service on the young man is fully realized by democracy in the case of the adult. Freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press become the means by which the great issues of the age are carried into every peasant village and every workshop, by which great world events become the fate determining every individual, a cultural influence acting upon every individual. Universal suffrage, which calls on all to participate in collective decisions, forces the parties to struggle for every last supporter; in the slogans of the political parties, every peasant, every worker, is surrounded by all the great achievements of our entire history, our entire culture; every speech to an assembly, every newspaper, conveys a part of our intellectual culture to every last voter. All voters, however different in terms of origin, wealth, and political viewpoint, are nevertheless encompassed by a community of culture, because they are all—as the object of the struggle of all parties—subject to the same cultural influence, because in the individuality of each the same cultural influence has become operative and solidified as character.

Of all the historical movements produced by the age of capitalism, the workers' movement is by far the most significant. Even its indirect effect is immense. It is the workers' movement that has won for the workers a reduction of the working day, with the result that at least a part of our national culture also permeates to them. It is this movement that has succeeded in raising the wages of the workers to the point where physical and intellectual impoverishment does not completely exclude them from the community of culture of the nation. But it has achieved more than this. By awakening a

fear of socialism in the propertied classes, it has forced them to enter the arena of struggle. Now the member of the bourgeoisie and even the Junker must endeavour to reach the masses. He too now seeks workers to organize for his own ends, to unite workers and peasants in the struggle against the working class. The struggle around the great question of property thus rages throughout the whole society, rages around each individual. By way of the press, associations, and newspapers the arguments of every party exert an influence on every member of the people. In this way, a fragment of the current of our culture—however diluted it may be—penetrates to every individual, affects that individual's character, and unites us as a community of culture bound together by the same cultural influences.

The Germanic peoples in Caesar's time were a community of culture, but this old community of culture disintegrated with the transition to agriculture and the nation's adopting a settled form of existence. The national community was replaced by local communities, clearly differing from locality to locality, from valley to valley. High culture united only the dominant and propertied classes as a nation. Only with the advent of modern capitalism was a truly national culture of the whole people produced, one that transcended the boundaries of the narrow village world. Capitalism achieved this by uprooting the population, tearing it out of local ties, restructuring it in geographical and occupational terms in the process of the formation of modern classes and professions. It completed its work by means of democracy—which is its product—as well as the popular school, military service, and universal suffrage.

Can capitalism then not take pride in its work? Has not this much-maligned phenomenon accomplished an immense task by recreating the nation as a community of culture that includes all and not merely the propertied classes? To be sure. However, capitalism cannot praise its work too loudly. It is the *progress of the forces of production* that has made possible the emergence of the modern national community of culture. The steam engine, the spinning machine, the loom, giant blast furnaces, and our Bessemer converters, the fact that the development of steamship travel and the railway first opened up fertile regions in distant parts of the globe to us: these things have provided the totality of the people with the access to cultural wealth that makes the nation a community of culture. The development of the forces of production, of the machine, is responsible for the restructuring of the population that underlies our great prosperity: greater prosperity has become an element of the culture that binds the people together as a community of culture. This development of the forces of production has certainly been realized through capitalism; the fact that it has been realized only in this way at the same time places limits on the development of the community of culture. The condition of the emergence of the modern nation was the growth of our forces of production and thereby of our prosperity. However, the fact that until now it has been possible for these forces of production to develop only

in the context of capitalism, only in the service of capital, limits the access of the masses to the culture of the nation; this fact establishes the limits of the development of the national community of culture.

The development of the forces of production means an immense rise in the productivity of the labor of the people. However, the growing wealth produced by our labor becomes the property of the masses only to a limited extent. The ownership of the instruments of labor has become a tool used to appropriate a massive part of the constantly increasing wealth. Only a part of the working day produces for the worker the goods that become his own; the rest of the working day is devoted to creating the wealth that becomes the property of the owner of the means of production. Material goods, however, always transform themselves into intellectual culture. Thus, the law of our age is that the *labor of one becomes the culture of another*.

The fact of exploitation, of surplus labor, which is manifested in the long working hours, the low wages, the poor nourishment, and the overcrowded housing of the worker constitutes a limit to the participation of the broad mass of the working people in the intellectual culture of the nation. The fact of exploitation, therefore, also restricts the emergence of the nation as a community of culture. It prevents the incorporation of the worker into the national cultural community. And what is true of the worker is also true of the peasant exploited by buyer capital and mortgage capital and of the artisan enslaved by the capitalist merchant. They are at work from early childhood till old age; in the late evening they look in vain for silence in their cramped living quarters, which all too many must share between them; the necessity of procuring enough for their daily needs leaves them without a moment's freedom. What can these people know of that which we happier individuals experience, that which binds us together as a nation? What do our workers know of Kant? Our peasants of Goethe? Our artisans of Marx?

However, capitalism restricts the development of the people as a whole in regard to the formation of a community of culture not only indirectly, due to the fact of exploitation, but also directly, as a result of the necessary *defense of exploitation*. To be sure, capitalism has expanded popular education to the degree it requires for its own purposes; but it will take care not to create a truly national system of education, which could place the masses in full possession of intellectual culture. This is not only because capitalism places excessive limits on the time available for schooling so as not to restrict its possibilities of exploiting children, not only because it begrudges the costs of schooling and would rather channel its wealth into the tools of its own power, but above all because, if provided with the opportunity to fully participate in the culture of the nation, the masses could no longer tolerate capitalism's domination; capitalism fears the popular school because it educates capitalism's opponent, and it therefore seeks to degrade the school to the position of a means of its own domination. Capitalism has necessarily produced com-

pulsory military service; but it has not created a truly popular army. It locks its soldiers in barracks and seeks to prevent them as much as possible from influencing the population. It seeks to cultivate in them, by way of external appearance, spatial separation, and ideological suggestion, a particular notion of status, which maintains a distance between the soldiers and the life of the masses. Capitalism has produced democracy. But although democracy was the adolescent love of the bourgeoisie, it is the terror of its old age, because it has now become a tool of the working class's claim to power. Universal suffrage in agriculturally backward Austria is still to be won; within the German Empire one can deny it to the workers for the regional diets; one can consider denying it to them for the *Reichstag*.⁶¹ Aging capitalism also fears freedom of the press, of assembly, and of association as means of power employed by its enemies. It thus does what it can to restrict the development of the nation. Capitalism cannot allow the nation to emerge as a cultural community in its fully realized form, because every element of intellectual culture becomes power in the hands of the working class, a weapon that will one day bring capitalism down.

We can certainly applaud every attempt to pass on a part of our scholarly and artistic traditions to workers. However, only the zealot will forget that only the isolated and unusually gifted worker can today become a cultivated individual, that the full possession of our cultural wealth remains at present necessarily denied to the workers. Whoever has seen our workers trying, after nine or ten hours of physical work, to acquire something of the immense wealth of our intellectual culture has seen how they struggle with the fatigue that wants to close their eyes, how they wrestle with the dreadful limitations of their poor educational background, which makes every new word a difficulty, how they endeavor to grasp the laws of society without ever having heard of the laws of nature, ever having learned about the laws of mechanics, how they try to understand exact laws of economics although they have never learned mathematics—whoever has seen this will not venture to hope ever to be able to make our culture the property of these exploited human beings. Only sycophants of the proletariat can persuade the workers that today they, as proletarians, can comprehend all scholarship, can enjoy all beauty. It is the great sorrow of the working class that it is not capable of this, that it is excluded from our national intellectual culture, from the greatest of treasures, on whose development even the least unskilled day laborer has an effect. It remains the case that it is only the masters who are bound together to form a national community by a shared culture, while the working, exploited, and oppressed masses, without whose work this culture could not exist for one day, indeed could never have emerged, are fobbed off with a wretchedly tiny portion of this wealth. But of course the day is closer than ever on which these masses will be able to take hold of this great wealth in order to make the intellectual culture that is the product of the labor of the entire people the

property of the entire people as well. Only when this day comes will a fully national community of culture begin to emerge.

THE REALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY OF CULTURE THROUGH SOCIALISM

Just as the bourgeoisie, once the numerically poorest and most insignificant of the estates within feudal society, rose up in this society, ultimately destroyed it, and built up its own society, so too there is a class stirring in contemporary society with whose interests our social institutions are incompatible, the working class. Step by step this class is winning ground in the class struggle and will ultimately establish a new society in place of the present one. But what will this society look like? The notion that every worker will become the owner of his instruments of labor, as in the days of the petty bourgeoisie of the guilds, would make technological development impossible; in the age of the machine, of gigantic transport networks, of great enterprises that are continually expanding, the means of production cannot belong to the individual worker; however, the society as a whole, the totality of the working people, can be the owner of the means of production. The society that the proletariat will construct will therefore be a socialist society. It will want to construct this society because the society of the present is in contradiction with its interests, is founded on the exploitation of the working class; it will be able to construct this society because, due to the concentration of capital, the accumulation of the instruments of labor under the command of relatively few enterprises, capitalism itself will create the possibility of transferring the means of production to social ownership. It will construct this society because the working class constitutes the daily increasing majority of the population and it is therefore the will of this class that will ultimately decide the destiny of the people.

When the society itself assumes control of the instruments of labor and organizes the production of goods on a planned basis, this means in the first place an immense increase in the productivity of labor. To be sure, it was capitalism that first developed the modern forces of production; however, the capitalist mode of production itself constitutes a barrier to the full utilization of these forces.

First, the capitalist mode of production reduces the amount of productive labor performed within the society, or rather, it reduces the number of working people engaged in productive labor, and, by maintaining an army of those who do not work or who are engaged in nonproductive labor, it shifts a correspondingly heavier burden onto the shoulders of those who are engaged in productive labor.⁶²

Capitalism excludes a considerable number of people from social labor altogether inasmuch as their property makes it possible for them to live with-

out working. The large and small capitalists, the growing number of those of independent means, are completely excluded from social labor, living on its output without augmenting it. To these are added all those making up their entourage: their wives, their servants, and the standing army that is required by the capitalist state. All of them diminish the number of productive workers. However, if in capitalist society some do not participate in the social labor process because their property makes work unnecessary, there are others who are excluded from the social labor process due to the fact that property is in the hands of the former. Capitalism constantly maintains an industrial reserve army, an army of unemployed. Under favorable economic conditions, capitalism draws a part of this unemployed sector into the sphere of production and provides it with employment. However, even under the most favorable economic conditions, unemployment never completely disappears; as soon as a crisis develops or the national economy merely experiences a severe depression, the number of the unemployed increases immediately and the quantity of labor performed decreases. Moreover, large sectors of the workforce are provided with full employment or any employment at all (farming, seasonal work) by capitalism only during particular times of the year. Capitalism is not capable of meeting the task of placing workers who are engaged in activities which, for technological or economic reasons, are limited to particular times of the year in other branches of production during the rest of the year.

However, capitalism not only reduces the number of people actively participating in the social labor process, but also, in particular, the number of those producing use values. Capitalism requires a vast army of diligent workers, which it forces to work hard from early in the morning until late at night and which, despite this, makes no contribution in terms of goods to the wealth of the society. Such an army is required by capitalism in order to wage the struggles created by capitalist competition. However, the labor that is devoted to directing customers away from competitors does not increase the wealth of the society by one iota. The work of the merchant and his assistants has a dual character: on the one hand, it entails the task of distributing the social product among the members of society, a task that must be fulfilled in every society; on the other hand, it also entails the work demanded by competition, the work of inducement, of persuasion, work that is required only by a society based on competition between private producers. What a vast amount of labor is devoured by advertising, from the newspaper advertisement to the world exhibition!

Socialist society will increase the number of productive workers to a vast extent. No healthy adult person will be able to live in a socialist society without working, since private property will no longer provide the right to the products of another's labor; and for each who wants to work there will be employment, for every worker will be welcomed as someone increasing the

prosperity of the society. And labor in this society will serve no other purpose than that of the production and distribution of goods and the enrichment of the society.

The capitalist mode of production not only prevents the available human labor power from being utilized to its full capacity. It also hinders the application of the most productive forms of industry. Capitalist production can never fully exploit the achievements of modern technology. Socialist society will be able to utilize a machine if the amount of labor it replaces is greater than that required to produce it; the capitalist mode of production, on the other hand, is able to use a machine only if it saves more on wages than it costs to produce. The lower the wages for labor, the greater the barriers to the introduction of new machinery and thus to the utilization of technological progress. Since the wage can be a manifestation only of the value of labor power and never of the value of the product of labor, capitalist society can never utilize all the machinery that a socialist society could immediately apply to production. Moreover, in the context of the capitalist mode of production, the surplus value produced by a society is distributed to the individual producers in proportion to the amount of capital utilized. Individual profit is in direct proportion not to the amount of labor performed, but to the amount of capital utilized. However, capital is not only variable capital, which is used to pay the workers, but also constant capital, capital invested in machinery and raw materials.

The production of iron and the production of machinery are branches of production with a high organic composition of capital: here there is a greater amount of capital invested in machinery and raw materials in proportion to the amount of capital allotted to wages than in other branches of production. The producers of the iron and the machinery thereby receive more profit than corresponds to the surplus value produced in their workshops; they appropriate a part of the surplus value of other branches of production. The manifestation of this is the price of the iron and of the machine. The production price of the machine is constantly above its value; it is too high to be a true expression of the amount of social labor it incorporates, because this production price incorporates a part of the surplus value produced in other branches of production and appropriated by the producers of iron and machinery by virtue of the magnitude of their invested capital. Capitalist society can utilize only machinery that saves more on wages than it costs; we already know that for this reason the low wages paid for labor constitute a barrier to the progress of mechanized production. We can now add to this that the higher production price of the machine, which is always higher than its value (which is determined by the social labor time required for its production), is a further barrier to the replacement of manual labor by the more productive labor of the machine. To this is added yet another reason: the cartels and trusts in the coal and iron industries raise the price of coal, iron, and machin-

ery still further above the production price established in the context of free competition, thereby making mechanized production still more expensive and representing a further barrier to technological progress. The socialist mode of production will remove all these limitations in one blow: here every machine will be usable that replaces more labor than is required to produce it.

If the laws of wage and price fixing inhibit technological progress in industry, in agriculture the capitalist mode of production inhibits to an even greater degree the adoption of more rational techniques. Capitalism is incompatible with rational agriculture.⁶³ The peasant enterprise is too small, the peasant technically too unschooled to be able to fully exploit the achievements of science in his enterprise; the large agricultural enterprise, on the other hand, is robbed by industrial development due to the emigration of its workforce to the towns; and the disinclination to work among wage laborers and the low intensity of the work they perform are a barrier to a more rational form of agriculture. Only with the advent of the socialist mode of production can it become possible to make full use of the great achievements of the science of agriculture.

Finally, the capitalist mode of production limits the productivity of labor by hindering a rational exchange of goods between the different economic regions. The wealth of each region will increase to an immense degree if it directs all its labor power into those branches of production in which the natural and social conditions in the region render labor most productive and acquires other goods through exchange with those regions best suited to the production of these goods. If we want to increase the productivity of our labor, we must obtain agricultural products from the regions with the best soil and iron from the regions with the richest ore and, in return, provide these regions with those goods that we can produce using less labor than they themselves would have to do. However, in the capitalist mode of production, the decision as to whether we produce goods ourselves or obtain them through exchange with other regions is not based on the consideration of how the wealth of the people as a whole can be increased, but on the basis of the particular interests of the dominant class. The free exchange of goods is therefore—as proven by a century of history—only an accident in the context of capitalist society. It is only where the general interest by chance coincides with the interest of the dominant class that a region participates in the free exchange of goods and thereby increases the prosperity of the people as a whole. Only in the context of the socialist mode of production will the question of which branches of production our labor is to be utilized in and which goods are to be obtained from abroad through exchange be decided exclusively from the standpoint of how best to increase the wealth of the country and of how best to increase the productivity of the labor of its people.

It is not only due to the limits it places on the augmentation of the productivity of human labor that the capitalist mode of production diminishes

the wealth of the society, but also due to the fact that it continually uses human labor for the production of things that it discovers too late satisfy no real social need, things that are not in fact commodities. On an isolated farm in the wilderness, the father of the house allocates the social labor: he sends one son into the fields, another out to hunt, and a third to the loom. In a socialist society, the administrative body responsible for production would allocate labor to the different branches of production. In a capitalist society, however, the choice of work is left to the individual, and it is only through crises and catastrophes that the necessary adaptation of the division of labor to the diversity of needs is achieved. Thus, we produce means of production and then close them down because we have no use for them; thus, we train a qualified workforce and then cannot provide it with employment; thus, we produce goods and then cannot find buyers for them. What an immense waste of human effort!

However, even where the product of labor becomes a good and can be sold as a commodity, the madness of our mode of production still reveals itself. What an enormous amount of labor is sacrificed to ends that make the society not richer, but poorer! How much do we pay annually for the birth and nourishment of those poor children who, thanks to wretched housing, thanks to the fact that pregnant women have to work in factories, thanks to insufficient nourishment, die in their first or second year of life!⁶⁴ All these economic sacrifices do nothing to enrich our culture, bring no one joy, but instead cause thousands of fathers the bitterest distress, thousands of mothers terrible physical and emotional suffering.

The transfer of the means of production from private ownership to ownership by the society thus represents, in the first instance, an immense increase in the wealth of the society. To be sure, one often hears claims to the contrary. The bourgeois economist, who sees only the wage laborer working under the whip of the capitalist, argues that all diligence would come to an end were the capitalist to disappear from the workshop. However, the bourgeois economist confuses here the function of *directing* social production with the right to *exploit* the worker. The director of production, who ensures order and industriousness in the workshop, will not be absent in the society of the future; however, he will be not a capitalist who drives on his slave labor for his own ends, but a representative of the workers themselves; he will, of course, not only be a representative of the workers in the workshop, with whose supervision he has been charged, but a representative of the entire society, of the totality of the working people.⁶⁵

The increase in the productivity of labor through the socialization of the means of production and the methodical mastery of the instruments of labor on the part of the society itself mean, on the one hand, a reduction in necessary labor time and thus more leisure for all and, on the other hand, an increase in material wealth and the fuller satisfaction of human needs. And

since, with the transfer of ownership of the means of production, the fact of exploitation, of surplus labor, disappears, the reduction in labor time, like the increase in material wealth, will benefit all. The workers of the coming society will not have to work as long as the wage laborers of today, because their work will not have to maintain a class of capitalists; and they will be able to more fully satisfy their needs than is possible today, because the planned management of social production will increase the productivity of labor and reward every hour of labor with a greater quantity of goods. Leisure and the ensured satisfaction of immediate existential needs are the primary condition of all intellectual culture. It is thus only in the context of democratic socialism that the entire population can be included in the national community of culture.

The participation of the entire people in the culture of the nation is not only possible in socialist society, but necessary. Democracy requires the education of every individual, because it calls upon each individual to participate in decisions. The first task of socialist cultural work will thus be the establishment of a national education system. The school emerged in the town as the school of the bourgeoisie; modern capitalism has expanded this system in the form of the popular elementary school [*Volksschule*]. However, the school still clearly exhibits the marks of its origins. Although it has now become the school of the working masses, it still teaches the people nothing of relevance to their work, but educates them "as if all Germans were destined for the chancery."⁶⁶

The school of the future will be in the first place a school of the working people; education for work will therefore be the focal point of instruction. However, it will not be merely a school of workers, but also one of Epicureans, for in the future there will no longer be a barrier between work and pleasure. That is why the school of the future will make all of the great riches of our intellectual culture the property of its students. Only a socialist society can accomplish that which capitalist society, stinting on every aspect of schooling and fearing the education of the masses, could never accomplish: the creation of a truly national system of education, one that makes education, as dreamed of by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, "in no sense a possession, as has been the case until now, but an integral element of the pupil's personality," and thus, by transmitting the national culture, an education that truly brings forth in its pupils—in every child of the nation—the national character, "an enduring essence, which is now no longer in a state of becoming, but which is, and which can be nothing other than what it is."⁶⁷

National education will provide the foundation for the growth of a national culture. Certainly, the culture of the members of the future society will be a new type of culture. This is, after all, the first time that the worker and the Epicurean are identical! The first time that the creators of the culture are at the same time its beneficiaries! Thus, entirely new personalities will

emerge, human beings equally different from both the idle Epicureans and the culturally deprived workers of the last millennium. They will carry within them the roots of their origins, the popular, the naive; they will bring with them the memories of the great struggles in which they won their society. Thus, in place of the traditional they will establish new cultural forms, new symbols. And these new human beings will not enjoy the culture in isolation as did the feudal lords of the Middle Ages, as did the princes of the Renaissance, as does the bourgeoisie of today, but socially, as did the citizens of Athens. The artist will not decorate the home of the wealthy banker, but will now create his works for the conference and meeting halls, the theaters and concert halls, the schools and places of work of the new society.

However, as new as this culture will be, it will also be the heir to all previous cultures. Whatever people have devised and invented, composed and sung, will now become the heritage of the masses. That which the minnesinger sang centuries ago to a proud princess, that which the artist of the Renaissance painted for the wealthy merchant, that which the thinker of the early capitalist period presented to a narrow stratum of the educated, will now become the property of the masses. The human beings of the future will thus create their own culture from both the heritage of the old and the new work of their contemporaries. And this culture will become the property of all, will become the foundation that determines the character of each, and thus will unite the nation in a community of character. And since in this culture the new will join itself to the old, will be linked to and mingled with it, will be in its substance partly determined by it, the traditional culture of the nation, the precipitate of the history of the nation, will at last become the property of that nation, the determinative foundation of its character. The cultural history of the nation has been until now the history of the propertied classes; only with the advent of socialism, with the conquest of the product of that history by the masses, will the history of the nation become the property of the masses; only in a socialist society will the masses contribute to the intellectual specificity of this history.

Only socialism can integrate the broad mass of the working people into the national community of culture. However, it will also change the essence of this community of culture by giving the nation autonomy, by giving it self-determination in regard to the development of its culture. The nation lacks this autonomy in the age of commodity production. This is not only because the destiny of the nation is not decided by the will of the masses; cultural self-determination is also absent among the ruling classes of today. For it is not a single will that today decides the destiny of the people, but innumerable, individual actions of individual persons, behind which laws are at work of which the participants are not conscious. An example can be used to illustrate this.

The transplantation of the population has without doubt transformed the

character of the German nation to an enormous extent. Have we not become different human beings as a result of being uprooted from the soil we once cultivated, from the forests and meadows we once roamed, and being placed in the great cities with their tenement buildings, in the industrial areas with their soot and smoke, in which the last flower and the last tree suffocate in air impregnated with coal? How different the people of our industrial cities are from the villagers of former times! But was it the nation that discussed and decided on this transformation of its entire being, this transformation of its character? Not at all. To be sure, the process of transplanting the population was carried out through the agency of human consciousness, decided on by human will. However, this process did not issue from the will of the nation, but from innumerable wills acting independent of one another; it was decided on by innumerable capitalists, who calculated on paper where the production costs would be lowest, the profits greatest; it was decided on by innumerable workers, who ascertained where employment could be found, where the wages could best enable them to eke out an existence for their families. And the result of these individual decisions, based on quite diverse considerations, is a transformation of the being of the entire nation, a transformation of the essence of its culture, a transformation of its character. Who gave these individuals the power to make the entire nation into something different from what it had ever been before? It was the law; the *private ownership of the instruments of labor* means nothing but that the nation has surrendered control of its fate and entrusted it to the will of individuals. However, these individuals decide not the fate of the nation, but only their own fate, and they know nothing of the effects their decisions have on the overall being of the nation. And yet, it is through nothing other than millions of such individual resolutions, which do not concern themselves with and know nothing of the nation, that the fate of the nation is determined. And if the man of science nevertheless discovers laws behind this apparent contingency of independent individual wills, which have ultimately brought about this transplantation of the population and thus transformed the character of the nation, these are laws of which those who came to these decisions knew nothing. They are laws that, in the inspired words of the young Engels, enforce themselves "without those concerned being conscious of them."

It is entirely different in a socialist society. The establishment of new enterprises, the geographical distribution of the population, become here the conscious act of organized society. Such issues have to be decided on by the organs of the society, discussed by the individuals making up these organs, and examined in regard to their effects. The geographical distribution of the population will thus become a conscious act. The society of the future will discuss and decide as to whether it wants to construct a new shoe factory in the coal region, where production costs are low, or in a beautiful forest landscape, where the workers involved in shoe production can lead as healthy and

pleasant a life as possible. The effect on the character of the nation, the determination of the changes to this character, will be assumed once again by the society; the future history of the people will become the product of its own conscious will. The nation of the future will thus be capable of that which the commodity-producing society can never achieve: of educating itself, of fashioning its own fate, of consciously determining the future transformation of its character itself. Only socialism can give the nation full autonomy, true self-determination; only socialism can release the nation from the effect of forces of which it is not conscious and which are outside its influence.

The fact that socialism will make the nation autonomous, will make its destiny a product of the nation's conscious will, will result in an increasing differentiation between the nations of the socialist society, a clearer expression of their specificities, a clearer distinction between their respective characters. This conclusion will perhaps surprise some; it is regarded as a certainty by supporters and opponents of socialism alike that socialism will reduce national diversity, narrowing or even doing away with the differences between nations.

It is certain that the differences between the material contents of different national cultures will be reduced in socialist society. Modern capitalism has already begun this work. The precapitalist peasant lived and produced for centuries in the manner inherited from his ancestors without adopting any of the advances made by his neighbors. He used the same primitive plough even though, only a few miles away, he would have had the opportunity to observe a better plough that would have assured him a much higher yield. Modern capitalism, however, has taught the nations to learn from one another; each technological advance becomes the property of the whole world within a few years, every change in the law is studied and imitated by neighboring peoples, each scientific and artistic current influences the civilized peoples of the entire world. There can be no doubt that socialism will increase this cosmopolitan tendency in our culture to an enormous extent, will reduce the differences between the material contents of cultures at an incomparably greater speed, such that the nations will learn still more from one another, each learning from the other that which corresponds to its particular goals. However, it would be precipitate to conclude from this that the reduction of the differences between the material contents of cultures will also lead to nations' becoming completely identical.

Observers of English life have often been astounded by the curiously conservative character of the English, have been amazed at how extraordinarily slow the English are to absorb new concepts, to learn new things from other peoples. This oddness of the English national character has protected the Britons from a number of fashion fads, strengthened the influence of a number of valuable conceptual systems, and impeded all forms of demagoguery in England; it has of course also greatly impeded the penetration into England

of a number of advances, including that of socialism. But our task here is not at all one of judging this phenomenon, but of understanding it. In my opinion, one of the causes of this curious phenomenon can be found in the long history of English democracy. Within his land, a despot is able to introduce new concepts within a short period of time; his mood today is the fashion of tomorrow in all the castles of the land, his will today the law of the land tomorrow. Democracy is entirely different. That which is new is able to win itself a place in a democratic land only if it gains the support of every single citizen, if it is appropriated, is acquired by every one of them; it is only by becoming the will of millions of individuals that something becomes the collective will of the land—to be sure, a much slower form of progress, but an incomparably more secure one. For, once having won its place, a new concept sits fast in millions of minds, and it takes a great deal to wrest it from them, to overcome its effect upon them.

This aspect of democracy in a capitalist country is incomparably more pronounced in the case of socialist democracy. For it is only socialism that represents true democracy, true rule of the people, because it gives the people control over the most important means of power, the means of production; only socialism makes truly popular rule a possibility at all, because it unites the people in a community of culture, exposes each member of the people to the influence of the entire national culture, and gives each the possibility of independent participation in decision making. New concepts will be able to find a place in socialist society only by seeking acceptance among all members of the people, each, by virtue of the socialist system of national education, a highly developed personality in full possession of the national culture. This means, however, that no new concept can be simply adopted, but must be taken up by, incorporated in, and adapted to the whole intellectual being of millions of individuals. Just as no individual simply adopts that which is new as part of his intellectual being mechanically, but incorporates it, integrates it into his personality, intellectually digests it, apperceives it, so too the nation as a whole will not simply adopt that which is new, but, while absorbing it, will assimilate it, adapt it to its being, and, in the process of incorporation by millions of minds, alter it.

Due to this important fact of national apperception, each concept that one nation adopts from another will have to be first adapted to and altered by the entire being of the nation before it is incorporated. Thus, nations will not simply adopt new literature and new art, new philosophy, and a new system of social wants from one another, but will incorporate such things only in an altered form. The adaptation of new elements to the prevailing intellectual culture involves linking and merging these elements with the whole history of the nation. Just as already today the English, French, and Germans have much more difficulty adopting a new world of intellectual values in unaltered form than, for example, do the Japanese or Croatian people, so too in socialist

society no new aspect of intellectual culture will be able to find a place within a nation without establishing a connection to its national culture, without being influenced by that culture. For this reason, the autonomy of the national community of culture within socialism necessarily means, despite the diminishing of differences between the material contents of cultures, a growing differentiation between the intellectual cultures of the nations.

Drawing the people as a whole into the national community of culture, achieving full self-determination by the nation, growing intellectual differentiation between the nations—this is what socialism means. The community of culture encompassing all members of the people, as it existed in the time of the communism of the clans, will be brought to life again by the communism of the great nations following the end of centuries of class division, the division between the members and the mere tenants of the nation. However, the basis of the nation has changed since the time of clan communism. The Germanic community of culture was based on the principle of descent from a common ancestral people: the fact that its members had inherited the same cultural elements from their common ancestors united them as a nation. It is different in the case of the community of culture of the modern socialist society: it is a product of social activity, a product of the education in which the children of the entire people share, a product of the cooperation of the nation in the labor of the society. This constitutes an immense difference. For the nation that was based on the community of descent carried within it the seed of its own disintegration: the more the descendants of a common ancestry were geographically separated and subjected to different conditions of the struggle for existence, the more different they became from one another, the more they developed as different peoples with different dialects, with the result that they no longer understood one another; peoples exhibiting different physical types, since they were no longer linked through intermarriage; peoples with different customs, different laws, different habits, different temperaments, different ways of reacting to the same stimulus.

However, although the nation based on the *community of descent* carries the seed of its own disintegration within it, the nation based on the community of education carries within it the tendency for unity: all its children are subject to the same education, all its members work together in the workshops of the nation, participate in the creation of the collective will of the nation, enjoy with each other the cultural wealth of the nation. Socialism thus carries within itself the guarantee of the unity of the nation. It will make the uniform German language, which is the great gate to our cultural wealth but which is still a foreign language for the masses, their mother tongue. It will make the fate of the nation the foundation that determines the character of every individual member of the people, who will now be called upon to participate in the formation of the national will. It will make the cultural wealth of the nation the property of every German and thereby make every German

a product of our cultural wealth. Mere community of descent means disintegration; a community of education and labor means the assured unity of the nation. The nation must first become a community of labor before it can become, in a full and true sense, a self-determining community of culture.

THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION

We can now begin to draw general conclusions from the empirical facts we have before us, and thus to define the concept of the nation, which is the object of our study. At the beginning of our investigation, we conceptualized the nation as a relative community of character. We are now in a position to determine more exactly the essence of this community of character.

At the outset of our work we defined the national character provisionally as the totality of physical and intellectual features that are specific to a nation, unite its members, and distinguish them from the members of other nations. However, these different features are by no means of equal importance.

The diverse determinations of the will are without doubt also part of the national character. The will expresses itself in every process of perception as attentiveness, which selects only certain phenomena from the mass of the phenomena experienced and apperceives only these. If a German and an Englishman make the same journey, they will return to their homelands having acquired quite different things; if a German scholar and an English scholar both choose the same object of investigation, their research methods and their results will be quite different. The will expresses itself even more directly in decision making: the fact that a German and an Englishman act differently under the same circumstances, that they approach the same work in different ways, that they choose different pleasures when they wish to enjoy themselves, that they prefer different lifestyles and satisfy different needs in a situation where they share the same level of prosperity—this is certainly constitutive of the essence of the national character.

It is also certain that the different nations possess different codes of representation: different concepts of justice and injustice, different views of the moral and immoral, the decent and the indecent, the beautiful and the ugly, different types of religion and science. However, differences in terms of knowledge are not of the same order as differences in terms of will: they determine the differences of will and explain these differences to us. Because every Englishman is educated differently from the German, because he has learned different things and is subject to different cultural influences, his reaction to the same stimulus is different from the German's. The relationship between the possession of different codes of representation and different orientations of the will is thus not one of equal status, but one of cause and effect.

The same is true of physical features. Different skull structures may be of interest to anthropologists, but for the historian, the social theorist, the

politician, they are of no interest as long as it is not assumed that different physical types are accompanied by different psychological features. Experience shows us that differences in physical build are accompanied either directly by different decisions under the same circumstances or by a difference in the ability to acquire knowledge and the type of knowledge acquired, which in turn produces different decisions, a different will. Even the anti-Semite would be indifferent to the Jewish nose were he not of the opinion that the physical type of the Jew is always combined with particular psychological features. The sole fact that the difference in anthropological features is accompanied by a difference in psychological features, and ultimately, directly or indirectly, by a difference in orientation of the will—even if we are not in a position to determine the causal relationship between physical type and orientation of the will—renders the physical features of an anthropological type interesting for us. The totality of physical features is thus also not of the same order as the difference in orientation of the will; rather, the two stand in a functional relationship, behind which a causal relationship is probably concealed.

We thus arrive at a narrower concept of the national character. It does not refer, in the first instance, to the totality of all physical and intellectual features peculiar to the nation, but merely to the difference in orientations of the will, the fact that the same stimulus produces different reactions, that the same external circumstances provoke different decisions. This difference in orientations of the will, however, is causally determined by the differences between the representations acquired by nations or between the physical specificities cultivated in nations through the struggle for existence.⁶⁸

We have enquired as to how such a community of character develops and have reached the conclusion that identity of character is ultimately the product of the same effective causes. In this way we have arrived at our definition of the nation as a *community of fate* [*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*]. It is now necessary to more clearly define the concept of community of fate. The concept of community does not refer to mere similarity. Germany, for example, underwent capitalist development during the nineteenth century just as England did. The forces that were at work and that fundamentally affected the character of people were the same in both countries. But the Germans did not thereby become Englishmen. Thus, *community of fate* does not refer to subjection to the same fate, but to the common experience of the same fate in the context of constant relations, of continual interaction. The English and the Germans both experienced capitalist development, but at different times, in different places, and in the context of only a loose relationship to each other. Thus, the same driving forces may have made them more similar to each other than had previously been the case, but these forces would never have made them into one people. It is not the similarity of fate, but only the shared experience and suffering of a fate, the community of fate, that pro-

duces the nation. According to Kant, *community* means “general reciprocal interaction” (Third Analogy of Experience: Principle of Community). It is only the fate experienced in the context of general reciprocal interaction and a constant, mutual relationship that produces the nation.

The fact that the nation is not a product of the mere similarity of fate, but emerges and exists only in the community of fate, in the constant interaction of those sharing this fate, distinguishes it from all other communities of character. An example of the latter is the community of character based on *class*. The proletarians of all lands exhibit the same characteristics. Despite all differences, the same class situation has stamped the character of the German and the English, the French and the Russian, the American and the Australian worker with the same traits: the same combativeness, the same revolutionary attitude, the same class morals, the same political aspirations. However, in this case it is not the community of fate but the similarity of fate that has produced the community of character. For although there may be relationships based on interaction between German and English workers, these are much more tenuous than the relationships that link the English worker with the English bourgeois. These relationships are constituted by the fact that both live in the same city, that both read the same posters and the same newspapers, take part in the same political and sporting events, by the fact that on occasion they speak with one another or, at least, both speak with the various intermediaries between capitalists and workers. Language is the tool of interaction. If more bonds of interaction existed between English and German workers than between the English bourgeoisie and the English workers, it would be the German worker and English worker who had a common language, not the English bourgeois and the English worker. Between the members of a nation, then, there exists a community of interaction, a constant and mutual effect in their direct and indirect interaction with each other, that distinguishes the nation from the class. It might perhaps be said that the influences of the manner of existence, of fate, more uniformly shape the workers of different nations than the classes of one and the same nation and that therefore, in terms of character, the workers of different countries are much more similar to one another than are the bourgeois and the worker of the same country. However, despite this, the community of character of the nation is distinguished from that of the class by the fact that the former emerges from the community of fate and the latter merely from the similarity of fate.

The nation can thus be defined as a community of character that has grown not out of a similarity of fate, but out of a community of fate. This fact also constitutes the significance of language for the nation. I create a common language together with those individuals with whom I most closely interact; and I interact most closely with those individuals with whom I share a common language.

We have become acquainted with two means by which the effective causes, the conditions of the human struggle for existence, forge together individuals in a national community of fate. One route is that of natural *heredity*. The ancestral conditions of existence qualitatively determine the germ plasm that links the generations: the question of which characteristics are passed on and which are eliminated is decided by way of natural selection. The conditions of existence of the ancestors thereby determine the inherited characteristics of their natural descendants. The nation is thus here a *community of descent*. It is unified by common blood, as the people say, by the community of germ plasm, as science teaches. However, the members of the nation bound together by common descent remain a nation only as long as they remain in a community of interaction with one another, as long as they maintain their community of blood [*Blutgemeinschaft*] through intermarriage. If the generational bond between the members of the nation is broken, the tendency immediately develops for new, distinct communities of character to emerge from the previously uniform people. The continued existence of the nation as a community of nature requires not only the community of blood established through common descent, but also the maintenance of this community through continual inbreeding.

However, the character of the individual is never simply the sum of inherited characteristics; it is also determined by the culture that is handed down to and that influences that individual: by the education he enjoys, the law to which he is subject, the customs according to which he lives, the conceptions of God and the world, of morality and immorality, of the beautiful and the unsightly that are passed down to him, by the religion, the science, the art, and the political views that exert an influence upon him—but above all by that which determines all of these phenomena: the manner in which he engages in the struggle for existence, the manner in which, surrounded by his fellow nationals, he acquires his livelihood.

Thus we come to the second major means by which the struggle for existence determines the individual: the oral transmission of cultural elements. The nation is never solely a community of nature, but always also a community of culture. Here too it is the fortunes of the preceding generations that in the first instance determine the individual: the child is subject to the influences of the society into whose economic life, laws, and intellectual culture he is born. Here too, however, it is only the ongoing community of interaction that maintains the community of character. The major tool of this interaction is language. It is the tool of education, the tool of all economic and all intellectual interaction. The culture's sphere of influence extends only as far as the communicative possibilities of the language. The community of interaction is limited by the scope of the linguistic community. Community of interaction and language reciprocally condition each other: language is the condition of all close interaction, and, precisely for this reason, the necessity

of interaction gives rise to a common language, just as inversely the dissolution of the community of interaction is accompanied by the gradual differentiation of language. I can, of course, learn a foreign language without becoming a member of a foreign people, because this foreign language can never subject me to the cultural influences it carries in the same way as my native language does. The culture mediated by my native language has influenced my childhood, the years of my greatest receptivity, and has initially formed my character; all later impressions are adapted to my existing individuality when they are assimilated, are subject to a change in the process of assimilation itself. To this is added the fact that a foreign language only rarely becomes the property of the individual in the same complete way as the mother tongue does, and that its most delicate and profound effects are lost: even the cultivated German is only seldom affected by the English and French work of art with the same force as by the German work of art. It is inconceivable for a nation to maintain itself as a community of culture on a lasting basis without the linguistic community, the most important tool of human interaction.

On the other hand, the community of language is still not a guarantee of national unity: despite their community of language, the Danes and the Norwegians are influenced by different cultures, and the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Serbs are subject to different culture influences despite their community of language. However, to the extent that the culturally segregating effect of religion disappears, the Serbs and the Croats will become a nation by virtue of their community of interaction based on the identity of language and by virtue of the similar cultural influences to which they are subject. The significance for the nation of the victory of a uniform language over the use of vernaculars follows from this. The necessity of closer interaction has produced the uniform language, and the existence of the uniform language now subjects all who master it to the same cultural influences. Reciprocal interaction unites them as a cultural community. The example of the Dutch clearly illustrates the relationship between cultural differentiation and the community of language. Although originally emerging from three fragments of the German tribes, the Dutch no longer belong to the German people; the evolution of the Dutch national economy, totally different from the fate of the German economy, gave rise to a different type of culture in the Netherlands; economically and culturally separated from the Germans, the Dutch dissolved their community of interaction with the German tribes. The bond joining the Dutch with each other was too close, the bond linking them with the other German tribes too loose; thus, they created their own language as a tool of their culture and took no part in the process of the cultural unification of the German nation through the agency of the uniform German language.

Community of nature and community of culture can coincide. The fate of the ancestors can become the character of the descendants, on the one hand through the inheritance of the characteristics of the ancestors, and on the

other through the transmission of the culture developed by the ancestors. However, the community of nature and the community of culture do not necessarily coincide: the natural descendants and the cultural descendants are not always one and the same. For the natural community unites only individuals of common descent, whereas the cultural community links together all those who, in the process of constant interaction, are subject to a common cultural influence. The stronger this cultural influence is, the more the individual assimilates the whole of the riches of the culture of a people and is determined in his specificity by them, the more rapidly he can become a member of the nation, the more he shares in the national character, although he does not belong to it in terms of the natural community. Thus, the conscious choice of membership of a nation other than that of one's birth is possible. Thus says Chamisso of himself: "Through language, art, science, and religion, I became a German."⁶⁹

Is humanity, then, really divided into nations in such a way that every individual belongs to one nation and never to more than one simultaneously? The mere fact of an individual's having a natural bond to two nations through descent alters nothing in regard to the strict differentiation of the nations. In border regions where there is a meeting of two nations, the people are the product of extensive interbreeding, with the result that the blood of both nations flows in the veins of each inhabitant in highly varied proportions. Nevertheless, this does not as a rule lead to a fusion of the nations. In this case it is the difference in terms of the community of culture that, despite the mingling of blood, markedly separates the nations. An example is provided by the national struggles in Austria. Anyone who sees a racial struggle in the struggles between the Austrians and the Czechs merely proves his historical ignorance. Among the Germans and Czechs, the peasants may perhaps have preserved a certain purity of blood, but the social strata that are engaged in the national struggle and that constitute the object of the national struggle—the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie, the workers—have mingled their blood through centuries of intermarriage to such an extent that one can speak neither of a German nor of a Czech nation as a community of nature. Nevertheless, the two nations have by no means merged with one another. The difference between the two linguistically mediated cultures enables both nations to continue to exist independently, clearly separate from one another.

The case of an individual who participates to an equal or almost equal degree in the cultures of two or more nations is quite different. Such individuals can be found in considerable numbers in border regions and regions where several nations exist side by side. From childhood onward they speak the languages of two nations. They are influenced to an almost equal degree by the fates, by the cultural particularities, of two nations, and thus, in terms of character, become members of both nations, or, one might say, individuals who do not completely belong to any nation. For the individual who is af-

fected by the cultures of two or more nations, whose character is influenced to the same degree by different national cultures, does not simply combine the characteristics of both nations, but possesses a character that is quite distinct, just as the chemical combination exhibits features different from those of the two elements that make it up. This is also the fundamental reason why the individual who is culturally the child of several nations is usually not very popular, is an object of suspicion, and, in times of national struggle, is even despised as a traitor and a deserter. The combination of cultural elements produces a new character, which causes the "cultural hybrid" to appear to both nations as a stranger, to appear just as foreign as the members of other nations. However, although the aversion to the cultural hybrid is understandable, one cannot allow oneself to be misled by it. It is very often the individuals of greatest stature who have been culturally affected by two or more nations. It is very common for our scholars and our great artists to be influenced by the cultural spheres of several nations in almost equal degrees. In a personality such as Karl Marx is fixed the history of four great nations—the Jewish, the German, the French, and the English—and this is precisely the reason why his work could penetrate the history of all the great nations of our time, why one can comprehend the history of the civilized nations during the last decades only with the aid of his work.

The cultural influence of several national cultures on the same individual, however, does not occur as an individual phenomenon, but as a mass phenomenon. Thus, German culture has without doubt determined the entire Czech nation at a fundamental level. Indeed, it is not completely incorrect to say that the Czechs are Czech-speaking Germans, something that naturally—from the standpoint of nationally based evaluation—is not a criticism when coming from the mouth of a German, but the highest praise. However, the adoption on a massive scale of the elements of a foreign culture by an entire nation never produces a complete negation of the differences between national characters but, at most, a reduction of these differences. For the foreign elements never affect the individuals with the same force as the original national culture: these elements are never adopted unchanged, but are subject to modification in the process of adoption itself, are adapted to the national culture that is already there. This is the phenomenon of national apperception with which we are already familiar.

The fact that the same effective cause—the conditions of the human struggle for existence—unites the people as a nation by two different means, namely, on the one hand, by the transmission to natural descendants of characteristics cultivated by the struggle for existence and, on the other, by the handing down of human cultural elements to persons linked by the community of language and interaction—this is what gives the manifestations of the nation that confusing diversity that makes the unity of the effective causal forces so difficult to recognize; we have nations where community of nature

and community of culture coincide, where the natural descendants are also those to whom the historically produced culture is passed down; we have natural hybrids who nevertheless belong to only one cultural sphere; then again we have individuals of uniform national descent whose character is formed by two or more national cultures; finally, there are nations that have no community of descent and whose strong unity is founded solely on the community of culture. Inversely, persons of common descent who are not united by a cultural community do not form a nation. A nation can exist only where fellow nationals exercise a mutual influence on one another, and this is made possible only by the tool of a common language and the transmission of the same cultural elements. A mere community of nature without a community of culture may as a race be of interest to anthropologists, but it does not form a nation. The conditions of the human struggle for existence *can* also produce the nation via the means of the community of nature, but they *must* always do so via the means of the community of culture.

Our investigation has shown us that the effectiveness of a common culture in constituting the nation is quite different in different forms of society. We have now encountered what are essentially three types of national community of culture. The first type, represented in our historical overview by the ancient Germans in the era of clan communism, shows us a nation in which all members are linked together by a community of blood and also by the common culture inherited from their ancestors. We have pointed out a number of times that this national unity disintegrates with the transition to a settled form of existence. The inherited characteristics become differentiated with the cessation of intermarriage between the tribes, which are now geographically separated and subject to different conditions of the struggle for existence; the inherited common culture is now also further developed in different forms by the different tribes. Thus, the nation carries within itself the seed of its own disintegration.

The second type is represented by the nation in a society based on the distinction between social classes. The mass of the people is further subject to the process of differentiation with which we are already familiar. The absence of sexual relations between groups results in growing physical differences; in the absence of any bonds based on interaction, the people develop different vernaculars out of what was originally the common language; subject to different conditions of the struggle for existence, they develop cultural differences, which in turn produce differences of character. The mass of the people thus increasingly lose their national unity the more the original community of inherited characteristics is lost in the course of the centuries, the more the originally common culture is concealed and eroded by the different cultural elements subsequently emerging. That which constitutes the nation is no longer the consanguinity and the cultural unity of the masses, but the cultural unity of the dominant classes perched above these masses and living off

their labor. They and those dependent upon them are linked together by sexual relations and by cultural relations of all sorts. In this manner, the nation is constituted by the knighthood in the Middle Ages and by the educated classes in the modern era. But the broad masses whose labor maintains the nation—peasants, artisans, workers—are nothing more than the tenants of the nation.

A third type is finally represented by the socialist society of the future, which will reunite all members of the people in an autonomous national unit. Here, however, it will no longer be common descent, but the community of education, of labor, of cultural enjoyment that will unite the nation. For this reason the nation will no longer be threatened with disintegration; the community of education, participation in the enjoyment of culture, the bonds engendered through participation in public life and social labor will guarantee national unity.

The nation is thus no longer for us a fixed thing, but a process of becoming, determined in its essence by the conditions under which the people struggle for their livelihood and for the preservation of their kind. The nation does not emerge in conditions under which the people simply seek rather than produce their nourishment, under which they obtain their subsistence through simple appropriation, through the occupation of empty land; it first appears at the stage where humans acquire what they need from nature through labor. Thus, the constitution of the nation, the specificity of each nation, is conditioned by the mode of labor, by the instruments of labor humans make use of, by the forces of production that they command, by the relations into which they enter in the process of production. The constitution of the nation, of every individual nation, is to be grasped as a part of the struggle of humanity against nature—this is the great task that the historical method of Karl Marx has given us the ability to accomplish.

For *national materialism*, the nation is a piece of a peculiar material substance that has the mysterious power to produce from itself the national community of character. From this point of view, the history of humanity becomes a history of the struggles and mingling of permanent, immutable racial and hereditary substances. Although this unscientific approach has in recent years—particularly under the influence of Gobineau—undergone a curious rebirth, it has, on the other hand, been actively opposed by Darwinism.⁷⁰ Even among those who place particular weight on the significance of hereditary racial characters, the view is gaining ground that “it is not enough merely to allege a diversity of races; one must also attempt to explain this diversity.”⁷¹ However, if one pursues this thought, race emerges as nothing more than one of the means by which the conditions of the struggle for existence manifest their efficacy and the forces of production that serve humans in their struggle with nature fashion the national community of character.

National spiritualism has made the nation into a mysterious “spirit of the people”; it has made the history of the nation into an autonomous evolution

of this spirit and world history into a struggle of the different spirits whose respective characteristics have determined their respective alliances and enmities. But even if Lamprecht, for example, persists in making the development of national consciousness the focal point of his history of the nation and believes himself capable of finding a general law for the development of the spirit of the people, he nevertheless explains the transformation of national consciousness, the development of the soul of the people from the age of symbolism to the age of sensibility, in terms of changes in the economy of the people. The development of the soul of the people is for him no longer the driving force of development, but the consequence of changes in the people's mode of labor. However, he does not content himself with comprehending the emergence of the nation in terms of the development of the human forces of production and changes in the human relations of production as a process governed by laws. In addition, he wants to interpret the development of national consciousness and the soul of the people as the effect of general laws that do not explain a single historical fact and merely describe the general character of development. Here he is no longer dealing with laws at all, but, as Simmel argues, with "precursors of exact knowledge," with "provisional syntheses of typical historical phenomena; they provide an initial orientation to the mass of individual facts."⁷²

Prepared thus, on the one hand, by Darwinism, which has overcome national materialism, and on the other by the historical research that has replaced the explanation of historical emergence on the basis of a mystical "spirit of the people" with the demonstration of the economic processes that determine the emergence of the nation, the *materialist conception of history* can comprehend the nation as the never-completed product of a constantly occurring process, the ultimate driving force of which is constituted by the conditions governing the struggle of humans with nature, the transformation of the human forces of production, and the changes in the relations governing human labor. This conception renders the nation as the historical within us. Darwinism has taught us to interpret the signs that the history of organic life has engraved into our living bodies; in Bölsche's charming reflections one can read how our own organs relate the history of our animal ancestors.⁷³ We are now learning to interpret the national character in a similar way. In the individual specificity that each individual has in common with the other individuals making up his people, and that thus unites him with these other individuals in a community, is the precipitate of the history of his (natural and cultural) ancestors; his character is solidified history. The fact that the personal specificity of each of us has been formed in the struggle for existence of past communities is what constitutes us as a national community of character.

If we comprehend the national character as a piece of solidified history, we also understand why the science of history is able to refute those who regard the national character as immutable, as constant. In no one moment is the

history of a nation ever completed. Changes in the fate of a nation subject the character of that nation, which is itself nothing other than the precipitate of a past fate, to continual transformation. It is the community of character that links fellow nationals of the same era; that which links fellow nationals of different eras is not a similarity of character, not, for instance, a conformity in terms of character between earlier and later generations, but the fact that these generations succeed one another, affect one another, that the fate of earlier generations determines the character of subsequent generations. This relationship is also reflected in the history of language.⁷⁴ The linguistic community is constituted by contemporaries linked by a community of interaction and not by generations that succeed one another. The descendants are determined in terms of their particular character by the fate of earlier generations, but they are not a copy of these earlier generations.

Only when we understand the community of character as emerging from the community of fate can we really comprehend the significance of the community of character. The starting point of our investigation was the directly empirical manifestation of the community of character, the similarity of character among fellow nationals, the fact that the average German is different from the average Englishman, but similar to every other average German. But such a statement has only relative general value. Is it not the case that each of us is acquainted with Germans who possess nothing of that which is otherwise regarded as the German national character? However, once we have progressed from the concept of empirical similarity to that of the community of fate that produces the community of character, we reach another, more profound, concept of the community of character, as opposed to the mere similarity of character.

The individual character is the result of diverse forces: among them we find not only the influence of the national community of fate, which affects every individual, but also a range of other, individually different, forces that also play a role in the constitution of character. Only where the effect of these latter forces is a limited one will the influence of the national community of fate be able to produce similar individual characters. But if the character of the individual is influenced by particularly powerful forces that are essentially different from those forces determining the characters of his fellow nationals, an individual character will emerge that, although this individual too has been formed by the national community of fate, no longer resembles the other individuals of his nation. Nevertheless, he remains a member of the national community of character, for however great the difference between him and his fellow nationals, he is linked to them by virtue of the fact that one of the forces that have formed him is identical with one of the forces that have constituted all other individuals of the same nation; he is a child of his nation precisely because he would have become the child of another if, even given the influence of the same individual forces, the blood and the traditions of

another nation had formed him. Thus, we encounter here another, more profound, concept of the community of character: it no longer signifies for us the fact that the individuals of the same nation resemble one another, but the fact that the same force has influenced the character of each individual—however diverse the other forces acting on the individual may be. Only now does the justification become clear for our use of the concept of the community of character, as opposed to relying on mere experience, which enables us to discern only a relative similarity of character. Although this character resemblance can be observed in the majority of the nation's members, the community of character, the fact that all are the product of one and the same effective force, is common to all without exception. This effective force, the historical within us, is the national within us; it is that which forges us together as a nation.

If we now understand the national in our character as the historical within us, we are in a position to comprehend the nation more profoundly as a social phenomenon, as a phenomenon of the socialized human being. For the individualist, human beings are atoms and are only superficially held together by a body of laws. However, for us the human being is not an atom, but the product of society; even Robinson, pursuing the struggle for existence isolated on his island, can do so only because, as the heir of his ancestors, as the product of his education, he is in possession of the abilities developed by his society or, as Marx put it, "the social forces."⁷⁵ Thus, the nation does not represent for us a certain number of individuals who are somehow superficially held together. Rather, the nation exists in every individual as an element of his specificity, as his nationality. The national character trait is manifested only as a character trait of individuals, but it is nevertheless produced by the society: it is the product of inherited characteristics and transmitted cultural elements that the ancestors of every member of the nation have produced in continual interaction with the other members of their society; it is itself a social product. The individuals who belong to a nation are united by the fact that they are all the product of the same effective forces, of the same society, that the selective effects of the struggle for existence of humans living together have been transmitted to these individuals in the form of their individual inherited characteristics, that the same culture, developed in the context of the struggle for existence of the same human community, has formed their individual characters. For this reason, and not because of any formal convention, the nation is a social phenomenon. The nation is not a sum of individuals; rather, each individual is the product of the nation; the fact that they are all the product of the same society makes them a community. The fact that the characteristics that are manifested only as traits of the individual are a social product and, in the case of all members of the nation, a product of one and the same society, unites the individuals as the nation. Thus, the nation does not

exist by virtue of a formal convention, but is—logically, not historically—
anterior to every formal convention.⁷⁶

But of course, in order to establish relations and to cooperate with one another, the humans forming a community require a language. Language is the most important tool of human interaction: the workers in the Bible could not continue building the Tower of Babel when God caused a confusion of tongues. Not all those who speak the same language form a nation, but a nation cannot exist without a common language. However, language is nothing more than a “primitive convention” existing by virtue of “external regulation”—if we take this concept in the broad sense in which Rudolf Stammler has introduced it to scholarship.⁷⁷ This is not to say, of course, that it is as if language came into being by statute, as if some wise legislator or a social contract created it; however, in terms of its validity, language is founded solely on external regulation. The fact that we associate a particular word with a concept, the representation of a thing with the representation of a certain phonetic combination, is based purely on convention. This is the most important rule that the child learns from the mother’s lips. Stammler is thus mistaken in believing he has found the constitutive feature of social phenomena in external regulation. The nation provides us with clear evidence of the fact that it is the community that is the substratum of all social phenomena, that is, the fact that the specificity of the individual is at the same time a specificity of all other individuals united in the community, for the character of each individual is formed in a process of continual interaction with all other individuals, and the individual character of each one is a product of the same social forces. However, it is only external regulation that makes cooperation possible between these individuals united as a community, makes possible the formation of a society, the preservation of their community, and the creation of a new one. External regulation is the form of social collaboration between individuals united by the community.⁷⁸

The diversity of national characters is an empirical fact that can be denied only by a doctrinairism that sees only what it wants to see and as a result does not see what is evident to everyone else. Despite this, there have been repeated attempts to deny the diversity of national character and claims that the difference between nations is a purely linguistic one. We find this opinion among many of those theorists whose approach is founded on Catholic doctrine. It was adopted by the humanitarian philosophy of the bourgeois Enlightenment. It also became the heritage of a number of socialists who sought to utilize it to shore up proletarian cosmopolitanism, a concept that, as we will see, represents the first and most primitive position taken by the working class in relation to the national struggles of the bourgeois world. This supposed insight into the insubstantiality of the nation lives on today in Austria in the language of the Social Democratic press, which loves to speak of comrades of the German and Czech “tongue” rather than of German and Czech comrades.

The view that national differences amount to nothing more than linguistic differences is based on the atomistic-individualistic conception of society, in which society appears as merely the sum of externally united individuals, and the nation therefore appears as merely the sum of those people united by external means, namely by language. Anyone holding this view repeats the error made by Stammler, who believed he had found the constitutive feature of social phenomena in external regulation, in legal statutes and conventions. For us, however, the society is not merely the sum of individuals; rather, each individual is a product of the society. Likewise, the nation is not a sum of individuals who enter into a relationship through a common language; rather, the individual is himself a product of the nation; his individual character has emerged solely in the context of constant interaction with other individuals, just as the character of these individuals has emerged in the context of interaction with him. These relations have determined the character of each of these individuals and have thereby united them in a community of character. The nation is manifested in the *nationality* of the individual fellow nationals, that is, in the fact that the character of each member of the nation is determined by the fate of all members of the nation, a fate experienced in common and in the context of constant interaction. Language, however, is no more than a means of this interaction—to be sure, a means that is always and everywhere indispensable—just as external regulation is the essential form of cooperation between individuals united in a community. Anyone who does not trust his own eyes, which daily see evidence of the diversity of national characters, must nevertheless accept the theoretical consideration that teaches him to understand in causal terms that different fates, experienced in a constant community of interaction, necessarily result in different communities of character.

This insight into the essence of the nation makes impossible not only the individualistic denial of the reality of the national character, but also the much more dangerous misuse of this concept. The national character is nothing but the determination of the orientation of the individual's will by the community of fate that that individual forms together with all his fellow nationals. Once constituted, the national character appears as an independent historical force. The diversity of national characters means a diversity of orientations of the will. Thus, each nation will conduct itself differently from other nations under the same conditions. Thus, for example, the development of capitalism among the English, the French, and the Germans has given rise to movements that, although very similar, differ in their details. The national character thus appears as a historical force. Whereas theory comprehends it as a product of history, everyday experience sees it rather as a creative force determining history. Whereas theory teaches us to comprehend national character as the precipitate of human relationships, direct experience sees it rather as determining and controlling these relationships. This is the fetishism of the national character. Our theory drives out this specter at a single

blow. That the national character apparently determines the wants and the actions of every member of the nation is no longer a mystery once we recognize that every member of the nation is a product of his nation and that the national character is nothing but that particular orientation of the will to which the community of fate gives rise in every member of the nation in the form of his individual specificity. Furthermore, the national character ceases to appear as an independent force as soon as we comprehend it as the precipitate of the history of the nation.

We can now understand that the apparently autonomous historical reality of the national character conceals nothing other than the fact that the history of the ancestors, the conditions of their struggle for existence, the forces of production they mastered, the relations of production into which they entered, also determine the behavior of their natural and cultural descendants. If we previously recognized natural heredity and the transmission of cultural elements as mere means by which the fate of earlier generations determines the character of their descendants, so now does the national character itself appear as a mere means by which the history of the ancestors continues to influence the lives of their descendants, their thought, their sentiments, their wants, and their actions. It is precisely due to our having recognized the reality of the national character that we have deprived it of its apparent autonomy and have learned to comprehend it as merely a means of the action of other forces. However, the national character thereby also loses its apparently substantial character, that is, the appearance of being the lasting, the permanent element in the flight of phenomena. In fact, being nothing other than the precipitate of history, the national character changes with every hour, with every new event the nation experiences; it is as variable as the events that it reflects. Placed amidst world events it is no longer a permanent entity, but a process of continual becoming and passing.

In conclusion, we should like to support this attempt to define the essence of the nation by comparing it with previous theories.⁷⁹ We have already referred to the *metaphysical* theories of the nation—national spiritualism and national materialism—and in a later context we will discuss the *psychological* theories of the nation, which look for the essence of the nation either in the consciousness of or the will to unity. It is therefore necessary here only to discuss those attempts that have assembled a number of elements and that have proposed that the nation is constituted by the coincidence of these elements.

The Italian sociologists cite the following elements:

1. Common area of habitation.
2. Common descent.
3. Common language.
4. Common mores and customs.
5. Common experiences, a common historical past.
6. Common laws and common religion.⁸⁰

It is evident that this theory assembles a number of features that cannot simply be juxtaposed, but can be understood only in terms of a relationship of interdependence. If we initially disregard the first supposed element of the nation, that of common area of habitation, then of the remaining elements it is the fifth that stands out: that of common history. It is this element which determines the others, which produces them. It is a common history that first gives common descent its determinate content, in that it is history that decides which qualities are passed on and which are eliminated. A common history produces common mores and customs, common laws, and a common religion, and thus—using our own terminology—the community of cultural tradition. Common descent and a common culture are merely the tools employed by a common history in realizing its effect, in its work of constructing the national character. However, the third element, a common language, cannot be ordered alongside these others; it rather represents a means of the second order. For if a common culture is one of the means by which a common history becomes operative in the formation of the national character, a common language is in turn a means through which a common culture is realized, a tool with which the cultural community is created and maintained: as external regulation, as the form of social cooperation among the individuals forming a community and continuously reproducing it.⁸¹

Thus, in the first place we substitute for mere enumeration of the elements of the nation a system: common history as the effective cause, common culture and common descent as the means by which this cause becomes operative, common language as the mediator of the common culture, simultaneously its product and its producer. We are now in a position to understand the relationship between these elements. For what has caused the greatest difficulties for theorists of the nation, the fact that these elements can be manifested in highly diverse combinations, with one element absent here, another there, now becomes comprehensible. If common descent and common culture are both means of the same effective factor, the concept of the nation is obviously not dependent on both means' being operative. As a consequence, the nation can be based on a community of descent, but it does not have to be, whereas by itself a community of descent can form only a race, never a nation. This in turn provides the basis for explaining the relationship between the different elements of the cultural community: common laws are certainly an important means of the formation of the community of character, but the community of character can also emerge and exist without them, given the fact that the effect of the other elements is strong enough to unite the individuals in a cultural community. A difference of creed can lead to the formation of two nations out of a monolingual people where the religious difference impedes cultural community and a common religion is the foundation of a common culture, as has hitherto been the case among Serbs and Croats. The Germans, on the other hand, remain one people despite

their religious division, because the confessional schism could not prevent the emergence and existence of an overall German community of culture. Here, at last, we can comprehend the relationship between language and the other elements of the nation: without a community of language there is no cultural community and therefore no nation.⁸² However, the community of language does not produce a nation in cases where differences in other respects—for example, the difference in religion in the case of the Croats and Serbs, or the difference in descent and in social and political relationships in the case of the Spanish and the Spanish-speaking South Americans—prevent the community of language from becoming a community of culture.

It remains for us to consider the first of the “elements” of the nation listed earlier, a common area of habitation. We have repeatedly referred to the fact that territorial separation destroys the unity of the nation. The nation in the form of the community of nature is gradually destroyed by territorial separation, due to the fact that different conditions of the struggle for existence cultivate different characteristic features in the geographically divided parts of the nation and that this diversity is not compensated for by any mingling of blood. The nation as community of culture is likewise destroyed by geographical separation because the geographically divided parts of the nation, which pursue their struggle for existence separately from one another, also differentiate the originally homogeneous culture, which, due to the lack of interaction between the divided parts, disintegrates into a number of different cultures. This is conspicuously manifested in the differentiation of the uniform language into different languages as a consequence of the all too loose bond of interaction between the geographically separated parts of the originally unified nation. If geographical diversity thus leads to the disintegration of nations, a common area of habitation surely represents one of the conditions of the nation’s existence. However, this is true only insofar as it represents the condition of a *community of fate*. To the extent that a cultural community, and conceivably even a natural community, can be maintained in spite of geographical separation, this separation is not an obstacle to the national community of character. The German in America who remains under the influence of the German culture—regardless of whether this is only by way of German books and newspapers—and who provides his children with a German education remains a German despite all geographical separation. A common area of habitation is a condition of the nation’s existence only to the extent that it is also a condition of the community of culture. However, in the age of the printing press, the postal system and the telegraph, the railway and the steamship, this is much less the case than in earlier eras. Thus, if the common area of habitation is not comprehended as an element of the nation alongside the others, but rather as a condition of the other elements’ becoming operative, the limits of the frequent assertion become clear that a common area of habitation is the condition of the existence of a

nation. In our view, this observation is of no small import, since our concept of the relationship of the nation to the soil forms the basis of our understanding of the relationship of the nation to the state, the most important form of territorial administrative body. Precisely for this reason we will have to return to this question and illustrate our response by way of individual examples. Here, however, our concern is only to show how our theory of the nation is able to comprehend the factors that former theories have directly juxtaposed with one another as “elements” of the nation, as the effective forces within a system, and to understand them in terms of their interdependence and their combined action.

However, our theory has yet to prove itself capable of dealing with a question that previous attempts to determine the essence of the nation have also failed to answer. This question concerns the task of drawing a distinction between the concept of the nation and the more restricted communities based on locality and descent within the nation. To be sure, it is a community of fate that has bound the Germans together in a community of character. But does this not also apply to the Saxons and the Bavarians, to the Tyroleans and the Styrians, and indeed to the inhabitants of every Alpine valley? Have not different ancestral fates, differences in forms of settlement and land distribution, in soil fertility and climate, formed quite distinct communities of character from Zillertalers and Passeiers, from Vintschgauers and Pusterers? Where does the boundary lie between those communities of character considered as autonomous nations and those regarded as narrower associations within the nation?

Here we must remind ourselves that we have already encountered these limited communities of character as the products of the disintegration of the nation based on the community of descent. From the time when the descendants of the Germanic ancestral people were geographically separated from one another and fettered to the soil through agriculture, henceforth leading their lives in isolation, without interaction, without intermarriage, they have become increasingly different from one another. Although they may well have started out from the point of a common natural and cultural community, they are nevertheless on the way to establishing autonomous natural and cultural communities quite distinct from one another. The tendency exists for each of these limited groupings that have emerged from the *one* nation to become a nation in itself. The difficulty in demarcating the concept of these narrow communities of character from that of the nation, then, is based on the fact that they themselves represent stages in the evolution of the nation.

As we already know, the tendency for the nation to fragment is countered by another tendency that strives to bind the nation more closely together. However, this counter-tendency is initially realized only in the case of the dominant classes. It binds together the knighthood of the Middle Ages, the educated classes of the early capitalist period, in a cohesive nation, one that is

quite distinct from all other cultural communities, that brings its members into close economic, political, and social contact with each other, creates a uniform language for them, and subjects them to the influence of the same intellectual culture and the same ethos. This strong bond of the cultural community initially unites the dominant classes as a nation. In this situation one does not need to ask whether a particular educated individual is German or Dutch, Slovene or Croatian: the national systems of education, the national uniform language, rigorously distinguish even the most closely related nations from one another. On the other hand, the decision as to whether the peasants of some village should be regarded as Low Germans or as Dutchmen, as Slovenes or as Croats, is necessarily subject to a degree of arbitrariness. Only the sphere of the members of the nation is clearly delimited, not the sphere of those who count only as tenants of the nation.

Modern capitalism gradually distinguishes the lower classes of the nations more rigorously from one another due to the fact that they too now gain access to the national system of education, to the cultural life of their nation, to the national uniform language. The unifying tendency now also takes hold of the laboring masses. However, it is only a socialist society that will see this tendency triumph. Through differences in national education and customs, socialist society will distinguish peoples from one another to the same extent that the educated classes of the different nations are distinguished from one another today. There may well exist limited communities of character within the socialist nation; but autonomous cultural communities will not be able to exist within the nation, because every local community will be subject to the influence of the culture of the nation as a whole and will engage in cultural interaction, in the exchange of ideas with the entire nation.

Only now are we in a position to comprehensively define the concept of the nation. *The nation is the totality of human beings bound together by a community of fate into a community of character.* The function of the community of fate here distinguishes the nation from the international collectivities of character constituted by profession, by class, and by state citizenry, which are based on the similarity rather than the community of fate. The concept of the totality of those sharing the same character distinguishes the nation from the limited communities of character within the nation, which never form a self-determining natural and cultural community that is determined by its own fate due to the fact that their close interaction with the nation as a whole means that they are also determined by its fate. In the age of clan communism the nation was clearly delimited due to the fact that it was constituted by the totality of all those who were descended from the ancestral Baltic people, all those whose intellectual being was determined by the fate of that ancestral people by way of natural heredity and cultural transmission. The nation will be clearly delimited anew in socialist society due to the fact that it will be constituted by the totality of all those who enjoy access to national

education, to the elements of the national culture, all those whose character will therefore be formed by these cultural elements, the content of which has been determined by the fate of the nation. Within the society based on the private ownership of the means of production, the dominant classes—once the knighthood, today the educated classes—constitute the nation as the totality of those among whom the same upbringing, shaped by the history of the nation and mediated by a uniform language and the national education system, gives rise to an affinity of character. But the popular masses do not constitute the nation—they no longer constitute it because the ancient community of descent no longer binds them closely enough together, and they do not yet constitute it because they have not yet been fully integrated into the emerging community of education. The difficulty involved in finding a satisfactory definition of the nation, a difficulty that has resulted in the failure of all previous attempts, is thus historically conditioned. Attempts to find the nation have focused on our class society, in which the old, strictly delimited community of descent has disintegrated into a host of local and descent groups and the new, emerging community of education has not yet been able to unite these small groups in a national whole.

Our search for the essence of the nation thus reveals a grandiose historical fresco. In the beginning—in the age of clan communism and nomadic agriculture—we find the unified nation in the form of the community of descent. Then, following the transition to settled agriculture and the development of private property, we see the division of the old nation into the cultural community of the dominant classes on the one hand and the tenants of the nation on the other, with the latter confined to narrow local regions resulting from the disintegration of the old nation. Later, following the development of the capitalist form of social production, we see the expansion of the national community of culture—the laboring and exploited classes still remain the mere tenants of the nation, but the tendency to national unity on the basis of the national system of education gradually becomes stronger than the particularistic tendency of the old nation based on the community of descent to disintegrate into ever more sharply divided local groups. Finally, once the society has stripped social production of its capitalist garments, there is a renaissance of the unitary nation as a community of education, work, and culture. The development of the nation reflects the history of the mode of production and of property. Just as private ownership of the means of production and individual production emerge out of the clan communist form of society and then, in turn, give way to cooperative production based on social property, so too does the unified nation split into members of the nation and tenants of the nation, and it divides into small geographical units that, following the development of social production, once again draw closer to one another, ultimately establishing the socialist nation of the future. In the era of private property and individual production, the nation divided

into members of the nation and tenants of the nation and split into numerous restricted geographical groups, is the product of the disintegration of the communist nation of the past and the material of the socialist nation of the future.

The nation thus reveals itself as a historical phenomenon in two respects. First, it is a historical phenomenon in terms of its material determination, because the national character actively manifested in every member of the nation is the precipitate of a historical development, because in the nationality of the individual member of the nation is reflected the history of the nation of which the individual is a product. Second, it is a historical phenomenon in terms of its formal bonds, because spheres of different dimensions are bound together to form a nation by different means and in different ways at the various stages of historical development. Not only does the history of a society decide which concrete features of the members of the nation constitute the national character; the form in which the historically effective forces give rise to a community of character is also historically conditioned.

The national conception of history, which sees in the struggles of the nations the driving force behind events, strives to establish a mechanics of the nations. The nations appear to this conception as irreducible elements, as fixed bodies that collide in space and act upon each other through pressure and counter-pressure. We, on the other hand, dissolve the nation itself into a process. For us, history no longer mirrors the struggles of the nations; for us, the nation itself appears as a reflection of historical struggles. For the nation is manifested only in the national character, in the *nationality of the individual*; and the nationality of the individual is nothing other than an aspect of his determination by the history of the nation, by the development of the techniques and conditions of labor.

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND NATIONAL SENTIMENT

As long as the individual knows only other members of his own nation, he will be conscious only of differences and not of similarities between himself and them. If I interact only with Germans, hear talk of only Germans, I have no opportunity to become conscious of the fact that the people I know resemble me in one respect, namely in their Germanness; I perceive only the differences: he is a Swabian, I am a Bavarian; he is a bourgeois, I am a worker; he is blond, I am dark; he is grouchy, I am cheerful. Only when I become acquainted with foreign peoples will I become conscious of the fact that these people are strangers, whereas I am linked to all those I have interacted with until now, and with millions of others, by the bond of membership in the one nation. Awareness of the foreign is a precondition of all national consciousness. It is no accident that our oldest and most famous celebration of the German people commences with the words: "Many lands have I seen." It is therefore

among those cast up in foreign lands, such as the merchant, the warrior, and the worker, that a national consciousness most readily develops; and it is in border regions, where several nations meet, that it is most widespread.

Seen in isolation, national consciousness is nothing but the recognition that I resemble the other members of my nation in terms of certain characteristics—in terms of physical features, the possession of certain elements of a culture, the specificity of the will—and that for this reason I am different from people who belong to other nations: in a more profound theoretical sense, the recognition that I am a product of the same history as my fellow nationals. National consciousness is thus by no means synonymous with the love of one's own nation or the will for the political unity of the nation. Finding one's way through the maze of social phenomena requires an insistence on clear distinctions between diverse psychological structures and on the maintenance of these distinctions with an appropriate terminology. In this process it becomes clear that national consciousness is to be understood as the simple recognition of membership of a nation, of the specificity of that nation, and of its difference from other nations.

As a community of character, the nation determines the actions of the individual member of the people, even if he is not conscious of his nationality. The nationality of the individual is one of the means by which sociohistorical forces determine the individual's decisions. However, the individual only becomes conscious of this determination by his nationality once he has recognized himself as the member of a nation. It is thus only national consciousness that makes nationality into a conscious driving force in human and, in particular, in political action.

It is no doubt for this reason that such great importance has been attributed to national consciousness for the existence and the foundation of the nation. Indeed some have claimed that it is precisely national consciousness that is the constitutive feature of the nation. In this view, a nation is the totality of those individuals who are conscious of their unity with one another and their difference from other nations. Thus, for example, Rümelin claimed: "My people are those whom I regard as my people, whom I call mine, to whom I know myself to be bonded by indissoluble ties."⁸³ This psychological theory of the nation seemed all the more acceptable when one was not able to locate an objective feature of the nation, when all attempts to discover the bond that unified the nation as a community either in language, in common descent, or in the fact of belonging to a state appeared to fail due to the diversity of national phenomena. However, this psychological theory is not only unsatisfactory, but actually incorrect. It is unsatisfactory because, even supposing it were correct that the nation is formed by those conscious of their affinity with one another, the question would remain: why is it that I feel myself to be connected with these rather than with those people? What are the "indissoluble ties" by which I know myself to be linked to the other

members of my nation? If I am conscious of my nationality, of what am I actually conscious? What is it that compels me to feel myself one with all Germans and not with the English or the French? Moreover, is it actually true that all members of a nation are always conscious of their affinity with one another? Is a German only someone who has grasped the idea of his affiliation with other Germans? Is the Swiss schoolteacher who has never in his life considered his affinity with the Berlin worker therefore not a German? Ideas emerge in my consciousness only on the basis of experience. The German who knows only Germans and hears talk of only Germans cannot become conscious of his difference from other nations, and, as a consequence, of his correspondence with his fellow nationals, of his affiliation with his nation; he has no national consciousness. However, it is precisely for this reason that his character is perhaps more purely determined by German culture than the character of another: it is precisely he who can fully and completely be a German.

Today, however, it can be said that everyone who belongs to the cultural community of a nation is also conscious of this affiliation. This dissemination of national consciousness is essentially a product of our capitalist era, which, with its unprecedented wealth of interaction, has brought the nations into such close contact with one another that no one who takes part in the culture of his nation can remain completely ignorant of other nations. Even a person who has never come face to face with someone from another nation becomes acquainted with foreign nations through literature and the press—if only in caricatured form; even in this person, knowledge of foreign nations gives rise to a consciousness of his own nationality. It is only in such an era that the mistaken opinion could develop that it is national consciousness that unites individuals as a nation.

National consciousness becomes a determinant basis of human action by being linked to a peculiar sentiment, the national sentiment. Psychology teaches us that even the simplest phenomena of consciousness, the sensations, regularly have a particular emotional connotation; the sensation aroused by the color red is accompanied by other feelings, as is that aroused by the color black or blue. In the same way, the more complex structures of our psyche also give rise to feelings in us—feelings of pleasure and displeasure, of tension and relaxation. The peculiar sentiment that regularly accompanies national consciousness—the recognition of the specificity of one's own nation and its difference from other nations—we call national sentiment.

When I become acquainted with a foreign nation, that which I initially observe appears to me as something new, something unfamiliar. Even the physical type I encounter in the foreigners is frequently different from that of my fellow nationals; their customs, their living habits, their intellectual culture are foreign to me, and in many instances I can accustom myself to them only very slowly. If I interact more closely with these foreigners, I observe

that they make choices and decisions that are different from those made by the people I know under the same circumstances, that they set about their work and enjoy themselves in a different manner.

Human consciousness is dominated by the law of inertia. In the process of our intellectual development, we have acquired a system of ideas. The attempt by new knowledge to topple this edifice is resisted by the inertia of our consciousness—it is only with great displeasure that the scholar who for years has held a certain scientific assertion to be true observes a new fact prove this assertion false. In the same way, a feeling of displeasure is very often attached to the observation of those things which are peculiar to another nation. The beautiful women of Italy might attract me for the moment with their unusual charms, but I will soon yearn again for the blonde beauties of my own land. I may at first delight in the culture of Italy, but it is only with difficulty that I am able to permanently accustom myself to this foreign people with their different views and customs; the specificity of a foreign will might at first amuse or delight me, but it soon becomes disagreeable to me to see the same external stimulus have a different effect on the foreigners from that which I expect after observing it a hundred times over among my fellow nationals in my homeland. If the experience of the specificity of a foreign nation confronts me suddenly, when I am unprepared—an instance of passive apperception—it is almost always accompanied by a feeling of displeasure. But even when I am prepared for the experience of foreign ways, and therefore initially enjoy them—an instance of active apperception—the law of inertia soon awakens a feeling of displeasure in me, one rooted in the fact that human consciousness adapts with difficulty and seldom without feelings of displeasure to a foreign peculiarity, the fact that it has difficulty adopting new ideas that contradict old ideas instilled over decades. Knowledge of a foreign nation is thus very commonly accompanied by a feeling of displeasure, the idea of one's own national ways by a feeling of pleasure.

Thus, knowledge of foreign nations commonly awakens a love for one's own nation. National sentiment thus flows from the "terribly dangerous" force of habit, from the reluctance with which the inertia of the human spirit opposes everything new and therefore everything foreign:

It is the common things, the eternal yesteryear,
 That which always was and always returns
 And holds true for tomorrow, because it has held true for today.
 For it is from the common things that man is made,
 And habit he calls his wet nurse.
 Woe to him who the old and venerable household
 Disturbs, the precious heritage of his ancestors!
 The years exert a sacred power,
 Things grey with age are to him divine.⁸⁴

The force constituted by the love for one's own nation varies in intensity according to the class and the individual. The peasant who knows no people other than the few inhabitants of his village, knows no customs other than those transmitted by the traditions of his own small district, no views other than those that he, like each of his neighbors, has learned from his mother, his schoolteacher, and his pastor, who knows no changes other than those imposed upon him by the eternal cycle of seasons, is the least accustomed to accepting and learning that which is new, to adapting new ideas to those already established. In his case, therefore, the inertia of apperception is particularly pronounced, the observation of all foreign ways bound to a particularly marked feeling of displeasure; every new garment, every foreign custom arouses his mistrust and very easily his fierce hatred. The national sentiment of the peasant has no more powerful root than that of the hatred of everything foreign felt by the individual who is closely bound to that which has been inherited, to tradition. It is quite a different matter in the case of the modern bourgeois or the modern industrial worker. The city, changing fashion, and the press present him with an environment that is constantly new, one in which he has long become accustomed to seeing the exotic without experiencing strong feelings of displeasure. In this case, the love of one's own nation has sources other than the hatred of foreign specificities.

One of these sources is the fact that the idea of one's own nation is linked spatially and temporally with other ideas, the emotional connotation of which passes to the idea of the nation. When I think of my nation, I recall my familiar homeland, the parental house, the first childhood games, my old schoolmaster, the girl whose kiss once made me happy, and from all these images flows a feeling of pleasure that encompasses the closely related idea of the nation to which I belong.

But there is more to this: my national consciousness is constituted not by my perception of a foreign nationality, but by my perception of my own nationality, my own kind. When I become aware that I belong to a nation, I recognize that a close community of character links me with that nation, that its fate has formed me, its culture determined me, and that it is an effective cause within my character. The nation is not something foreign to me, but a part of me that is also present in the being of the other members of my nation. The idea of the nation is thus linked with the idea of my own self. Anyone who reviles the nation therefore reviles me; if the nation is praised, then I share in this praise. For the nation has no being outside of me and my own kind. The idea of the nation is thus associated with powerful feelings of pleasure: it is not, as has been believed at times, the real or imagined community of interest with fellow nationals, but the recognition of the bond of the community of character, the realization that my nationality is nothing but my own manner of being, that associates a feeling of pleasure with the idea of the nation, awakens within me a love for my nation. I love myself because I

am dominated by the primitive instinct for self-preservation; and since the nation appears to me as nothing other than a part of myself, national specificity as a part of my character, I therefore love the nation. The love for one's nation is thus not a moral principle, the product of a moral struggle in which I can take pride, but in fact nothing other than a product of the instinct for self-preservation, the love of myself, whatever I am, which extends to include all those who resemble me, who are linked to me by a community.

In addition to all these forces that drive national sentiment there is yet another: it is the source of the enthusiasm that, as Goethe says, arouses history. For those with a good knowledge of history, the idea of the nation is linked with the idea of its fate, with the memory of heroic struggles, of the incessant struggle for science and art, of triumphs and defeats. The sympathy that the individual accords to those who have struggled in the past is transformed into a love for the incarnation of this diverse fate, the nation. In fact, we are introducing not a new element here, but merely an enlargement on the two preceding elements. Just as the idea of the nation owes a good deal of its rich emotional aspect to its close association with the idea of my own youth, so too does its association with the idea of those individuals who have taught us to love and admire history kindle new love for it. And just as I learn to love the nation when I recognize my own being in its particularity, so too does its history become dear to me if I believe that it is in the fates that have shaped it since ancient times that the forces are contained that have engraved the traits of distant generations into the being of their descendants and into my own being. The romantic enthusiasm for things long past thus becomes a source of love for one's nation. It is for this reason that the effect exerted by a national artwork—Wagner's *Meistersinger*, for instance—assumes a national aspect: it teaches us to love a part of the history of the nation and thereby the nation itself.

Knowledge of the history of the nation produces above all a lively national sentiment among the intelligentsia. However, the more the popular school, the newspaper, the lecture, and the book provide knowledge of the fortunes of the nation, the more the history of the nation also evokes a national sentiment among the popular masses.

The national sentiment that thus emerges leads to a curious nationally based evaluation of things. For, since the idea of the German people is linked to a feeling of pleasure, I soon come to believe I can call German anything that for me is linked with a feeling of pleasure. If I now describe someone as a "real German," I no longer wish to merely indicate the nationality of the man, but also to laud him, to glorify him. "Good German" becomes an expression of praise, "un-German" a reproach. The name of the people becomes a form of evaluation; I believe that I am praising an action if I describe it as "good German," that I am stigmatizing it when I describe it as "un-German."

This constitutes the basis of the curious romantic tone that, according to Bismarck, resonates when we speak of the German people.

Scholarship is able to explain to us the emergence of the national sentiment from national consciousness, the emergence of the curious national form of evaluation from the national sentiment. But it is also able to criticize this national evaluation. And this is a task of no little significance. For it is only the critique of national ideology that can produce the atmosphere of sobriety that alone makes a fruitful examination of national politics possible.

CRITIQUE OF NATIONAL VALUES

The curious phenomenon of national evaluation, the fact that we regard anything German as good, regardless of what it is, and call anything that is good "German" in order to praise it, arises from the causal linking of the individual member of a people with his nation. Because the individual is the child of his nation, its product, all the specific characteristics of his mother nation appear to him as good—they are, after all, also his own. For this reason, he is capable of adopting anything that conflicts with this specificity only by surmounting a powerful feeling of reluctance; he must recreate himself, transform himself, if he wishes to move beyond the boundaries of his own national specificity.

However, man is not only a cognizant being, conscious of the causal link between himself and his nation, but above all a being of will and of action, who sets himself goals and selects means of achieving these goals. This fact gives rise to another form of evaluation, which comes into conflict with national evaluation.

Our reason attributes value to a means according to its utility: for example, if the health of the individual or the masses is the goal of the hygienist, he will consider valuable everything that promotes this goal; if the economic policymaker strives for the greatest possible increase in the productivity of human labor, he considers valuable everything that makes human labor more productive, and considers harmful anything which decreases its productivity. However, we do not content ourselves with the evaluation of the means; the immediate goals—health, the productivity of labor—are themselves subject to evaluation as to whether they are capable of serving as means of realizing our supreme goal. We may determine this goal in different ways—one person may find the highest of ideals in the greatest happiness of the greatest number, another in the community of autonomous individuals, an ideal that then becomes for him the standard against which values are measured. However, once this ideal has been determined, all human design is judged as valuable or worthless, as moral or immoral, according to whether it is capable of serving as a means of realizing this supreme goal, this moral ideal.

We thus arrive at another type of value: we consider as valuable, good, and

just that which constitutes an appropriate means for the realization of a particular goal; this particular goal, in turn, appears as valuable, good, and just when it can be subordinated as a means for the realization of a supreme goal, of an ideal. This is the form of evaluation—arising from the rational choice of a means of realizing a particular goal and the rational choice of a goal as the means of realizing the supreme goal, the moral ideal—that constitutes the form of evaluation employed by *rationalism*.

What, then, is the relationship of this rationalist form of evaluation to the national form of evaluation arising from national sentiment? Rational evaluation and national evaluation can coincide. When, for example, Lessing waged his struggle against the influence of French culture on German education, this struggle against “Frenchness” gave rise to a form of national evaluation that appeared as a struggle for the preservation or the restoration of national specificity. However, it also encompassed a form of rational evaluation. The culture of the French court could not meet the needs of the class constituted by the newly emerged German bourgeoisie; it conflicted with both the aesthetic ideal and the moral ideal of this class. When at this time the great spokesmen of the German bourgeoisie defended German ways against foreign influences, they did so because German ways appeared to them as more valuable, as of greater stature, because German culture was in their eyes a better means of realizing their supreme goal, their ethical and aesthetic ideal. Rationalist evaluation and national evaluation thus coincided.

However, the coincidence of these two forms of evaluation is the result of historical accident; it is by no means a necessity. National specificity is a product of the fate of the nation. However, there is no world spirit imbued with reason at work within the fate of the nation that transforms the rational into being [*Seiende*], and being such that it becomes rational, but only the blind necessity of the struggle for existence. It is therefore pure accident when the characteristics cultivated and instilled in a nation by the struggle for existence appear to later generations as valuable and as appropriate means for the realization of their goals. For instance, a series of harsh strokes of fate—the demise of early German capitalism and the decline of the German bourgeoisie as a consequence of the shift in international trading routes, the emergence of the absolutist state, the subjection of the peasantry to the oppression of landholders, the misery of the Thirty Years War—made servile humility a national characteristic of the Germans of the seventeenth century; in no sense could this characteristic of the German nation appear valuable to later generations as a means for the realization of their goals, and in no sense could the behavior resulting from this characteristic appear as the path to their ideal.

Thus, national evaluation and rationalist evaluation do not necessarily coincide. For the rationalist, to whom only that which serves his immediate goal and ultimately his supreme goal, his ideal, appears valuable, it seems simply ridiculous to evaluate a quality not in terms of whether it is appropri-

ate, but in terms of whether it is national, whether it is specific to our nation. He therefore scoffs at the romantic nationalist, who prides himself on the mere fact that he is a “good German.” Thus Herder says: “We deplore the narrowness of the sphere of ideas that separated the nations from one another in the Middle Ages; in our case, God be thanked, all national characters have been obliterated.” For Lessing, the evaluation of things from a national standpoint is merely a “heroic weakness.” And Heine mocks national evaluation thus:

I am no son of Rome, I am not a Slav,
A German donkey am I,
As were my fathers, they were so well-behaved,
So down to earth, so sensible. . . .

Oh what bliss to be a donkey,
A descendant from such long-eared ones,
I would like to shout from the rooftops:
I was born a donkey. . . .

I am a donkey and want to be true,
Like my fathers, the ancients,
To good old donkeydom,
To donkeyhood.⁸⁵

National evaluation and rationalist evaluation are both rooted in human nature. The former is ultimately based on the fact that the human being, bound to the nation by a causal relationship, is the product of his nation. The latter is based on the fact that the human being is a being that sets itself goals and chooses means, a being that orders itself within the natural and causal context through conscious action. Both forms of evaluation arise from the nature of the human, both are equally ineradicable, both are found in every human being, struggle with each other within every individual. Their intensity varies, of course, from individual to individual: those heavily subject to the influence of tradition, in whom selective reason only faintly counterbalances the influence of sentiment, tend toward national evaluation. More sober individuals, on the other hand, with a strong capacity for reason and a more limited capacity for sentiment, free spirits who have clearly resolved to free themselves from the power of tradition and to choose their own path independently, have no understanding of national evaluation.⁸⁶

This contradiction, at work in every human being, between national and rational evaluation acquires great social significance due to the fact that class and political oppositions seize hold of the conflict between the two. National specificity is always the product of the traditional organization of society. If revolutionary movements emerge that aim to overthrow the existing social order and replace it with a new one, those with an interest in the preservation

of the existing social order, that is, the ruling and propertied classes, will rapidly point out that the specific qualities of the nation have been created and conditioned by the existing order of society and that every putsch against their rights and their property will destroy or change the traditional specificity of the nation. They thus make national evaluation into a tool of their class struggle. When capitalism threatened the feudal social order, the landholding class asserted that feudal institutions were rooted in the national "spirit of the people"—capitalism, it was argued, was a foreign growth that would destroy the specificity of the nation—and that every good German was therefore obliged to protect the national legal institution of serfdom against the foreign institution of bourgeois legal equality. As democracy penetrated into central Europe, those holding power mocked it as a foreign—English or French—product that did not fit the national character of the Germans and would destroy it; every good German, it was argued, should therefore support absolutism and feudalism. Similarly, the unrestricted division of peasant property is still opposed today with the argument that it derives from the foreign "pagan law of the Romans" and that the right of inheritance must be maintained on the grounds that it is a German legal institution.

But it is in Russia that we find national evaluation acquiring its greatest significance as a means of reactionary struggle. For decades, every reform in accordance with the western European model was opposed by a movement that concocted a brew of Slavic national essence from the poverty and ignorance of the mujiks, the despotism of government officials, the power of the tsar, and the superstition of the Orthodox Church, a brew seen as having to be guarded at all costs against every Western influence. For decades Slavophilia opposed the *Zapadniki* [Occidentalists] in different forms; it survives today in some branches of Russian literature, in some areas of political thought, and for a time even exercised an influence on the reformist and revolutionary parties.

Whereas those classes that fear the loss of their power and property want to preserve national specificity and profess to hold national values in high regard, the rising classes that have yet to win power in the society are rationalist in their outlook. Far from valuing all that which has been historically passed down, these classes launch an attack on this very notion. For them, national specificity is nothing but the specificity of the classes that dominate and exploit the nation. Thus, national institutions, which are alleged to be the only institutions that correspond to the national character and that facilitate its preservation, represent for the rising classes the bulwark of the domination and exploitation enjoyed by the classes that are their enemies. What contempt the German democrats had prior to 1848 for the talk heard from those who wanted to justify the unbearable political and social conditions in Germany as the product of the "Christian-Germanic spirit of the people," for the national historical school, "a school which legitimates the baseness of today with the

baseness of yesterday, a school that declares rebellious every cry of the serf against the knout once that knout is a time-honored, ancestral, historical one."⁸⁷ Although national evaluation is dear to all conservative classes, the form of evaluation employed by all revolutionary classes is rationalist.

This also holds for the working class of today. It is, in the words of the young Marx, "a class with radical chains, a class of civil society that is not a class of civil society, an estate that is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere that has a universal character by virtue of its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular wrong but wrong generally is perpetrated against it; that can no longer invoke a historical but only a human title; that does not stand in any one-sided antithesis to the consequences but in an all-round antithesis to the premises of the German state; a sphere, finally, that cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thereby emancipating all other spheres of society, which . . . is [thus] the complete loss of man and hence can win itself only through the complete rewinning of man. This dissolution of society as a particular estate is the proletariat."⁸⁸ Because the working class is not yet a class of the nation, it is also no longer a national class. Excluded from the enjoyment of cultural wealth, it sees this cultural wealth as the property of another. Where others see the lustrous history of the national culture, it sees the poverty and the servitude of those upon whose broad shoulders the national culture has rested since the decline of ancient clan communism. It sees its ideal not in the preservation of national specificity, but in the overthrow of all previous social orders; only this can make it a member of the nation. For this reason, it applies the knife of its criticism to all that is merely the result of historical transmission. For this reason, all that has been handed down has no worth for the working class, but must first prove its worth by serving the struggle of this class. The working class therefore mocks all those who seek to combat its struggle by asserting that its class struggle conflicts with the specificity of the nation, since it is only the class struggle that can bring the working class membership in that nation.

Since the cultural wealth of the nation is not the cultural wealth of the proletariat, national evaluation is not the proletarian mode of evaluation. The exclusion of the working class from the national culture is the source of its anguish, but it is also the root of its dignity. The landed noble once expelled the ancestors of this class from house and farm in order to enlarge his estate; its fathers had to leave the peasant village in which their forefathers had lived for centuries—perhaps since the nation first adopted a settled existence—thereby being uprooted, torn out of all tradition; the working class itself is left to the mercy of the variable influence of the large cities, dragged into all the currents of the era, tossed here and there through every part of the land by the play of economic circumstances. The working class has thus become rootless, freer from the crippling force of tradition than any class preceding it. It has thus

become, so to speak, the embodiment of rationalism; for the working class, nothing is sacred merely by force of age, tradition, or custom; rather, it rejects all that is merely handed down, recognizing no other criteria than the goal for which it struggles and the means that it must choose to achieve this goal. It welcomes all that is new; from everything that is new and foreign it chooses that which it deems appropriate; the national specificity of tradition appears to it as simply an outmoded limitation. The Russian worker takes his ideals from Germany, the German learns new methods of struggle from the Belgians and the Russians, he imitates the Englishman in trade union matters, the Frenchman in terms of political struggle; each new current immediately awakens his interest—he is even inclined to overestimate each one, precisely because it is new, unprecedented, unfamiliar, precisely because it opposes that which for others represents the national cultural heritage and the specificity of the nation. There is no class that is inwardly as completely liberated from all forms of national evaluation as the rising proletariat, freed from all tradition by the devastating, destructive force of capitalism, excluded from the enjoyment of the nation's cultural wealth, engaged in a struggle with all power that has been passed down through history.⁸⁹

However, the more the proletariat becomes rationalist in its outlook, the more national evaluation finds favor with the proletariat's immediate adversary, the bourgeoisie; to be sure, such national evaluation sounds strange in the mouths of capitalists. It is, after all, the effects of capital that have destroyed the traditional national specificity of all nations, have transformed the entire essence of every one of them. As long as the bourgeoisie was still in its youth, national evaluation remained foreign to it; at that time, it held the inherited debris of history in contempt and dreamed of the social edifice that it would build according to the plans of its own class reason. But the more the proletariat gains power in opposition to the bourgeoisie, the more sympathetic the latter becomes to all forms of historicism, including the national form of evaluation.

The struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is a struggle over property. Once, in a time long past, private property served the demand: to each that which he himself has earned. Within the capitalist workshops this principle underwent a change and came to mean: to the master the product of the labor of others. But even here it did not lose all sense. The ownership of the means of production was linked not only to the claim to surplus value, but also to a social function, that of the coordination of production. However, this function became increasingly separated from the fact of ownership: in the joint stock company, in the cartel, in the trust, in the organization of our banking system, the owner loses all social function, has no part in the coordination of labor anymore; what remains is his claim to the product of the labor of others. The principle of ownership has thus been completely altered: once it meant that the worker was protected in regard to the owner-

ship of the product of his labor; today it means nothing more than a claim to the labor of others, has become a mere title for exploitation. The owner can no longer refer to a social function, to a service that he performs for the society, but only to the mere fact that he has inherited his property, that his property is a product of historical development. He has no legal title now other than historical title.

The young bourgeoisie struggled against the traditional structures of the state; the old bourgeoisie fears democracy and clings to the monarchy and the bureaucracy, its allies in the struggle against the proletariat. The young bourgeoisie constructed the "state of reason"; the bourgeoisie that has grown old defends the historical rights of the monarchy. The bourgeoisie today thus values all that has been historically handed down because it owes its own domination solely to historical tradition; and because it values everything historical, it also values the historical within us, that is, our nationality. Thus, the bourgeoisie has increasingly become the defender of national specificity, has increasingly accommodated itself to national evaluation. It believes that it will thereby be able to defend the traditional social order, that this order has arisen from the specificity of the nation, and that it requires this national specificity to preserve itself. It is no accident that bourgeois theorists of today are endeavoring again to make the preservation of national specificity a moral duty; that national spiritualism has been resurrected; that in our universities the historical school dominates the fields of jurisprudence and economics; that our literature and our art have discovered national specificity.

National evaluation and rationalist evaluation arise from different facets of the human being, necessarily emerge in every individual, exist at odds with one another in every one of us. However, this internal contradiction in us is transformed by the class struggle into an external contradiction in the society. More and more, national evaluation becomes the form of evaluation employed by the dominant and propertied classes, and rationalist evaluation that of the working class. Different values also produce different politics.

NATIONAL POLITICS

One of our most important tasks is that of establishing a clear distinction between the different orientations of will that are grouped and merged with one another under the term *national politics*. This work must begin here, even before we come to speak of the relationship of the nation to the state.

From evaluation ensues an intention. If I regard national specificity, whatever its source, as valuable, this gives rise to the intention to preserve that national specificity. National evaluation thus breeds national politics, which in this context means concerted and methodical action with the goal of preserving national specificity. In order to distinguish this form of national politics from other orientations of will also designated as national politics, we can

describe it as national-conservative politics. It is a conservative politics because it wants to maintain national specificity in its present form. But it is also a conservative politics in the sense of being almost always the politics of the dominant and propertied classes, which are interested in the preservation of the existing social order and are therefore conservative classes.

There is a close connection between national specificity and the social structure. On the one hand, every social structure creates a particular structure of the national psyche. The national specificity of a capitalist nation is thus fundamentally different from that of a feudal nation. On the other hand, the preservation of a particular national specificity is also a condition of the maintenance of a particular social structure: thus, a particular mental disposition of the masses is a condition of absolutist bureaucratic domination, which cannot possibly continue to exist if this mental disposition changes (whatever the means by which this change is brought about). The classes interested in maintaining the existing social structure must therefore seek to preserve the specificity of the nation, since it is a condition of their power in the society. They explain their desire to preserve their power in the form of the existing social institutions on the grounds that this is the sole means of safeguarding the precious specificity of the nation. The bourgeoisie wants to maintain the mentality of servility, the "accursed frugality," the humble and fatalistic submission of the workers to their poverty, because the possibility of exploitation is thereby ensured. But it claims to want to preserve its domination over the workers on the grounds that the alleged virtues of frugality, piousness, the "patriarchal relationship" between "employers and employees" are thereby preserved. This is the *internal lie* of national-conservative politics: it pretends to want to preserve social institutions for the sake of national specificity; in reality it wants to preserve national specificity in order to ensure the enjoyment of its power, of its exploitation of others.

But can the nation really do without this aspiration to preserve its specificity? Does it not correspond to the instinct for self-preservation in every living being? Is it not the case that cultural cosmopolitanism, which, instead of preserving national specificity, aims to acquire for the nation what is valuable from all nations, threatens to bring about the decline of the specific national essence? Does it not want to grind humanity into a bland mush in which all national diversity disappears?

In order to counter this argument we have repeatedly referred to our observation of the phenomenon of national apperception. We know that, over the course of centuries, the nation has adopted cultural elements from the most diverse range of nations. The ancient Germans were initially strongly influenced by the more highly developed Celtic culture and later by Roman culture. Christianity brought with it Middle Eastern, Greek, and Roman cultural elements. During the era of feudalism, the influence of southern French culture was, in particular, extremely pronounced; in the era of the Crusades,

this was accompanied by Italian and Middle Eastern influences, and, with the development of capitalist commodity production, Germany experienced the influence of Italian humanism and the Italian Renaissance. The following centuries were again marked by a pronounced French influence. The reawakened bourgeoisie was influenced by the culture of antiquity and the science and art of France, England, and the Netherlands. The nineteenth century saw the most diverse range of nations, even nations from remote parts of the globe, enhance the richness of our culture. And despite all this, one cannot speak of the disappearance of national specificity. This fact is explained by the phenomenon of national apperception: no nation incorporates foreign elements in unaltered form; each adapts them to its whole being and subjects them to change in the process of assimilation, of intellectual digestion. French cultural elements were absorbed by the Germans just as they were by the English. But these elements of French culture became something altogether different for the English from that which they became for the Germans. The leveling out of differences between the material contents of cultures in no sense means the elimination of national specificity. The consciousness of the specificity of the nation has never been more evident than in our own era, although today each nation without doubt learns a great deal more at a much greater speed from other nations than ever before.

However, quite apart from the fact of foreign influences, national specificity is subject to constant transformations, without the nation's thereby ever ceasing to constitute a community of character different from all other nations. One has only to look, for instance, to the radical transformation of the national specificity of the German people during the nineteenth century! In the present context, we want to emphasize only one aspect of these manifold changes.

When the great battles in the countries of the West were being fought in the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the absolutist state and the landed nobility, during which time the bourgeoisie in Germany was pinned down by the backwardness of economic development and political oppression, Germaine de Staël declared at one point that anyone in Germany whose viewpoint did not take the whole world into account had no place in the land. The German intelligentsia of the period absorbed all the knowledge of their era. The modern natural science developed in Holland, England, and France, the French and English theories of the state, and the forms of philosophy developed on the basis of both these branches of scholarship were adopted in Germany. However, the concepts borrowed from the nations of the West at this time were elaborated in a quite different form in German lands from that found in France and England. Since direct class confrontation had not at this time become a possibility in Germany, attention was not deflected from theoretical principles; the necessity of practical application, which emerged very early in England and, after the Revolution, also in

France, was not felt in Germany and thus did not lead to compromises between idea and reality. Germany thus became the classical land in which principles were thought through and the deductions based on them taken to their conclusion. It was on such a foundation that our philosophy developed, the consistent rationalism that argued that the smallest action could not be justified unless it could be incorporated within a grand system of goals. Only in Germany could a Vischer declare that he could not contemplate how a man could conduct politics without having studied and reflected on the logic of Hegel. And this mode of thinking did not remain confined to the narrow stratum of the intelligentsia; in diluted form it also penetrated the broad mass of the population; the schoolmaster, the priest, the newspaper, the beginnings of political agitation gradually made this cast of mind into the mode of thinking employed by the masses as well. "Visibly and, in my opinion, generally acknowledged," states Fichte, "the movements and aspirations of the era aspired to exiling darker sentiments and establishing the sole rule of clarity and knowledge." One cannot comprehend the revolution of 1848 if one does not take into account this national particularity of the Germans of this era. Today a part of this mode of thinking survives among the German workers; it justifies Engels's celebrated phrase to the effect that the German workers are the heirs of German classical philosophy, the German socialists the successors of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel.

However, capitalism and the constitutional monarchy dominated by the Junker and the bourgeois have completely transformed the nature of this particularity of the German nation. A hollow empiricism and historicism, the taste for individual research of no value, the adulation of success, that *Realpolitik* that, in the words of Marx, regards as reality that which it sees in front of its nose, characterize the intellectual culture of Germany today. Bourgeois rationalism is no longer possible; proletarian rationalism is forbidden by the bourgeoisie by means of the state it dominates, which seeks to exclude every individual of a "suspect cast of mind" from all practical activity. Today it is not the German intelligentsia but the Russian intelligentsia that are the kindred spirits of the German academic youth of the 1830s and 40s. And this transformation, too, is by no means limited to the academically educated upper stratum; the new spirit is also seeping through many channels into the broad mass of the population. The revisionism within German Social Democracy is its heir: it arises from the renunciation of all "impractical" principles, from the opportunistic politics that have supplanted the rationalism of the past, the cast of mind that no longer believes it can justify its actions by seeing in them the means to a supreme goal theoretically recognized as just, but believes it can justify them only in terms of the immediately visible, albeit correspondingly minor, success.

So violently have only a few decades of capitalist development transformed the national specificity of the people. But does this mean that the

German people is now a people devoid of national specificity? Have the Germans thereby become Englishmen or Americans? Transforming the specificity of the nation by no means signifies the relinquishment of national specificity.

From this insight ensues the idea of another form of national politics. We have to ensure not that future generations resemble the living, but that our descendants, linked by the community of character, also form a nation. But how large will the circle be that forms the nation in the future? Methodical cooperation with the goal of ensuring that the whole people has a share in the national community of culture, that it is determined by the national culture and thereby linked together in a national community of character, can surely also be described as national politics. In order to distinguish this form from the already familiar national-conservative politics, I will call it national-evolutionary politics. It earns the name evolutionary in that it breaks with the idea that our task is one of preserving the historically developed specificity of the nation in unchanged form; it opposes this erroneous conception with that of the development, the evolution, of the national character. But it can also be termed evolutionary in a more profound sense on the basis that it not only does not impede the evolution of the national character, but aims to make the entire people into a nation, to enable it to develop into a nation. It is concerned not only with the development of the nation, but with the development of the entire people into a nation.⁹⁰

This national-evolutionary politics is the politics of the modern working class. To be sure, the working class pursues its politics not in the interest of the nation, but in its own interest. But because the proletariat necessarily struggles for possession of the cultural wealth that its work creates and makes possible, the effect of this politics is necessarily that of calling the entire people to take part in the national community of culture and thereby to make the totality of the people into a nation.

This goal is already served by the democratic politics of the proletariat. Universal suffrage has become a powerful lever of national development, because it forces the parties to struggle for the support of every last day laborer and, in the propaganda work for their program, to make a piece of the national culture the property of the masses. Freedom of the press, of assembly, and of association first make possible the influence of the culture on the broader mass of the population. Cooperation that strives for clearly defined goals in the workers' organizations lifts the worker out of the depths of a merely vegetative existence, one consumed by labor, sleep, and the rawest of sensual pleasures, and provides him, if only to a meager extent, with elements of the national culture.

The education policy of the proletariat has the same effect. The popular school is a constant preoccupation of the proletariat everywhere, whereas for the bourgeoisie it is increasingly an object of indifference, even of suspicion.

Every new school class is a new conquest of the nation. But much more powerful still than the direct effects of the democratic and education policies of the proletariat are the indirect effects of its economic policy.

National-conservative politics supports the forces of politicoeconomic reaction. The petty bourgeois, but in particular the peasant, ensure the preservation of national specificity. It is precisely the defense of agrarian policy for which national evaluation often serves as a means. The peasant is tightly woven into the tradition of a close circle, of his descent group, of his village; he abandons nothing of this way of being; he is the enemy of everything new, everything foreign. When one observes that no system of foreign domination has succeeded in robbing the peasant of his nationality, that the Alsatian peasant has not become French and that the Transylvanian Saxon has not become a Magyar, this is based on the fact that the peasant rigidly preserves the ways of his locality and his clan. It is not their Germanness which these peasants have preserved; rather, one has remained an Alsatian, the other a Saxon. Certainly the cultures of the Alsatian and the Transylvanian-Saxon peasants share common traits; but on top of their common ancestral culture the centuries have deposited new cultures that have long concealed their old community. Several decades ago we would have been able to say: the German peasant does not fundamentally belong to the nation because he does not participate in the German community of culture, because he is tied to the nation by nothing more than common blood and tradition, which he owes to common Germanic ancestors and which have long been concealed by subsequent development. Those who wish to keep the peasant in this state hinder the emergence of a national cultural community that encompasses the whole people.

It is quite a different matter once capitalism begins to transform agriculture. Capitalism draws a part of the rural population into industry, transforms peasant sons into industrial workers who, released from local ties, are much more strongly subject to the uniform cultural influence of the nation. It also transforms no less markedly the existence of that part of the population that continues to work in agriculture; it forces the peasant to make a transition to intensive agriculture, makes him into a pure farmer, a commodity producer as worthy of the title as any other; the modern farmer, who participates in the management of his cooperative, changes his techniques according to the requirements of the market, reads his newspaper, is a member of the "Farmers' Association," is a member of the national cultural community in a quite different sense from the peasant of earlier times.

Anyone who wishes to preserve the ancient status of the peasant and to check the process of capitalist transformation impedes the merging of the nation into a close cultural community. The grain duties within the German Empire could well be seen as a means employed by national-conservative politics; national-evolutionary politics must discard them.

The case of so-called middle-class politics is highly similar. There was a time in which the artisans and small merchants were bearers of the national community of culture: the era of emerging commodity production. However, we already know that commodity production could expand only in the form of capitalist commodity production, could demolish feudal society only in this form. We know that with the emergence of capitalism the bourgeoisie became culturally differentiated into the strata of the “educated” and the “uneducated” and that in this way the petty bourgeoisie was excluded from the national community of culture. The era of Hans Sachs has vanished irretrievably.⁹¹ Today the petty bourgeoisie is subject almost as little to the cultural influence of the nation as the peasantry. Threatened and enslaved by capitalism, its members have longer working hours and seldom better earnings than the wage laborer; on the other hand, it is deprived of the cultural influences to which the proletariat is exposed by virtue of the latter’s class situation and the class struggle. The petty bourgeois works in isolation, not together with other work comrades in the factory; he does not enjoy, or, when he does, then only to a limited degree, the education that comes with organization; he does not know the liberation from all local limitations that derives from the wage laborer’s freedom of movement; he is not subject to the powerful cultural effects of the proletarian class struggle. The petty bourgeoisie plays only a small part in the great process of the evolution of the entire people into a nation; the path to the national community of culture leads over the ruins of the craft industry destroyed by capitalism.

When the proletariat, in its own interest, struggles against the artificial preservation of the ancient peasantry and of the petty bourgeoisie, it thereby serves the evolution of the collective into a national community of culture; its class politics is a national-evolutionary politics. However, it is not enough that the proletariat does not aim to check the development of capitalism; it must also ensure that the effects of capitalist development are to the benefit of the broad mass of the population. This goal is served by the social policies of the working class: legislation for the protection of workers and the struggle of the trade unions, wage increases and the decrease in working hours are the necessary preconditions for the broad mass of the people to become members of the national cultural community. This is why the nineteenth century knew no greater national exploit than the heroic struggle for the shortening of the working day, the great May Day movement.

But the working class knows that, as great as the success of their struggle may be, it can never attain full possession of the national culture within capitalist society. Only in socialist society can the national culture become the possession of the entire people, thereby making the entire people a nation. This is why all national-evolutionary politics is necessarily socialist politics.

The conflict between national-conservative and national-evolutionary politics is also clearly revealed in their respective positions regarding groups

within the nation defined by locality and by origin. From the standpoint of the national form of evaluation, it is consistent to want to maintain such regional idiosyncrasies, to encourage the dialects in their struggle with the uniform language, and to want to maintain traditional costumes. For us, on the other hand, such regional idiosyncrasy within the nation appears as an obstacle to the community of culture: those for whom the uniform German language is a foreign language cannot share in the national literature, science, or philosophy; they are not at all shaped by our traditional culture, are not in the least integrated into the German community of character. Certainly the study of dialects merits all attention, and the aesthetic enjoyment of local idiosyncrasies is of course understandable; but we must not forget that all such regional idiosyncrasy, arising from the regional entrenchment of the peasant and effectively combated by capitalism, the wage laborer's freedom of movement, democracy, and the modern school, is an obstacle to the national cultural community and therefore an obstacle to the unity of the nation. When national-conservative politics favors the maintenance and promotion of these regional idiosyncrasies within the nation, it is in fact being anti-national. The romantic joy found in all traditional idiosyncrasy destroys the cultural unity of the nation. We pursue a national politics not by uncritically admiring and striving to maintain all that which is traditional, but by struggling to enable every individual member of the people to absorb the culture and thereby become a child of the nation.

2. The Nation-State

THE MODERN STATE AND THE NATION

The state of the Middle Ages was founded on the feudal system. The vassal was under obligation to his lord to provide military service and to attend the latter's court; in return, he was granted land in the form of a fief. The medieval state was based on this relationship, which was, according to customary right, hereditary in the case of both parties. The German king was the overlord of the princes, who were in turn the overlords of the other barons. Thus, it was the king who summoned the princes, the prince who summoned the barons to arms and to the court; in the feudal tribunal, the king sat in judgment on the princes, the prince in judgment on his vassals. The military and judicial constitutions were thus based on the feudal system. However, the functions of the medieval state did not extend beyond the military and judicial systems, for the only tasks of this state were those of maintaining external and internal peace.

The modern state was born as a child of commodity production. It was only when the product of labor became a commodity and was transformed into money that a part of the society's labor product in the form of money, as tax, could maintain the state in economic terms and enable it to create a mercenary army and a body of paid officials, making it independent of feudal ties. However, the modern state did not emerge in the form of the nation-state. The cradle of the modern state was the country with the oldest system of capitalist commodity production—Italy. The first modern states were the wealthy Italian city-republics, in which the dominant capitalist class was at first able to utilize the state as an instrument of capitalist interests. However, the mercenary army emerging with the modern state soon made it possible to establish a tyranny on the basis of brute force, a small military state founded on a mercenary army. Anyone who had the means to equip a mercenary army could attempt to establish himself as the prince of a small state. The investment of capital in such a venture was certainly worthwhile, for the tyrant was able to use the military force at his disposal to make the subject citizenry into

a taxable mass, which was forced not only to maintain his army, but also to meet the costs of establishing the small state. Thus emerged the innumerable small states of Italy, no longer founded on feudal legal title, but on the undisguised exercise of brutal military force. However, these military tyrannies were as much modern states as the city-republics. Since it was the taxable potential of the subject citizens that constituted the source of their power, the tyrants had to satisfy the economic needs of the citizenry and foster capitalist exploitation using state means; these tyrannies were veritable modern states, characterized not only by the subjection of all citizens directly to the state, but also by the universality of the state's objectives, which were no longer limited to the mere safeguarding of peace, but now encompassed the methodical pursuit of a politics fostering the economic development of the citizenry externally and internally.

The emergence of this modern state was a curious thing. Anyone who had money could create a state for himself, using an army of paid soldiers; and anyone who ruled a state by force of arms could also exploit the taxable potential of his subjects and thus consolidate his hegemony. The modern state thus initially had no natural borders. It was not necessarily limited to a city, but did not take the form of a large nation-state. Thus, it split Italy into a host of smaller and larger states, which later became the victims of Spanish, French, and Austrian domination.

In the case of the large nations of the West, the development of the modern state took another path. Here it was linked with the organization of the feudal state: the supreme head of the feudal state, the monarchy, was able to invest the ancient legal institution of the national monarchy with new content. The monarchy, which was the head of the feudal state, was able to make the new means of commodity production serve royal interests, to subject the feudal lords to the authority of the state using a mercenary army and paid officials, and in this way to create on a large scale that which the Italian states represented on a small scale. In France this development commenced with the "great Provençal dowry" (Dante), with the subjection of southern France to the power of the French king in the Albigensian Wars. Under Philip VI (1328–50) the only great duchies remaining were those of Flanders, Burgundy, Guyenne, and Brittany; the new peers were no longer independent princes, but already subject to the power of the monarchy. The monarchy now set about making the taxation system, the civil service, and the professional army—which had become possible due to the expansion of the monetary system—into instruments of its power. It created a standing army that was under the exclusive command of the king, with captains appointed directly by the Crown. The estates [*Stände*] were forced to grant the king a "*taille perpetuelle*" for this purpose, a tax paid no longer for only a brief duration, for instance in times of war, but on a permanent basis to enable the king to maintain his army. At the same time the king succeeded in forbidding the

barons and lords to extort money from their subjects for the purpose of paying mercenaries and prohibited, under threat of severe punishment, the raising of troops. The indignation of the nobility in the face of these decisions was clearly expressed in a series of revolts, which were put down within a short time. On the basis of the revenue flowing from the "*taille perpetuelle*," the king was soon in a position to maintain a standing army of seven thousand to nine thousand men. And as modest as this beginning was, its importance was shown under Louis XI, who was able to subjugate the powerful duchies—which roughly corresponded to the larger German principalities—and to create a durable, centralized, and united nation-state in France.

The development of the modern state in Germany was the complete opposite of state development in France. The German Empire emerged from the Carolingian Empire. In the process of partitioning the enormous empire of Charlemagne, which encompassed both Roman and German regions, the boundaries constituted by the different nations by no means determined the lines of demarcation between the new partial empires. Nevertheless, at least in the west, in the area of northern France, the border of the empire ultimately came to coincide with the boundary between the nations. This was a result of the pronounced cultural difference between those regions where the Franks had settled under the influence of Roman culture and those where the Germans resided on the land of their origin—a cultural difference manifested in different forms of agriculture and land division and in different constitutional and legal forms. This cultural difference was necessarily decisive for the borders of the partial empires resulting from partition; but since the Germans settled in Roman regions were absorbed by the Romans and Romanized Celts of Gaul, whereas the Germans residing on their own land preserved their own distinctive ways, the West Frankish Empire necessarily became French, the East Frankish Empire necessarily German.

However, the direct result of this was certainly not the emergence of a German nation-state. The tribal kingdoms subjugated by the Carolingians very soon reemerged under the title of the "tribal duchies." The most powerful tribal duke induced the others, through force or negotiation, to recognize him as the German king; as a consequence, Franconian, Saxon, and Swabian dukes in turn became kings of Germany. The dominant seignorial class was generally well disposed toward the power of the king; for the distant king was far less dangerous to the independence of the feudal lord on his fief than was the neighboring duke. And the advantage of having all the armies of the knights under the authority of one king was proved when the German tribes were threatened by external foes. Thus, the victory of Otto I over the Magyars on the Lechfield consolidated his domination of the whole of the East Frankish Empire; thus, Conrad II was first able to gain the support of the Saxons when he succeeded in recovering long-forgotten tribute from the Slavs.

The German monarchy was thus now able to control the ancient tribal

duchies. To maintain this position, the monarchy relied heavily on the Church. The ecclesiastical princes could not claim hereditary power as the tribal dukes could; the decision as to who would occupy the bishoprics and abbeys ultimately lay with the king. The German monarchs thus fostered the power of the Church in order to create an instrument of their own power. With the support of the wealthy and powerful ecclesiastical princes, with their immense properties and numerous vassals, the German kings finally crushed the tribal dukes by creating new principalities without regard for ancient tribal boundaries. This development commenced with the foundation of the duchy of the Billungers on Saxon land and ended with the great upheaval following the defeat of Henry the Lion: the ancient duchies were abolished and replaced by a series of principalities, territories that, even if their princes bore the old title of duke, shared little more than their name with the ancient duchies, which were virtually independent of the empire.¹ It was this development that, when the now-wealthy Church would no longer tolerate its role as a mere instrument of power of the monarchy, plunged Germany into the turmoil of the great dispute between the papacy and the monarchy; however, it was also this development that prevented the empire from disintegrating into a number of fully independent duchies.

When commodity production also became established in Germany, it initially appeared as if this would also be of benefit to the empire. In Germany, too, the towns became the centers of a movement toward unification, and it seemed plausible that a king, supported by the power of the towns, could subjugate the old principalities and create a unified German nation-state. However, if this blossoming of commodity production in Germany also created here a tendency toward the creation of a large unified and centralized state, it was ultimately the territories and not the empire that benefited.

The Hohenstaufen were the first German monarchs to grasp the potential advantage to the power of the monarchy represented by the development of commodity production. However, it was not the German bourgeoisie, which was then only slowly developing, but the more advanced monetary economy of Italy that they saw as providing support for their power. Frederick I and Frederick II both sought to utilize the power of the old empire over Italy in order to gain access to the taxable potential of the Italian bourgeoisie. Their focus was exclusively on this goal, and, in order to secure the support of the armies of the German princes for their plan, they granted them concession after concession within the empire itself. Thus, they left the towns in Germany at the mercy of the princes and did without the most lucrative royal rights to the princes' advantage. The Italian policy of the Hohenstaufen finally came to an end with a terrible defeat after a long and eventful struggle. However, it was now too late in Germany to remind the towns, which had been left at the mercy of the princes, of the abandoned royal rights. The growth of the bourgeoisie, commodity production, and the money economy

in Germany itself no longer augmented the power of the king, but augmented the power of the German princes.

We have already discussed in another context the way in which the German princes, using the public authority of the count, fused the power of feudal, vassalage, and property rights in the form of a unitary supreme power over their subjects. The German Empire thus entered the capitalist epoch as a loose union of independent states. Admittedly, the empire had already assembled an imperial army against the Hussites, and the estates of the empire had granted the emperor an imperial tax, the “common penny,” for this purpose; however, the emperor strove in vain to gain the approval of the estates—as had happened in France—for a standing army, the “*miles perpetuus*,” and for a regular, ongoing imperial tax for its maintenance. The reign of Charles V saw the imperial army made up of contingents provided by the individual estates of the empire, and the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” still unsuccessful in obtaining a regular imperial tax—apart from the ridiculously small “monies of the chamber,” which served to maintain the Imperial Supreme Court [*Reichskammergericht*]. The empire had thus not managed to utilize the new instruments of power emerging with the development of commodity production; the advantages presented by this development fell for the most part to the territories. In the same period as bourgeois development was providing the impetus for the emergence of the German nation as a unit in a quite new sense, the German Empire disintegrated into a large number of independent states, which were unconcerned with each other as long as they were not crossing swords. The same development which produced the unified nation-state among the great nations in the west produced in Germany the division of the nation into states.

As the contrast between German and French development clearly shows, it was principally the difference in the distribution of power within the feudal state that ultimately decided whether the modern state united the nation as a single political community or split it into numerous independent territories. For, in the case of the great European nations, the birth of the modern state was based on the fact that commodity production—which, as capitalist commodity production, increasingly becomes the general form of social production—provided the forces of the feudal state with the possibility of investing the ancient juridical and institutional form of the feudal state with a new efficacy. The distribution of power within the feudal state was therefore decisive in determining whether it was the king or the princes—the peers—who proved capable of creating the modern state founded on a taxation system using money, a civil service, and a professional army. At the time, of course, there were good reasons for the differences in the way power was distributed. Today these differences appear to us as somewhat accidental. Modern living nations do not much concern themselves with the fact that there were good reasons for political structures that today do not accord with their needs to emerge centuries

ago in a particular form. It is no wonder, then, that the nineteenth century experienced a violent transformation of the traditional state system during the great period of nation-state formation.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

The dominant theme running through the radical upheaval in the traditional state system in the nineteenth century was the principle of nationality: each nation should form a state, and each state should encompass one nation alone! The struggles for the unity of Germany and the liberty of Italy, the liberation of Greece, Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria from Turkish domination, the struggle of the Irish for home rule, of the Polish for the restoration of the Polish state, and the break of the South American states with Spain were all manifestations of the great struggle for the realization of the principle of nationality.

This phenomenon is so striking that many theoreticians interpret the will to coexist in an independent political community as one of the constitutive features of the nation. For Renan and Kirchhoff, for example, the nation is the totality of persons coexisting in an independent community who are prepared to defend and make sacrifices for that community.² We are dealing here with a *psychological* theory of the nation. However, whereas the theory we have already encountered, which aims to define the nation in terms of national consciousness, the recognition of affiliation, is intellectualist, the theory that discovers the essence of the nation in the will to political unity and freedom is *voluntarist*.³

Our objections to this theory are the same as those we have already advanced against the psychological-intellectualist tendency. This theory is unsatisfactory because it also evades the question as to why we should want to be unified in a community with precisely these and not other individuals. However, it is also incorrect because it is simply false that all people wishing to belong to a community form a nation as a consequence of this desire—there are Czechs who consider the existence of Austria to be a necessity for their nation and who argue with Palacký that Austria would have to be invented if it did not already exist; but they do not therefore belong to an Austrian nation.⁴ And it is equally incorrect that all those belonging to a nation desire the political unity of their nation: the Germans in Switzerland and many of the Germans in Austria have absolutely no desire for the realization of the dream of German unity.

The fact that the nation-state is seen as the rule, the multinational state as a mere exception, as a remnant of times past, has led to a disturbing confusion in the terminology of political science and politics. Thus, one commonly understands under the concept of the nation nothing more than the totality of citizens or the totality of the inhabitants of an economic region. In Ger-

many, every form of politics that grants the existing class-governed state the necessary instruments of power—soldiers, artillery, warships—is termed national politics; in France, national politics is seen as the politics of “*revanche*” and of colonial expansion. When one speaks of the national economy, one thinks not of the economy of the nation—for example, that of the Germans in all countries—but of that of the German economic region, a region that certainly does not include all Germans and, in fact, incorporates Germans, Frenchmen, Danes, Poles, Jews, and in smaller proportions, members of the most diverse nations. If one speaks of the “protection of national labor,” one refers not, for instance, to the protection of German labor in Austria or in the United States, but to the protection of labor within the German economic region, and so on. Here, we are not concerned with the nation in this sense. This linguistic usage is based on a confusion between the nation and the population of state and economic regions.⁵

When the relationship between the nation and the state is being discussed, theorists are usually content with the assertion that it is “natural” for every nation to want to become a state. However, the problem for scholarship is not thereby solved, but only formulated. We need to ask why it seems “natural” and reasonable to people that every nation and always only one nation forms a political community. The principle of nationality clearly includes two aspirations: first, the will to national liberty, the rejection of foreign domination, the demand for “one nation, one state!”; second, the will to national unity, the rejection of particularism as well as the demand for “the entire nation in one state!” It is necessary at this point to explain how it is that these aspirations could emerge in the nineteenth century and become powerful enough to topple the traditional state system.

The impetus for the nation-state movement unarguably came from the longing to repulse foreign domination. In instances where foreign domination of a nation also entails oppression and exploitation, this longing to repulse the foreign power requires no explanation. Such was the case, for example, in the revolution of the Serbs. The Serbs, clearly distinct in terms of nationality and religion from the ruling Turks, endured severe exploitation and oppression under a bellicose and feudal form of Turkish domination. The Turkish overlords expropriated a considerable proportion of the peasant nation’s labor product; the nation was forced to pay its masters for the right to exist with a poll tax; hated measures, such as the ban on the bearing of arms or the mounting of a saddled horse, meant that the scorned *rajah* [herds] experienced their oppression daily. It was inevitable that this oppressed people would rise up against their foreign masters as soon as the opportunity for success presented itself. When these conditions emerged as a result of the internal dislocation of the Turkish Empire and Russia’s Balkan policy, this enslaved people rose up to fight for its liberty, for its own nation-state. The situation was no different in places where—as in Greece—the mass of the people lived in enslavement

whereas an aristocracy of officials and a wealthy bourgeoisie profited extensively from the exploitative measures of the ruling state. Here, the national revolution took the form of a revolution of the enslaved masses; however, the bourgeoisie also played a role. It is precisely a wealthy bourgeoisie that has particular contempt for the ruling nation; the sons of the monied and civil service aristocracy studied at the universities in the west and brought home with them the ardent desire for liberty wrought by the events of 1789; it was Schiller himself who challenged the Greek students among his listeners to work for the liberation of their people. Thus, there awakens in the bourgeoisie of the enslaved nation the desire for independence, and it is this class that becomes the leader of the national struggle, because it is to the bourgeoisie that power necessarily falls in the nation-state that is to be won.

The situation is different where foreign domination represents for the masses not a deterioration, but an amelioration of economic conditions. The Polish uprisings were, in the first instance, rebellions of the nobility, the *Szlachta*. They foundered on the indifference, in part on the resistance, of the peasants, who feared that the restoration of the Polish state would mean the revival of unrestricted exploitation by the landed aristocracy. The revolution in the name of the nation-state was thus constituted here, in the first instance, by a rebellion of the class of lords of the oppressed nation, for whom the loss of the nation-state included the loss of their hegemony; it was not a movement of the popular, working masses, whose situation within the nation-state would have been no better, and perhaps even worse, than it was under foreign domination. Nevertheless, a dissemination of the concept of the nation-state can also be seen among the popular masses. The same phenomenon can be recognized in Germany under Napoleon I. The subjection of large parts of Germany to French domination meant, of course, the dethroning of the narrow, dominant strata of the nation; for the popular masses, however, foreign domination in this case brought with it advantages rather than disadvantages: a share in the great achievements of the French Revolution, the elimination of feudal shackles, the introduction of the new bourgeois legal order. Nevertheless, the movement behind the wars of liberation was in no sense merely a movement of the courts and bureaucracies dethroned through French domination, but a movement involving broad social strata. How do we explain this phenomenon? How do we explain the curious fact of the popular masses' rising up against foreign domination, even where they have not lost anything under the foreign power, where they, at most, have changed oppressors, indeed, where foreign domination has even improved the situation of the subordinate strata of the populace?

Members of the petty bourgeoisie, peasants and workers in every state, including nation-states, are subject to external domination, are exploited and oppressed by the landed aristocracy, capitalists, and bureaucrats. However, this domination is disguised; it is not visible, but must first be comprehended.

External domination by another nation, on the other hand, is visible, immediately perceptible. When the worker enters an office of the authorities, when he appears before a court, he does not comprehend that it is an alien power that rules over him through the agency of the official and the judge, since the official and the judge act as organs of his nation. If, on the other hand, the official or judge belongs to another nation, if he speaks a foreign language, the fact of the subjugation of the mass of the people by alien powers becomes visible in an undisguised form and, as a consequence, intolerable. In the army of the nation-state, the peasant's son serves as the instrument of an alien power. However, this alien power, the dominant classes, whose goals are served by the army, understands, of course, how to disguise this fact; it understands how to lead the people to believe that the army is an instrument of the whole nation. If, on the other hand, the officers are members of a foreign nation, if orders are given in a foreign language, then the peasant's son, if he must obey, understands immediately that he is subject to a foreign power. The capitalist, the feudal lord, appears in the nationally unified society as an organ, as an intermediary agent of the nation that has entrusted him with the task of directing production and distribution; if he is a member of a foreign nation, the peasant or the wage laborer understands immediately that he must work in the service of a foreigner, for the benefit of a foreigner. Herein lies the real significance of foreign domination: that it renders immediately visible, perceptible, and thereby insupportable all exploitation and oppression that is otherwise accessible only through a process of comprehension.

However, there is yet another reason that, in particular, makes a new foreign ruler—rather than one that has existed since time immemorial—the object of the masses' hatred. In the thought of a child, the bearer of disaster always appears as its cause. Just as in the childish view of justice found among less developed peoples it is the one who inflicts damage who is also guilty of that damage and the judge does not inquire into intent, incitement, or abetment, so too was the German peasant in the epoch of the wars of liberation unconcerned with the fact that the disaster of the French wars had been brought upon him by the German princes who conspired against the French Revolution because of their hatred of the political and economic freedom of the bourgeoisie and the peasants. The peasant sees only the French soldier who brings war into the land, the French army that kills his sons and destroys his wealth, and, as a consequence, a hatred for the French is awakened in him. How, then, should he possibly tolerate French rule over his land? All the rage, all the vindictiveness unleashed by the war is not directed against the rulers of one's own nation, who have instigated the war, but against the strangers who, in a direct and visible manner, kill the people's sons, assault its daughters, and lay waste its fields. The hatred unleashed by the war thus becomes the motor of the desire for national liberty.

The yearning to repel foreign domination is to be seen as the motor of all

movements of the nineteenth century promoting the formation of a nation-state: the conspiracy of the absolutist princes of Europe against the French Revolution confronted the French people with the danger of having to bow before foreign wills, of having to sacrifice the liberty they had won to an alien power; thus, the revolutionary struggle of the French became a national cause. When the armies of Napoleon I subsequently subjugated Germany, the yearning for national autonomy was also aroused there, and Arndt, the enemy of the French, took precedence over Schenkendorf, the herald of the emperor.⁶ The general struggle against foreign domination was also represented by the wars of liberation engaged in by the Italians, the Irish, the Poles, the Greeks, and the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula. Throughout "Young Europe" the desire for national liberty grew from the hatred of foreign domination.

This hatred also gave rise to the yearning for the political unity of the nation. Only a strong community that unified the whole nation seemed capable of preventing the continuation or return of foreign domination. As Treitschke formulated it, because the multiple system of domination had become one of general servitude, the Germans now craved a strong, unified German Empire.⁷

The forces unleashed by the development of modern capitalism also supported this aspiration. Capitalism required a large, populous, economically unified region; the necessity of capitalist development therefore argued against the political fragmentation of the nation. If the capitalist states had been linked to each other by the free exchange of commodities and fused into a *single* economic region, capitalism could well have endured the fragmentation of the nation into a number of independent states. In reality, however, the state in the capitalist world has nearly always also become a more or less independent economic region: the exchange of commodities between states is limited by protective tariffs, taxation policy, the system of railway tariffs, and the diversity of laws. The great mass of the commodities produced within a state serves the needs of the consumers living within its borders. Capitalism's desire for a large economically unified region therefore became the desire for a large state. In what follows, we attempt to sketch the reasons that made the development of large states in the nineteenth century a necessity.

The more populous an economic region is, the more numerous and the larger the enterprises manufacturing any given commodity can be. An increase in the size of the enterprise, as we know, means a reduction of production costs and an increase in the productivity of labor. However, the same effect is achieved through an increase in the number of the same type of enterprise: in the first place, because within the enterprise there is an increase in the division of labor, in specialization, that significantly increases the productivity of labor. There can be no doubt, for example, that the extraordinarily rapid industrial development of the United States of North America was fun-

damentally promoted by the fact that the extent of the economic region there made a much more extensive division of labor possible than in the European states. In addition, the existence of a larger number of enterprises of the same type located in close proximity to each other reduced the costs of renovating and repairing the production apparatus: in Lancashire, where one spinning mill is located close to another and all enterprises make use of common repair workshops, the requisite repair costs are much less than in cases where an individual spinning mill must maintain its own repair workshops. In the same way, the costs involved in the preparation and completion stages of production—dyeing, starching, and so on—are lower where the same services can be utilized by many enterprises of the same type. Finally, a larger number of enterprises of the same type makes possible improvements in the means of transport available, which results in further reduction of the costs of production. Where a large number of factories are located near one another, canals and railways are constructed, although, in the case of a small number of factories, these means of transport can either not be constructed or, due to less intensive use, require the payment of higher transport costs for each piece of freight. In the same way, the costs of enlisting a qualified workforce—from the managing director to the least qualified wage laborer—are much lower where large industry is served by the trade schools than in places where comparatively fewer jobs are available in a small number of enterprises. The economic utilization of the waste generated by production is, by the same token, possible only where a large industry supplies this waste in sufficient quantities.

But this is not all. Since Lancashire is part of a large economic region, it will consequently apply its capital and workforce only to those branches of production for which Lancashire offers particularly favorable conditions: the spinning and weaving of cotton, the construction of machinery and coal mining. It will produce these commodities in large quantities and, due to the scope of its production, increase the productivity of its labor; the county will meet all of its other requirements by exchanging the goods it needs for the products of its own labor. However, if the county was an autonomous economic region with only limited trade with other regions of the United Kingdom, it could of course only produce cotton fabrics, machines, and coal in much smaller quantities, leading to a decrease in the productivity of labor in these branches; what is more, the county would have to meet other needs through its own production, would also have to invest labor in branches of production where natural conditions are unfavorable. The same investment of labor would bring a much lower return in goods. For every economic region it is more advantageous to invest its work in those branches of production for which the natural conditions are favorable and to acquire other goods through exchange, as opposed to producing all the goods it requires to satisfy the needs of its consumers itself.

In the direct production of goods we find, then, a dual cause for the

superiority of larger economic regions: first, the fact that, as a rule, the productivity of labor increases with the scope of production; second, the fact that each region is better able to satisfy its needs through free commodity exchange than by producing goods in all branches of production itself.⁸ However, the superiority of the large economic regions is not based only on advantages in terms of production, but also on the regular flow of the circulation of capital.

The number of letters thrown into a certain mailbox in one day is a result of pure accident. Today it may be more, tomorrow less. If we count, on the other hand, the number of letters that are found in all the mailboxes in a large city, the number will be fairly constant, since the coincidence of more at one collection point will be balanced by the coincidence of fewer at another. The number of suicides in any one village or in a small city does not appear to obey any law. In one year, there are no suicides, in the next, ten people voluntarily take their own lives. If we count, on the other hand, the suicides throughout a large country, we are surprised by the constancy of the figure. The coincidental deviations in individual locations are ultimately balanced out when taken in the context of the country as a whole. This law of large numbers is of great significance for the circulation of capital. In a small country, a hail storm, a fire suffices to disturb the constant flow of capital circulation; in a large economic region, on the other hand, the coincidental deficiency in one part of the country is offset by the wealth of another part of the country. If a pressing need suddenly develops somewhere in a small economic region, it is felt by every enterprise throughout the country. The demand for money capital, the rate of interest, and the prices increase. In a large economic region, on the other hand, large amounts of money capital are accumulated, with the result that increased local need is far from being capable of bringing about an increase in the rate of interest. Conversely, if an individual locality within a large economic region enters the market with a very modest demand, this hardly makes an impression on the market in a large country; in a small economic region, on the other hand, the circulation of commodities throughout the country falters as a consequence of such local disturbances. In a small economic region, each partial crisis immediately becomes a general one. The economic situation in a large economic region, on the other hand, is almost immune to merely local disturbances and is subject only to the great laws that govern the economic situation in all capitalist economies.

All these reasons are so powerful that small states can never be content to be completely independent economic regions, that even in cases of the most extensive tariff protection measures they must strive to establish commodity exchange with other countries. However, the exchange of commodities between small economic regions and other countries is confronted with substantial obstacles. To begin with, the diversity of currencies, of taxation legislation, of civil and procedural law constitute obstacles to commerce between

states. Every state establishes its own system of communications, and, for this reason, knowledge of markets in other states is seldom as exact as that of one's own market. Only a large state is in a position to regulate the transport system, to impose tariffs on the railways; the small state, which shares a railway line with a series of other small states, is capable only of impeding transport, but not of fostering economic development through a methodical tariff policy.

States attempt to surmount these difficulties using all manner of agreements: monetary unions, trade agreements, customs unions, conventions on mutual law enforcement, on trademark, model, and patent law, interstate regulation of the system of railway tariffs—all serve this end. However, in its contractual dealings with neighboring states, the small economic region is in an inferior position. "In proportion to its production, the external trade of a small region is large and therefore important for this country; but for the large foreign state from which this small country wants to import and to which it wants to export commodities, this commercial relationship is of limited significance when compared with its own production. The small state consequently has little success in safeguarding its interests in conventions and in persuading other states to adapt their commercial policies to its needs."⁹

But the small state is weaker not only in terms of economic policy, but also politically. Capitalism, however, requires the strong arm of the state in order to realize its expansionary aims. How else could German capital seek profitable investments in foreign countries? How could the German merchant cover foreign markets if he could not rely on the protection of the military power of his state? The small state, incapable of guaranteeing its citizens in foreign countries security, therefore appears to capitalists as an inadequate, imperfect instrument of their domination. This is even more so given that the small state is, as a rule, also a very expensive instrument. For, under otherwise identical conditions, the administration of the large state is cheaper and the demands of taxation consequently less than in small states.

The nations of the nineteenth century clearly saw the advantages of the large state. The prosperity of France following the removal of the customs barriers between its provinces was general knowledge. Little wonder, then, that the demand grew among Germans and Italians for the formation of Germany and Italy into large economically unified regions.

We thus see the German bourgeoisie take the lead in the struggle for the establishment of a large German economic region: led by Friedrich List, the bourgeoisie struggled for a customs union and for a German railway system.¹⁰ In 1833, Prussia, the two Hesses, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony joined together to form a single customs territory. In 1847, for the first time after a long period of interruption, uniform German legislation was passed that, as evidence of the strength of the movement for unity, established the German system of exchange regulation, which subsequently became the commercial code for all German states.

However, the superiority of large economic regions explains only why the Germans desired a large state; but why a nation-state? Why should it be precisely the frontiers of the nation that become the frontiers of the state? Here, the effect of economic need is combined with the influence of political upheaval.

We have already referred a number of times to the fact that the bourgeoisie, as long as it was locked in a struggle with the traditional state order, was rationalist in its outlook: the legal title of historical tradition meant nothing to it; that which sought to exist had to prove its utility before the court of the reason of the bourgeois class. Locked in a struggle with the absolutist state, which restricted the freedom of the bourgeoisie's leading members, threw its sons into prison, gagged its press, prosecuted its writings, dissolved its associations, the bourgeoisie disdained the form of the state that had historically emerged and called for the natural state, the state governed by reason. This disdain for all historical tradition was further nourished by the upheavals of the Napoleonic epoch. If the Peace of Lunéville meant an inglorious end for a host of small German states, why should the remaining states continue to exist? And as the Congress of Vienna went about revising the map of Europe and restructuring the system of states after the wars of liberation, did it not appear absurd to obstruct the path of upward development with the old apparatus and flotsam from an age long past? Such questions added weight to the concept of the natural state, of the government of reason. But what are the natural boundaries of the state?

Here the national consciousness and national sentiment, strengthened by the wars of the Napoleonic epoch, pointed to the nation as the "natural" foundation of the state and formulated this idea as the principle of nationality: for every nation a state, for every state only one nation. For the peasant and the landed noble, this foundation is constituted by territory: the natural boundaries of the territory are the natural boundaries of the state; for the member of the bourgeoisie and the worker of the capitalist epoch, on the other hand, the state is above all an organization of people created to serve their purposes: that which separates people must therefore separate states. The state commands me externally; the nation lives within me, is the living, effective force in my character, which is determined by its fate. The nation thus appears as a natural structure, the state as an artificial product. If the traditional state no longer meets the needs of the age—protection against the threat of foreign domination, the demand for a more extensive economic region—what could be more logical than to adapt the artificial product, the state, to the natural product of human history, the nation, to make the nation itself the substratum of the state? Is it not the case that the difficulties caused by the diversity of languages within the nation-state and the national hatred that divides the different nations of a state provide direct evidence that the multinational state is an artificial structure? Is it not natural and reasonable to

unite the national community of character within the state and to separate it from other nations with state borders? Herder gave clear expression to such ideas. The nation is a natural growth: “[A] nation [*Volk*] is as much a natural plant as a family, only with more branches. Nothing therefore appears so directly opposite to the end of government as the unnatural enlargement of states, the wild mixture of various races and nations under one scepter.”¹¹

Let us try to distinguish the individual ideas summarized in this sentence. Its basis is clearly the demand for the state, as the product of human design, to adapt to nature, to follow nature. It is the epoch of Rousseau and the revival of the formula of the Stoics, the *naturam sequi*. Nature is seen as immutable, as given, the state as mutable, as movable; the state must therefore adapt itself to the demands of nature. The nation, however, is natural, a product of nature.¹² The state must therefore follow the nation, must politically unite the nation, the whole nation, but only one nation.

Is it correct that the nation is a product of nature and that the state is an artificial product? For us, this distinction no longer corresponds to its former meaning. The ancient opposition, dating back to the time of Plato and Aristotle, between, on the one hand, the political rationalism that considers the state as an artificial product erected by human will according to the imperatives of reason, and, on the other, the political naturalism that considers the state as a product of nature, dominated by “great eternal iron laws,” has been overcome by modern epistemology. Today, we know that what we are dealing with here is a difference of viewpoint and not exclusive alternatives. If we proceed scientifically, the state, like any other phenomenon, is a natural product and governed by laws; it is our task to investigate these laws, which govern the emergence, the modification, and the passing of the state. If, on the other hand, we proceed politically, if our aim is to transform the state, then it is for us, of course, a product of human will, the object of our actions. This remains the case despite the fact that science is capable of retrospectively understanding the will that creates the state in terms of its causal determination or, in regard to the future, of grasping the process of the formation of will in causal terms and thereby the orientation of future political will. For science, the nation is, like the state, a product of nature; we can understand how the community of fate produces the nation by means of the heredity of bred characteristics and the transmission of common cultural elements. But for the politician, the nation is also a product of his will, an artificial product: the objective of his actions can be to preserve or to modify the national character, to expand or to narrow the circle of members of the nation. If, then, the state can be considered as much a natural product as the nation, that is, comprehended as an object of science governed by laws, and then, on the other hand, as an artificial product, that is, as an object of our will, does Herder’s idea that the state, as an artificial product, must follow the nation as natural growth, must adapt to it, still make any sense?

This idea, which forms the basis of every justification for the principle of nationality, must be understood in its historical context. During the revolutionary epoch, the bourgeoisie was locked in a struggle with the state, with the whole traditional legal system. The absolutist state had either preserved the feudal and guild legal forms or had not fully eliminated them, and was thereby impeding the development of capitalism; the small size of the economic regions had become an impediment to the development of the forces of production; the economic and political authority of the absolutist state had become insupportable for the now mature bourgeoisie, which wanted to govern itself; the traditional small state could not be protected from foreign domination. As a consequence, the bourgeoisie aimed everywhere to overthrow the prevailing legal order, to destroy the existing state. However, it did not thereby want to destroy the state as such, but to replace it with another, one that met its requirements for the safeguarding of private property: from the bourgeois point of view, the state had dominated it long enough and should now become an instrument of bourgeois domination.

But how were the boundaries of the new state to be determined? The bourgeoisie was now faced with the question: if we destroy all prevailing positive rights, all existing state institutions, are all social phenomena thereby really destroyed? And it discovered that there are social phenomena that, irrespective of whether they have emerged under some particular legal order and have been able to survive only under a legal order, can nevertheless exist independent of a prevailing law that is hostile to them, independent of a hostile power, and that can survive this power because they reside not in an external power, but within the individual. The bourgeoisie thus discovered the nation as a community. When Palacký, in a moment of rage against the Austrian state, said that the Czechs were there before the Austrian state existed and that they would still be there if the Austrian state disintegrated, he expressed the idea that forms the basis of the principle of nationality: that of the community, which is the active, indestructible force within every individual, which, once it has emerged, is independent of all prevailing positive rights, independent of all existing powers. The national community exists whether or not the state falls, because it lives within every single individual. It is this fact that the revolutionary rationalism of the bourgeoisie recalled. If it destroyed the state, it would not at the same time destroy the community living within the individual, and therefore would have the substratum for the formation of the new state: the indestructible community was seen as becoming the foundation of the new society, of the new state.

The bourgeoisie treated the state as an artificial product because it wanted to transform it, and it treated the nation as a natural formation because it would continue to exist even if the state disintegrated. It is thus not, as first appears, the opposition between a causal and a teleological approach that is expressed in the confrontation between the state as artificial product and the

nation as natural formation, but the opposition between external power and internal community. In that the revolutionary bourgeoisie aimed to destroy the traditional state, which was hostile to it and did not meet its needs, it confronted the hostile, external power with the permanent, internal community of the nation: it demanded that the internal community itself become the support for external power and that external power protect the internal community. This is the root of the principle of nationality.

As violent as the effects of this demand were in the nineteenth century, it was not able to exert itself completely. We will therefore have to examine the forces that counteracted this principle and that maintained the multinational state. Moreover, we will have to ask whether these forces will be permanently strong enough to prevent the complete triumph of the principle of nationality or whether the existing multinational states are simply the remains of the past, which future development will eliminate and replace with pure nation-states. This requires, however, an analysis of the multinational state. We therefore now turn to the consideration of Austria, the most highly developed of the large multinational states of Europe. Those who are knowledgeable of the situation in other countries will easily distinguish between the social phenomena examined here that are peculiar to Austria and those which are common to all multinational states.

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3. The Multinational State

AUSTRIA AS A GERMAN STATE

The Austrian state was a product of the great movement that led the sons of Germany's peasants away from their home soil, where farmhouse increasingly pressed against farmhouse, to the northeast and to the southeast. The Austrian state was a late fruit of the colonization in the southeast, just as the Prussian state was a product of that in the northeast.

German colonization of the area of present-day Austria had a diverse character. The settlement of what are today the German Alpine lands presents a different picture from that of the subjugation of the Slovene peasants of the south under German feudal lords, and a different one again from that of the German penetration of Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary.

The Bavarian colonists who settled the Alpine lands also did not find a region completely devoid of inhabitants. More than a few of the inhabitants of the Roman provinces of Rhaetia, Noricum, and Pannonia, principally Romanized Celts, had survived the waves of mass migration; moreover, the departure of the Lombards from Pannonia was followed by the migration into the region of Slavic tribes that alone retained the originally Panslavic name of Wends or Slovenes. These had settled a large part of what are today the German Alpine lands. In Tyrol they occupied an area stretching from the Puster Valley to the region between Sillian and Lienz; in the Salzburg region, in the Gastein Valley, and to the south of Radstadt, in the Krems and Steyr Valleys, they remained until into the eleventh century.¹

However, the sparse Romano-Celtic and Slavic population could not maintain its hold on the rich lands. Without encountering resistance, the German peasants began to settle in the region: Bavarians in great numbers, but also Franconians, Swabians, Saxons. The numbers of colonists gradually outstripped those of the Celtic and Slavic inhabitants; the older occupants adopted the more developed Germanic culture and were integrated into the German population. Christianity, preached from the German bishoprics of Passau and Salzburg, also became a means of Germanizing the foreign population.

Within a few centuries the Romano-Celtic and Slavic nationalities in the region had completely disappeared.

However, it was only in places where the land had been very sparsely populated by the Wends that the Slavs were completely integrated into the German people; where the Slavs had settled close together, the situation was different. The Slovenes had moved into the Alpine lands from Pannonia through the river valleys; the farther up the valleys they moved, the sparser became their settlement. Conversely, the Germans penetrated from the northwest; their impact was greatest on the upper reaches of the rivers flowing into the Danube and increasingly weaker to the south. Thus, it was the Slavs located in the southeast who were best able to survive intact. The farther we look to the northwest, the more complete becomes the triumph of Germanness. Today, census figures still bear clear witness to this: the Slovenes have completely disappeared from Tyrol, Salzburg, and Upper Austria; in Carinthia they represent 25.08 percent of the population, in Styria 31.18 percent, and finally in Carniola 94.24 percent.

But German colonization also penetrated areas where the Slavs lived close together in large numbers. Even where the peasant did not become German, the Slovene peasant still came under the rule of the German lords. This development began with Charlemagne's wars against the Avars. The year 795 was the last year in which a Slavic duke of Carinthia is mentioned; from then on Bavarian dukes ruled the land. Enormous territories now fell into the hands of the crown. It leased and gave these to cloisters and abbeys, to powerful laymen, to royal and ecclesiastical ministerials; the new masters brought German colonists into the region and established German feudal landholdings. Around 811, Charlemagne established the boundary between the archbishopric of Passau and that of Aquileia; the Drau became the boundary of the German Church, and thus the boundary of the Germanizing influence of the Christian mission and the colonizing activities of German abbeys. In 820 the Slavs rose up against German oppression, but were defeated; the native noble was robbed of his land and replaced by the German noble. From then on the Slavic peasant was also subject to the rule of the German feudal lords. In Slavic areas the feudal culture became German. Thus, the surviving members of the local nobility adopted German language and custom and were gradually integrated into the class of German feudal lords. Today in Carniola the large landowner is still German, the peasant Slavic; only a few decades ago the domination of the nobility in the region signified the dominion of the Germans over the Slavs.

We know from our history of the German nation that the unifying national culture during the feudal epoch was that of the feudal lords. Here we encounter a people lacking the class that alone in this epoch was able to create and develop a national culture. In the case of the Wends, we can, as it were, experimentally prove our earlier claim: here we have a people without

the class that was the sole support for national culture during this epoch. And in fact, the Slovenes played no part in the entire culture of the feudal epoch. The Slovene peasants did not form a national cultural community at all, but formed only narrow local communities. What united the Slovene villages was not the emergence and continual development of a national culture, but merely the fact that within the meager cultural community formed by the peasants of each village those elements that had been transmitted to all of them from the ancestral Slavic people were sluggishly passed down from generation to generation. This commonality, increasingly concealed by diverse forms specific to particular localities, was very different from the powerful force of unitary national development, from the pulsating cultural life of the great nations to which the class of feudal lords belonged. Nations such as that of the Slovenes have been characterized as *nonhistorical nations*, an expression that we will retain. However, this does not mean that such nations had never had a history—for the Wends had a history until 820—and not that such nations, as Frederick Engels believed in 1884, were generally incapable of a historical life—for this opinion is definitively refuted by the history of the nineteenth century. Rather, we designate these nations as nonhistorical because their national culture, in the age in which the ruling classes alone were the bearers of such a culture, knew no history, no development.

For a full millennium, the Wends bore the character of a nonhistorical nation. Certainly, they were influenced by the expansion of the cultural community of the German people, which was a consequence of early capitalism and the political, religious, and moral upheaval that came in its wake. In the epoch of the Reformation we see the beginnings of a Slovene literature: the Bible and many devotional writings were translated into Wendish. The Slovene peasants rose up in the great peasant wars in the name of the “*stará pravda*,” the ancient law. However, the same causes for the rapid reduction of the circle of those participating in the culture in Germany—the shift in international trade routes, military upheavals, the Counter-Reformation—also soon brought the brief national upsurge here to an end. The Wendish peasant once again sank back into an existence devoid of culture. It was only the nineteenth century, it was only capitalism, only the advent of the modern state, that saw the liberation of the peasant from the feudal yoke and the beginning of self-administration, schooling, and compulsory military service, that awakened the Slovene nation from its slumber, led it onto the historical stage, creating for it the possibility of uniting the masses as a nation by way of its own living culture. In the age of feudalism this possibility did not exist. The Slovene was a peasant, and the peasant interested the feudal lord only insofar as he made the culture of the dominant feudal class possible through his socage and taxes; the nationality of the peasant was a matter of indifference. The German feudal nobility in the south thus took what they needed to live from the labor of Slavic peasants, just as they did elsewhere from the labor of

Germans or as they did, for example, in Latvia from the labor of Latvian peasants. As far as the historical life of the Middle Ages was concerned, Carinthia, Styria, and Carniola were exclusively German lands.

The influence of the great German colonization drive was quite different to the southeast in the nation-states on the border of the German Empire, in Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary. Here, Germanness did not absorb and enslave the indigenous nationality, although of course it penetrated the substance of the nation-state and gave rise to manifold changes to it.

The Germans moved into Bohemia as burghers, as peasants, and as miners. The Bohemian kings consciously promoted urban colonization. They too recognized the new power for the monarchy developing out of commodity production and, since commodity production and circulation in Germany was in advance of Bohemian development, they deliberately brought German merchants and artisans into Bohemia. The German burgher arriving in Bohemia either entered an already existing community or founded new towns. As early as the eleventh century, a German community was established in Prague. In the thirteenth century, many of the German towns obtained royal letters of franchise. The German towns in Bohemia experienced a new surge of development with the boom in mining. German miners were called in and founded a number of exclusively German towns. In the fourteenth century the wealthier burghers, the merchants, and the more distinguished artisans were almost exclusively German, whereas the other artisans, the peasants, and the urban proletariat were for the most part Czech. The town councils were almost exclusively in the hands of the Germans. Their wealth and privilege provided them with immense power, and they dominated the university; the benefices in the chapters, the bishoprics, and the cloisters were in the hands of Germans, whereas the poorer parishes were left to the Czechs. A Hussite pamphlet from 1437 illustrates vividly, if not perhaps without exaggeration, the social position that the Germans in Bohemia owed to their wealth: "Who were the mayors and councillors in all the royal towns of Bohemia? Germans. Who were the judges? Germans. Where did one preach to the Germans? In the cathedral. Where to the Bohemians? In the graveyard or in their houses."²

The colonization of Bohemia by the German burgher was accompanied by German peasant colonization. From the twelfth century onward, German peasants settled the border regions of Bohemia, cleared the land, and established free German villages and markets or were allocated land by the Bohemian monarch in the midst of the Slavic population, as some were by Ottokar II in the region of Saaz and Elbogen.

The Bohemian royal court and the Bohemian nobility were also subject to German influence. The highly developed culture of the German feudal class represented a model for the Bohemians, just as, for example, the court of the French king had been a model for the German courts of the seventeenth cen-

ture. The Przemyslids had the daughters of German princes as mothers and wives, they spoke German themselves, and German poets such as Reimar der Zweter, Tannhuser, and Ülrich von Türlin sojourned at their courts; the Bohemian knighthood imitated German codes of chivalry, took German names, and were great admirers of German chivalric art forms.³

German cultural influence was far less strong in Hungary and Poland. Nevertheless, we find in Hungary all the forms taken by German colonization. From the twelfth century onward Saxon peasants settled Transylvania; German burghers and German miners followed them, particularly in the wake of the Mongolian invasion. In Poland, colonization by burghers predominated. All the large cities and the majority of the small cities had German populations and German law.

The penetration of these lands by German culture brought them closer to one another and to the German Empire. For the first time the possibility arose for these lands to unite in a large state system. The fact that this possibility became reality can be explained on the basis of the German Empire's internal development.

We have already discussed, when we sought to explain the development of the modern state in Germany as based on commodity production, how it became the task of the German monarchy to create a power base whose military force could support its development of the empire into a state. We saw how the Hohenstaufen sought to create a modern state in highly developed Italy, a state that could have become the basis of their power in the empire. However, as we know, this bold aspiration ended in a terrible defeat. The Hohenstaufen had sought in vain to diminish the old royal rights in Germany in order to win the support of the German princes for their Italian policy. In the reign of Frederick II, the attempt to make an emperor—in the sense of the ancient Roman emperor—the mainstay of German royal power came to an end. The audacious plan of the Hohenstaufen had failed, but the goal it had served necessarily became the aspiration of every German king. The establishment of a powerful state as the foundation of royal power could not be realized within the old imperial territory, which had now split into a host of principalities. The kings thus turned all their efforts to the colonial territories. From the time of the collapse of the Hohenstaufen policy onward, the center of gravity of the German Empire lay in the colonial regions, and it still lies there today.

This displacement of the center of gravity of the empire was not in the least surprising. In cultural terms, the colonial lands had long adapted to the motherland, indeed perhaps even surpassed it. The first blossoming of our literature already drew a rich harvest from the soil that had been settled by German colonists centuries before. However, much more significant by far became the political superiority of the colonies. From the beginning, the power of the princes on colonial soil extended over a far wider area than was

the case in the motherland. Initially this was probably for the same reason as that explaining why the peasant's fields were larger in the colonial region, but then later also because the colonial princes, as guardians of the imperial march, were unable to do without greater power. And this power was not, as in the motherland, undermined by a large number of immunities. The dukes of Austria exercised great power over the church in their land, had considerable financial means at their disposal, and had a large number of ministerials and, under these, a bonded knighthood as their subjects. In the epoch of Frederick Barbarossa they were already among the most powerful princes in the empire.

Securing this power soon came to appear as an enticing goal. During the interregnum of the empire, Przemysl Ottokar II for the first time united Austria with Bohemia, thereby becoming the most powerful prince in the empire. From this time onward, it was clear that the future of Germany lay in the creation of a great colonial empire through the unification of Austria with Bohemia and perhaps also with Hungary. The German royal crown beckoned to anyone who could unite these imposing powers; he could perhaps hope to subjugate the now almost independent princes of the empire and give new content to the concept of German royal dignity. It was this that the Habsburgs made their goal following the suppression of the Przemyslids. They took up a firm position in Austria and, with dogged persistence, strove to augment their territorial possessions in order to create the great colonial empire that was to secure their domination of Germany. A short time later, another royal house, the Luxemburgs, also tried their hand at achieving the same goal. The history of Germany now became a struggle between these two houses. Fortune initially smiled upon the Luxemburgs. Then the Habsburgs secured the heritage of their fortunate rivals by marriage. The great colonial empire emerged for the first time when Albrecht V inherited the realm of the emperor Sigismund and thereby unified in a single hand the Habsburg and Luxemburg possessions. The power of the Habsburgs was thereby securely established. From that time on, the imperial crown remained in their hands until the Holy Roman Empire perished ingloriously in the turmoil of the bourgeois revolution. To be sure, they later again lost Bohemia and Hungary, but they unceasingly renewed their efforts to reach the goal to which they had once been so close. When the Jagiello Louis fell on the battlefield of Mohacs, they again inherited Bohemia and Hungary, which were thenceforth unified with Austria.⁴ The continued existence of the great empire that united the southern German colonial territories with the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, bound to the German Empire by the powerful influence of German culture, was thus secured for centuries.

The emergence of the Austrian state can be comprehended only on the basis of German development; its evolution is explained by the desire to make the colonial territories into a support for German royal power. Once

this had been achieved, the hope that the German kings, backed by such extensive power, could create a state out of the old empire, as had been done in Spain, France, and England, would perhaps not seem so rash. However, it was the peculiar fate of the Austrian state that, having barely emerged, it was faced with another gigantic task, a task that called on all of its powers and that would make the accomplishment of the former task, for which it had originally been created, a permanent impossibility. This new task was the protection of Christian Europe from the Turks. A few years after the Habsburg Albrecht inherited the Luxemburg realm, Constantinople fell into Turkish hands. Louis Jagiello fell in the struggle against the Turks, and the Habsburg Ferdinand became his heir. Three years later the Turks stood at the gates of Vienna; central Hungary remained in Turkish hands; eastern Hungary was ruled by the Vojvodina of Transylvania as vassals of the sultan. Croatia, the lands of Inner Austria, even Bohemia, Bavaria, and Saxony trembled in the face of the Turkish threat. In these centuries of struggle, as Engels once said, "the victory of Karl Martell beneath the walls of Vienna and on the Hungarian plains was won again and again." Through these struggles, Austria acquired new tasks and a new significance. If its development had initially been merely a requirement of the German monarchy, its existence was now a need of the lands united within it, which only in their unity felt themselves able to resist the Turks. In Croatia, the connection to the power of the Habsburgs as support against the Turks was already deemed necessary before the battle of Mohacs. When Maximilian I put himself forward for the Hungarian crown, he already had the support of the Croatian counts.⁵ In the same period, the Croatian count Nicholas Frangepan was supported financially by the emperor and the German imperial diet "that he might better serve" the empire against the Turks. In 1509 the estates [*Stände*] of the five lands of Lower Austria declared themselves ready to support the Croats against the Turks.⁶ In 1524, before Mohacs, the "*domini Croacie*" offered the sovereignty of their land to the Archduke Ferdinand. In the same year Ferdinand granted "several Croatian counts" considerable financial support "in order that they may come through this winter and offer the Turks more impressive resistance." In 1526 Ferdinand provided the Croats with reinforcements of cavalry and infantry for the struggle against the Turks. The Inner Austrian estates also repeatedly provided them with assistance in their struggle.⁷

How it was that the unification of the Austrian lands, once merely a political instrument of the German kings and the Habsburgs in their struggle for German royal dignity, became a necessity for the lands themselves in the face of the Turkish threat is shown clearly by the continual call of the estates in the lands threatened by the Turks for the unification of the estate committees of all Habsburg lands for the purpose of collective preparation for the Turkish war. In 1502 the committees of the estates of the five Lower Austrian lands

attended a collective sitting for the first time. By 1509 the estates from Tyrol and West Austria [*Vorderösterreich*] were also represented and arranged a defensive and offensive alliance with the Lower Austrian estates. Ferdinand called for an assembly of the committees of the estates of all Habsburg lands to meet in Linz in 1529. The planned congress failed to take place due to the resistance of the Bohemians, but the estates of the lands threatened by the Turks repeatedly called for a new attempt and reprimanded the emperor for not making enough effort to ensure its success. They were not capable, argued these estates, of offering "imposing" resistance; the Bohemians had therefore also to be enlisted. In 1537 the Hungarian and in 1540 the Tyrolean and West Austrian estates called for a collective congress of the committees of all estates. In 1541 collective consultation involving all estates actually took place, the object of which was the liberation of Austria from the Turkish yoke.⁸

The history of this movement for the union of the estates clearly illustrates the first change in the imperial Austrian idea. The existential basis for Austria no longer lay in the aspiration to create a great colonial empire that could become the foundation of German royal power, but in the desire of the individual lands for union as a defense against the Turks. Austria thus had, from its emergence onward, a dual task: on the one hand, the establishment of a strong and unified German state and, on the other, the defense of Christian Europe against the Turks. However, for centuries it was forced to concentrate all its forces on the second task, and its first and original task thus remained unsolved. Not through Austria, but centuries later against Austria, did the German Empire first become a state. Austria's exclusion from the German Confederation in 1866 was the logical conclusion of this development.

Although Austria conducted its struggle against the Turks over centuries, it also faced an enormous task within its own borders: the struggle between the power of the princes and that of the estates. It is very important to understand this struggle in terms of its driving forces, for its outcome decided the fate of Austria for a period of two centuries and established relationships between the nations that were overturned only by the rapidity of development during the nineteenth century, relationships that, however, still today have a decisive significance for the degree of cultural development of the individual nations and for the power relations between them.

The level of state formation that the Habsburg lands had reached at the time of their unification was that of the dualistic estate-state system. This represented a curious intermediate formation between the feudal and the modern state, which emerged in the process of the slow adaptation of the institutions of the feudal state, which was based on the feudal bond and the manorial system, to the modern state, which was based on commodity production. In the feudal state the vassal was obliged, at the behest of the feudal lord, to appear at his court and to offer counsel as demanded. From this obli-

gation a right gradually developed. No lord was to alter the legal ties of his vassals without hearing their counsel and securing their agreement. With the development of the territorial princely sovereigns, it became a constitutional principle of the empire that no sovereign could establish new legislation without the consent of his vassals, the distinguished figures in his territory.⁹

With the development of the modern state, the claims of the territorial sovereigns on the estates grew; however, it was not without resistance that the knighthood accepted the increase in their required military services or that the towns accepted increased taxation. The prince had to accord the estates extensive rights if he was to gain from them the means to establish his sovereignty over a fixed territory and to support it with the new instruments of expanding commodity production, the mercenary army, and the bureaucracy. The power of the estates consequently grew, and a curious dualistic form of hegemony and administration gradually developed. Apart from the decrees of the sovereign, there were the laws of the estates; apart from the army of the prince, the army of the estates; apart from the administrative apparatus of the prince, that of the estates, apart from the sovereign's system of revenues, the fiscal administration of the estates. When the estates granted the sovereign taxes, it was a case of extraordinary assistance for a particular purpose; the sovereign declared in the taxation request that he owed the estates his deepest gratitude for their approval and that he did not wish to burden them again. The collection of the taxes was also the business of the estates' administrative authority. The Berg County compendium of law declares, "None of the money comes into the hands of the sovereign or his officers." Thus, the sovereign and the estates were not organs of one and the same state, as are the monarch and the parliament today; rather, they basically represented two sovereign powers independent of one another and coexisting on the same soil. The inhabitants of the territory were, on the one hand, the subjects of the prince and, on the other, members of the region represented and governed by the estates.¹⁰

The situation of dualistic estate-state hegemony and dualistic administration was a transitional form within the process of the development of the modern state, a form that nowhere proved durable. The struggle between the sovereigns and the estates was necessarily fought out everywhere. The conclusion of this struggle, of course, took diverse forms. Either the prince succeeded in completely subjugating the estates, as in France, or the estates were incorporated into the state as state organs, developing into a parliament, as in England; or the estates remained victorious and made the land into an aristocratic republic with a monarch as its figurehead, as in Poland and the Roman-German Empire.¹¹

The Habsburg lands also bore the curious character of the dualistic state of princes and estates. When Maximilian I laid the foundation stone of the Austrian bureaucracy, of administration by paid officials, the estates immediately

put up resistance. However, nothing was gained with complaints of “*Doctores and Procuratores*.” The estates soon decided to oppose the bureaucracy of the prince with their own administrative apparatus. Although previously the marshal of the land [*Landmarschall*] and the vice marshal had sufficed to discharge the business of the estates, now regional committees were established and soon followed by a stable of professional regional officials. It was a sure sign of the beginning of administration by the estates when the estates of Styria in 1494, of Carniola in 1511, and of Carinthia in 1514 acquired their own buildings for the purpose of establishing a seat for their own administrative organizations.¹² In 1495 in Styria and Carniola the organization of a taxation system of the estates was begun. At their own expense, the regional estates enlisted troops, placed them under the command of territorial officers, and paid them a salary; the sovereign had to be content with the estates’ placing their troops at his disposal for a period of a few months. Naturally the prince remained at liberty to raise his own army using his own resources, which he then had at his unlimited disposal. In the initial phase of the Thirty Years War, the armies of the Austrian estates fought against the imperial troops above and below the Enns.¹³

Of course, this situation—a dualistic hegemony exercised by two equally sovereign powers—proved intolerable in Austria as well. The princes complained of their powerlessness in relation to the estates. In 1613, the emperor Matthias wrote to Archduke Ferdinand that it was only by being extremely accommodating that he had till then been able to prevent the estates in Austria from openly rebelling, that in Hungary the Palatine was doing as he wished, that in Bohemia he could not convene the diet if he was not prepared to recognize the confederation of the estates and therefore could not levy any taxes, and that Moravia resembled a republic more than a principality.¹⁴ In Bohemia, under the Jagiellos, the relationship between the king and the lords was well characterized with the play on words “You are our king; we are your lords.”

The opposition between the state and the estates determined all the great struggles of this epoch. Their struggle first gave content to the antithesis of centralism and federalism in this period. There has often been argument as to whether the relationship between the Habsburg lands of this period should be regarded as a personal or a political union. However, those who pose this question fail to understand the nature of the dualistic estate-state system. Where estate power was dominant, there was no union at all between regions at this time. Each region was an independent state that united with the other states to a particular end for a particular period, but that could dissolve this union at any time. However, there was also no union where princely power was dominant. For the prince, all regions constituted one state, which he—insofar as he was capable of ruling at all, insofar as his power sufficed within the dualistic estate-state system—reigned over uniformly. This was so whether

or not he utilized particular organs for different regions or groups of regions and issued different decrees for them on the basis of what was expedient. What appeared as a struggle between the unity of the empire and the particularism of the regions was in fact a struggle between territorial princely power, extending over all regions and uniting them, and the regionally limited estates. In this struggle the prince was without doubt the stronger party: all the tendencies driving toward the formation of a large and powerful Austria promoted his power.

The army was the clearest illustration of the fact that only the authority of the territorial prince was capable of fulfilling the functions that the regions could expect from a unified empire. Certainly, the estates also provided troops for each other. When in 1525 the great peasant war threatened individual regions, when in 1528 Carniola feared a Turkish invasion, and often on later occasions, the estates lent each other "neighborly assistance." However, this military assistance was afforded only from case to case, always unwillingly, and was never of sufficient strength. It was from the power of the prince alone, and not from the unwilling aid of the estates of the neighboring regions, that each individual region could expect adequate protection against external enemies, above all against the Turks. It is thus not surprising that already in 1667 Styria, called on for neighborly assistance by Carniola, declared it was the concern of His Majesty to defend his lands.¹⁵ "Neighborly assistance" was afforded for the last time in 1706, when the estates of the duchy of Carniola sent a contingent to protect Görz and Gradisky. In the following year, Carinthia and Carniola refused to provide the support requested by Styria, and from then on neighborly assistance was no longer demanded.

The superiority of the state in relation to the estates was thus based on the union of forces achieved through centralism. The estates certainly recognized this and sought to defeat absolutism with its own instruments. The assemblies of the estate committees, whose task should have been the unification of the regions for the struggle against the Turks, became the seat of estate rebellion; in their struggle against the power of the prince, the estates of all the Habsburg lands now banded together. The "confederation of estates," at one time demanded by the emperor, now became a conspiracy against the emperor. So powerful were the forces that were driving toward the unification of the Habsburg lands and making the large state superior to the individual land that the movement of the estates itself was forced, wholly against its will, to serve the cause of centralism, the strengthening of the ties between the lands.

The struggle between the state and the estates also seized upon the religious oppositions that dominated the age of the Reformation. The Habsburgs had decided, not without procrastination, for Catholicism; they did not want, of course, to do without the power and prestige that flowed to the Roman Empire from its patronage of the Roman Church. The estates seized upon every change to traditional values that the expansion of commodity

production brings about everywhere: the Gospel became an instrument of the struggle of the estates against the state. Still more important, however, was the fact that the struggle of the estates in the wealthiest and most highly developed land under the Habsburgs, Bohemia, which was at the same time the land occupied by the most powerful estates, took on the form of a national struggle.

We have already referred to the powerful social position enjoyed by the Germans in Bohemia prior to the Hussite wars. The power of this German presence was based on the wealth of the German bourgeoisie within the land and on the influence exercised by German chivalric culture upon the Bohemian royal court and the Bohemian nobility. Furthermore, this German presence found valuable support among the Luxemburgs, the German princely house that united the Bohemian crown with the Roman Empire and that made Prague the capital of the German Empire. However, German domination in Bohemia dug its own grave. Every advance made by the German bourgeoisie, the blooming of its commerce and mining, represented an expansion of commodity production. In Bohemia, the transition from a purely agricultural economy to one based on commodity production gave rise to the same immense revolution in thought as it did in other lands. This revolution occurred early in Bohemia, which for a time numbered among the most highly economically developed lands of Europe; the revolt of the lower classes was particularly marked here, since the struggle against the hostile forces within the society was at the same time a struggle against foreign domination. Bohemia thus experienced its Reformation period during the Hussite wars. The Germans in the land were pushed back, and Bohemia now experienced an epoch of purely national culture. However, in regard to the ideology of the nation, the fact that the revolution necessarily took the form of a national struggle against Germanness remained a decisive influence.

This ideology was now seized upon by the estates in their struggle against state and princely power. The Habsburg kings were German, were surrounded by German advisers, and employed German officials and the German language in their centralist administrative system. The estates, on the other hand, were made up of Czechs, and the organs and language of estate administration were Czech. The opposition between state and estate power thus took on the appearance of an opposition between national groups. In the context of the struggle between state and estates, the Czech noble naturally stressed his nationality. He insisted with increasing abruptness on the rights of the Czech language and increasingly sought to suppress the German language through all kinds of legislative measures in order to give the struggle of the estates the appearance of a national struggle, in order to find an ally for estate aspirations in the hatred of the people for their foreign masters. When in 1611 Count Dohna attempted to communicate a message from the emperor to the Bohemian estates in German, the lords shouted at him that he

could speak German in Germany, but in Bohemia he had to speak Czech. Through a whole series of laws, the estates established Czech as the exclusive official language of the estates, as the language of charters and official documents and as the language of estate tribunals, while at the same time the administrative apparatus of the prince employed the German language.¹⁶ Anyone wishing to apply for the noble *Incolat* or the title of city burgher had to prove knowledge of the Czech language. Finally, at the height of the estates' struggle, only a few years prior to its catastrophic conclusion, the situation had developed to the point where those who could speak Czech and nevertheless used German were threatened with punishment, where knowledge of the Czech language was required of all pastors and teachers, where the use of Czech was prescribed under threat of sanctions in particular parishes and schools that had become German, and ignorance of the Czech language was even punished through disadvantage under the laws governing Czech inheritance.

As was the case elsewhere, in Bohemia—and in Austria as a whole—the state triumphed over the estates. In the battle of the White Mountain, the state established its military superiority, and the imperial army, in the struggles of the Thirty Years War, provided the state with a lasting guarantee of the fruits of its easy victory. For the Czech nation, however, the struggle of the estates ended in a terrible catastrophe.

The first act of the Counter-Reformation was the annihilation of the Czech nobility. The leaders of the rebellion of the nobility were executed, and those remaining were robbed of their lands and forced into exile. Their land was awarded by the emperor to adventurers from different lands who had rendered him service during the turmoil of the war—often to military commanders in place of payment for services—to Germans, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Flemings, Italians, and others. Taking possession of the land of the proud Bohemian nobility certainly appeared to have been a hazardous business, and as late as 1652 Johann Adolf von Schwarzenberg wrote: "I would gladly have established myself in the lands of imperial succession, particularly in Bohemia, but I fear the Saint Wencislav, who has the reputation for not tolerating foreigners."¹⁷ However, confident in the strength of imperial arms, the foreign lords soon overcame their fear of the Saint Wencislav. All of them, irrespective of origin, adapted themselves to the state that had allocated them the rich lands of Bohemia, and they became German. From this period until the nineteenth century, the whole Bohemian nobility had a German character—insofar as the high nobility, of course, which was related to the noble families of all lands and in every epoch almost exclusively used the French language, can be said to have a national character at all. The remaining Czech nobles also aligned themselves with the other members of their class and were assimilated into the German or Germanized nobility.

Along with its indigenous nobility, the Czech nation also lost the upper

strata of its bourgeoisie. The Czech merchants and the artisans of high rank were Protestant. Rather than submit to the enforcement of the Catholic faith, they emigrated. Here, as almost everywhere else, it was the wealthiest and most vigorous burghers who preferred emigration to the abandonment of their persecuted faith.

A series of further events contributed to the decline of the Czech bourgeoisie. First, the terrible devastation caused by the Thirty Years War. Bohemia, which at the end of the sixteenth century had two and a half million inhabitants, counted only seven hundred thousand following the Thirty Years War. The shift in the international trading routes also accelerated the inexorable decline of the Czech bourgeoisie. For the Habsburg lands, the fall of Constantinople and the decline of Venice, the loss of their possessions in the Levant, represented terrible catastrophes, the economic significance of which was based in no small measure on the fact that their northern and western trade was mediated by these two commercial centers.¹⁸ The effects of these unhappy events were transplanted from the one land to the other. For the bourgeoisie in Bohemia, they represented the final blow. Around the middle of the seventeenth century, according to Becher and Hörnigk, Prague had 1,245 artisans, in 1674 only 355. In Iglau, prior to the Thirty Years War seven to eight thousand people were employed in textile production alone, whereas a few decades later the total amounted to only three hundred.¹⁹

Having completely lost its nobility and the upper strata of its bourgeoisie, the Czech nation was now restricted to an impoverished, downtrodden artisan class and the peasantry. It was precisely during this epoch, however, that the peasantry was forced to bear a particularly heavy burden. With the confiscation of property following the battle of the White Mountain, the manorial estates that had been managed directly by the owners themselves disappeared, and their place was taken by the large latifundia of the lords, princes, and counts, which were placed under the control of administrators; the nature of this administration is revealed by the fact that, as late as 1848, the country folk referred to these administrators as *Karabáčníci*, a term derived from the word *karabáč*, meaning "the whip." The relationship between the country folk and their new masters was quite different from that which had prevailed under the former landholders. Although the former lords had merely continued to run their farms according to inherited custom, the new lords were parvenus who had come through the harsh school of war, foreigners who knew no limit to exploitation other than their own power and interest. The farms left empty following the devastation of the Thirty Years War were not reallocated, but instead were absorbed into the holdings of the nobility; having augmented his land at the cost of the peasantry, the lord now forced those peasants who had been spared to do a correspondingly greater amount of service in socage. In vain, a decree reminded the lords that they would be rewarded with God's benediction if they allowed the peasants

enough time to attend to their own needs. And when the oppressed peasants rose against their tormentors from 1679 to 1680, the imperial troops put down the uprising, and the lords, employing a malicious interpretation of the new socage patent, extended socage demands beyond all previous limits.²⁰

It was these harshly oppressed peasants who now constituted, along with a few thousand artisans in the impoverished towns, along with rural and urban day laborers and domestic servants, the mass of the Czech people. These classes were unable to further develop the national culture. Without a nobility and without a bourgeoisie, the Czech nation lost its culture and disappeared from the historical stage. The year 1620 represented for the Czechs what the year 820 represented for the Wends: eight centuries after the Slovenes, the Czechs too became a nonhistorical nation.

The nation was excluded, above all, from the political sphere, from the conscious work of shaping the state. Certainly, the foreign heirs of the ousted Czech nobility soon forgot their origins and showed little thanks to the Habsburgs, to whom they owed their land and power; however, the intrigues and quarrels of the nobility had nothing in common with national struggles. In the diets of the estates, some forms were maintained that recalled the Czech character of the Bohemian estates, and the use of the Czech language was maintained here to a modest extent.²¹ However, estate consultations became a farce without any real content; the power of the new Bohemian nobility rested no longer on these consultations, but on its position in the state administrative apparatus and the army, no longer on the struggle against the state, but on its position as an organ of the state. The state, however, had nothing at all to do with the mass of the Czech people, the peasants who were under the juridical and administrative authority of the manorial lords. Thus, in legal terms, the Czech nation did not exist at all for the state, which was consequently barely acquainted with the Czech language. The seignorial officials, of course, had to speak Czech with the peasants, but the mass of the Czech population was not able to appear before the organs of state administration or the state courts. As a consequence, in the wake of the annihilation of the Czech nobility and the upper strata of the Czech bourgeoisie, the Czech language rapidly disappeared almost completely from the state bureaucracy. Although the "new provincial regulation" of 1627 replaced the exclusive dominance of the Czech language with equal rights for German and Czech in the administrative apparatus as a whole, only a few decades later the state authorities were communicating with each other exclusively in German and, even with the parties, only seldom in Czech.

As the Czech nation disappeared from state life and the Czech language from state administrative bodies, so too perished the intellectual culture of the Czechs. Following the battle of the White Mountain, Czech books were initially printed abroad, in Pirna and Dresden, Berlin and Halle, for Czech emigrants. However, with the dying out of this emigrant population, Czech

literature disappeared completely; peasants and day laborers did not purchase books, and the nation no longer had its upper classes. In Bohemia, books were collected throughout the land and destroyed as a result of Czech literature's being deemed heretical in the wake of the Hussite wars. This hunting down of books continued into the eighteenth century. The Jesuit Anton Konias, who died in 1760, could still boast that he had burned sixty thousand Czech books.²² Whereas the Protestant Slovaks in Hungary continued to produce literature for a time, it disappeared entirely in Bohemia and Moravia; at most, a prayer book was printed from time to time in the Czech language.

Czech became the language of the despised and exploited classes. In 1710, the Moravian historian Sřtedovsky complained that the upper classes scorned the Slavic language "as if the same befits only the common rabble."²³ Little wonder that each who rose to a place in the upper social strata, who acquired wealth, higher education, or an elevated position in the administrative apparatus or the army, was ashamed to speak the language of peasants and servants.

The national Czech culture was dead. When the Czech people subsequently awakened to a new cultural life in the nineteenth century, there was a desire to revive memories of the former flowering of Czech culture, to reintroduce long-forgotten words into the vocabulary, and to rekindle defunct national sentiment upon the proud memories of the nation. However, the contemporary intellectual culture of the Czech nation did not originate from Czech culture as found between the years of 1526 and 1620, regardless of the preference for superficially connecting contemporary culture with this former period.²⁴ Between the two periods lay two centuries of nonhistorical existence, during which the Czechs were held together as a nation not by the bond of a living national culture, but by the consistent transmission of the elements of their ancestral culture within the numerous narrow local circles into which the peasant nation disintegrated. Czech history confirms the experience of other nations in regard to the fact that peasants living in geographical isolation are unable to maintain the unity of the nation. Without interaction with the nation outside the narrow circle within their village, the different groups constituting the people become increasingly distinct from one another, modifying their culture and even their language, something that is always a clear indication of the absence of the community of interaction and culture. In the eighteenth century, people already spoke of a distinctive Moravian nationality and language. When the nation reawoke in the nineteenth century, it was open to doubt as to where its borders lay and as to whether the Moravians and the Moravian Slovaks indeed belonged to the Czech nation.²⁵ And although the revitalized nation has succeeded in incorporating these groups, it is, on the other hand, still not certain today whether the price of two centuries of nonhistorical existence will ultimately

be the estrangement of the Slovaks of Upper Hungary, not only from the state, but from the nation.

From a national point of view, the suppression of the Bohemian estates meant that the Czech nation was constrained to the lethargic existence of a nonhistorical nation. From a political point of view, it meant that the way was open for the development of the modern state, unified and centralist. The Habsburgs very soon set about the task of exploiting their victory and uniting Bohemia with their hereditary lands to form a unified state. This goal was served by their mercantilist policy. Initially, each of the Habsburg crown lands constituted an independent economic zone. However, as early as the reign of Karl VI, measures under the title of "transit traffic" were introduced that entailed subjecting merchandise imported by Habsburg lands to customs duties only once in cases where commodities crossed several crown-land borders. In 1775 the Bohemian lands, with the exception of Tyrol, were in fact successfully united with the Alpine lands to form a single customs territory. Gradually these lands came to constitute a single economic zone. The exclusive authority over commerce enjoyed by urban merchants who supplied a locally restricted market was replaced by the privileges of industrial and agricultural producers, which extended over the whole economic zone. The beginnings of the division of labor were soon established in broad outline. Wool and glass were produced in Bohemia, cloth in Moravia, iron in Styria, and fashion accessories in Vienna for the whole economic zone.

While the development of a unified economic zone was initiated by mercantilist policies, the development of the unified state was also consciously promoted using other means. Above all, the concern here was with the establishment of a uniform law for the hereditary lands of Bohemia. To be sure, Leopold I did not follow the advice of Leibniz that he might, as a second Justinian, establish a new compendium of civil law and proclaim it as law throughout his lands, but as early as 1720 the legislation governing inheritance was made uniform, initially for the five lands of Lower Austria. Then, under Maria Theresa, work was begun on the comprehensive codification that ultimately led to the creation of a formally and materially uniform system of law for the hereditary lands and Bohemia (also in part for Hungary and the newly acquired Galicia).

Finally, the task of creating a unified administrative apparatus for Bohemia and the hereditary lands was also undertaken. The decisive step in this direction was the abolition of the Bohemian Court Chancery in 1749. Thenceforth, the Bohemian lands, like the Alpine lands, were placed under uniform government from Vienna.

In the years immediately following the battle of the White Mountain, absolutism did not take full advantage of its victory, and indeed could not do so in the immediate aftermath of this great display of estate power. In constitutional-legal terms, absolutism only limited the power of the estates rather than

eliminating it altogether; certainly, it strengthened the bond between the individual lands and the crown, but it did not fuse them in the form of a unified state. From a national point of view, it provided the German language with the same rights as Czech, but not exclusive recognition. However, after only a few years, the state was able to take a further step. Its power grew from decade to decade; it became militarily stronger with the transition from a mercenary army to a standing army based on the conscription system; it became more powerful economically due to the slow revival of commerce and industry in the mercantilist epoch, providing it with new sources of taxation; it became politically stronger through the extension of bureaucratic administration. Although the state thus gained strength, the forces waned that represented an obstacle to its unity. The consultations of the estates increasingly took on the character of an empty game without involving the exercise of any real power.²⁶ The disappearance of the Czech nobility and bourgeoisie eliminated the Czech nation from public life, despite all formal equality for the Czech language guaranteed by the "new provincial regulation." The prevailing power relations had thus been transformed, and the victorious state could now fully realize the consequences of the defeat of the estates. The reforms under Maria Theresa now gave legal-institutional expression to the social power relations that had at this point in fact already prevailed for some decades: Bohemia and the hereditary lands became a unified state, linked by a more or less loose bond with the other Habsburg states (Hungary, the Netherlands, Galicia, the Italian possessions). The process through which the Austrian state emerged was the same as that in all other German territories and resembled the path of development followed by the other states on the European continent.

The course of events marking the evolution of the Austrian state was repeated in almost every other case. Absolutism eliminated the estates and thereby superseded the dualistic estate-state system; it then tore down the barriers constituted by the old forms of estate organization, made its lands into a unified economic zone through its mercantilist policies and into a unified juridical unit through uniform legislation and bureaucratic administration, and thus created, from a collection of disparate regions, a state. When supporters of the right of Bohemia to form a state now bemoan this development as illegal, their claims may or may not be deemed just before the court of formal law, but it is nonetheless certain that there is hardly a state on the continent the development of which has not taken this revolutionary path.

It was through the victory of the state over the estates that Austria became a state. However, the defeat of the estates at the same time condemned the Czech nation to the role of a nonhistorical nation; Austria thus became a German state. Peasants constituted the mass of the non-German population in Bohemia and the hereditary lands. The peasants, however, were not directly subject to the authority of the state; rather, they were *mediatized*. No judge representing the state passed judgment on them "in the name of His Majesty

the Emperor"; instead, they were subject to the jurisdiction of the landed noble. Rather than directly, the state ruled the peasant only through the landed nobility. The mass of the members of those classes directly subject to the authority of the state was either German or Germanized.

We now know how long a path of development was necessary in order to make Austria into a German state: the colonization of the southeast by the Germans, the emergence of the modern state, its long struggle and final victory over the estates. And yet, from a world historical perspective, the union of Bohemia and the hereditary German lands in a German state constitutes nothing more than a moment in the evolution of the modern state, which had emerged but was still not complete. Austria was a German state from the moment the modern state completely vanquished the dualistic estate-state system. However, it remained a German state only as long as the class of the landed nobility, although having lost its collective power—in the form of the estates—to oppose this state, retained individual power over the peasants. It remained a German state only as long as the mass of the population was culturally excluded from the development of a national culture and was mediatized—subjected politically only to the landed nobles rather than directly to the state. It remained a German state only as long as the state had not established the general unity of all of its subjects, a unity that subjected every citizen directly to the state. Austria was a German state at a particular point on the path leading from the feudal state, based on feudal ties and the feudal manorial system, to the modern state, based on capitalist commodity production. Austria was a German state when it took the path leading to the modern state, but it had not yet reached this goal. When German nationalist authors complain that Austria is today no longer a German state, they merely prove that their understanding of history is no greater than that of the supporters of Czech state rights. Thus, they deplore the fact that today the masses are also gaining a share in the progress of the culture. Thus, they yammer over the fact that today the mass of the population has emerged from the role of subjects of a feudal lord to become citizens of a state. Our whole account now reaches a decisive point. We have now to demonstrate how the development of capitalism and that of the modern state as conditioned by the former have awakened the nonhistorical nations to historical life, thereby confronting the state with the great national question that moves it with such force.

Our historical introduction has already identified the driving forces of national development. Let us cast a glance at the relationship of the Czechs to the Germans. The transition from the natural economy to commodity production and exchange provided the Germans, the instigators of commodity production in Bohemia, with considerable social power among the Luxemburgs. The intellectual revolution that was called forth everywhere by the expansion of commodity production awakened in Bohemia the Czech reaction against German domination. The Hussite wars ushered in a period of

national vigor in Bohemia. The dominant class of feudal society adapted to the state emerging on the basis of commodity production in the form of the dualistic estate-state system. A struggle developed between the estates and the state. Supported by its superior instruments of power, the state triumphed and eliminated the dominant classes of the nation. The Czech nation became a people of peasants and servants and found itself excluded from political and cultural life. It was only in the nineteenth century that it was awakened to new life by the revolution that incited the lower classes to participate in cultural development and political decisions. The forces driving this process were not exclusive to Bohemia; they were the same forces that had taken effect in other lands. However, the social struggles that everywhere gave rise to modern society and the modern state took on the form of national struggles and had a national significance in the context of multilingual Austria. National and social development are not two different, clearly distinct spheres of human development: it is the struggles everywhere of the economic classes, the transformations of the means and relations of production, that determine the power and powerlessness, the death and rebirth of nations.

THE AWAKENING OF THE NONHISTORICAL NATIONS

The German character of the Austrian state was already considerably diminished by the political upheavals that began in the second half of the eighteenth century. The number of German subjects was reduced through the loss of Silesia and West Austria [*Vorderösterreich*], while at the same time the number of Slavs and those from Romance language regions increased through the acquisition of Galicia and Bukovina, Lombardy and Venice, Trento, southern Istria, and Dalmatia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Austria included, if we leave aside Hungary for the moment, three historical nations: the Germans and the Italians, both of which had a nobility and a bourgeoisie, and the Poles, which bore the character of a historical nation due to the existence of the Polish nobility; at this time, the Czechs, Ruthenians, Slovenes, and Serbs could be counted among the nonhistorical nations in the sense with which we are familiar. In Hungary, only the Magyars and Croats, because of their nobilities, and the Germans, because of their bourgeoisie, constituted historical nations; on the other hand, the Slovaks, Serbs, Romanians, and Ruthenians had no place in the ruling classes and were culturally nonhistorical nations, politically without any constitutional rights. The Slovak nobility had long become Magyar, just as the Czech nobility had become German and the Ruthenian Polish.

This picture has been completely changed by the developments of the last 120 years. Everywhere capitalism and, in its wake, the modern state have brought about the extension of the cultural community by releasing the masses from the ties of an omnipotent tradition and inciting them to partici-

pate in the recreation of the national culture. For us, this represents the awakening of the nonhistorical nations. We will seek to portray this process, the fundamental basis of our national struggles, using the example of that nation which has lived through it most rapidly and with the greatest success: that of the Czechs. The fact that the Czechs traveled the path from nonhistorical to historical nationhood far more rapidly than other peoples was not due, for example, to the fact that they had already constituted a historical nation two centuries previously, in contrast to, say, the Slovenes, whose subjection to the rule of dominant classes of German nationality stretched back over a millennium. Rather, the Czechs owe the speed of this process to the favorable geographical position of their settlements, to the fact that the regions they occupy are the most highly economically developed of the Austrian lands, a fact that led to the Czechs' being more rapidly drawn into the process of capitalist cultural development than the other nonhistorical nations.

We already know that from 1620 to 1740 the Czech nation barely existed for the state: the nobility and the bourgeoisie were German; the mass of the Czech people consisted of peasants, agricultural and industrial day laborers, and servants; they neither had, as state citizens, any influence on legislation, nor were they, as subjects, the object of administration by the state; rather, the state had left them as subjects to the manorial lords, who—tellingly enough—were still referred to as the “authorities.” The state now began gradually to shake these foundations. The state of the eighteenth century represents a curious intermediate historical stage: it was still a seignorial-noble state, since all influential positions in the administrative apparatus and the army were reserved for the nobility and the noble manorial lords had almost unlimited dominion over the great mass of the population; it was, however, already a bourgeois state, since it had to, in its own interest, promote the interests of the citizenry—that is, those of its capitalist upper stratum, the bourgeoisie—if it wanted to continue to exist. Throughout Europe, capitalism made rapid strides: each state required its own wealthy capitalist class as a source of taxation if it wanted to maintain a rigid form of bureaucratic administration and a large army, which it could not dispense with in this epoch of frequent conflict. No other concern was more frequently discussed in the consultations of the highest state legislative and administrative colleges than that for the taxpayers, the “royal and imperial contributors.” Irrespective of the fact that the state still looked almost exclusively to the feudal nobility to serve as its organs, it nevertheless already had to promote bourgeois interests, had to take bourgeois commerce into account. This state of feudal and bourgeois classes was thus one of those interesting mixed formations commonly engendered by great periods of world historical transition.

The phenomenon of “enlightened absolutism”'s promoting the class interests of the bourgeoisie was initially manifested in its commercial and industrial policies, in *mercantilism*. The state created an extensive economic zone

in order to accelerate capitalist development. It granted industrialists' high protective tariffs and "exclusive privileges," often providing financial support as well. It induced the nobility to construct factories and enticed foreign employers and workers into the land. It did away with the guild laws, insofar as these obstructed capitalist development. It sought, through bans on coalitions and through the fixing of maximum wages and minimum working hours, to protect employers from the "covetousness" of the worker, which was already feared at this time. It sought to provide employers with the required qualified labor power by disseminating occupational knowledge, even enforcing this using police. The state thus used all available means to establish the capitalist manufactory and the putting-out system in Austria. In this process, the state administrative apparatus acquired a host of new functions; it could now no longer limit itself principally to its relationship with the nobility and, if need be, with a narrow bourgeois upper stratum. Rather, it now sought to and indeed had to intervene in the daily life of the popular masses, the merchants, artisans, and workers, in order to educate, direct, regulate them. Thus, the state for the first time made a large mass of the population active in industry and commerce the object of its administrative activity.

However, the state was unable to limit itself to this sphere. Of far more serious consequence than its regulation of commercial relationships was the fact that it now began to interfere with the traditional structure of agriculture. It was led to do this for a wealth of reasons. Initially, the peasantry drew the attention of those holding power to the oppression it was forced to endure through a host of uprisings, which were put down only with great effort and loss of blood. For the state, the "expropriation of the peasants' land" represented a grave danger, for with every "dispossessed" peasant it lost a taxpayer. The harsh oppression that weighed on the peasants retarded population growth, on which the government placed a high value for military and fiscal reasons. The manorial system constituted a hindrance to industrial development; for, on the one hand, the lords denied industry the necessary supply of workers by binding the peasants to the soil and by making the adoption of a trade dependent on seigniorial authorization and the payment of what were at times considerable charges; on the other hand, a broader market for industrial products could not develop as long as the mass of the population, the peasants, were impoverished by the demand for labor services and dues, were unable to intensively cultivate their land, were often unable to take barely more from the soil than required for their subsistence, and, because they were not included in the sphere of commodity sellers, were unable to enter the market as commodity buyers. Finally, the reform of the manorial system appeared as a requirement of the state administrative apparatus itself: only when the peasant was directly subject to the state official, when the state was no longer reliant on the not always willing hand of the landed nobility, was a strict and uniform administration of the whole territory under the state possible.²⁷

Very soon the idea was being entertained as to whether it might not be best to eliminate the manorial system altogether, allocate the seignorial land to the peasants, and abolish socage. Typically enough, this idea first appeared in a report by the military adviser to the court concerning the reform of the recruitment system.²⁸ However, the state was understandably unable to resolve to take such a radical step. Measures to protect the peasants culminated in the regulation of socage under Maria Theresa and in the celebrated edict by Joseph II of 1 November 1781. All of this reforming activity by the state was of the greatest significance for the state's relationship to the great mass of the population: the state no longer abandoned the peasants to the exclusive rulings of the individual lords; the state itself now intervened in the situation of the peasantry, regulated it through its laws, and ensured respect for these through its officials; with the district administrative bodies, it created an organ that directly addressed the peasant, without the mediation of the lord. Thus, the mass of the agricultural population, through the agrarian reforms, as well as the mass of the urban population through mercantilist commercial and industrial policies, became the object of state administrative activity.

This development of the functions of the state was not peculiar to Austria. However, for us, they immediately take on a national significance. For the masses, with which the state now actually came into contact, belonged in part to non-German nations; the artisans, workers, peasants, and agricultural day laborers in Bohemia were in part Czech. Thus, the state was initially confronted with the problem of language. It had to find officials who were versed in the language of the lower classes. Consequently, not only was it decided that the judicial officers of the patrimonial courts and the urban magistrates had to be acquainted with the language of the people; the state also demanded knowledge of the Czech language of state officials located in Czech districts.²⁹ Maria Theresa ordered that "without specific cause and *ceteris paribus*, no one other than such *subjecta* as speak and write Bohemian are to be proposed." Certainly, with the profound decline of the Czech language, this was not easy to realize. At the time of the reorganization of the royal tribunal in Brünn, it was reported to the empress that, apart from a single official, "no *subjectum subalternum* is available with sufficient command of the Bohemian language to extract one *argumentum* from the Bohemian *actis*." As a consequence, thought also had to be given in the education of civil servants to the acquisition of the Czech language. In 1747 the Piarist order was instructed to give more attention to the teaching of the Czech language in its upper secondary schools [*Gymnasien*]. Instruction in the Czech language was introduced at the military academy in Wiener-Neustadt in 1752, at the Vienna Academy of Engineers in 1754, and in Prague upper secondary schools in 1765. In 1775, a chair of Czech language was created at the University of Vienna. In 1778, the teaching of Czech was introduced into the private schools of the nobility in Vienna and Brünn. The fact that the aim of this

cultivation by the government of instruction in Czech was merely to ensure that it had a sufficient number of civil servants with a good command of the Czech language is best shown by a report of the Imperial Commission of Studies on the occasion of the creation of a chair of Czech language at the University of Prague in 1791. The commission regarded this chair as dispensable, because the students in Prague had the opportunity to learn Czech outside the university: "In Vienna, the Bohemian language required a chair, since there would otherwise be no means of learning this language; in Prague, this measure would be quite superfluous."³⁰ The government cultivated the Czech language only insofar as it required it as an administrative tool; the increased attention accorded to Czech was due purely to the extension of the tasks of the state.

At the same time, however, interest in the Czech nation was awakened elsewhere. The urban middle classes of the more highly developed countries of western Europe—particularly England and France—had, in their struggle against the seigniorial class and the absolutist state, if not recreated, then certainly resuscitated the ideas of humanity and natural law. However, an ideology that arises in the class struggles of a particular land in a particular epoch always has an effect that, in temporal and geographical terms, extends beyond the milieu in which it was born. Thus, the thought of the revolutionary French middle classes of the eighteenth century also penetrated into Austria. It was without doubt one of the driving forces in the industrial and social policy of the Austrian state. Intellectually, a man such as Joseph II was a child of the revolutionary-rationalist French and English urban middle classes.

In his class struggle against the nobility, the burgher could not refer to his aristocratic lineage or the merits of his ancestors as the nobility could; he did not enjoy a refined culture as the ladies and lords in the palaces did; he could not support his demands on the basis of the fact that he could call vast estates his own and that hundreds of peasants were duty bound to provide him with service in socage. And yet, he held his claims to be justified and demanded that the state administrative apparatus take these into account. If the nobility boasted of its distinguished origins, its wealth, its civilized ways, the young urban middle classes could only retort that the burgher was also a human being. The burgher thus revived the old concept of the natural equality of all human beings, whether they be of distinguished or modest origins, whether they live in magnificent castles or in the simple town houses of the burghers—the old concept that all humans are equal and that everything human is valuable. The idea of humanity is the ideology of the young urban middle class.

In Germany, the idea of humanity had already provided the seed for a growth in sympathy for the fate of the less developed nations. Loving studies of the nonhistorical nations were initiated, their cultural heritage, their folk songs and sagas collected. These products of a primitive culture were

no longer collected merely as curiosities, but with a belief—ever present in the epoch of Rousseau—in the bliss and perfection of the natural state, in the worth of all that was human, whatever the origins of people, whatever the stage of civilization they had reached, in the concept of the equality and kinship of all human beings. Herder's sympathy for the nonhistorical nations, for example, was sustained by such a spirit.³¹ This line of thought inevitably found fertile ground in an Austria encompassing so many nonhistorical nations. A whole literature emerged here that aimed to draw attention to the educated classes of the Czech nation and that called for the cultivation of the Czech language. Just as the scorned peasant, the worker, and the servant gained worth as human beings under the influence of the Enlightenment idea of humanity, so too did their scorned nationality and language. This literature reached its culmination in the writings of Dobrovsky. It was he who discovered the Czech nation as an object of scholarship, as it were, inquiring into the laws of the Czech language and studying Czech literature and history. He himself had received a German education—like all the educated of his epoch in Bohemia—and wrote his works in German; he did not believe in the possibility of reawakening the Czech nation to new life yet. However, he implanted in the hearts of his listeners a benevolent interest in the Czech nation, in its culture, its language, its history—a seed that later produced a rich harvest.

In the historical epoch of the manufactory, of mercantilist politics and the reform of the seignorial system, the urban middle classes were not yet engaged in a class struggle for domination of the state; however, their interests determined the character of state administration and their ideology became the dominant ideology of the epoch. And, in the same way, the nonhistorical nations had not yet awakened at this stage of their development, but were already finding as nonhistorical nations, as nations constituted only by exploited and oppressed classes, the interest of the state and the sympathy of the educated.

This stage of national development also stamped its character on the great educational reforms during the reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph. This era initially produced the reform of secondary education. As we have already seen in our history of the German nation, the use in scholarship of Latin was suppressed in favor of German as a consequence of the rise of the German urban middle classes; this shift was now reflected in changes to the teaching curriculum in intermediate and secondary schools in Austria. As early as 1735, it was stipulated that upper secondary schools in Lower Austria were to use the German language to introduce lessons conducted in Latin. From 1764 onward, German poetry was represented in textbooks; in the same year, the German essay was introduced into the Jesuit secondary schools. Following the suppression of the Jesuit order (1773), many Latin schools were shut down and replaced by German secondary schools [*Hauptschule*]; as a result,

the number of upper secondary schools in Bohemia sank from forty-four to thirteen, and in Moravia from fifteen to eight.³² Moreover, in those upper secondary schools that remained, German was introduced as the language of instruction. "Incidentally," wrote Joseph II in 1782 in a rescript to the Imperial Commission of Studies, "the German language is the true mother tongue of the land, in which one can write medical prescriptions just as well as one can cite philosophical syllogisms and moral precepts; as it is, legal advocates already write everything in the German language, and it is also spoken by the judges."³³

When Latin ceased to be the language of instruction and became a mere subject, it could only be replaced by the German language; for only the German people had an urban middle class, an intelligentsia, a bureaucracy; those from the nonhistorical nations who acquired a higher education were automatically Germanized, as were those who acquired large possessions or a respected position in the society. Through this educational reform, the languages of the nonhistorical nations were effectively excluded from upper secondary education. For as long as Latin was the language of instruction, and another language was employed only to instruct the youngest classes in the use of Latin to the point where they could follow lessons, it was merely a question of expediency as to which language should be used for this initial period of instruction. Consequently, it was not seldom that Slavic languages were also used for this purpose. However, as soon as German became the language of instruction in upper secondary institutions, a government circular was issued for Moravia to the effect that the Latin language should be taught no longer in "Moravian" but in German, and Joseph II decided that only those children able to speak the German language could be admitted to upper secondary institutions.³⁴ On the other hand, at the same time, as we already know, the Slavic languages were introduced into secondary education as a subject, because the state needed civil servants with a command of these languages. As a whole, this reform of the system of secondary education thus fits into a picture we have already seen: the Czech nation was still a non-historical nation, having no access to the classes acting as the agents of intellectual culture, and, as a consequence, its language could not be the lingua franca of the secondary schools; on the other hand, a new range of administrative tasks had drawn the attention of the state to the mass of the Czech population, had brought state officials into contact with this part of the population, and, as a consequence, the Czech language had to be introduced as a subject into the program of secondary schools.

While the reform of the secondary education system merely reflected the stage reached in national development, the reform of elementary education pointed to the future. The general school ordinance of 1774 introduced the "normal schools" [*Normalschulen*] in the capitals of the crown lands, the "main schools" [*Hauptschulen*] in the other cities, and the "elementary schools"

[*Trivialschulen*] in the countryside.³⁵ Now, for the first time, the popular masses received a school education. Between 1775 and 1789, the number of schools in Bohemia rose from 1,000 to 2,294, the number of students from 30,000 to 162,000.³⁶ Naturally, lessons in the elementary schools were in the local language, and in Czech localities, Czech textbooks were also used. In 1783, Joseph II ordered that it be ensured that, in Czech localities, candidates for the teaching profession know both languages of the land and that school inspectors have a command of the Czech language.³⁷ Of course, instruction in these elementary schools was provided only on a very limited scale and no one could expect from them a flourishing of Czech intellectual culture; however, by teaching the children of artisans and peasants to read and write, they created the possibility for the new culture of the Czech nation, which had sprung from different roots, to influence the popular masses via its poets and thinkers, for their works to become the property of the masses and to bind them together as a nation in a new sense, as a historical nation.

For national development, the epoch of the manufactory represented an epoch of transition. The nonhistorical nations continued to exist as such, remaining without any access to the dominant and propertied classes, which alone had the capacity to be the agents and creators of a higher culture. Nevertheless, the nonhistorical nations now drew the attention of the state and the society to themselves; their language penetrated the schools and the state administrative apparatus, their language and culture became the object of scholarly investigation, and their fortunes won the sympathy of the educated strata under the influence of Enlightenment ideas. A further, immense step forward in the economic domain had first to be taken before these non-historical nations could themselves step onto the historical stage.

In Austria, too, the first half of the nineteenth century saw rapid progress in the form taken by capitalist enterprise. Whereas the eighteenth century knew only the capitalist form of rural putting-out system and the manufactory based on the division of labor within the workshop, the first half of the nineteenth century saw the expansion of the factory based on the capitalist utilization of the machine. In Austria, too, capitalism seized hold of the new forces of production. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, only one steam-driven engine was in use in Austria, whereas in 1841 there were already 231 such engines, representing a force of 2,939 horsepower, and in 1852 671 engines with a force of 9,128 horsepower. In the cotton industry, the steam engine was first utilized in 1815; in the same year, the first steam-driven fulling machine was put into operation in Brünn. The first steam mill was not constructed until 1842, the first steam hammer not until as late as 1844. However, the first attempts at steamship travel on the Danube had already been undertaken in 1818. The construction of the Austrian railway system began in 1825, the construction of the first large steam train in 1837. In 1835, production of railway tracks was also begun; the first Austrian tracks

were produced from simple refined iron, but were soon replaced by tracks of puddle iron. The puddling process had already been introduced in 1830 in Witkowitz. The heating of steam boilers with wood soon became uneconomical due to the rise in the wood price, and, as a consequence, the increasing utilization of steam power led to a rapid increase in the demand for coal. The value of the combustible coal required in 1826 amounted to only 400,000 florins, but already in 1868 amounted to 20.5 million florins.

The introduction of the new steam engine was paralleled by the progressive development of industrial machines. Of greatest significance by far was the development within the textile industry. In 1799, Leitenberger founded the first English mechanized cotton-spinning mill in Austria; within a short time, many enterprises followed his example. The mule jenny was first used for the spinning of wool in 1837, whereas the first mechanical flax-spinning mill was founded in Moravia in the twenties. The Jacquard loom was introduced to cotton and silk weaving in 1839. The Brünn wool-weaving mill adopted the mechanical weaving loom in 1851. Roller printing and the production of Turkey red were also introduced to Austria prior to 1835. The first shawl factory was founded in Vienna in 1810.

The food industry also transformed its methods. In the third decade of the century, the milling industry moved from flat milling to semolina and high milling; in the years from 1840 to 1850, the so-called French millstone was introduced into Austria; the first steam-driven mill, as already stated, was constructed in 1842. The first beet sugar factory appeared in Moravia in 1829, in Bohemia in 1830. In 1835 there were already seventeen such factories within Austria, in 1850 eighty-four. Between 1835 and 1850, the quantity of beets processed rose from 374,080 to 1,958,746 metric hundredweight [*Zollzentner*].³⁸ The potato distillery was introduced into Austria in 1825. In 1822, the first oil factory was constructed in Prague.

We see similar advances in the wood-processing industries. The first furniture factory was founded in 1804, the first joinery on a factory scale in 1826. In 1837, the Bohemian landed nobility began to introduce the steam saw. Paper production also reached significant proportions from the end of the eighteenth century onward. In the printing industry, the replacement of the old hand press with the high-speed press began in the thirties. From 1795 onward, pencil production experienced a new upturn, and in 1843 production of steel nibs commenced.

It now became possible for local industry, having assumed larger proportions, to produce its own work instruments. For example, a mechanical workshop was founded in Brünn in 1813 for the production of Cockerill spinning-machines. In 1836, machines for sugar manufacture were already being built in Austria. Finally, progress in mechanical production benefited iron production. Between 1826 and 1868, the value of pig iron produced in Austria rose from 4 million to 22.2 million florins. The techniques of iron production

were also completely transformed. In 1826, the first coke blast furnace in the empire was constructed in Witkowitz. In the field of iron smelting, the first dome oven was introduced in 1830. As already mentioned, the same year represented a turning point for wrought iron production with the introduction of the first puddling oven. The production of steel-reinforced concrete was begun in 1815 in Bohemia, and the production of cast steel on a large scale was begun in 1825 in Saint Aegidy.³⁹

The transition from the manufactory to the modern factory reinforced and illustrated the devastating effects of the continual advance of capitalism.

Technological progress very directly affected the working class. During this epoch, the working class first encountered the absurdity prevailing under capitalist domination, whereby every new triumph of the human being over nature represented for the worker increased unemployment, increased misery. The factory workforce, composed to a considerable extent of underage children, without the right to organize or deny their employer their labor, encountered in this epoch the blessings of capitalism in a form more terrible than ever before or since. In vain, they revolted against the unlimited exploitation with fierce riots. In 1843, Brünn was shaken by worker unrest, when the capitalists brought in workers from the countryside in order to reduce wages and thus teach the workers the meaning of capitalist freedom of movement. From 1844 until 1846, the introduction of the Perrotine machine into the cotton-printing industry provoked worker unrest in Prague, Pilsen, and Königgrätz, in Reichenberg, Böhmisches-Leipa, Leitmeritz, Komotau, and Eger. In 1847, there were bread riots in Vienna, and the bakeries in Fünfhaus, Sechshaus, and Gaudenzdorf were plundered. The view that "proletarians" and "communism" were threats to social stability was thus already well established.

However, it was not only the workers who were radicalized by capitalism. The master craftsmen, whose scope of activity represented an obstacle to every further step in capitalist development, also underwent a transformation. During the eighteenth century, artisans in a number of professions were already protesting bitterly about their capitalist competition. The cloth makers of Reichenberg already moaned in 1765 over the fact that the factories were bringing ruin to their industry, and the Sternberg master weavers protested as early as 1771 against the construction of factories. The linen weavers of Vienna devoted themselves to cotton weaving, because they were unable to compete with the linen industry of Rumberg, Schönberg, and Sternberg, but they were soon also excluded from cotton weaving by the capitalists. A survey from 1833 records the complaint: "Many masters and qualified tradesmen were forced to engage themselves as journeymen, and a number of them had to earn their daily bread working as day laborers." However, the fact that capitalism brought this social upheaval into the countryside proved of even greater significance. The machine serving the capitalist attacked

the peasant and the agricultural day laborer by robbing them of their earnings from the old putting-out system. In Austria, it was hand spinning that most rapidly fell victim to the competition of the factory. In Lower Austria, there were still more than a hundred thousand hand spinners at the end of the eighteenth century, in 1811 only eight thousand. The official report on the trades exhibition of 1835 states: "In the Bohemian border regions, from Nachod to Tetschen, a quarter of the population work, at least at times, with the spindle or the spinning wheel, and of these half are full-time spinners, numbering in total some ninety thousand. Seven thousand spinners alone reside on the Hoheneibe domain, on the Nachod domain over eight thousand. Due to the low prices for cloth and the growing competition from machine thread, which has proved itself highly advantageous for weaving, the wage for the spinner has sunk to such a low level that it now amounts to a mere two to three kreuzer daily." In the Erzgebirge, the people were engaged for a daily wage of four to six kreuzer. Through the discovery of the spinning machine, the human being had increased his power over nature to an enormous extent; however, this triumph was paid for by the Bohemian peasants and rural workers with the spread of typhus.⁴⁰

It was capitalism that spread revolutionary discontent among the rural masses. But it also found nourishment for itself in the rural system. Since the French Revolution, the state had not lifted a finger to ameliorate the situation of the peasants, who were harshly oppressed through seigniorial taxes and labor services. Not disturbing the existing state of affairs had become the highest principle of government, in order to avoid conjuring up the dreaded spirit of the revolution. The extent of the bitterness of the peasantry was revealed in 1846, when the peasants attacked the revolutionary Polish nobility from behind. Following the defeat of the Polish nobility, the news spread among the peasants that the emperor, as thanks for their loyalty, had freed them from socage demands. The excitement spread to the peasants of the other crown lands, and even in Lower Austria, military force had to be used to ensure that the peasants provided labor services.

The social upheavals had thus revolutionized thinking. Externally, the discontent was concealed behind traditional relations; but a world of new values, new thoughts, new desires had seized the spirit. It was as if the thundering din of the steam-driven engines, of the spinning machines and the mechanical looms, of the sugar factories and the steam saws, of the railways, had awakened the slumbering people, had torn open their eyes. Whereas until now profession and social position had been a source of shame and domination by others had been borne as the heritage of centuries, as an act of divine providence, now the artisan, the worker, even the peasant felt themselves to be human beings, as worthy as the proud lord, the arrogant bureaucrat, the profit-greedy capitalist, and their misery now appeared as a crime perpetrated against them by society.

This awakening of the self-consciousness of the lower classes now acquired a national significance in Austria, as did every social transformation. The fact that the language of the peasants and servants had no rights in relation to the language of the state and was forced to bow to its dominance had once been self-evident, and anyone managing to climb even one rung up the social ladder had emulated the ways of the rulers, including their refined language, and had been ashamed that his mother tongue was the despised language of servants. Now, however, the artisan and worker, who had been roused to self-consciousness, no longer emulated the ways of their rulers at all; they now consciously felt themselves to be different from those who exploited and oppressed them; they no longer desired to be like them and openly carried their nationality with pride, the nationality of those whom their enemies had enslaved and impoverished. In that they proudly admitted to a nationality different from that of the hated rulers, in that they spoke without inhibition the language of the people where once only the language of the rulers had resounded, they gave a vivid, tangible form to the antagonism between the classes. All social oppositions within the land acquired a national semblance, for the dominant classes had long ago become German.⁴¹ The hatred for the bureaucrats, the nobility, and the capitalist class, which was inflamed by an immense economic upheaval, necessarily appeared as the hatred of the Czechs for the Germans; the fact that the lower classes had become conscious of their identity and attributed to themselves as much worth as the wealthy and powerful necessarily caused the German and Czech nationalities, the language of the German rulers, and the language of the Czech people to confront each other as equals. It is no accident that at every stage of this reawakening no slogan was more frequently employed than that one should "not be ashamed" of one's mother tongue. Thus, amid the storms of rapid social transformation, the humble, timid artisan, ashamed of his language, became a patriot, a "*vlastenec*."

The revolutionary transformation of the spirit to which capitalist development gave rise had an immense impact on the intelligentsia. Where this class had not become a caste of privileged professionals estranged from the people, its thoughts and feelings always resembled the sensitive chord whose delicate tone reproduces every breeze that blows from its surroundings. What was being experienced by the Czech masses in the form of an only half-understood mood was transformed in the minds of the intelligentsia into a clear idea, a conscious desire. Above all, it was the members of the lowest but nevertheless most powerful intellectual professions that absorbed the new mood of the masses, elaborated it, and became its leading articulators: the elementary schoolteachers and the lower clergy. Both these professions had by nature always belonged to the Czech people in a different way from the medical, legal, and bureaucratic professions; their members were forced by the nature of their work to engage in a closer form of coexistence with

the people, to use the people's language on a daily basis in the pulpit and behind the lectern. In the teacher and the pastor, the movement that now seized hold of the Czech nation had a spokesman in the most remote village. It is no coincidence that a large number of Catholic and Protestant clergy are found among the men whom the Czech nation celebrates as its revivers. But the other intellectual professions could also not evade the powerful force of the national consciousness and national sentiment that had awakened. One cannot represent the Austrian intelligentsia of the period prior to 1848 using the model of the intelligentsia of the German Empire today, an intelligentsia whose spirit speaks to us daily from the dull intrigues of the student corps, from the ridiculous arrogance of the reserve officer, from the disgraceful German system of class justice, from the struggle of physicians with the medical insurance companies. For the most part, it was the younger sons of peasants and artisans who scraped through the long years of study on the breadline, arduously earned a few florins from badly recompensed lessons, and relied for the rest on the customary free meals in order, after years, to become clergymen, country physicians, or petty officials.

Up until this point, these strata had always become German through their German education. Now, however, their Czech national consciousness awakened within them. They were themselves revolutionary: they hated the German state, which gagged the freedom of thought; they hated the landed noble who looked down from his proud mansion with such contempt upon the poor country physician and the badly paid petty official; they hated the capitalist with that feeling of envy with which the poor intellectual so often confronts the pompous lack of education.

In their hatred for the German ruling stratum, they now began to feel a solidarity with the popular masses, which were pervaded by the same hatred; they began to recall their origins among these masses, to recall their nationality. The use of the German language in the school and the administrative authority now appeared to them as an irksome constraint in which was manifested the domination of the detested social forces under which they suffered. It was they who—an extraordinary audacity—began to speak demonstratively in Czech at the "society" balls, thereby declaring their support for the scorned, exploited masses of the people, for those excluded from "society." They became willing students of Dobrovsky, began to study the Czech language, literature, and history, and it was not long before one or the other of them tried his hand at writing verse in Czech.

However, the intelligentsia cannot act as the bearer of a living intellectual culture alone. This always requires the undefined social stratum that we habitually refer to as the "public," to whom the thinkers address their thoughts, the poets their songs and their verse, whose needs and tastes determine the intelligentsia's creative activity. This stratum now also emerged among the Czech people. A part of the Czech petty bourgeoisie had also participated in

the expansion of capitalism. The growth of the cities increased ground rents, increasing in turn the income of the householder, the small shopkeeper, the innkeeper. The emergence of a stratum of consumers with purchasing power increased the income of many an artisan, indeed enabled him to become a small capitalist himself. The Czechs also participated in the expansion of the milling and brewing industries. Capitalist development undermined the former uniformity of the petty bourgeoisie. Although it impoverished the mass of artisans, it also brought about the formation of a petty bourgeois upper stratum, which profited from the more rapid pace of economic development. And this social stratum, despite its growing prosperity, did not become German, as would certainly have formerly been the case; for it was also stirred by the revolutionary ideology of the time; it also felt a hatred for the Germans holding power in the state and society; it also heard the cry that one should not be ashamed of the nationality of the popular masses, of the mother tongue of the people. In this way a Czech petty bourgeois upper stratum that was able to act as the bearer of a new national culture emerged alongside the Czech intelligentsia.

The fact that Czech culture in its beginnings was resolutely petty bourgeois was most clearly manifested when the Czech people were forced to declare their position on the social and political questions arising during the upheavals of 1848. The masses constituting the audience of the first Czech scholars and poets were also the supporters of the first Czech party. Their petty bourgeois politics are evidence of the petty bourgeois character of this culture as a whole. The economic demands of the assembly in Saint-Wenzels-Bad had a petty bourgeois character.⁴² Palacký was an opponent of universal suffrage, opposed communism with old talk of the natural inequality of human beings, and spoke of the proletariat as the terror of his time. Havlíček opposed the privilege of the nobility and declared himself an opponent of the "money aristocracy," but he also opposed the right to work, opposed socialism, demanded that the state protect freedom and property, and, although he was fundamentally a partisan of equal suffrage, declared himself in favor of a low poll tax. When, in the constitutional commission of Kremsier, the question was debated as to whether the deputies should be indemnified, Rieger declared that this was not necessary, as "industrialists, larger businessmen, and the like" would gladly discharge this office free of charge.⁴³ Czech politics in 1848 was thus just as hostile to the landed nobility and the bourgeoisie as it was to the working class; it was in effect a petty bourgeois politics. The petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia put their mark on the whole of the newly created culture of the nation.

This new Czech culture in the first place rediscovered the Czech past. Upon the images of its own past, as painted for the people by Palacký's history, now rose the self-consciousness of the nation that had been enslaved for two centuries. This task of scholarship was initially undertaken using the

German language. The writings of Dobrovsky, the principal work of Kollár, Šafařík's history of Slavic literature, and Palacký's history first appeared in German.⁴⁴ However, it was not long before the Czechs began to use their own language—for so long merely a language of servants and peasants—for scholarly and artistic works. Here the task remained to be solved which Dante had once solved for the Italians, Luther for the Germans. From the peasant dialects a uniform language had to emerge, from the raw and corrupted language of daily life a language that could be shaped as a tool of scholarship, that could be a precious material for poetic creation. This work was accomplished by the Czech authors active in the first half of the nineteenth century. The development of the uniform Czech language began approximately with the translation of *Paradise Lost* by Jungmann and culminated in the poetry of Kollár.⁴⁵ Anyone who aims to understand this path of development in historical terms as a whole will not pass judgment on the literary worth of this body of work. Rather, he will seek to comprehend the love with which a nation that has traveled the path from the misery of nonhistorical being to historical being within only a few decades commemorates the men in whose consciousness the general revolution of the spirit was first condensed into the form of the individual artwork. And this new culture now became a unifying bond closely linking the newly emerged educated stratum of all the Czech descent groups. The new uniform language, the community of the new literature and scholarship, the new consciousness of unity and of the new national sentiment, and soon the community of political will as well, brought an end to the old process of differentiation that, through its invisible, corrosive action, had gnawed at the unity of the nation over the course of centuries: Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks were entwined again by a new bond, one that became stronger from day to day and that united them as a nation.

A people of oppressed peasants and servants, which regarded its language with shame, had become a nation with a considerably broad stratum of intellectuals and prosperous petty bourgeois members who had become conscious of their nationality and were pervaded by a lively national sentiment. The state did not adapt to this new situation. It still ruled as it had when the nation still slept the slumber of a nonhistorical nation. The Austria of the emperor Francis still appeared as a German state. The practices pursued under Maria Theresa and Joseph II were continued. Civil servants who had to deal with the lower social strata were required to know the language of the people, and it was ensured that the curricula of upper secondary schools in all Czech and multilingual localities also included Czech grammar and the Czech essay as subjects in order "to rectify the glaring lack of personnel qualified for political posts and capable of both languages of the land."⁴⁶ For the same reason, certain exercises in the Czech language were conducted in the theological and medical faculties. The state cultivated the Czech language because it needed civil servants, physicians, and clergy who could communicate with

the peasants, artisans, and workers in their own tongue. At this time, the Czech nation itself had no rights regarding the cultivation of its own language: the state made use of Czech only to the extent that appeared to be expedient or necessary for the wellbeing of its subjects. On occasion, those in power entertained the thought of supporting the Czechs as a means of playing them off against the revolutionary German bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, but Austria remained essentially a German state: German was the language of administration and the courts, the law, and the army. This state of affairs corresponded to the stage of national development of the Czech people during the reign of Maria Theresa. In the nineteenth century, it appeared as an anachronism. For the nation now awakened to national consciousness, the domination of the Czechs by Austria took on the form of domination by a foreign power. The bourgeois revolution in Austria was thus necessarily also a *national* revolution.

This revolution had long announced its coming. When, during the reign of Joseph II, thirty-three "original Bohemians" addressed a petition to the Bohemian estates in which they protested the suppression of the Czech language, this still constituted an isolated phenomenon, which might have aroused interest as a curiosity. The situation became quite different once the violent economic upheaval of the following decades had awakened the nation from its slumber. The revolutionary national movements of the Greeks, the Italians, the Magyars, and the Irish found a vigorous response in Bohemia. In the epoch of O'Connell, "repeal" became a popular Czech political slogan, and Havlíček, then editor of a semiofficial newspaper published in Czech, filled the columns of his paper with extensive reports on the struggle of the Irish against the English, as he was not permitted to write about the repression of the Czechs.

In the course of the events of March 1848, the old system collapsed and the state was forced to adapt to the new significance of the nation. The revolution eliminated the contradiction between the ossified legal system and the altered national situation. Although it would be ridiculous to consider it a juridical source or to celebrate it as the "Bohemian Charter," the document of 8 April 1848 written by the hand of the emperor, which never came into force and which, in its ill-considered contents and its incomplete form, well reflects the confusion reigning at court during those days, is nevertheless, as the first sign of a systemic change, undoubtedly a historical document.

But the revolution not only signified the necessity for the state to adapt to the new cultural evolution of the nation; it also represented a strengthening and acceleration of this cultural evolution itself. The new freedom of the press, of association, and of assembly became the means by which large masses were drawn into the Czech cultural movement. Whereas prior to 1848 there had been only one Czech newspaper, now, within only a few weeks, a whole Czech press came into being. The Prague associations established local groups

in the rural towns, and thus also drew the population of the smaller localities into the national cultural movement. The political struggles not only gave the movement new content, but also charged the people with new enthusiasm, new passion.

To be sure, this turbulent period was followed by the years of reaction. Once again the attempt was made to govern the Bohemian lands as if the Czechs were still a nonhistorical nation. But these years served only to strengthen the power of national evolution. It was a time in which the power of the landed nobility was conclusively eliminated, in which the peasant was liberated from socage, becoming the free proprietor of his land and directly subject to the state's administration and jurisdiction; it was a time in which the legal obstacles that still restricted capitalist development were removed: a time of the rapid economic development of Austria. Austria also participated to a modest extent in the capitalist upsurge of the fifties, which was ushered in by the discoveries of gold in California and Australia. It was precisely during the decade of reaction that the transformation of the forces of production, the economic reorganization to which the Czech nation owed its reawakening, took on a more rapid tempo. The absolutism of Bach was not identical with that of Metternich: in that the former made itself a tool of capitalist development, it created its own gravedigger.⁴⁷ The attempt to once again govern Austria as a German state was ultimately destined to fail, even if a military defeat had not accelerated this development. The battle of Solferino was followed by the collapse of absolutism. And as early as 1859, the first beginnings can be seen of the extension of the Czech lower secondary school system. With this, the triumph of the nation was in fact decided. The process by which the nation subsequently secured a national system of education extending from the primary school to the university and established the right to employ its language in public administrative bodies and courts is generally known and does not require elaboration here. Our task here has simply been one of exposing the violent currents in economic and social life, on the back of which the Czech nation created its new culture.

Of all the Austrian nations constituted by only the oppressed and exploited classes, the Czech nation was the one most rapidly seized by capitalist development. It was thus the first to appear in the marketplace of history and raised its voice the loudest. However, although its evolution has preceded that of the other formerly nonhistorical nations, it has not been alone in taking this evolutionary path. In the case of the Slovenes, this evolution began in the Napoleonic era, when a part of the Slovene-speaking territory fell under French domination. The slowest case of the new evolution of the nation has been that of the Ruthenians. When in 1846 the Austrian government called on the Ruthenian peasantry for assistance against the Polish uprising, public opinion in Austria, deliberately misled by the Polish *Szlachta*, regarded the Ruthenians as "an invention of Count Stadion."⁴⁸ Even in the Kremšic con-

stitutional committee it was debated whether a Ruthenian nation even existed. And still today, the Ruthenian nation not only has no university, but also has only a very rudimentary lower secondary school system. The limited nature of its political power is demonstrated by the injustice committed against it in the new program of electoral reform. That is the fate of a nonhistorical nation, of a purely peasant nation; and yet it is certain that the Ruthenians are also on the path along which the Czechs have already passed and upon which the Slovenes long ago embarked. The popular school, compulsory military service, universal suffrage, newspapers, and people's assemblies are also subjecting the Ruthenian masses to the same cultural influence; the agitation provoked by the Russian Revolution [1905] among the masses of the Ukraine is now reverberating in eastern Galicia. In the agrarian strike, the Ruthenian peasantry has found a tool that serves both the national and the economic struggle, for nowhere else in Austria do economic and national antagonisms so directly coincide as in the struggle of the Ruthenian peasantry against the Polish landed nobility. The process of social evolution that represents the reawakening of the nonhistorical nations has not stopped at the border of Galicia.

The stage of national development that the individual, formerly nonhistorical nations of Austria have reached is reflected in the level of their economic development. Whereas in 1900 only 43.1 percent of Czechs were involved in agriculture and forestry, among the Slovenes the figure was 75.4 percent, among the Serbo-Croats in Austria 86.9 percent, the Romanians 90.3 percent, and finally, the Ruthenians 93.3 percent. If one compares these figures with the degree of national cultural evolution of the individual peoples, one finds a conspicuous correspondence. The smaller the part of a nation involved in agriculture and forestry, the more the nation is seized by the process of industrialization and the more it is subject to the effects of capitalism, the higher the stage of national development it has reached; the awakening of the nonhistorical nations is one of the innumerable manifestations of capitalist development. The national dispute, which shakes the foundations of the state, is one among a number of painful pathological phenomena called forth by the passage of capitalism into the body of the society. The Austrian nationalities question is nothing more than a tiny detail of the great social question with which the development of capitalism has confronted all the peoples of the European cultural sphere.

MODERN CAPITALISM AND NATIONAL HATRED

The awakening of the nonhistorical nations coincided with an era characterized economically by the transition from the manufactory to the modern factory, socially by the liberation of the peasantry, and politically by the bourgeois revolution. The continual process of national development reflected the

social restructuring and geographical resettlement of the masses to which the march of modern capitalism had given rise everywhere, including Austria. In the first half of the nineteenth century, capitalism, as Werner Sombart so graphically put it, first took up residence in the great edifice of society; in the second half of the century, it took possession of the entire edifice, adapting the whole structure to its own ends, modifying it for its own purposes. Even if this development proceeded more slowly in Austria than in other countries, the development of the nations concerned and their national struggles can nevertheless be understood only in relation to this social upheaval.

If we seek initially to ascertain to what extent the individual nations participated in the process of capitalist development, several clues are provided by the Austrian survey of occupational groups conducted in 1900. The first effect of the process of capitalist transformation, and that of most serious consequence, was the destruction of the old peasant economy, the modification of the organization of work in the society, which was manifested in the altered distribution of workers within the professional classes and which brought the masses into industry and commerce and transformed the remains of the old peasantry into pure farmers, into mere commodity producers. Table 3.1 provides an indication of the extent to which the individual nations participated in this development. The figures presented are taken from the 1900 occupational survey and are based on one thousand persons who declared themselves as belonging to each of the language groups listed below.

Table 3.1 Occupational Groups of Members of Various Language Groups in Austria, 1900

	Agriculture and forestry	Industry	Trade and commerce	Civil service, independent professions
German	335	383	134	148
Czech	431	365	93	111
Polish	656	148	112	84
Ruthenian	933	25	17	25
Slovene	754	134	35	77
Serbo-Croat	869	46	38	47
Italian	501	234	127	138
Romanian	903	27	25	45

Number surveyed: 1,000 individuals in each language group.

According to these figures, less than half of the German and Czech populations and only barely half of the Italian population are involved in agriculture and forestry. The Ruthenians, Romanians, and Serbo-Croats can still be regarded as almost purely agrarian nations. In the middle, between these two groups, are the Poles and Slovenes. In industry as in commerce, the Germans

have the leading position. In industry, they are followed first by the Czechs and then by the Italians; in commerce, by the Italians and then the Czechs. (The predominance of the Poles over the Czechs in commerce is only apparently the case; it can be traced to the large number of what are in reality nonassimilated Polish Jews who have nevertheless declared themselves as belonging to the Polish language group.) Thus, the Germans have participated to the greatest extent in capitalist development, followed by the Czechs and the Italians.

Let us now turn to the social positions of the members of the individual nations within the occupational groups. Table 3.2, for example, indicates the social composition of national groups in the industrial sector, using one thousand persons who declared themselves as belonging to each of the language groups listed:

Table 3.2 Social Composition of the Members of Various Language Groups within Austrian Industry, 1900

	Self-employed workers	White-collar workers	Blue-collar workers	Day laborers	Participating family members
German	182	30	731	28	29
Czech	157	14	764	34	31
Polish	318	17	559	50	56
Ruthenian	399	6	447	78	70
Slovene	255	4	661	35	45
Serbo-Croat	299	6	630	26	39
Italian	253	14	663	17	53
Romanian	243	5	534	191	27

Number surveyed: 1,000 individuals in each language group.

Initially noticeable is the fact that, in the case of those nations that, as we have already seen, have been least subject to the process of capitalist development, the number of self-employed is greatest. The highest proportions of self-employed in industry are found among the Ruthenians and the Poles, the lowest among the Germans and the Czechs. In the case of blue-collar workers, the proportions are reversed: the number of blue-collar workers found among the Ruthenians, the Romanians, and the Poles is the lowest, among the Germans and the Czechs the highest. Thus, among the Germans and the Czechs, for every self-employed producer, there are many more blue-collar workers than in the case of the Ruthenians and the Poles. The self-employed among the Ruthenians and the Poles are predominantly artisans, whereas we find a considerable number of capitalists making up the self-employed among the Germans and the Czechs.

If we attempt to distinguish the capitalists from the artisans within the

self-employed sector, the number of white-collar workers provides us with a valuable indicator. For the white-collar worker—the engineer, technician, foreman, accountant, and so on—is found only in the capitalist enterprise: he is absent from the craft industry. The more highly developed capitalist nations—the Germans, Czechs, Poles, and Italians—therefore comprise more white-collar workers than the less developed nations: Ruthenians, Slovenes, Serbo-Croats, and Romanians. But these figures enable us to deduce still more: the nationality of the blue-collar worker is immaterial for the capitalist; on the other hand, as a rule he surrounds himself with a staff of white-collar workers who speak the same language as he does. The German industrialist might well employ Czech factory workers, but his factory director and his office personnel will, as a rule, be German. Since we can see that the number of white-collar workers among the Germans is much higher than among the other nations, we can conclude that the Germans necessarily occupy the leading position among the industrial capitalists. Since we can see from the comparative numbers of self-employed producers and blue-collar workers that the Czech nation is more highly developed in capitalist terms than the Polish nation, whereas, on the other hand, the Poles lead the Czechs in terms of the number of white-collar workers, we can conclude the following: in the Polish region, the industrialist also, as a rule, normally utilizes the Polish language; the Czechs are more highly developed in industrial terms in that they comprise fewer artisans and more industrial workers than the Poles, but the Czech workers are very often in the employ of foreign, obviously German, capitalists.

The fact that the Germans have a stronger representation within the bourgeoisie than within the population as a whole has a dual cause. In the first place, this is an effect of the historical fact that during the epoch marked by the beginnings of industrial capitalist development in Austria the dominant classes belonged to the German nation, Austria being at this time politically and culturally a German state. Insofar as the Austrian bourgeoisie emerged from the then-dominant classes, it was, from its birth onward, German; insofar as it emerged from foreign elements, it became Germanized. The weavers from Verviers, for example, who founded the Brünn wool-weaving mill, naturally adopted the language and customs of the dominant nation in Austria rather than the Czech language, which was then the language of an enslaved people, of a nonhistorical nation. By the same token, the Jews who developed from innkeepers, petty traders, and usurers into industrialists, wholesalers, and bankers sought inclusion in the German cultural community. Furthermore, even those descendants of the nonhistorical nations who successfully negotiated the ascent into the capitalist class abandoned their mother tongue, the despised language of servants and peasants, once they had acquired their new social position and became German. As diverse as the origins of the Austrian bourgeoisie were, it is unarguably the case that they bore a German character in cultural terms. Only with the awakening of the nonhistorical na-

tions did the development of a national bourgeoisie become possible for them, too. However, the German bourgeoisie had a lead over their counterparts of one and a half centuries, during which the capitalist development of Austria had represented the development of a German capitalist class; little wonder, then, that the young bourgeoisies of the other nations have been unable to attain the level of development of the German bourgeoisie. In Austria during the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, only an Italian bourgeoisie could be found alongside the German bourgeoisie. It too has, up until the present, maintained its greater economic and cultural advancement in relation to the southern Slav peasant peoples.

The German character of the Austrian capitalist class is also connected with the fact that Austrian industry developed most rapidly in the regions settled by the German nation. This can be attributed in part to the fact that the German regions already possessed more and larger cities than the Slav lands prior to the expansion of manufacture. The Germans also had a number of historical accidents to thank for the rapid development of their industry: for example, the stimulation that the commercial development of German Bohemia owed to the economic policy of the Friedlander.⁴⁹ The fact that the Germans inhabited the border regions of the Sudeten also inevitably favored their industrial development. The beginning of the mercantilist customs policy also saw the development of smuggling on a large scale. The capitalist industries wanting to process foreign raw materials moved closer to the borders. The strong stimulation to the wool and cotton industry in northern Bohemia without doubt owed much to the smuggling of English yarn. And if the old domestic weaving enterprise was initially tied to the German border regions, these regions affirmed their industrial superiority following the transition from the putting-out system to the factory and the cessation of smuggling of foreign yarn.

But even apart from the fact of smuggling, German areas were the first to offer favorable conditions for production. The Germans occupied the mountain regions—the Alps and the mountains bordering Bohemia—where industry found the hydraulic power it required. Even more important was the fact that rich coal seams were mined at an early stage in the German region.

The originally German character of the Austrian bourgeoisie thus had a dual cause: the bourgeoisie was German due to the fact that industry initially developed in German regions—above all in Vienna, the German regions of the Sudeten, and Styria—thanks to a series of coincidental circumstances. Moreover, the bourgeoisie in the Czech and the Slovene regions was also German, because prior to the awakening of the nonhistorical nations all the members of the ruling, propertied, and educated classes in the Alpine and Sudeten lands were Germans.

These facts explain a whole range of phenomena that form the basis of our national struggles. Everywhere there existed a marked antagonism between

the bourgeoisie and the other classes making up the population; in our Czech regions, where the capitalists were German and the petty bourgeoisie, the workers, and the peasantry Czech, this social antagonism necessarily took on the particular form of the national antagonism. Everywhere there existed marked antagonisms between the industrially developed and the agrarian regions. Where the industrial regions were German and the rural regions Czech, this economic antagonism necessarily clothed itself in a national guise. Our aim here is again to present by means of an example the diverse social antagonisms that in multilingual Austria first entered the consciousness of the masses in the form of national antagonisms; we focus on the social antagonisms that form the basis of the struggle between the Czechs and the Germans in Bohemia. The choice of this particular example is based on the fact that Bohemia represents the most highly developed land of the monarchy and, precisely for this reason, is the land of the most animated of national disputes. Our task here is made a very great deal easier by the excellent work of Rauchberg, upon which we draw many times in what follows.⁵⁰

Rauchberg divides Bohemia into four regions. As German districts, he groups together the political districts in which more than 80 percent of the Austrian citizens indicated German as their usual language in the last census. As districts with a German majority he defines those political districts in which 50 to 80 percent of the Austrian citizens indicated that German was their usual language, and 20 to 50 percent Czech. Those districts defined as having a Czech majority had 50 to 80 percent with Czech and 20 to 50 percent with German as their usual language. Finally, those districts in which more than 80 percent of Austrian citizens use Czech as their usual language are defined by Rauchberg as Czech districts. Within the Czech districts, he provides the figures for Prague and its environs in many cases separately from those for the other Czech areas due to the fact that the rapidly flourishing industrial region of Prague exhibits in many respects a different development from that of the other Czech districts.

Following Rauchberg, we will initially present several pieces of evidence for the fact that the purely or predominantly German districts are in effect the headquarters of Bohemian industry. We do not include the figures for Prague and its environs here, since we will come to focus upon them in another context. Table 3.3 shows the occupational distribution of the people of Bohemia in 1900, using one thousand persons residing in each type of district.

In the German part of Bohemia, the majority of the population are found in industry, whereas in the Czech part the industrial population is still smaller than the agricultural population. There are also more persons engaged in commerce in the German areas than in the Czech areas. However, it is not only the ratio of industrial to agricultural populations, but also the social composition of the industrial population itself, that provides evidence for the

fact that the German parts of Bohemia have reached a higher level of capitalist development.

Table 3.3 Occupational Groups in Bohemia, 1900

	Agriculture and forestry	Industry	Trade and commerce	Civil service, independent professions
German districts	249	527	120	104
Districts with a German majority	274	536	95	95
Districts with a Czech majority	445	357	84	114
Czech districts (excluding Prague and environs)	473	334	82	111

Number surveyed: 1,000 individuals in each type of district.

Source: Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*

Table 3.4 shows the social composition of the industrial sector, using one thousand persons in each type of district.

Table 3.4 Social Composition of Members of the Industrial Sector in Bohemia, 1900

	Self-employed workers	White-collar workers	Blue-collar workers	Day laborers	Participating family members
German districts	144	21	788	29	18
Districts with a German majority	112	19	810	30	29
Districts with a Czech majority	146	12	762	26	54
Czech districts (excluding Prague and environs)	180	15	744	23	38

Number surveyed: 1,000 individuals in each type of district.

Source: Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*

In German areas the white- and blue-collar workers represent a larger proportion of the working population, the number of self-employed a smaller proportion than is the case in the Czech areas. Thus, for every self-employed producer in the German areas there is a greater number of white- and blue-collar workers than in the Czech areas. In the German areas, the triumph of capital over the craft industry is more complete, the German areas having reached a stage of a higher concentration of capital.

The opposition between the German and the Czech areas should thus be first comprehended as an opposition between the advanced capitalist regions and the less developed regions. Everywhere one finds an opposition between such regions. Everywhere the bourgeoisie of the industrially advanced regions refers to its wealth, the splendor of its culture, the high direct taxes that it is able to bear; everywhere it looks down with contempt on the regions that are less developed in capitalist terms, are poorer, and are therefore culturally retarded. The industrialist of Rhineland-Westphalia refers to "east of the Elbe" with hardly less contempt than do the industrialists of Reichenberg and Aussig to "Czechia."

Let us now attempt to comprehend in economic terms the opposition between two regions that are at different levels of capitalist development, but that engage in the exchange of commodities with one another, a task for which the Marxian theory of price provides us with a valuable tool.

The mass of the surplus value produced in both regions is determined by the mass of the surplus labor provided by the workers of both regions. But what part of this surplus labor falls to the capitalists in each of the two regions? The capital of a more highly developed region has a higher organic composition, that is, in the region that is more advanced in capitalist terms the same amount of wage capital (variable capital) corresponds to a greater amount of material capital (constant capital) than is the case in the less developed region. Marx has taught us to understand that—due to the tendency to equilibrium in the rate of profit—it is not a case of the workers of each of the two regions producing surplus value for "their" capitalists; rather, the surplus value created by the workers of *both* regions is divided between the capitalists of both regions, not according to the amount of labor carried out in both regions, but according to the amount of capital that is active in each of the two regions. Since in the more highly developed region the same quantity of labor provided corresponds to more capital, the more highly developed region also attracts a larger proportion of the surplus value than corresponds to the quantity of labor actually carried out in that region. It is as if the surplus value produced in both regions is first thrown on a pile and then divided between the capitalists according to the amount of their capital. The capitalists of the more highly developed region thus not only exploit their own workers, but also always appropriate a part of the surplus value that has been produced in the less developed region.

If we consider only the prices of the commodities, each region receives in exchange as much as it provides; if we focus, on the other hand, on the values, it becomes clear that it is not equivalents that are exchanged. In the products that the region with the higher level of organic composition of capital provides, there is less labor objectified than in the commodities that it receives from the region with a lower level of organic composition of capital. The more highly developed region thus provides the less developed region,

with which it conducts commercial relations, with less labor than the latter has to provide for the more advanced region. The capital of the developed region appropriates a part of the labor of the less developed region.

Where the advanced region provides industrial products in exchange for the agricultural products of the less developed region, the fact of ground rent of course counteracts the exploitation of the agrarian region. The ownership of land gives the agrarian region the power to deduct a part of the surplus value in the form of ground rent and to remove it from division among the capitalists on the basis of the amount of capital invested. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that even ground rent is unable to hinder the transfer of a part of the value produced to the capitalist class of the industrial region by means of the production price of industrial products. There can also be no doubt that this constitutes the basis of the economic relationship between German Bohemia and Czech Bohemia. Were this not the case, then the quantity of surplus-value appropriated by the capitalists of German Bohemia would remain in exactly the same proportion to the quantity of surplus-value in the Czech region as that existing between the work of the society carried out in German Bohemia and that carried out in Czech Bohemia; indeed, since wages in Czech Bohemia are lower than in German Bohemia and surplus labor time consequently makes up a greater fraction of the working day, a greater profit should be realized for every worker employed than is the case in German Bohemia. In reality, however, the profit realized by the German Bohemian capitalist class is unarguably greater, as it in fact must be in order to remain proportional to the size of the workforce employed in German Bohemia. Or, expressed another way: a greater amount of profit corresponds to every worker employed in German Bohemia than in the Czech region. This economic fact is manifested in the greater average prosperity of the German Bohemian population, in the dazzling development of its cities, in the higher average level of culture found among this population. That which German nationalist authors so happily designate as the superior culture of German Bohemia and the "inferiority" of the Czech region is nothing other than the effect of the fact that governs all capitalist competition, the fact that the more highly developed capitalist regions appropriate a part of the value produced by the regions that are less developed in capitalist terms.

The higher level of taxation in German Bohemia can also be attributed to this fact. Because German Bohemia's share in the surplus value produced within the Austrian economic zone as a whole is based not on the size of its workforce, but rather on its capital expenditure, and because, on account of the higher organic composition of its capital, a greater amount of capital in this region, and thus also higher profits, correspond to the same number of workers, it is able to support a higher rate of direct taxation in proportion to the size of its population than can the Czech part of the land.

From this fact the German middle classes draw the conclusion that the

population of that region that pays more direct tax per head of population is also owed more power within the state and the land than actually corresponds to its size. However, this demand merely expresses a typically bourgeois conception of the state. Assuming that political rights should be dependent on fiscal contribution, why should it be the case that only taxation in its direct form should count as taxation and not also taxation in its indirect form, that is, the indirect taxation that is borne by the masses and that forms the main basis of the state budget? And should each individual really have a degree of legal power with regard to the state that is proportional to his fiscal contribution to the state budget through taxation? And finally, if human labor is the creator of value, should the ability to provide taxes be attributed to those who appropriate the product of another's labor or to those who create the value through their labor, who in fact are the only real bearers of all taxation? Should the fact that a proportion of Czech labor enriches not Czech, but German, capitalists really confer a privilege on German Bohemia in relation to the Czech region?⁵¹

If, however, we do not allow the knowledge that Czech Bohemia supports the material and intellectual culture of German Bohemia through a part of its labor to be reduced to a justification for the political demands of the German nationalists, it can provide us with the key to understanding the historical demands of the Czech as well as the German bourgeois parties. The German bourgeoisie in Bohemia requires the whole Austrian market. As a consequence, it wishes to see Austria form a unitary region in terms of laws, transport, and economic activity: in relation to the empire, it is centralist. On the other hand, it wishes to protect its booty of surplus value by avoiding having to also meet the needs of low tax-bearing Czech regions through its own higher tax burden: it is therefore federalist in relation to the Austrian provinces, demands territorial separation of German Bohemia and Czech Bohemia, and wants to make German Bohemia an independent crown land. The viewpoint of the Czechs is otherwise. For their agricultural products, they require the market outside the Sudeten lands either not at all or to a far lesser extent than does German industry; for them, the unity of Austria as a legal and economic zone therefore carries less weight. On the one hand, they require the German market within the Sudeten lands, and, on the other, they wish to be able to use the fiscal potential of the German industrial regions to serve their own needs. They are consequently federalist in relation to the empire and centralist in relation to the province [*Land*], the unity of which they defend. We thus encounter here with the deepest roots of the German-Czech constitutional dispute. The industrial region has a far greater need for a large unified economic zone than does the agrarian region: as a consequence, the Germans are centralists in regard to the empire, the Czechs federalists. The more highly developed region in capitalist terms can support higher taxation, and this raises the question as to whether this fiscal potential should be uti-

lized exclusively by this region or also by the agrarian region that is historically bound together with it: as a consequence, the Germans are federalist in regard to the crown lands, the Czechs centralist.

The fact that the German region has reached a higher level of industrial development also means that the population movement within Bohemia assumes great national significance. As everywhere else, the population has undergone a process of resettlement whereby a part of the population leaves the agrarian region and migrates into the industrial region. In national terms, this has meant the immigration of Czechs to the German region of Bohemia. Rauchberg has described this movement in precise detail. In the present context, it will suffice to refer only to the end result of his investigation. He has compared the number of persons resident in each language region with the number of persons born there; on the basis of these figures he has then calculated the extent of movement into and out of the individual language regions.

In table 3.5 we compare the levels of population movement between the German districts and the other language regions.

Table 3.5 Population Movement in Bohemia between German Districts and Other Language Regions

	Moved to German districts	Moved away from German districts	Gain or loss (absolute)	Percentage gain or loss to local population
Districts with a German majority	26,307	31,502	-5,195	-0.3
Districts with a Czech majority	23,860	7,548	+16,312	+0.9
Czech districts	127,510	46,678	+80,832	+4.6

Source: Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*.

The column headed "Moved to German districts" shows us how many persons have immigrated to the districts with a more than 80 percent German population from the three other district categories. The column headed "Moved away from German districts" shows us how many persons have emigrated from the German districts. The third column gives us the difference between gain and loss in regard to population movement between the German districts and each of the three other district categories, thus providing the balance of this movement as a whole. We see from this that it is only to the districts in which the population is 50 to 80 percent German that the German districts have relinquished more people than they have received from them. By comparison, considerably more persons have immigrated to the German from the Czech districts than from the Czech to the German districts. In particular, the level of immigration to the German districts from

those districts in which the population is more than 80 percent Czech is very high, in absolute terms and in relation to the local population.

A very similar picture is presented by the migration balance in districts with populations that are 50 to 80 percent German, as shown in table 3.6.

Table 3.6 Population Movement in Bohemia between Districts with a German Majority and Other Language Regions

	Moved to districts with a German majority	Moved away from districts with a German majority	Gain or loss (absolute)	Percentage gain or loss to local population
German districts	31,502	26,307	+5,195	+1.3
Districts with Czech majority	13,049	5,653	+7,396	+1.8
Czech districts	54,116	13,683	+40,433	+9.9

Source: Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*.

The balance of migration in this group of districts is positive in relation to all other district categories. The districts with a German majority have received more people from all other language regions than they have relinquished to them. The immigration surplus from the Czech regions is also particularly large here. It is above all the agrarian Czech regions that have relinquished their surplus population to the German industrial regions.

Let us now consider more closely this migration from the Czech agrarian regions to the German industrial regions and its national effects. It is the workers who constitute the mass of the immigrants. Due to the destruction of the old putting-out system and the transformation of agricultural techniques, the peasant's son and the agricultural laborer could no longer find a place for themselves in their homelands. The surplus of labor power and the inability of the agricultural proletariat to help itself through union organization reduced its living standards. By comparison, the demand for labor power increased in the industrial regions due to the constantly strong accumulation of capital, due to the conversion of surplus value into capital. Moreover, union struggle here resulted in wage increases, and the higher wages lured the Czech proletariat into the German regions. Where industry only gradually developed, the Czech workers arrived only on an individual basis, and in most cases their new surroundings were able to assimilate them from a national point of view within a short time. However, places where the demand for labor power rose rapidly experienced a mass immigration of Czech workers, who banded firmly together and conserved their nationality.

The Czech worker came from areas where the wages were low, where the standard of living was at a low level. Consequently, he arrived in the region as someone who undercut wages and often as a strikebreaker. It is no wonder, then, that he awakened the hatred and the rage of the German worker. Even

today, the industrialists of German Bohemia, however nationalistically German they might be, often enough attempt to replace the “covetous” German workers with Czech workers who have not yet discarded the vice of “confounded frugality.” In the first place, they safeguard their profits at the cost of the German workers, and, if the hatred of the German workers for the Czech immigrants is thereby nourished and if the workers—filled with national hatred—allow themselves to be enticed by a bourgeois national party, this represents a tidy bonus for the German capitalists. However, this game no longer very often proves a success for them. The German workers have long since learned that the only method they have of protecting themselves against Czech wage undercutting and strikebreaking is that of winning the support of the Czech workers for their trade union organization and training them for union struggle. And the progress of the Czech workers’ movement has also filled the Czech proletariat with the consciousness of the solidarity of all worker interests. Thus, the undercutting of wages by Czechs has fortunately already become an exception. Czech immigration certainly initially awakened national hatred, national rage among German workers. However, this hatred was unable to take on the concrete form of political will: modern industrial workers cannot demand the repeal of the freedom of movement, a strategy that would represent the only means of countering Czech immigration. Bitter necessity has thus taught the German workers that only by waging a common struggle against capital, shoulder to shoulder with the Czech workers, can they achieve success.

It is precisely Czech immigration to the German industrial region that has taught the German workers to comprehend the solidarity of the interests of all workers, the necessity of the common struggle of the workers of all nations. The effect of Czech worker immigration on the petty bourgeoisie has been quite different. Although the interests of the German workers initially suffered under Czech immigration, for the petty bourgeoisie it proved economically advantageous. The growth of the population meant increased profits for traders and artisans, as well as rising ground rents for house owners. Nevertheless, almost the whole of the German petty bourgeoisie is filled with a burning hatred for the Czech minorities. From where does this phenomenon stem?

It is based first on the mistrust, the aversion felt by the member of the settled petty bourgeoisie, rooted in the soil of the traditional homeland, for every stranger, every “new arrival” [*Zuag’rasten*], as the Viennese say. It is, as we have already explained elsewhere, the *inertia of apperception*, the reluctance in regard to everything unfamiliar, everything strange, everything not corresponding to the specificity of the narrow local sphere in which the petty bourgeois is born, marries, and dies that constitutes here the roots of national sentiment and national hatred. The eyes of the bourgeois, the eyes of the proletariat, turned here and there by capitalist economic trends, see, if not

the wide world, then always a great economic zone; the petty bourgeois and the peasant, however, sit rooted to the soil and hate everything that is strange, everything new that penetrates their narrow sphere from outside.

This national instinct was seized upon by the *parish cliques*, which are found in various combinations in every parish. In small rural towns, they are composed of members of the local intelligentsia—the physician, teacher, pastor, apothecary—a few house owners, shopkeepers, innkeepers, and the like. In the villages, wealthy peasants take the place of the prosperous burghers. In larger industrial localities, the parish clique is composed of members of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. In some places, one and the same clique, continually replenished with direct offspring or the inclusion of persons of similar social status, has had the parish under its control since the beginnings of autonomous parish administration. Elsewhere, several cliques may compete for control of the parish: the pastor and the teacher, the chief of the fire brigade and the leader of the veterans, or even two competing lawyers, backed by their respective supporters, feud with each other over power within the parish. It is these cliques that compose the parish council according to their preferences, that name the candidates for public elections, and that are willingly followed in public life by the nonparticipating petty bourgeois population. Our parish electoral regulations have made these cliques into a formal legal institution and handed over the most important administrative branches to them.

The parish cliques at first resented the immigration of Czech workers. The new arrivals did in fact represent a financial burden for the parish: it had to establish new schools, deal with expanded policing requirements, and cope with a range of other new tasks. However, what was at first experienced as unpleasant soon became dangerous. In the growing industrial city, it was always very difficult for those who ruled the parish on a hereditary basis to preserve the enjoyment of their authority and their power. If the influx was nationally homogeneous, they might at best have been able to maintain their status; when it was foreign, such an attempt seemed hopeless. The clique, which had ruled for decades, undisturbed and unchecked, was confronted with a dangerous foreign force, and as a consequence it assumed a leading role in the conflict between national groups.

As long as the mass of the immigrant workers remained undemanding and unassuming, led a miserable life that knew no alternatives other than those of heavy work and sleep in miserable lodgings on the most distant edges of the city, or at most enjoyed alcohol in the sordid public houses that were carefully avoided by members of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie; as long as the Czech worker humbly avoided the masters of the city, did not burden them with demands and grievances, and approached those who were better dressed with humility, the parish clique tolerated Czech immigration. However, now the popular masses of the working people have

awakened to new life, to an astounding new consciousness of themselves. They no longer bow before the parish powers, but demand their rights from them. They demand the satisfaction of their cultural needs, above all schools for their children. They disturb the peace of the parish with strikes, with their political struggle, with assemblies and demonstrations. Indeed, they are sometimes so brazen as to want to celebrate festivals.

This new life, to which modern workers everywhere have awakened, has fortunately also taken hold of the Czech minorities in the German industrial region. For the German worker, this is an extremely satisfying phenomenon. The more proudly the Czech worker raises his head, the less does the German worker have to fear Czech wage undercutters and strikebreakers, the more he can hope for strong support from his Czech comrades in the struggle against capital and the class state. But the petty bourgeoisie—and above all the parish cliques to which the petty bourgeoisie gives its allegiance—are very startled indeed by this new development. For them, every stirring of proletarian self-consciousness represents revolution, every stirring of the national minority a threat to their power within the parish. They cannot expel the Czech workers and forbid them entry to the town; however, it is their opinion that within the town the national minority should be neither seen nor heard. “Preservation of the German character” of the city has now become their slogan. What are these frequently cited words, which our German nationalists have made a matter of highest moral duty, upon which the Vienna district councillors must even take a vow according to the Lueger ordinances, actually supposed to mean?⁵² Do they mean that the influx of the Czech workers should be prevented? There is surely no capitalist land in which it is possible to restrict freedom of movement; we would very much like to see the house owners, the innkeepers, the shopkeepers—not to speak of the industrialists—who would want to approve of such a rule in earnest: it is, after all, they who are the economic beneficiaries of this worker immigration. Preservation of the German character of the town means rather that one should see nothing of the national minority, that the town should appear as if it were German, that—God forbid—Czech inscriptions or noisy Czech speech or Czech colors should not betray that which everyone knows to be a fact: that capitalist development has made the monolingual town of the petty bourgeoisie into a bilingual town of capitalists and proletarians. But the preservation of the German character represents more than this ostrichlike policy in regard to the national minority. It also means that the parish administrative system does not concern itself with the migrant workers, that it does not satisfy the self-evident needs of these workers, above all their cultural needs, that it does not once consider as necessary the pitifully modest measure of social welfare work and social security with which the Austrian parishes otherwise favor their workers. Complete neglect of the social duties of the parish, a complete absence of any parish social policy—this

is above all what the parish cliques call the preservation of the German character of the town.

To be sure, if the Czech worker population increases to a great extent, it can in fact happen that the German character of a town will come under threat, that the Czech population will gradually become predominant, and that the German population will become a minority. Whoever has learned to comprehend the social process that produces and determines national migrations will not see in this inevitable concomitant of a violent process of development the worst of all evils. We have paid for this capitalist development with the obliteration of millions of existences, with the sacrifice of millions of children, with the unspeakable misery of the popular masses; compared with this, the loss of a village or an industrial town to the Czechs appears insignificant. We know that this capitalist development is a prerequisite for our people to truly become a national cultural community, a goal for which the fact that here or there in the context of this immense process of radical change a German majority becomes a German minority is not a high price to pay. We know that this social upheaval is a precondition for our people to achieve true self-determination, to achieve full autonomy; for this reason we are certain that even those Germans located in the few industrial centers where the German population is pressed into the position of a minority will find the means to preserve their cultural community with the German people. However, what is clear to us is not clear to the petty bourgeois. The market of the capitalists is a great empire, is the entire globe; for the industrial worker, a large economic zone has long constituted his labor market; today he is forced to sell his labor power here, tomorrow there. The petty bourgeois, however, remains tied to one place: he produces and conducts trade exclusively for a narrow local circle, and his ideas do not extend any further than the boundaries of this sphere. He sees never his people, only his town. He has no concern for what industrial development means for his nation; he does not know that the process that threatens the position of the Germans in his parish is at the same time responsible for strengthening, economically and politically, the total power of his nation, for enriching its material and intellectual culture, for incorporating for the first time the great mass of the working people into the nation; for him, the collapse of his power within his small parish represents the end of the world. It is this that causes the effects of industrial development to appear so appalling to the Germans, which has lent the question of minorities its exaggerated significance, that has roused national hatred in such terrible form: the fact that our petty bourgeoisie does not at all consider the problem from a national standpoint, that is, from the standpoint of the great nation, but wrongly regards the German nation as that which in effect constitutes our national parties—the sum of a few hundred parish cliques.

All these factors formed the basis for the frivolous attitude of the whole of

petty bourgeois national politics. The only means of preventing the influx of foreign workers, the elimination of the freedom of movement, was completely impossible. As a consequence, the petty bourgeoisie had no goal for its national politics, the substance of which now became exclusively that of giving expression to its hatred, as always without incorporating any precise objective. Ensuring that no street sign speaks to the national minority in its own language, that no judge or official communicates with the minority in its own language, now became the substance of petty bourgeois politics. A flag in the colors of the national adversary constituted an insult to "national honor." A Czech workers' festival seemed to the member of the German petty bourgeoisie to be a crime that he had to prevent at all costs. It is a politics that no longer seeks in the least to define its objective; a politics that is nothing more than the impotent expression of national hatred; a politics that necessarily arises from the fact that the petty bourgeois cannot do without the Czech worker and yet can also not tolerate him.

This politics, however, subsequently provoked a movement of reaction within the national minority. The national sentiment of every minority in a foreign environment is always particularly pronounced. In this case, it increased through the hatred with which the local population opposed the foreign immigrant. That which one denied him out of hatred now came to appear to him as particularly valuable. The language of street signs, the official language of the courts, things that seem so terribly insignificant in comparison to the great social problems of our epoch—now became for him an issue of "national honor." He too now celebrated festivals, no longer for the purpose of enjoyment, but for the purpose of offending the bitter national adversary. Thus emerged that frivolous game that in Austria one calls national politics, which, born out of national hatred, continually reproduces national hatred and is nevertheless incapable of altering the real power relations of the nations, inexorably determined by economic development, to even the smallest degree. The fact of whether a Czech minority increases within a German-speaking region depends on the strength and orientation of the economic development of the city; Czech festivals and Czech inscriptions cannot accelerate the growth of the foreign minority; one cannot prevent its growth by forbidding Czech inscriptions and disturbing Czech festivals.

These national struggles were radically intensified as soon as the Czech petty bourgeois followed the Czech worker into the German-speaking region. The emergence of a Czech petty bourgeoisie in the German cities and industrial centers proceeded in a dual manner: first, through the fact that a proportion of the Czech workers always climbed into the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie—the apprentice artisan became a master craftsman, the worker who had accumulated savings or received a small inheritance became a shopkeeper or innkeeper—and, second, through the immigration of artisans and petty traders from the Czech-speaking region. The Czech petty bourgeoisie naturally

found its customers among the Czech workers in the German cities. It was now that national bitterness increased to an immeasurable extent. Up until this point, the German petty bourgeoisie had still gained advantage from Czech immigration. Now its Czech competition robbed it of this despised yet valuable custom. Now the preservation of the German character of the town became something in the economic interest of the petty bourgeois; the Czech business sign of his competitor threatened him with the danger of losing the custom of the Czech worker. Nationality now became the means of struggle against one's competition. The Czech petty bourgeoisie adopted the slogan "*Svůj k svému*" and thereby ensured their Czech custom. "Do not buy from Czechs!" answered the German traders and artisans. The threat to the power of the parish clique also now increased. In the face of the Czech workforce it had felt secure, protected by restricted voting rights; the Czech petty bourgeois, however, was a voter. In the context of the struggle between the petty bourgeois classes of both nations for customers and for power within the parish, national hatred grew from day to day.

The immigration of the member of the Czech petty bourgeoisie into the German region was also an effect of the rapid capitalist development of German Bohemia. The emigration out of the Czech region diminished the profits of the local trader and artisan; the immigration into the German part of the land increased petty bourgeois profits there. However, the law of the equalization of the rates of profit governs all competition. Producers and traders continually turn to those regions in which profits are higher, continually emigrate out of those regions where profits are falling. As long as the Czech agrarian region relinquishes workers to the German industrial region, as long as the population of the German region grows more quickly than that of the Czech region, the petty bourgeoisie will migrate from the Czech part of the land to the German-speaking region. Whoever wishes to prevent the immigration of the Czech petty bourgeoisie must restrict the industrial development of German Bohemia. For this reason, the national politics of the German petty bourgeoisie has no concrete goal, serves no particular purpose; is nothing more than the impotent expression of the national hatred unleashed by the resettlement of the population.

The movement of the Czech petty bourgeoisie into the German industrial regions was accompanied by that of the Czech intelligentsia. The physician and the lawyer were also attracted to the industrial cities with their rapidly growing population and the promise of a high income. Here, too, nationality became a principle of competition. The Czech physician and the Czech lawyer took the custom of the Czech minority away from their German colleagues; the competitive envy felt by these German colleagues turned into national hatred. In this case, however, it was not only nationality, but precisely the national struggle that became the means by which this competitive struggle was waged. The Czech physician or lawyer in the German industrial

city knew no better way of making his name known to the Czech minority, of advertising among patients and clients, than by becoming the leader of this minority: he represented its national interests in both spoken and written form; he provided the hatred of the minority, reinforced through struggle, with eloquently powerful expression. He, the hated competitor of the German intelligentsia, now disturbed the peace of the ruling parish clique by pleading the cause of his compatriots before the authorities; he became politically dangerous by organizing the national minority into a political party. He, the "nationalist agitator," was pursued, above all, by the German intelligentsia, the ruling parish clique and the hatred-filled German petty bourgeoisie with all its wrathful fury.

However, the immigration of the Czech intelligentsia soon took on another form. The German petty bourgeoisie soon encountered the Czech official in the public administrative bodies and courts of the state. The despised national adversary now became the representative of the power of the state; the German petty bourgeoisie saw itself as virtually placed under a form of foreign domination by the Czechs. The penetration of the courts and the administrative authorities of the German regions by the Czech official was also ultimately based on the fact that the German-speaking region was above all the center of industry. In the German regions, industry and commerce absorbed the descendants of the middle classes. The sons of the German petty bourgeoisie became above all white-collar workers in industry and commerce. In the Czech regions, on the other hand, where industry developed more slowly, the only path open to the younger son of the prosperous peasant and of the petty bourgeois who could not follow his father's profession was that provided by education. Formerly, the younger peasant son chose above all the profession of pastor—even today, a not insubstantial proportion of the Catholic clergy in the German-speaking region are Czech. Today, he turns to other professions.

We have seen that the Germans are much more heavily represented among the white-collar workers in industry and commerce than are the Czechs; now we see that the academic professions include a proportionally higher number of Czechs than Germans. In Bohemia, according to the professional census, public service and independent professions accounted for only 1,131 out of ten thousand Germans, but for 1,178 out of the same number of Czechs. Table 3.7 provides the figures for secondary school attendance in Bohemia reported by Rauchberg.

The level of attendance of secondary school, a necessary prerequisite for the independent professions, is much higher among Czechs than it is among Germans. If the difference between upper secondary school attendance by the Germans and that of the Czechs has decreased somewhat over the last decade, this is only because Czech attendance of nonclassical secondary schools has grown so extraordinarily quickly. If we have up until now

Table 3.7 Secondary School Attendance in Bohemia for 1880–81, 1890–91, and 1900–01

School year	German upper secondary schools	German <i>Realschulen</i> (non-classical secondary schools)	Czech upper secondary schools	Czech <i>Realschulen</i>
1880–81	240	84	318	90
1890–91	233	102	292	91
1900–01	230	129	236	203

Note: Figures given are numbers of students per 100,000.

Source: Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*.

frequently found the Czech judge and official so frequently in the German region, we will soon also encounter the Czech engineer and architect in the German industrial region. There can be no doubt as to the reason for the high rate of participation among Czechs in the independent professions when we see that, for example, in the school year 1900–01, twenty-one out of a hundred thousand Germans but only ten out of a hundred thousand Czechs attended advanced technical schools. If we further compare the figures for upper secondary schools in industrial German Bohemia with those in the agrarian Alpine lands, we will find this pattern confirmed. The higher attendance figures for the Czech secondary schools and the lower ones for the German secondary schools in Bohemia are an effect of the fact that German Bohemia is more advanced in industrial terms than the Czech part of the land. This highly educated Czech intelligentsia now flocks naturally into the German industrial region, in which the population size and therefore also the need for officials, judges, lawyers, and physicians rapidly increases. The German petty bourgeois consequently encounters Czech officials in growing numbers in local government offices and courts, in the offices of the postal system and the railways. For him, the hated Czech embodies the power of the state, administers his affairs, passes judgment over him, collects taxes from him. Every encounter in the sphere of public administration nurtures national hatred anew.

The industrial character of the German and the agrarian character of the Czech part of the land constituted the fundamental cause of the Czech immigration to German Bohemia: it was the cause not only of the immigration of Czech workers, but also of the influx of the Czech petty bourgeoisie and the Czech intelligentsia. This immigration aroused the hatred of the German population, above all that of the German petty bourgeoisie and the German intelligentsia. This hatred was unable to take on the concrete form of a political demand, because Czech immigration could be brought to an end only if its cause were eliminated, and the German Bohemian population certainly

did not want to restrict the development of the region's industrial forces. The petty bourgeois thus found emotional release in demonstrations devoid of objective or sense, in fruitless outcry. The hatred felt by the majority awakened that felt by the minority. The news of the struggles inflamed passions on both sides. The question of national minorities was blown up out of all proportion to its numerical importance, and because one was unable to account for the aimless politics of hatred in rational terms, it was justified with the empty slogan of the struggle for the "national honor." Whoever seeks the solution to the Bohemian nationalities question will not be able to ignore this fact. One cannot answer this important question if one is unable to solve the problem of the national minorities. But now the national hatred that fills the Austrian population and above all the Austrian petty bourgeoisie can be comprehended in causal terms. It is a product of that painful process of population resettlement and the antagonisms and struggles it produced; it is nothing more than one of the many forms of the social hatred, the class hatred, engendered by the violent upheaval that has been produced everywhere in the old form of society by modern capitalism. *National hatred is transformed class hatred.*

We have up until this point considered the German regions as the industrial, the Czech as the agrarian areas. Meanwhile, industry also developed in the Czech region. Here, too, the capitalist class was initially German. The historical fact that in the old Austria the dominant and propertied classes everywhere had been German continued to exercise an effect at the time of the emergence of industry in the Czech parts of the land. Thus we find, for example, several principal centres of the textile industry within the Czech region in northeast Bohemia. But in these places, where the population is either exclusively or predominantly Czech, the employers are either Germans or Jews who have sought integration into the German cultural community, who speak German and provide their children with a German education, who support the German national parties and surround themselves with a staff of German white-collar employees. Anyone who visits the centers of this textile industry—Nachod, Königinhof, Hořic, Eipel, Neustadt on the Moldau, and others—will find everywhere a German colony in the midst of a Czech workforce and a Czech petty bourgeoisie, a colony that consists almost exclusively of the capitalists and their white-collar employees and is strongly interspersed with Jewish elements.

The capitalist colony was never able to integrate itself into the petty bourgeois world. It brought with it another lifestyle, another way of life, other opinions into the petty bourgeois town. Above all, however, it evaluated people on a different basis. That which was previously accorded prestige in the small town now lost all importance. What was the shopkeeper compared to the industrialist? The teacher compared to the factory director? Even the pastor was not greeted by the foreign interlopers, and they did not accord the

conventional respect to the honorable members of the petty bourgeoisie who enjoyed the privilege of sitting at the table reserved for the "notables." The typical petty bourgeois citizen, suspicious of everything foreign, saw his customs flouted, his social dignity held in scant regard. And here, too, the foreign colony presented a danger to the clique that governed the parish. As small in terms of the number of its members as the German colony might have been, the system of privileged voting rights very soon provided it with political power. Due to the importance of their fiscal contributions, the German industrialists very soon took exclusive control of the first electoral curia, and their white-collar employees disputed the right of the local petty bourgeoisie to the second electoral curia. Thanks to the plutocratic organization of our parishes, the capitalist German minorities posed a far greater danger to the parish cliques than did the Czech worker colonies to the German parishes. Thus, the petty bourgeois Czech saw his traditional conceptions, his customs and way of life flouted by the German minority, his social prestige threatened, his power in the parish destroyed.

The petty bourgeois individual's envy of the capitalist's superior standard of living, his lack of understanding of the more liberal life style of the modern bourgeoisie, was in most cases not mitigated by any economic interest in the Germany colony. The German gentlemen and ladies were not the customers of the Czech tailor and shoemaker in the small rural town, but obtained all they needed from the city. They did not spend their leisure time in the public house of the petty bourgeoisie, where the philistines sat over their beer and discussed the great questions of the world as represented in their small minds, but created their own centers for their own forms of social gathering. A large proportion of the industrialists spent a large part of the year not in the Czech industrial town, but, for example, in Vienna. The surplus value that was produced by the labor of the Czech worker in the small town was thus not exchanged for the merchandise of the local petty bourgeoisie, but for that of the fashionable capitalist enterprises in the city.

However, it was not only the petty bourgeoisie that was the enemy of the German capitalist and the German white-collar worker. The weaver working in his home, grossly exploited and impoverished, also knew the German only as capitalist. The workers in the spinning mill, the mechanized weaving mill, and the cotton printery were also confronted by the capitalist and the foreman as Germans. All the hatred of the workers for the capitalist necessarily took the form here of national hatred.

In a highly unusual manner, the hatred of the Germans was linked with the hatred of the Jews. The German minorities in the Czech industrial regions were to a considerable extent composed of Jews. If, on the one hand, the old hatred of the Jews was kept alive by the fact that the Jews appeared in the guise of the national adversary, of the German, so, on the other hand, hatred of the Jews was also generally transposed onto the German nation, to which the Jews in these regions belonged.

No class struggle conscious of its objective was able to express the hatred felt by the Czech petty bourgeoisie for the German colonies in its midst. The petty bourgeois could not in fact wage any struggle in earnest against the German capitalists; for the only means by which he could have been delivered from the German strangers, the elimination of industry within the Czech-speaking region, were means he could not want. Thus, he too was left with no other means of venting his passions than the politics of senseless rage, the politics of demonstrations devoid of concrete aims, of petty violence, of aimless harassment. He thus also began—just like the German petty bourgeois—a struggle against German inscriptions, against the use of the German language, against German festivals. Here too, that which was worthless in itself became something highly valued by the minority as soon as the attempt was made to take it away. The German student in Prague regarded a leisurely walk, a stroll in the Czech town, as already constituting a national act. The same national tension that in German Bohemia was produced by the immigration of Czech workers and petty bourgeoisie was created here by the settlement of German capitalists and their white-collar employees.

But while the petty bourgeois hatred waged its noisy and useless struggles on the market, capitalism silently worked further at its task of social differentiation. Its next success was the creation of Czech capital, of a Czech bourgeoisie. The emergence of a Czech bourgeoisie has above all been connected to the rapid industrialization of a number of Czech regions. Above all, it is the industrial region of Prague and its environs that has developed so extraordinarily rapidly over recent years.

Rauchberg presents the following figures regarding the industrial character of Prague and the suburbs closely tied to it. In 1900, of every thousand persons resident there, the following numbers could be found in the occupational groups listed:

Agriculture and forestry	124
Industry	475
Trade and commerce	210
Public services and independent professions . . .	191

Of every thousand persons working in industry, there were the following numbers in the positions listed:

Self-employed workers	158
White-collar workers	41
Blue-collar workers	767
Day laborers	22
Participating family members	12

The number of white-collar workers is conspicuously high, the number of participating family members conspicuously low. Both figures indicate the capitalist character of Prague industry. The comparatively high number of independents can be in part explained by the fact that many entrepreneurs

whose enterprises are situated outside of Prague reside in the city and can be in part attributed to the fact that in Prague, as in every large city, there resides a considerable number of artisans dependent on capital, who from an economic point of view are hardly more than workers in the putting-out system, but are recorded in the statistics as independents.

The population of Prague and its suburbs increased at an extraordinary pace, as indicated by the following population figures:

1880 276,260

1890 343,383

1900 437,053

Between 1881 and 1890 population growth amounted to 24.29 percent, between 1891 and 1900 to 27.27 percent. This growth essentially benefited industry. The proportion of the population working in industry rose between 1890 and 1900 by the following percentages:

German districts 148.3

Districts with a German majority . . . 210.2

Districts with a Czech majority 6.9

Prague and environs 288.4

Other Czech districts 76.4

In no other language region has the displacement of the population into industry occurred as rapidly as in the industrial district of Prague.

Certainly, the capitalists in the Prague industrial district were initially as a rule also German. However, the rapid industrial development here produced a national bourgeoisie. The rapid rise in ground rent as a consequence of the growth of the population transformed a number of Prague house owners into capitalists. The rapid deployment of industrial forces provided some petty bourgeoisie with the opportunity to realize supplementary profits, and in the hands of the thrifty petty bourgeois citizen the surplus value realized became capital. Many a small trader, in times of rapid industrialization, transforms himself into a small capitalist.

It is not only by way of *accumulation* that Czech capital emerged, but also by way of *centralization*. Savings banks and cooperatives collected together the innumerable fragments of capital in the land. Unifying their forces enabled the creation of large Czech capitalist undertakings, Czech joint stock companies, a large Czech bank, an insurance company, breweries, and so on.

Finally, the Czech bourgeoisie also emerged due to the fact that capitalists of other nationalities adapted to their Czech surroundings and merged with the Czech people. This was particularly common among the Jewish capitalists, whose children, under the influence of the Czech school and the Czech environment, were won over to the Czech cultural community. In the most recent census, 55.2 percent of the Bohemian Jews already declared Czech to be their usual language.

The development of a Czech bourgeoisie initially changed nothing in regard to the prevailing national antagonisms; rather, the young Czech upper bourgeoisie made the national quarrel serve its own interests. It imitated on a higher level the example of the Czech petty bourgeoisie and made its nationality into an instrument of struggle in the sphere of competition, a competition that was no longer tied to a restricted local market, but that now extended over the whole region settled by the Czech people. Now it became a matter of national duty to buy Czech matches and Czech soap, to make one's capital available to a Czech bank, to insure one's house against the risk of fire with a Czech company.

But it was not only as a seller of its merchandise, but also as purchaser of labor power, that the Czech bourgeoisie utilized tensions in the national sphere. By placing itself at the head of the nation and actually or allegedly representing national interests, it sought to mask class oppositions, to maintain the allegiance of the Czech workers, and to hinder the common struggle of the Czech and German workers against the Czech and German bourgeoisie, or at least to weaken the army of the working class through national division. The national hatred that had been produced by the transformation of all traditional relations through the effects of capitalism, the resettlement and restructuring of the population, and that had been condensed in the minds of the petty bourgeois strata of both nations thus became for the young Czech bourgeoisie an instrument of their interests, a means of ensuring the sale of their merchandise and the compliance of their workers. As the petty bourgeoisie is the bearer of national hatred, so is the bourgeoisie the beneficiary of national hatred.

If we cast a glance back over the last century of the history of the Czech people, we see two great events: in the era of the transition from the manufactory and the putting-out system to the modern factory, the awakening of the nation from the misery of nonhistorical existence, an awakening that rendered insupportable the traditional legal order governing national relations and ultimately led to national revolution; then, in the era of penetration by modern capitalism, the rapid industrialization first of the German part of the region, then also of the Czech part of the region, we see the awakening and progressive intensification of the national hatred that became the driving force of the national struggles. The emergence of the factory system and the movement of the population out of agriculture into industry were, however, manifestations of one and the same great process, the great transformation in the structuring of the work of the society: an increasing proportion of societal labor was turned to the manufacture of the means of production, a decreasing proportion directly to the production of consumer goods. When the factory replaced the manufactory, a part of the work carried out by the society shifted from the production of consumer goods to the production of machines. When the development of modern means of transport, of the railway

and the steamship, made it possible for the fertile lands in distant parts of the globe to be turned to the service of the grain requirements of Europe, when the elimination of the old putting-out system by the modern factory and the introduction of machines into agriculture drove the population out of agriculture into industry, this meant that a great part of the work of the society was now devoted to the production of steam engines, spinning machines, looms, locomotives and railway tracks, steamships and docks, coal and iron, but also that the society devoted less work directly to the cultivation of wheat and corn, to the production of our clothing. This change in the allocation of workers, in the structure of societal work, is the great law governing the development of our forces of production.

In economic terms, this change in the forces of production is manifested in the change in the composition of capital. A smaller part of the total capital of the society remains in the form of variable capital. Progress to a higher organic composition is synonymous with the transition from the manufactory to the factory, which has awakened the nation from the slumber of non-historical existence. Progress to a higher organic composition of capital is synonymous with the movement of the workforce out of agriculture into industry, which through a diverse process gives rise to national hatred, the driving force of national struggles. Those who have a love for compressing the causal explanation for complicated social phenomena into a short formula can confidently risk this phrase: the transformation of the power relations of the nations of Austria, the national struggles, are one of the many violent effects of the progress to a higher organic composition of capital. And when we recall the other effects of the violent upheaval of capitalism, which has transformed the entire face of the European cultural sphere, has led powerful states downward and elevated others out of inconspicuous beginnings, has completely transformed the very being of people, the scope and content of our whole culture, we can well claim that national development within Austria is far from being the most significant or serious effect of this complete transformation of the forces of human production. Seen from a historical distance, the Austrian nationalities conflict is nothing but one of the less considerable and less significant concomitants of a violent world historical process of upheaval that will usher in a new age in the history of humanity.

THE STATE AND THE NATIONAL STRUGGLES

In 1848, the Austrian nations found themselves confronted for the first time with the task of condensing their national claims into a political program. However, in the first months of the revolution, the nationalities question was posed in terms quite different from those of today.

Austria at this time encompassed four large historical nations: the Germans, the Italians, the Poles, and the Magyars. The constitutional program of

these nations was the realization of their nation-states. The Germans of Austria struggled together with their fellow nationals in the other states of the German Confederation for a unified German state. In the same manner, the Italians, Poles, and Magyars struggled for their nation-states. This policy, however, necessarily aroused the resistance of the nations that had until now been nonhistorical and that could not hope to secure free and independent nation-states for themselves. They feared that they would fall under the foreign domination of the large historical nations. In the hereditary lands, the initial question was not one of how the Germans, Czechs, and Slovenes should regulate their relations with each other within the state; the dispute concerned rather the issue of whether the Czechs and Slovenes should fall under the domination of a large German nation-state. In the same manner, the Ruthenians feared Polish foreign domination, the Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, and Romanians Magyar domination.

Whereas the Germans wanted Austria to be integrated into a large German Empire and the other historical nations wanted to dismember the old Austria, the nonhistorical nations, which were only just awakening to historical existence, placed their hopes in the continued existence of Austria. Austria was seen as saving them from foreign domination. They did not want to dismember Austria, but wanted to struggle within Austria for rights for their nations. However, this produced an ambiguous attitude in regard to the historical nations. On the one hand, the nonhistorical nations now also took on a revolutionary character: they, too, struggled for a constitution and civil liberties, for the liberation of the peasants; the revolution of 1848 was also their revolution: the incapacity of absolutism to fulfill the needs of the nations that had awakened to new life was one of the causes of this great upheaval. On the other hand, they did not want to destroy the old Austria, as did the revolutionary bourgeoisie and the revolutionary nobility of the old historical nations, and they feared the possibility of foreign domination by these nations in the new nation-states that the revolutionaries wanted to establish upon the unsteady ground of the old state. Although their revolutionary attitudes led them to the side of the revolutionary bourgeoisie in Germany and Italy, of the revolutionary nobility in Poland and Hungary, their concern for the continued existence and freedom of their nations led them to the side of reaction.

To no avail, revolutionary parties within the small Slavic nations also sought to hinder the placement of the forces of these nations at the service of the counterrevolution. The more pressing the danger to the nation appeared, the more the feeling of solidarity with the revolution of the historical nations paled into insignificance and the more the nonhistorical nations (and with them, the Croats) aligned themselves with the forces of reaction. For those struggling for the cause of revolution, however, this rapprochement necessarily appeared as a betrayal of the cause of liberty, and during these months the

democratic movement throughout Europe expressed its hatred for the small Slavic nations, which, through their alliance with the forces of reaction, contributed to no small extent to the defeat of democracy.

It was also at this time that Friedrich Engels wrote his articles on the Austrian nationalities question in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. These articles cannot be dismissed as merely journalistic works devoid of lasting value. For they, too, reveal the inspired historical vision of their author. Engels saw, more clearly than any other author of this epoch, the history of the emergence of Austria, the historical bases of the power relations between nations, even if he was incorrect regarding certain details; it was also he who coined the concept of "nonhistorical nations," which we have taken from these articles. However, we may not forget that these articles were born in the storms of the revolution, that they were written at a conjuncture that drove the nonhistorical nations into the camp of reaction, were written with the expectation that a Russo-German war would break out within a few weeks and would bring about the triumph of democracy over absolutism, but also the subjugation of the nonhistorical nations to the nation-states of the old historical nations. This explains many an error made by Engels, explains above all the fundamental error of these articles, the opinion that the nonhistorical nations can also not hope for a future. Today this view stands definitively refuted. And those who have not been convinced by the history of the Austrian nations must surely be convinced by the history of the Russian Revolution [1905], which has led nonhistorical nations such as the Latvians, the Estonians, and the Ukrainians into the first battle of the revolutionary struggle. And today, precisely on the basis of the method of historical research that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels have taught us, we can comprehend the causes of the awakening of the nonhistorical nations to historical life under the influence of capitalism, of revolution, and of democracy.

Only when the hope had faded that the old historical nations would be able to erect their nation-states upon the ruins of the old Austria was the Austrian nationalities question opened up, the answer to which the nations are still trying to find today. The question now is no longer one of the continued existence of Austria nor of its affiliation with the German Empire; the question now is only that of how the nations within Austria wish to regulate their coexistence. In the constitutional commission of Kremsier the Austrian nations for the first time sought an effective form for their coexistence. And here, the roles of the nations were immediately reversed. The representatives of the nonhistorical nations now became revolutionary, the historical nations conservative. The nonhistorical nations wanted to destroy all remnants of the old Austria, to do away with the old crown lands, and their spokesmen, the Slovene Kautschitsch and the Czech Palacký, proposed the division of Austria into a series of regions unified as far as possible on a national basis. Thus Palacký, whose proposal encompassed the whole of the monarchy, called for

the division of Austria into the following regions: (1) German Austria, (2) Czech Austria, (3) Polish Austria (to which the Ruthenians, whom one did not yet accord the status of a nation, should belong), (4) Illyrian Austria, (5) Italian Austria, (6) Southern Slavic Austria, (7) Magyar Austria, (8) the Wallachian Provinces. Within the borders of their area of settlement, each nation was to regulate its affairs freely and independently. The Germans, on the other hand, still perceived themselves as the usufructuaries of the historical regional division of old Austria, within which they had been the dominant nation, and defended the traditional system of the crown lands.

The constitutional commission sought to mediate between the two positions. Although it left the crown lands intact, the larger lands were to be divided under imperial law into a number of districts. The demarcation of these districts was to be undertaken with the "greatest possible consideration" of nationality. The districts were to be administered by an elected district assembly, the competence of which was not insignificant. It was to establish by-laws and exercise supervision of the parish; roads and means of transport were to be under its charge. Assistance for the poor, health and humanitarian institutions and religious foundations, and finally, institutions for the improvement of agriculture were to be left to its charge. But above all the district assemblies were allocated responsibility for matters of national culture. According to article 126 of the Kremsier draft constitution, "the educational system, with the right to determine the language and subjects of instruction, but with equal consideration accorded the languages of the district," was to be the responsibility of the district assembly. Each nation would thus have administered, at least within its defined area of settlement, its national system of education through the district assembly. To be sure, this constitution would not have completely spared Austria from national quarrels. However, it would have given each nation the possibility of independently establishing its own system of education within its language region and would have spared the nations from having to struggle within the *Reichsrat* or the provincial assembly for each school, from having to buy or extort each school from the state or the representatives of the other nations. A whole range of important questions, questions that have repeatedly unleashed the passions of the national struggle, would thus have been excluded from the argument. But when on 4 March 1849 the deputies in Kremsier wanted to assemble in order to adopt this draft constitution, they found the assembly hall occupied by the army; the forces of reaction, with a heavy-handed coup, had brought an end to the first and best attempt of the Austrian nations to find a legal code for their coexistence.⁵³ Only after the defeat upon the Italian battlefields, when the new constitutional era began, did the Austrian nations find themselves confronted anew with the same problem.

According to Rudolf Springer, the multinational state can regulate the coexistence of citizens of different nationalities in two ways.⁵⁴ It can first

comprehend the nation as an entity, make it a legal unit; the union of nations then constitutes the state. Springer calls this the *organic regulation* of the relationship of the nations to the state. This organic regulation can be undertaken in two further ways. According to the *territorial principle*, the regions inhabited by the different nations are demarcated from one another, and within each region each nation administers its own national affairs. The state regulates and administers only those affairs common to the different nations. The nation is here a territorial corporation. Or the state comprehends the nation as a community of individuals without ensuring it exclusive control within a particular region, thus taking as its basis not the territorial principle, but the *personality principle*. In this case, all Germans within Austria, whatever part of the empire they might inhabit, constitute a legal entity, an association. They administer matters of national culture, for example, through an elected national council. The national council has the duty to establish German schools for the members of this association, wherever they live; it has the right to levy taxes from them for the purpose of financing the needs of the nation.

In opposition to this organic conception is another that Springer describes as *centralist-atomist*. Here, the nation does not appear at all within the legal order; the legal order knows only, on the one hand, the state, and on the other, the individual, the individual citizen. This is also the legal order of Austria: the nations, for us, do not constitute juridical entities, either in the sense of associations of individuals or that of regional administrative bodies. Thus, if someone appoints the Czech nation as his heir, the will is invalid: the law recognizes no one who could claim the inheritance. If someone insults the Polish nation, the nation cannot institute proceedings against him: there is no one who would be legally entitled to institute such proceedings. The nation cannot tax its members; it cannot erect a school or a theater. Rather, such tasks can be undertaken only by the state, the individual citizen, or a voluntary association, a union of citizens. The nation has no juridical influence on the state; it cannot determine the actions of the state in any matter and cannot demand anything of it. All this is possible only for the individual, the solitary person who is accorded juridical power in relation to the state, as a voter, as an appellant before the administrative authority, as a plaintiff before the courts. It remains to individuals to decide whether they will voluntarily combine in a political party on the basis of their nationality and, as such, determine the will of the state, whether they want to realize the fulfillment of the cultural needs of their nation.

The antagonisms between the Austrian nations are not the consequence of inferior laws or an inferior constitution. Their ultimate cause lies in the great economic and social transformations that have led the nonhistorical nations onto the historical stage, that have caused national migrations and inflamed national hatred. But the form in which these antagonisms have acquired po-

litical efficacy, the particular contours of the political struggle in which the development of nations expresses itself, is nevertheless conditioned by the juridical form under the rule of which the nations confront one another.

The medieval state recognized a wide range of associations of individuals. In part these bore a ruling character, such as the landed seignory, the association of those under fief law and the association of those under liege law, and in part the character of a cooperative, such as the regional association [*Markgenossenschaft*] and the guild; in part they combined ruling and cooperative elements in that those under the same seignorial power were linked as a cooperative, just as was the case in the manorial community [*Hofgenossenschaft*] of the bonded peasants of the same manor. All these associations of individuals freely created their own laws. Within the cooperative, it was the will of the members that created the law through custom or statute; within the seignorial associations the will of the lord had lawmaking power; and where seignory and cooperative were combined, both the lord and the cooperative constituted by his dependants participated in the formation of laws.

This power of the seignorial and cooperative associations was not based on a conferment by the state. In the modern state there is of course only *one* free and independent power, the sovereign state; and wherever legal power is to be found within the state, it is derived from the state, is regarded as conferred by the state, and can be amended or revoked by the state. By contrast, the medieval state did not recognize the concept of sovereignty. As in the Carolingian epoch the ancient people's law emerging from the customary rights of the people's tribunal coexisted without an intermediary alongside the royal court, both equally autonomous, both equally independent of one another, so too the law of the seignorial and cooperative associations within the medieval feudal state was not derived from the state, was not subject to the influence of the state, and could not be revoked by it. Only the increase in the actual power of the state, brought by commodity production and by armies and bureaucracies paid in money, enabled the state to augment its juridical power. The appeal to Roman law would have borne little fruit, and the new theory of the state developed by the philosophers who developed the concept of sovereignty (Bodin, Hobbes) would never have come into being had the development of commodity production and the money economy not given the state the effective power to make itself independent of the old seignorial and cooperative associations and then either to eliminate them or subject them to its statutes.

The estates [*Stände*] represented a reassembling of all the autonomous powers not bound to this state. Within the dual estate-state system, the state was always confronted with a power that did not derive its system of rights from the state, but negotiated with it power to power. But the state either subjugated the estates or made them its organ.⁵⁵ Only now did the state become sovereign. In some cases, the associations of individuals entirely disappeared,

whereas in others—seignories, guilds—the state allowed them to continue to exist, but only in a dependent form, subject to its laws. Increasingly the absolutist state limited the ancient associations of individuals; it thus strove to achieve a situation in which a centralized state power confronted only the mass of unorganized individuals, a situation “in which, apart from the state, there are only individuals, in which no intermediary of any kind stands between the supreme universality of the all-providing state and the sum of individuals constituting the people, in which such associations are rather considered as local manifestations of the state or as individuals.”⁵⁶

Thus we have on the one side centralized state power and on the other the society reduced to its smallest parts, its atoms, to single individuals. The centralist-atomist conception of the state is the idea of the state found in absolutism. This idea of the state was inherited by liberalism and taken to its logical conclusion. The bourgeois-revolutionary theoreticians of the eighteenth century had already declared their support for the centralist-atomist conception of the state; in this respect there is no fundamental difference between Rousseau and Hobbes. Following its victory, liberalism swept away the last remains of the ancient autonomous associations of individuals by eliminating the guilds in the towns and by dissolving the seignorial-peasant relationship in the countryside. The work that absolutism had begun was thereby completed.

The force that had produced the centralist-atomist idea of the state and decided its victory was the development of capitalist commodity production. Capitalist commodity production required neither the cooperative nor the seignorial association. The social character of production no longer needed a cooperative of producers as soon as the large capitalist enterprise united the isolated workers as its workers in the work of the society. The personal bondage of the workers became unnecessary from the moment capitalist property gave the owner the power to exploit the legally free worker. Cooperative and seignorial associations were thus rendered unnecessary and could disappear. And indeed they had to disappear, since they constituted a hindrance to the development of capitalism. The centralist-atomist idea of the state was initially the absolutist conception of the state and subsequently that of liberalism. It was both because it constitutes the capitalist idea of the state.

But liberalism did not simply adopt the absolutist conception of the state; it also modified it. Liberalism was the political program of the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the absolutist state. The notion of the sovereign state itself was left unchallenged by the bourgeoisie. However, the burgher felt himself restricted from birth until death by the all-pervading power of the state and its organ, the bureaucracy; the bureaucrat regulated his enterprises, censored his every expression of opinion, observed every step he took in public as in private life. Thus, the burgher initially demanded protection of his liberty against the state. But he wanted not only to secure a sphere of freedom

against the all-pervading power of the state, but to conquer the power of the state. Dissatisfied with the promotion of his interests by the state insofar as these coincided with the state's interests, he wanted to determine the will of the state himself. He wished to become an organ of the state, to participate as a voter in the formation of the overall will of the state. Thus, the bourgeoisie demanded that legislative power be transferred either to the people itself or to the parliament, the elected representative of the people, and that the administrative apparatus be responsible to the representative body of the people. In all of this, the centralist-atomist idea of the state remained unaltered. On the one side, centralized state power remained in place; facing it was the unorganized mass of individual citizens. But the individual citizen was guaranteed a range of civil rights and liberties, which the state could not restrict, and the individual citizens were themselves called upon as voters to form the overall will of the state.

The centralist-atomist idea of the state necessarily also determined the regulation of the relationship of the nations to the state. Absolutism could not constitute the nations as corporations—either as regional administrative bodies or as interterritorial associations of persons. Rather than create new corporations, absolutism was concerned with smashing the old traditional social associations in order to confront an unorganized mass of subjects with the centralized power of the state. Liberalism now inherited this centralist-atomist conception: it also did not constitute the nation as a corporation. However, on the one hand, it guaranteed the individual a sphere of juridical liberty and, on the other, it called on the individual to participate in the formation of the overall will of the state. This also determined its position in relation to the national question.

In the same way as liberalism assured the individual of other civil rights and liberties, it also had to guarantee him the right to maintain and develop his national specificity. Thus, in the constitution of 25 April 1848 we already find the sentence "To all peoples is guaranteed the inviolability of their nationality and their language." The imposed constitution of 7 March 1849 adopts this principle: "All peoples have equal rights, and every people has an inviolable right to the defense and preservation of its nationality and language." This principle then passed into our current constitution and is expressed in article 19 of the Basic Law of the State concerning the general rights of the citizen. Insofar as this principle incorporates a restriction of the authority of the state and its organs, it is quite clear, and it can be logically related to the system of individual civil rights and liberties. Thus, in Austria, one cannot forbid anyone from utilizing his language in spoken or written form; article 19 extends this protection of personal liberty still further through the largely ineffective regulation that, in the bilingual regions, no one can be compelled to learn the second language of the region. Just as the Basic Law of the State seeks to safeguard the individual citizen against the violation of the

privacy of the post by the bureaucracy or against arbitrary arrests, so too does it prevent the state from forbidding the individual the use of his language or forcing him to learn another language. Were the state nevertheless to do this, the individual citizen can bring a complaint on the matter before the imperial court on the grounds of violation of his right as guaranteed by the Basic Law of the State.

So far, so good. However, in order to maintain and further develop its culture, the nation requires not only this safeguarding of the rights of the individual, but also the active role of the public administrative apparatus; it requires schools, theaters, museums, and academies. The concern here is no longer with the limitation of the power of the state; in this instance it is precisely the activity of the state that the nation needs in the interest of its culture. Here, article 19 fails. To be sure, it assures the nations of the "preservation of their nationality and language." But this is hardly more than an empty promise. If the Polish majority in the Galician diet refuses the Ruthenians a new upper secondary school, the Ruthenians cannot complain by appealing to the Basic Law of the State. Who is entitled to bring the complaint if the Ruthenian nation is not constituted as a corporation? How could the imperial court bring down a decision in relation to a complaint against a decision made by a legislative body to which it must accord the freedom to adopt or reject applications? How should the imperial court ultimately decide how many upper secondary schools the Ruthenians require for the "preservation of their nationality and language"?

Here the liberal constitution offers the citizens another way. As voters they, of course, have an influence on the state itself. Should they desire that the state administrative apparatus fulfill the cultural needs of their nation, they are free to join together with their national comrades to form a political party, to send their national deputies to the relevant representative bodies, and to charge them with the task of utilizing their legal power within the legislative bodies to compel the state to fulfill the needs of the nation. The centralist-atomist idea of the state compels the population to divide itself into national parties; it compels each nation to maintain a commando in the parliament whose task it is to ensure that the state legislation and administration satisfies the needs of the nation; it compels each nation to strive for power in regard to legislation and for influence within the state administrative apparatus. In Austria, what is usually characterized as national politics is in fact national power politics, the strivings of the nation to gain representation within the *Reichsrat*, the provincial assemblies, and the bureaucracy such that the nation is in the position to compel the state to satisfy its respective cultural needs. The grouping of the Austrian population in national parties and the struggles of these parties for power within the state, for power over the state, is a necessary consequence of the centralist-atomist regulation of the relationship of the nations to the state.⁵⁷

The struggle of the nations for influence over the state now necessarily becomes a struggle of the nations against one another. This struggle concerns the allocation of the given number of seats in the parliament. The more one nation wins of these seats, the fewer remain for the others. It concerns the expenditure of state income for the purposes of the individual nations. The more the state spends on meeting the cultural needs of one nation, the less means it can place at the disposal of the other nations. The struggle of each nation for power over the state is therefore also a struggle against the other nations. Every struggle for power is a struggle against the other aspirants to power; where national politics means power politics, it leads necessarily to national struggle.

If we separate national interests from the legal order to which nations are subject within the multinational state, it becomes clear that these interests, in themselves, are by no means in conflict with one another. Each nation wants to maintain its specificity and further develop its culture. In itself this aspiration by no means leads to national struggle. The German wants his children to attend a good German school; the language in which Czech children are instructed can be a matter of indifference for him. Conversely, the Czech calls for Czech schools; whether and how German children are instructed does not concern him. The German wants to exercise his rights before his judge in his language. The Czech wants the judge to address him in his own language. Does this constitute a basis for struggle? Cannot the needs of each nation be fulfilled without the interests of the other nations thereby being endangered? In themselves, certainly. However, the centralist-atomist constitution of the state provides the nation with no other means to ensure the satisfaction of its needs than the struggle for power over the state. If one nation increases its power within the state, it thereby reduces the power of the other nations. In this way, each nation becomes hostile to the demands of the other nations. It is the centralist-atomist constitution alone that transforms the natural aspirations of every nation—in themselves of no concern to the other nations—into the struggle of each nation against the fulfillment of the cultural needs of the others.

But the Austrian constitution of 1861 and 1867 not only pointed the nations toward the struggle for power; it also attempted to determine in advance the distribution of power among the nations. It sought in effect to secure the domination of the formerly nonhistorical nations by the historical nations and among the historical nations themselves the predominance of the Germans.

This goal was initially served by the curial franchise for the provincial assemblies and the *Reichsrat*. The first curia was constituted by the great landholders. Herein lay a privilege for all historical nations, which were alone in possessing a nobility; the formerly nonhistorical nations came away empty handed. This meant, in particular, a privilege for the Germans, since the

seigniorial class in the Czech and Slovene lands was predominantly German by virtue of descent and education. The second curia was constituted by the chambers of commerce and industry. Their electoral privilege also necessarily strengthened the hand of the Germans, who constituted the greater part of the bourgeoisie. The great mass of the population, however, was crammed into two curias: the curia of the towns, markets, and industrial centers and the curia of the rural parishes.

As the curia of the towns obtained much stronger representation—one deputy corresponded to far fewer voters than was the case in the rural parish curia—here again those nations were privileged that incorporated a larger share of the urban and industrial population, in particular, the Germans. Finally, in both curias the right to vote was made dependent upon a taxation census. Once again, the nations composed predominantly of proletarians, the smallest-scale artisans, peasants, and day laborers, were placed at a disadvantage. In this manner the old historical nations within the empire were assured of greater power than that which corresponded to the size of their populations; the representation of the Germans was greater than that of the Czechs, the Poles were more effectively represented than the Ruthenians, the Italians better than the Southern Slavs. But it was the Germans who secured the strongest representation of all.

However, the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy were not in a position to assert their hegemony over the whole empire. Thus emerged the Compromise [*Ausgleich*] of 1867. The dominant classes of the old historical nations (apart from the Italians, whose numbers were too small after 1866) divided power among themselves. The western half of the empire was left to the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy, the eastern half to the Magyar nobility. The Germans in Austria ensured their hegemony in the west by totally abandoning the administration of Galicia to the Polish nobility from 1869 onward. In the same manner, the Magyars accorded autonomy to the Croats within their own land. All other nations—the peoples that had neither a bourgeoisie nor a nobility—came away from this division empty handed.⁵⁸ In the Austrian half of the empire, which is our exclusive focus here, the hegemony of the Germans was hereby assured.

What is the origin of this peculiar constitution that sought to guarantee the Germans in Austria a level of power that bore no relation to the size of their population? The domination of the Czechs and Slovenes by the Germans, of the Ruthenians by the Poles, of the Southern Slavs by the Italians was the national manifestation of domination by the classes that had taken hold of state power. These classes were constituted by the great landowners, the bureaucracy, and the bourgeoisie. The seigniorial class in western Austria had been German or Germanized since the suppression of the estates by absolutism. The Polish and Ruthenian peasant masses in Galicia were left at the mercy of the Polish nobility, in exchange for which the latter became the

most reliable source of support for German domination in western Austria. Although the different nations were represented in the large body of lesser officials, this group remained unconditionally obedient to the higher German bureaucracy in matters of politics and public life. Finally, as already discussed, the Austrian bourgeoisie was also predominantly German. German hegemony within Austria from 1861 until 1867 was not the hegemony of the German people over the other nations; it was the hegemony of the great German landowners, the German bureaucracy, and the German bourgeoisie over the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and the workers of all nations, including the German nation.

However, German hegemony in Austria was not only based in the historically transmitted class structure; it was also an instrument of foreign policy. At the beginning of the constitutional era, Austria was directly confronted with the task of finding a solution to the German question. Schmerling had already been the spokesman of the Great German [*großdeutsch*] Party in the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848.⁵⁹ He retained this role when he drafted the new Austrian constitution. As long as it claimed the imperial crown for the Habsburgs, Austria had to appear to be a German state. However, disguise is not legal tender on the market of history. The German veneer with which Schmerling concealed the old state edifice deceived no one. The artificial predominance of a narrow German stratum could change nothing in terms of the real power relations within the empire. The Great German policy was defeated on the battlefield of Königgrätz [Sadowa]. However, Austria still did not give the matter up for lost. The Compromise of 1867 with Hungary was intended to satisfy the rebellious Magyar nobility and to place German hegemony within the western half of the empire on a correspondingly firmer footing. In vain! The year 1870 witnessed the realization of the long-coveted goal of the Small Germany [*kleindeutsch*] policy when Prussia assumed the imperial German crown.

For a moment it seemed as if the failure to achieve the end would necessarily entail the defeat of the means. Now, since the Austrian hope of hegemony over Germany had been destroyed, the supremacy of the Germans in Austria itself no longer appeared a necessity. Under Hohenwart, the December constitution was seriously threatened.⁶⁰ However, it was precisely at this point that the hegemony of the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy in Austria revealed itself to be more than merely an instrument of foreign policy and showed how deeply rooted this group was within the power relations of the empire itself. In order to oppose Hohenwart, a coalition was formed between, on the one hand, the interests of the German bourgeoisie, which was seeking to avoid falling under the domination of the feudal landowners and the Czech petty bourgeoisie in the most highly developed region of the empire, and, on the other, the German tradition of the bureaucracy and the power of the Magyar nobility, which could not tolerate the liberation of the

Slavs in Austria because it feared the rebellion of the Slavs and Romanians within its own land. The Hohenwart ministry fell, and German domination in Austria survived the concept of Great Germany.

The centralist-atomist regulation of national relations leaves no nation with any guarantee of the satisfaction of its cultural needs other than power within the state. However, from the outset this power was allocated to the historical nations through the dual nature of the monarchy and through the selective franchise within Austria. The nonhistorical nations were thus confronted with a constitution that pointed to the struggle for power, and yet also excluded them from this power. This produced a hostility toward the state, an irreconcilable hatred of Austria, among these nations—and in particular among the Czechs, the most highly developed of them. If there is a nation that has an interest in the continued existence of Austria and for which the thought of Austria's decline necessarily awakens not the hope of national unity, but the fear of foreign domination, it is that of the Czechs. And yet in no other Austrian nation can the same hatred, the same hostility toward the Austrian state, be found as that seen among the Czechs. And the more this hatred that was awakened by the Schmerling constitution spread and deepened, the more the Austrian bureaucracy nourished it with its crude means of persecution, confiscation, administrative harassment, and partisan justice. A state of mind was thus created in the Czech people that has subsequently given rise to the aggressive radicalism of the Czechs in regard to all national questions, a bitter mood to which all sober consideration of national questions appears insupportable.

The class that first put its stamp on the national struggle was the landed nobility. This class encompassed highly heterogeneous elements: on the one hand, the great latifundia proprietors, who called immense estates throughout Austria and in many cases also beyond the borders of the empire their own (one thinks of the Schwarzenbergs and their ninety-nine estates), lords of high rank whose genealogy stretched at least as far back as that of the dynasty and who consequently viewed their rank as equal to that of the crown; on the other hand, the lesser nobility with correspondingly small landholdings, who from time immemorial had occupied the high and intermediate positions in the bureaucracy and the officers' corps, who had been in close contact with the bourgeoisie since the flourishing of capitalism, and who were therefore imbued with the ideology of the bourgeoisie.⁶¹ The societal power of this class was still very extensive at the beginning of the constitutional era. The economic power and social standing of the bourgeoisie, which alone could have disputed the traditional position within the society of the seignorial class, grew only gradually in Austria, where the progress of capitalism proved slow. The concept of civil equality only slowly penetrated the consciousness of the masses; after all, it had been only a few years since the state judge and state official had replaced the "lord"—the "authority." This social

weight of the nobility was strengthened by political privilege, by the selective franchise for the provincial assemblies and the *Reichsrat*. The big landowners had been accorded this prerogative on the basis of their German nationality. A part of the nobility did not disappoint expectations. It became an ally of the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy and provided them with a majority in the representative bodies. However, the most powerful part of the nobility, the great latifundia proprietors of Bohemia, allied themselves with the opponents of the German liberalism dominant at the time. The alliance of the "feudal nobility" with the Czechs gave the national struggles under the rule of the liberal constitution their initial character.

We encounter a related phenomenon for the first time in the epoch of enlightened absolutism. Absolutism had taken from the old estates what remained of their political significance. The whole of its legislation and administration was under the influence of the rationalist bourgeois spirit of the Enlightenment, and therefore in contradiction to the traditional ideology of the greater part of the nobility. But even if the nobility had forgiven absolutism for reducing the rights of the estates and for the policies of Joseph II concerning the church, it could never forgive the fact that the state also intervened in its economic situation, the fact that imperial officials and commissioners investigated the complaints of the peasants, the fact that the state forbade expropriation of peasants' land, limited the obligations of the peasants regarding labor services and dues, granted the peasants freedom of movement and choice of profession, and altered the taxation laws to the disadvantage of the lords. At this time the Bohemian nobility recalled the struggles that the Czech nobility had led against the state prior to 1620, and since these struggles had been clad in the guise of national struggles against the German state, the Bohemian nobility also toyed with the idea of provoking a national struggle against the hated societal enemy. Of course, the prevailing relations had completely changed since the defeat of the old Bohemian estates, and thus the incensed lords had to content themselves with quite harmless demonstrations. Thus, during the reign of Joseph II, as reported by Count Kaspar Sternberg, the nobility expressed its indignation at the emperor's reforms by agreeing among themselves that all Bohemian nobles would use only the Czech language in the antechambers of the imperial castle, although they could speak it only to a very limited extent.⁶²

The sympathy of the nobility with the Czechs revealed itself more clearly when the new cultural life of the Czech nation emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century. It is possible that the patronage provided by this or that noble to young Czech writers might have merely been the result of an idle whim, one that could be satisfied equally well by a small outlay to support the beginnings of Czech literature as by the collection of some curio or other. But clearly there were also some among the Bohemian nobility who already saw that the cultural movement of the nation would necessarily gain a political

significance. Some noble gentlemen may have been drawn to the young movement by the influence of the ideas of humanity and nationality with which the epoch was imbued. Others encouraged it out of hatred for the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. Soon the nobility no longer regarded itself as German, but as standing above both nations, as their arbiter by birth. Josef Matthias Count of Thun wrote in 1845 that he could say "with complete confidence that I am neither a Czech nor a German, but a Bohemian," whereupon a Czech answered that this constituted great progress since only a few years previously no Bohemian noble would have hesitated to describe himself as a German.⁶³

However, it was only after 1860, when in the "strengthened *Reichsrat*" Clam-Martinić, Nostitz-Rhienick, and Goluchowski supported the theory of "politicohistorical individualities," that this brief relationship became a lasting alliance. How could it happen that this doctrine, which was fundamentally antinational, which was quite consciously and explicitly employed to counter the "Garibaldian dogma of nationalities," ultimately led to the alliance of the Czech national party with the feudal nobility? As long as the large landowners and the bourgeoisie did not have a common enemy to fear in the form of the proletariat, the opposition of these two classes dominated political struggles everywhere. In the struggle against the growing power of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state, the nobility sought allies and found them everywhere in the classes that were in economic conflict with the bourgeoisie. In England, the Tories occasionally supported the workers in the struggle against capital in order to detach them from the Liberal Party. Similarly, the Junkers in Germany—and during the Prussian constitutional conflict the crown itself—attempted to play off the workers against the liberal bourgeoisie. In Austria, too, a part of the nobility flirted with the idea of rescuing the middle classes and protecting the workers for as long as it hoped to find an ally in the petty bourgeoisie and the working class for its struggle against liberalism. And although the social demagoguery of the nobility nowhere achieved the success it sought, it was in Austria that the conditions most favorable to its reception prevailed. Here the social demagoguery of the nobility assumed the particular form of national demagoguery. The nobility sought to combat the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy by allying itself with the national movement of the Slavic, and in particular the Czech, petty bourgeoisie. In this context, the nobility's opposition to the constitution provided a means of establishing this alliance.

Within the empire, the nobility had to share power with the German bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. The prospect of Bohemia's becoming an independent state, however, represented a quite different situation. In this case, the Czech petty bourgeoisie would have voted down the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. However, the idea of the Czech petty bourgeoisie's governing Bohemia seemed impossible in undemocratic Austria at a time when only

the great and the wealthy were called on to exercise power, when the system of electoral privileges gave the curia of big landowners the power to help this or that nation to gain a majority, and when the big landowners were thereby given the role of arbiter between nations, of the ruler of nations. The idea of Bohemia's becoming an independent state thus meant that power would fall automatically into the hands of the proprietors of the great latifundia.

Added to this was the fact that the social standing of the nobility became more politically effective the smaller the sphere in which the struggle for state power was waged. Within the empire, the standing of the nobility faded; for the proud names of the Bohemian lineages were foreign to the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie in other regions. Within the narrow local sphere, on the other hand, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie were not capable of escaping the force of the economic power and the traditional standing of the "masters," and therefore gave the nobility their political allegiance without resistance.

Finally, the concept of federalism was also ideologically appealing to the nobility. For this class, the imperial constitution appeared to be a child of the despised revolution that had destroyed its ancestral privileges and broken its power over the peasantry. The crown lands, on the other hand, were historical entities that were closely associated with the memory of the estates system. Since the power of the nobility was based everywhere on historical tradition, this class assumed the role of the defender of this historical tradition. Furthermore, it was the nobility's love for the semimediæval past that gave rise to the doctrine of the inviolability of "politicohistorical individualities" and their necessary maintenance as the foundation of the state.

The nobility thus raised the question of the constitution. It opposed centralism with federalism: Austria, it argued, should become a federal state, with the new imperial constitution replaced by a loose federation of almost independent crown lands. The federal constitution being proposed was also characterized in terms of autonomy for the crown lands—a grave misuse of the word: autonomy means self-administration. If I unite an industrial and an agrarian region, a German and a Czech region by force such that one must be dominated by another and both by a class of foreign landed proprietors, this constitutes not autonomy in the sense of self-administration, but heteronomy, foreign domination. The federalist constitution would also not have altered anything in regard to the centralist-atomist conception of the relationship of the nations to the state; it could not have constituted the nations as corporate bodies because all Austrian nations inhabited more than one crown land. Thus, for all peoples, the crown lands' constitution represented the division of nations, and since nearly all crown lands were inhabited by more than one nation, the federalist constitution represented in every crown land the domination by one nation of the others. Under the federalist constitution, too, every nation would have been forced to enter the struggle

for political power in order to ensure satisfaction of its cultural needs; the struggle for power in the crown lands would simply have replaced the struggle for power in the empire.

However, the displacement of the national power struggle from the empire to the crown lands would, of course, have fundamentally altered the distribution of power among the nations. The Czechs, whose position was intolerable under the Schmerling constitution and equally so under the December constitution, saw a hope here of winning the power that they needed in the context of the atomist-centralist regulation of national relations and that was denied them by the prevailing constitution. There was no economic interest that conflicted with federalism for them. The member of the Czech petty bourgeoisie produced and traded only for the local market. The Czech farmer by no means required a market as large as that required by the German bourgeoisie. His interest in the existence of an extensive, unified economic zone regulated by law was consequently only minimal. Rather, his economic interests were met if the industrial regions of the Sudeten took his goods and, through their higher fiscal capacity, contributed to his needs. His national position within the province [*Land*] was far more favorable than within the empire. Since the curial franchise meant that the Czech nation could not form a majority even in the Bohemian provincial assembly, where there were six Czechs for every four Germans, its participation in political power could be ensured only if it allied itself with the nobility.

The Czechs thus entered a lasting alliance with the feudal nobility. Palacký abandoned the demand for an organic regulation of the relations between the nations and the state, for national autonomy, which he had represented in the Kremsier constitutional commission, and obligated the Czech petty bourgeoisie to support the program of federalism. The party of the Old Czechs acquired the support of the feudal nobility by adapting themselves to its economic needs and its ideology. Palacký, who in 1848 had wanted to eliminate the traditional crown lands and place the administrative apparatus in the hands of nationally demarcated territories, now based the energetic demands of the Czech people on Bohemian constitutional law, which had long since become decrepit. And in all cultural questions, which were a matter of indifference from the national point of view, the party of the Old Czechs increasingly abandoned demands based on the bourgeois-liberal position. Only a small group within the Czech bourgeoisie under the leadership of Sladkovský and Grégr refused to sacrifice the demands of bourgeois liberalism for the sake of the feudal nobility.

For the Germans, the federalism of the crown lands naturally represented a grave danger. It would have broken the hegemony of the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy within the empire, placing the German bourgeoisie in the most highly developed land of the monarchy at the mercy of its social adversary, the feudal nobility, and its national adversary, the Czechs; it would have

ensured that the large fiscal capacity of German industry in Bohemia served the needs of the agrarian part of the land. It threatened the German bourgeoisie with the danger that the dismemberment of the legally unified region would be followed by the division of the unified economic region, and thus the loss of its markets. The struggle between centralism and federalism, the centralized state and Bohemian constitutional law, was the class struggle of the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy with the large landed proprietors—the political manifestation of the antagonism between profit and ground rent. Due to the German-Liberal constitution, which imposed the struggle for power on all nations, and yet, through a cunning system of political privileges, sought to exclude the Czech nation from access to this power, the Czech people gave their allegiance to the class of landed proprietors, despite the fact that it had been the destruction of the old Czech nobility that had initially allowed this class to establish itself in the land, although its members were of foreign and to a large extent German origin, and although its power was based on the exploitation of Czech peasants and workers.

Apart from the large landowners, it was above all the intelligentsia that took hold of the national struggle. The political power of the intelligentsia at the beginning of the liberal constitutional era was considerable. To be sure, in terms of its numbers the intelligentsia always constituted only a small fraction of the people. But because the great mass of the people had been excluded from the electoral bodies, the “educated” constituted a not inconsiderable part of the voting population. Their voting numbers had all the more weight because the intelligentsia took a very active part in political life, whereas the masses, as shown by the low level of participation in elections for the provincial assemblies and the *Reichsrat* until the beginning of the nineties, had long viewed political life with an attitude of passivity and incomprehension. Added to this was the fact that the teachers and vicars, doctors and lawyers, apothecaries and lesser officials in the provincial cities and the villages were, as a rule, the leaders of the parish cliques, which were followed politically by the whole electorate. But over and above this, the political influence of the intelligentsia was increased due to the fact that the great mass of the Austrian population, on account of the poor state of elementary schooling, was too ignorant and maladroit, and, on account of its lack of political education, far too uncomprehending of the political process to represent its own political position. The political leadership of the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie thus necessarily fell everywhere into the hands of the academically educated.

The political attitude of the intelligentsia was determined everywhere by its position outside the production process, outside the classes. The antagonisms and struggles between entrepreneurs and workers, capitalists and artisans, agriculturists and industrialists did not concern the intelligentsia; it did not understand them. It regarded all class struggles with indifference and perplexity, since it had no particular interest to pursue. But although the intelligentsia

was uncomprehending in the face of genuine economic concerns, it was influenced more than all other classes sharing in power by the ideas of its time as a result of its education. It was not where the classes of bourgeois society faced off against one another, but where the whole people as an undifferentiated mass engaged in struggle that the intelligentsia fought in the front line. It was therefore the intelligentsia that placed itself at the head of the struggle of the people as a whole against absolutism—in 1789 in France, in 1848 in Germany and Austria, and today in Russia. And for the same reason the intelligentsia took an active part in struggles everywhere in which the nation as a whole confronted other nations. Thus, for the intelligentsia in Austria, everything pointed toward the national struggle. In itself, the great political influence wielded by the intelligentsia necessarily had the effect of diverting the eyes of the population away from social antagonisms and toward the national struggles.

As soon as the members of the intelligentsia who had emerged from the masses of the nonhistorical nations were no longer absorbed by the cultural community of the historical nations, but instead preserved their nationality, it was they who found foreign national domination difficult to bear. To the intelligentsia, everywhere desirous of social prestige, the fact that its nation was neglected, its culture looked down upon, that its people had no share in political power, was unbearable. The Czech student perceived the German language of the schools, the Czech official the German language of the courts as a visible sign, as the concrete form of disdain for his nation, as a violation of his "national honor." It was thus the intelligentsia that first began the struggle for the national school and for the language utilized by the administrative authorities and the courts. If the large landowners made the national question a constitutional question, it was the intelligentsia that raised the question of national schools and the question of language.

The question of the national school is certainly the most important of all national questions; for national education is the bonding material of the nation. However, the intelligentsia considerably overestimated the significance of this question. The development of a nation does not exclusively, or even predominantly, depend on the form of its education system. "What are the hours in school compared with the length of a whole day, the years of schooling and childhood compared with a whole life!"⁶⁴ Intellectuals, however, who themselves have spent a larger part of their lives in school than the members of all other classes and whose children in turn spend their whole youth in school, have a greater interest in the question of schooling than do all other classes. And the schools for which they fight are not the elementary schools, in which the broad masses are educated, but the schools that they themselves attended as students and at which they are active as teachers, the intermediate schools and the establishments of higher education. The national question is therefore for them above all a question of secondary schools and universities.

The question of the language of administration and the courts certainly also has its own deep historical foundation. The struggle against the exclusive validity of the German language was based on the advancement of the non-historical nations to new cultural life. Today, the struggle around the issue of language reflects the struggle of the nations for power within the state, a struggle that is inevitable given the domination of the centralist-atomist idea of the state. But is it not peculiar that for officials, judges, and lawyers this question appears more important than it actually is?

However, the intelligentsia of the different nations was led not only by their education and employment to overestimate the significance of the schooling and language question; it very rapidly also acquired a direct economic interest in the resolution of these questions. The Czech intelligentsia had always learned German; the German intellectuals, who still disdained the language that was once the language only of oppressed classes, rarely have command of the Czech language. The use of Czech as the language of administration in the Czech-speaking region excluded the German officials and lawyers there. If the knowledge of the Czech language was required in the German region, as was the case under the language ordinance of Badeni, the German official saw himself even here as threatened by the competition of Czech colleagues.⁶⁵ By struggling for the retention of German as the exclusive language of administration and the courts, the German intelligentsia attempted to fend off the competition of Czech colleagues. It also saw the same significance in the schooling question. If the secondary schools and universities were German, studies were rendered substantially more difficult for the sons of the Czech petty bourgeoisie and peasantry: the struggle against Czech schools was at the same time a struggle of the German intelligentsia against the Slavic competition. This struggle became more bitter the greater the threat the German intelligentsia perceived as coming from colleagues from other nations. The more unpleasant the German official found the superior position of the Czech in the hierarchy, the German lawyer and doctor the competition of the Czech colleague, the more vigorously he struggled against the Czech upper secondary schools and universities, the more passionately he clung to German as the language of administration. And the whole circle of those who were subject to his political influence loudly echoed his demand.

The great landowners made the national question a constitutional question. The intelligentsia made it a question of schooling and language. But although a class struggle formed the basis of the struggle over the constitution, that of the landed noble class against the bourgeoisie and bureaucracy, it was not a class struggle that was concealed by the quarrel over the language of schooling and administration, but merely a competitive struggle within one class, a struggle based on competition within the intelligentsia.

We have thus established the content of the political struggles between the nations. The next class to take the political stage, the petty bourgeoisie, did

not give the program of the national parties new content, but only determined the energy of the struggle, altered the tone with which national demands were represented. The upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, the prosperous merchants, innkeepers, landlords, and the more successful artisans, took part in the political struggle from the beginning of the constitutional era onward. However, they were under the leadership of other classes—the bourgeoisie and the great landed proprietors, the bureaucracy, and the intelligentsia—and were thus unable to determine the essence of the national struggle. It is only from 1882 onward that the petty bourgeoisie as a whole began to express itself politically and stamped its character on the national struggle.

It was its radicalism that the petty bourgeoisie initially brought to Austrian politics, its predilection for loud words, the course insult, and the “aggressive tone.” Harassed and subjugated by capitalism, unsatisfied with the form of society of which it was a victim, it wanted to vent its wrath. Had the petty bourgeoisie been forced to struggle with the other classes for the realization of its economic demands—obligatory trade associations and the certification of qualification—this radicalism could have at least partially assumed the form of a political struggle for the specific demands of the class. However, it was spared this struggle by the selective franchise. In the curia of the towns it was almost impossible for someone to be elected who did not claim allegiance to the small business politics of the middle classes; here, economic class interest no longer constituted a force of party formation. And in the other curias, in which the large landowners, the bourgeoisie, and the peasantry dominated, the demands of the petty bourgeoisie could not make themselves heard at all. The curial division made class struggle through elections impossible. The struggle over the politics of the middle classes was thus decided from the beginning by the division of the parliament into curias and, as a consequence, petty bourgeois radicalism was unable to express itself fully in this struggle. If the petty bourgeois parties had had any hopes of direct control of state power—for example, through a parliamentary ministry drawn from their midst—they would have been forced to accommodate themselves to the needs of the state and to temper their radicalism. But the bureaucracy had a firm hold on the state administrative apparatus, and, although certainly granting influence over it to the bourgeoisie and the landed nobility, it did not yet do so in the case of the only slowly rising petty bourgeois parties. The radicalism of the petty bourgeoisie was thus neither diverted from the national struggles by the necessity of the struggle with other classes nor tempered by the necessity of considering the needs of the state. The struggle for the constitution, for the issues of schooling and language, was now conducted with quite different words and gestures and with a passion quite different to that seen previously. Because it could not be expressed in the political struggle for the demands of the class, the dissatisfaction of

the economically vexed petty bourgeoisie took on the form of nationalistic radicalism.

The petty bourgeoisie had been prepared for this national radicalism by the national hatred that, as we already know, capitalist development and the resettlement of the population had incited, particularly in the petty bourgeoisie. This national hatred had led to a predilection for pointless national demonstrations, to the war of extermination against street signs in the other language, and to the prevention of the festivals and assemblies of the minority. The petty bourgeoisie now introduced this policy of national demonstration into the parliament. Now it was not a matter of securing power for one's own nation, but of offending the foreign nation. The struggle was no longer a means to an end; rather, demonstration for its own sake was the form in which the petty bourgeoisie expressed the radical disposition arising from its social dissatisfaction and the national hatred produced by social upheaval. And this extreme mood of combat was not tempered by any consideration of the necessity for policies within the state with consciously planned goals. For the petty bourgeoisie never saw the state or the people as a whole, but only saw the small town in which its life took place, and its reaction if a Czech school or a Czech official disturbed its comfortable little nest was a desire to smash the whole empire to pieces. It was of little concern to the petty bourgeois that he endangered the position of his whole nation if it was only the city of Cilli that did not receive a Slovene upper secondary school. From this petty bourgeois radicalism arose the inflexibility of national politics: no national party could make a concession to its opponent or reach an agreement with it—on penalty of its own ruin.

This petty bourgeois national radicalism was initially manifested among the non-German nations. Among the Germans the influence of the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy was stronger; even after 1882, it kept German politics moving in a direction that did not make the coexistence of the nations within one state simply impossible. But the more the petty bourgeoisie took its politics into its own hands here and the more the psychology of petty bourgeois voters determined the comportment of the parliamentarians they elected, the stronger national radicalism became here too. This German radicalism was fostered by the fact that the domination of the German majority in western Austria could not be maintained. The alliance of the feudal lords with the Czechs had already severely hampered the cunning plan to make the German minority in the empire the majority in parliament. The extension of the franchise in the curia of the cities and rural parishes increased the number of voters from the nonhistorical nations. The state had to gradually adapt itself to the fact that the nations had awakened to historical life and satisfy at least the most pressing cultural needs of the non-German nations. As a consequence, political history appeared to the petty bourgeois as a continual diminution of German power. The less Austria was a German state, the less

the German petty bourgeoisie perceived the interests of the Austrian state to be the interests of its people and the more the Germans became a national party like the others. Whereas the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy had once constituted the power that defended the state—which they dominated—against the onslaught of the petty bourgeoisie of the other nations, the German petty bourgeoisie now formed national parties that conducted the struggle for state power with the national parties of other nations, unconcerned with the needs of the state. The destruction of the old Liberal party and the beginning of German obstruction of the Badeni ministry meant that in the German camp, too, petty bourgeois radicalism had broken the influence of the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy.

The storms of the national struggle, which was now being conducted with growing bitterness and passion, drew an increasing proportion of the masses into national power politics, above all the peasants. The peasant of the old school did not have a close relationship to the social milieu in which economic changes were producing national hatred. The Czech worker and member of the petty bourgeoisie did not penetrate his village. Even today the peasants in many parts of Bohemia and Moravia ensure that their children learn the second official language of the land. For this purpose the German peasant puts his child out to board with a Czech peasant for one year, and in return takes the latter's child as a boarder. But the peasants in the interior of a homogeneous language region, who never encountered their national adversaries, did not concern themselves with the national struggle. The ideology of these peasants, bound fast to tradition and not yet stirred by the national struggle, was clericalism. From the beginning, the relationship of the Catholic Church to the national struggle was one of incomprehension and hostility. In the famous pastoral letter of 17 June 1849, which was issued by a synod of thirty-five bishops of the German-Slavic hereditary lands, the nationalities were declared to be the remnants of "heathenism" because "the diversity of language is merely a consequence of sin and the fall from grace." The clerical German peasants, who saw themselves as tied to the large feudal landowners by common agrarian interests, by a hatred of liberalism, and by their ideological attachment to the past, therefore also did not hesitate in forming an alliance with the feudal lords, Czechs, and Poles to form the "iron ring" that brought an end to German domination in Austria.

But the more the peasant was drawn into the sphere of capitalist commodity production, the more rapidly his attitude to the national question changed. The Czech cotter and smallholder who labored in the putting-out system for a German capitalist was already a nationalist. However, as soon as commodity production included the peasants, as soon as the peasant became a pure farmer and came into close contact with the urban population, he too was subject to urban ideology, the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie. Moreover, industrial development also brought national conflict into the village. In the

Czech village the German factory owner and the German white-collar worker now appeared, in the German village the Czech worker and the Czech petty bourgeoisie. Better education, compulsory military service, the political struggle, public meetings, and newspapers brought the peasants ever closer to the urban petty bourgeoisie. In this way the peasant in the Sudetenland was first led to the national parties.

Gradually this movement also drew in the German peasants of the Alpine lands. Here, too, the peasant economy changed. The railways, tourist traffic, and the economic cooperatives progressively transformed the peasant of the old school into a pure farmer, brought him closer to the petty bourgeoisie of the cities. The old form of clerical politics now became impossible here too; the clerical party had either to adapt itself to the new spirit of the peasants or be replaced by a neo-clerical party, the Christian Socials. These parties had now to reckon with the power of national ideas in the countryside as well. They were not at the forefront of the national struggle, but they could no longer disregard it; they could no longer ally themselves with national adversaries, but had to support the petty bourgeois nationalists of their own nation in every decisive vote.

However, it was not only the peasants but also a section of the workers who were seized by the idea of the national power struggle. When in 1897 the workers voted for the first time in the new curia under general suffrage, it was the Social Democratic Party that triumphed in Bohemia, the classic land of the nationalities struggle. But its great success unleashed the wrath of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. The curial constitution provided them with their means of struggle. The interests of the propertied classes were after all sufficiently safeguarded, since the 72 deputies selected under universal suffrage were opposed by 353 representatives of the privileged curias of the propertied classes. The national parties could thus, without presenting any danger to the class interests of the bourgeoisie, affiliate themselves with "national workers' parties" that promised the workers to protect their interests, thereby aiming to win the latter's support for the national power struggle. The elections in 1901 demonstrated that this mendacious strategy was not without success. German and Czech Social Democrats suffered a defeat in Bohemia and Moravia. A considerable proportion of the indifferent workers had lost all sense of prudence in the roaring din of the national struggle and allowed themselves to be won over to the policies of their class adversaries. Even the organized Social Democratic workers could not entirely escape the mood of the hour. Here and there appeared signs that they no longer adhered to their international ideas with the same steadfastness, that some in their ranks had begun to doubt themselves.

It was only now that the entry of the parties into the national struggle for power was complete. The picture is a strange one: demands were still being argued over that were once formulated by the great landowners in their struggle

against the bourgeoisie, and later by the intelligentsia in their own competitive struggle—over centralism and federalism, universities and upper secondary schools, the language of the administrative authorities and the courts. But now in this struggle all the forces of the nations were being deployed, including those of the peasants and a part of the workers. The form and energy of the struggle were determined by the petty bourgeoisie, but the furious radicalism of the petty bourgeoisie and its national hatred had infected the peasants and a proportion of the workers. However, the larger the masses addressed by the national politician, the louder became his cry and the coarser his gestures, the more every party lost a sense of the natural boundaries of its power, and the less it became possible for any nation, even in the most insignificant of national struggles, to make a concession to or come to an understanding with an opponent.

The nations had set out to capture power within the state in order to ensure that the state satisfied their cultural needs. The struggle for power within the state had become a struggle of the nations against one another. This struggle became increasingly vehement until it culminated in the German and Czech parliamentary obstruction. Now each nation was strong enough to prevent its national adversary from making even the most negligible progress. But this also meant that for all nations the path to cultural progress was blocked, insofar as it required assistance from the state. The nations had wanted to capture power in the state and achieved only the most ignominious impotence. No nation could obtain a new university, a new secondary school, or a favorable settlement of the simplest question in regard to the language of administration without the gracious consent of its national adversary.

But there is still more. In 1901, a grave economic crisis also struck Austria. The renewal of trade agreements confronted all classes with an important question, the answer to which fundamentally influenced the development of Austrian industry and agriculture and thus also the cultural development of every nation: the extent of its cultural community and the wealth of its culture. The renewal of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise [*Ausgleich*] raised a whole series of highly significant questions. Old laws that did not correspond to the needs of the time, such as the old penal code and the military code of criminal procedure, were still in force and annually destroyed thousands of existences. Reforms that the whole population had long recognized as imperative and the rapid implementation of which was required for the salvation of thousands, such as the establishment of pensions for the old and invalid, were still not complete. But Austria had no time for all this. The Austrian parliament was obstructed because of the internal administrative language in Bohemia and because of the Czech university in Brünn, and no class, no nation in Austria was even able to take a position on all these important questions or decide on a solution that conformed to its will. The ministry of Koerber disposed of the most important economic and political questions

without consulting the parliament on the basis of article 14.⁶⁶ The nations had set out to capture political power, and they had lost all power, had handed over the state to the bureaucracy completely.

However, the bureaucracy was also not content with its authority. To be sure, it was able to guarantee the basic survival of the state, to safeguard external peace within the state, and to deal with the most pressing matters in an absolutist fashion. But the state needed more: it required continual cultural work, incessant reforms. All reform activities, however, had come to a standstill due to the parliament's being paralyzed by the national struggle.

Each nation was powerless because the other peoples would not permit the state to comply with its will; all classes were powerless because the struggle of the nations among one another destroyed their power and handed all political power over to the bureaucracy; and this bureaucracy was itself impotent because the machinery of legislation had come to a standstill. This was the face of Austria from the time of the Badeni ministry's language ordinances up until the Gautsch ministry's electoral reform bill. This situation of the complete impotence of all nations, of all classes, and of the state itself represented the self-annulment of the centralist-atomist constitution. All eyes now inevitably turned to the other possibility of regulating the relationship of the nations to the state, which Springer (Renner) has termed the organic conception. The working class was the first of all the classes to recognize the new necessity. In September 1899 the all-Austrian Social Democratic Party [*Gesamtpartei*] congress in Brünn announced that national autonomy was now the national program of the working class.

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE NATIONAL STRUGGLES

The original and most self-evident instinct of the working class is its revolutionary instinct. The revolutionary mood of the young awakening proletariat also determined its attitude to the nation. It is for this reason that the worker is a nationalist wherever the nation turns against the oppressor, wherever the adversaries in the national struggle are the great and powerful in our society, wherever the overthrow of all that exists is the goal of national politics. It is for this reason that the workers have led the national struggle of all those nations enslaved by Czarism; it is for this reason that the Polish socialists in Prussia have also defended the interests of the Polish nation being oppressed by the Prussian class-state; it is for this reason that the workers in Hungary have fought for the national interests of the Germans and Slovaks, of the Romanians and the Serbs. And it is for this same reason that the workers of the nonhistorical nations in Austria were also nationalists. To them, the state that tyrannized them appeared to be German, as did the courts that protected the propertied and threw those with no possessions into prison; every death sentence was pronounced in German; German was the language in which the

army was commanded that was sent in against the starving, defenseless workers whenever there was a strike. The German language was, as Victor Adler once said, "the language of the state, of administration, and of oppression" in the old Austria. Moreover, the German language was also the language of the immediate class enemy, the language of the factory owner and his foreman, of the merchant and the usurer.

On the other hand, the national movement of the workers' own nation appeared to be revolutionary: the nation was, after all, excluded from political power; it was not satisfied with the prevailing constitution; the newspapers of the national parties were confiscated and their pioneering figures imprisoned; furthermore, the petty bourgeoisie of the nation was also locked in struggle with the German bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. The revolutionary instinct awakened in the workers of the nonhistorical nations a hatred of the dominant historical nations and a sympathy for the power politics of their own nation. The nationalistic spirit of the workers of the nonhistorical nations in the first stage of its development was not considered or reflected upon, but born, spontaneous and naive, out of sympathy and hatred. The initial position of the workers of these nations in regard to the national question was a naive nationalism.

In the historical nations in Austria, with the exception of the Germans, the revolutionary instinct also led to this naive nationalism. The national movement of the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Italians was revolutionary and hostile to the prevailing state order. It is hardly surprising, then, that they were sympathetic to the revolutionary workers.

It was quite different outside Austria for the nations that were satisfied with their national situation and, within Austria, for the Germans. Here the proletariat did not confront class adversaries from other nations. Rather, the classes that exploited and oppressed the workers were of the same nationality. Here national politics did not initially mean a struggle against the dominant state order. Up until the collapse of the old Liberal party, the German bourgeoisie in Austria did not form a national party like the others, but formed the party that defended the prevailing constitution and that supported their privilege. The German nation was not oppressed: its power was far greater than its numerical importance merited. In this context, national politics was not represented by a rebellious petty bourgeois movement. Rather, it was the politics of the classes that the proletariat hated as its exploiters and oppressors, the politics of the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. Here the workers could not be nationalists. The dominant classes defended their privilege as the condition of national power. Could, then, the power of the nation appear to the German workers as anything other than a deceitful pretext, the aim of which was to provide a foundation for class domination by the class enemy?

When the German workers began their class struggle against the propertied and educated classes they discovered anew the time-honored idea once

utilized by the bourgeoisie itself in the struggle against the class of the landed nobility. Our adversaries, thought the workers, may possess more than we do, may have more knowledge than we do, may wear better clothes, speak more eloquently, and write more correctly than we do. But should we therefore have fewer rights before the state than they? Should not we also have a right to the enjoyment of life and the pleasures of culture? Are we not human beings as much as they are? Thus, the idea of humanity was revived in the workers, the demand for the equality of all those bearing a human countenance. For the German worker the nation now became a "bourgeois prejudice." National differences faded before his eyes, and just as he struggled against his own exploitation and oppression, he now wanted to eliminate all exploitation and oppression, whether they were directed against a class, a sex, a religious community, or a nation. He saw himself as struggling for the liberation of the whole of humanity. If the revolutionary instinct of the worker of the oppressed nation led to a naive nationalism, among the workers of those nations content with their situation it produced a naive cosmopolitanism.

Incidentally, German Social Democracy in Austria also has a nationalistic strain. However, this originates not from the workers, but from that small number of bourgeois intellectuals who found a path from bourgeois democracy to socialism. The bourgeois democracy of the Germans in Austria was nationalistic; their dream was the great German republic, the one free Germany of 1848. As everywhere else, capitalist development in Austria dismantled the old form of democracy. And as everywhere else, the best elements of this democracy ultimately rallied to the struggling armies of the working class. Thus bourgeois democracy was also one of the sources whose waters fed the great current of Social Democracy. For us German Social Democrats in Austria, Engelbert Pernerstorfer represents the personification of this piece of the history of our party.⁶⁷ Such men also brought with them into the party their national yearning. And just as the expert on riverbeds is able to distinguish the stone splinters that led him to this or that source issuing from this or that mountain range, so too do we easily discover in the world of ideas of German socialism in Austria those dispositions and thoughts that have been brought to it by the best elements of the bourgeoisie as the heritage of bourgeois democracy. But this bourgeois-national strain has never been powerful enough to trouble the naive cosmopolitan character of the German workers' movement in Austria, which arose from the living conditions of the workers themselves.

The German-national politicians thoroughly enjoy accusing the German workers in Austria of having much less national sentiment than their Slavic and Italian comrades. This is true to the extent that the German workers have brought from their youth—during which class consciousness first awoke in the form of the revolutionary instinct—a different ideological heritage, a different state of mind from that of the proletariat of the other nations in

Austria. This fact occasionally still exercises an effect today. In the meantime, however, the revolutionary instinct of the workers has gradually developed into a clear consciousness of class contradictions and class interests. The relationship of the worker to the national question is thereby also changing. The naive nationalism of one is gradually being overcome, just as is the naive cosmopolitanism of the other. In both cases there is a slow but steady development of the international politics of the proletariat of all nations, clearly conscious of its specificity.

If we now want to enumerate, classify, and analyze the forces driving this politics, forces at work in the minds of thousands of workers, we must proceed from the position of the worker in the social process of production. The workers produce values, but these values are not their own; rather, the ownership of the means of production gives the ruling classes the power to pay off the workers with a part of the value of their product and to appropriate the rest, the surplus value. This fact dominates the entire politics of the working class. The first question raised by the workers is that of the distribution of the value of the social product. Which part of the value of the social product should fall to the working class, which part to the owners of the means of production? The interests of the classes are here in opposition: the larger the part of the value of the social product that falls to the working class, the smaller that which the propertied class can appropriate—and vice versa. The question of the distribution of the value of the social product is not a legal question. The propertied classes are not satisfied with any distribution other than that which ensures no more than the bare existence of the workers. The working class cannot pretend to be satisfied with any arrangement other than that which gives the whole of the value produced to the ensemble of workers. Between these two extremes there is no point that can be shown to be correct or just. There is no just wage. No court can decide the question of the distribution of the value produced. It is not a question of law, but a question of power. From this necessarily follows the struggle of the workers against the propertied classes, and the most immediate manifestation of this class struggle is the struggle of the trade unions concerning the level of wages.

The fact that the workers always receive only a part of the value they produce whereas the remainder falls to the propertied classes can also be expressed as follows: the workers produce those commodities that become their own for only a part of the working day, whereas during the remaining working hours they produce the commodities that constitute the income of the owner of the means of production. During this second part of the working day the workers thus perform surplus labor, unpaid labor for the propertied classes. This fact poses the question of the duration of the working day. The workers refuse to work for the propertied classes. The working day should last as long as is required to produce the commodities that constitute the income of the working class. The propertied classes, on the other hand, want to prolong the

working day immeasurably. If they are imprudent, they demand that the worker remain at the machine as long as he is still able to move his limbs; if they are prudent, they demand that the worker toil as long as the prolongation of the working day can still increase their surplus value. Here, too, there remains considerable latitude between the two extremes of the working day. Here, too, no court can decide what duration of the working day within these extremes is just and reasonable. This question is also a question of power, a question that is decided in the class struggle. This class struggle is manifested in the trade union struggle concerning the duration of the working day.

The necessity of the class struggle divides all nations. The economic interests of the workers and the propertied classes oppose each other within each nation. On the other hand, the interests of the workers of each nation correspond to the interests of the workers of all other nations.

The level of wages depends in the first place on the demand for and the supply of labor power. Let us first assume that in one part of an economic region—for example, German Bohemia—the supply of labor-power is relatively low, whereas in another part of the same economic region—for example, in the Czech part of Bohemia—the supply far exceeds demand. The immediate consequence of this will be that in German Bohemia wages will be higher than in the Czech part of the land. However, this fact will lead to Czech workers' emigrating from the Czech part of the kingdom to the German part because they will find employment there more easily under more favorable conditions. The immigration of Czech workers to German Bohemia will have the effect of increasing the supply of labor power, and a tendency will emerge for wages to sink there. On the other hand, the emigration of workers from the Czech part of the land will have the effect of reducing the supply of labor power there, and a tendency will thus develop for wages to rise. As a result, the workers in German Bohemia will suffer from the fact that the workers in the Czech districts draw lower wages, whereas the workers in the Czech districts will gain a direct advantage from the fact that the German workers enjoy more favorable working conditions. For the workers in the German districts it would be advantageous if the supply of labor power in the Czech districts were lower, but the wages higher. On the other hand, it will be in the best interest of the workers of the Czech districts that the workers in German Bohemia be well paid. It will also be in the interest of Czech workers that the Germans receive high wages and in the interest of German workers that the Czechs receive high wages.

Until now we have been examining the effect of the supply of labor power on the level of wages. We achieve the same result if we examine the effect of the demand for labor power. Suppose that in German Bohemia the demand for the commodity of labor power is very high and that wages therefore rise there. In the Czech districts, on the other hand, the demand for labor power is very low: the danger emerges there of wages' sinking. Now, the capitalist

considers wages as production costs. Under otherwise equivalent conditions in the German districts, in this hypothetical case the production costs are higher, in the Czech districts lower. The lower the production costs, the higher are the profits. Under otherwise equivalent conditions, in this hypothetical case the rate of profit is higher in the Czech part of the land than in the German part. Now, capital migrates to where the rate of profit is highest. Thus, more capital will be directed to the Czech districts than to the German. In the former, more new enterprises will be established, and those already established will be more rapidly expanded. An effect of this migration of capital is that wages in the Czech region begin to rise, whereas in the German part of the land the demand for labor power rises more slowly; because the working population grows continuously, the number of unemployed grows and wages begin to sink. Again the German workers suffer due to the fact that wages in the Czech districts are lower and, as a consequence, they want wages there also to rise. Again it is shown that the higher wages of the German workers ultimately also lift the wages of their Czech class comrades and that the latter have an interest in the German workers' being well paid.

However, the level of wages depends not only on supply and demand, but also on the strength of the trade union. Capitalist society always maintains an army of the unemployed. This is very numerous during a depression, a period of adverse economic conditions, and diminishes during a period of prosperity, a time of favorable economic conditions, but it never disappears completely. In capitalist society the unemployed have the function of safeguarding surplus value, of holding down wages. For the unemployed proletariat is denied access to all goods. He is consequently always inclined to accept any type of employment, even if the wage guarantees him only a bare existence. The capitalist therefore always has the possibility of countering the covetousness of the workers—and, in the case of rising unemployment, of even lowering their wages—by threatening to replace them with the unemployed, who are constrained by hunger to take work at any price. It is now the task of the trade unions to change this function of the unemployed. They achieve this above all by two means: first, by changing the psychology of the unemployed, by teaching the workers that it is undignified and immoral to undercut their class comrades; second, by making it possible, through unemployment benefits, for the unemployed to survive economically without offering their labor power to the capitalist for lower wages. But the trade union is capable of even more. If the number of the unemployed is so small that the capitalist is not able to replace his workers or if the education of the unemployed by the trade union is so effective and the support granted them sufficient that the workers do not have to fear that their unemployed colleagues will take their jobs, the trade union will artificially create the condition of temporary unemployment. With the help of the strike, the employer is forced to concede more favorable working conditions. The function of the unemployed thereby changes

abruptly into its opposite: intermittent unemployment changes from a means of holding down wages into a means of increasing them.

If we now suppose that the German workers organize themselves into trade unions and conduct union struggles, we see that they are immediately threatened by the Czech workers who undercut wages and by Czech strike breakers. The German workers can conduct their union struggle only if the function of the Czech unemployed is changed through union education and support. The German workers thus have an interest of their own in the Czech workers' receiving unemployment benefits. The German workers are thus acting in their own interests when they support the organization of their Czech class comrades. But there is still more. The union struggle is never based only on the provision of financial support for the unemployed, but is also based on changing the psychology of the workers. The worker must perceive the undercutting of colleagues in the workshop to be immoral. If this were not the case, financial support for the unemployed would have to be as high as wages themselves in order to prevent the unemployed from undercutting wages. This alteration of the psychology of the population is the product of very varied forces. It presupposes above all that the worker has reached a certain cultural level. It is therefore in the interest of the German worker, for example, that the Czech worker attend a good school. The transformed psychology of the unemployed presupposes an increased consciousness of personal dignity. The German worker, therefore, has an interest in his Czech class comrade's appearing in the eyes of the law, the authorities and courts, and the bourgeoisie not as a slave with a bent back, but as a free man; everything that makes the Czech worker a coward and kills the consciousness of his own worth harms the economic interests of the German worker, poses a threat to his wage. The psychological transformation of the worker is substantially promoted by the independent political movement of the working class. This is why the German workers have a direct interest in the growth of the Czech workers' party.

It can already be seen that the internationalism of the mature working class is fundamentally different from the naive cosmopolitanism of its early youth. It now no longer disregards the fact of the diversity of nations; nationality is no longer seen as a "bourgeois prejudice" that must not be allowed to discourage the aspiration for the liberation of the whole of humanity; rather, its politics are rooted in the clear knowledge that the interests of the workers of one's own nation cannot be promoted other than by supporting the struggle of the workers of the other nations. Its politics no longer spring from the concept of humanity, but from the knowledge of the *international solidarity* of class. The first requirement that this produces is that the workers of all nations unite in the struggle against the immediate class adversary, the employers, that the trade union organization embrace the workers of all nations, and

that within the trade union the workers of each nation defend the interests of the workers of all other nations as their own interests.

But the struggle of the working class is not directed only against the immediate class adversary, the employers, but also against the state. The state influences economic life by various means. The workers now demand an economic policy that leads to an increase in the demand for labor power, that facilitates the union struggle, and that brings about an increase in wages. But since the real income of the working class is dependent not only on the level, but also the purchasing power of the money they receive in wages, they further call for economic measures that increase the purchasing power of this money by keeping prices low or reducing them. Good opportunities for employment and cheap bread constitute the goal of the proletarian economic policy. The employers, on the other hand, strive to keep the production costs of their commodities low and their prices high. Cheap labor power and high prices are the objectives of their efforts. The interests of the workers are thus here, too, in opposition to those of the propertied classes: a political position shared by both is impossible. On the other hand, the interests of the workers of the different nations coincide. Just as it is impossible that the workers of any nation would agree with the industrialists of that nation on a tariff, so is it certain that German and Czech textile workers and metal workers will make the same demands of the trade policy of the state.

This coincidence of economic interests above all forces the workers to struggle shoulder to shoulder against the propertied classes of all nations in regard to questions of economic and social policy. However, it soon becomes clear that the interests of the workers are identical not only in the context of the struggle to determine state economic policy, but also in relation to other questions of legislation. If, for example, a penal law is under debate, no workers of any nation will be able to agree with the propertied class of their nation on how the law should deal with the thief, the vagrant, the beggar, or the worker on strike who has manhandled a strikebreaker; on the other hand, the workers of all nations will have the same interest in regard to these questions, and therefore will make the same demands. And this is the case for the discussion of every new law.

The ultimate goal of all proletarian struggle can be none other than the complete elimination of capitalist exploitation. This goal, however, can be reached only by transforming the means of production from private property into the property of the society. Again the working class encounters within each nation here the resistance of the propertied classes, which do not want to abandon their property, the source of their income, of their culture, of their power. Again the demands of the workers of each nation coincide with the demands of the proletariat of all other peoples.

As in the union struggle, the workers of all nations also necessarily unite in the political struggle. They do this not because of any excessively sentimental

attachment to the liberation of the whole of humanity, but on the basis of the sober consideration of the fact that the interests of the workers of all nations coexisting in the state are identical and in opposition to the interests of the propertied classes of all nations. Just as the position of the worker in the process of production necessitates an international trade union movement, so too does the position of the worker in the class-state require an international political class struggle.

This requirement is contradicted by the fact that under the centralist-atomist regulation of national relations all national questions are questions of power, and the population is therefore forced to divide into national parties that struggle for power in the state. The fact of class opposition gives rise to the need for all workers to unite in an international party based on class. The atomist-centralist constitution gives rise to the need for all Germans, all Czechs, and so on to unite in an intersocial national party. One could of course argue that these two requirements do not contradict one another. The Czech workers must surely ally themselves in regard to social questions with the German workers, in regard to national questions with the Czech bourgeoisie. However, this combining of both requirements is logically impossible. It already proves to be impossible in the case of the first and fundamental political act, that represented by elections. For example, in an electoral district in which a candidate of the German bourgeoisie confronts a candidate of the Czech workers, which of the two should the German workers help to victory? If they vote for the candidate of the German bourgeoisie, they diminish the power of their class, but if they vote for the Czech worker, they diminish the power of their nation. The same problem is posed in the struggle of the parties within the representative bodies themselves, for in the multilingual land almost every social question also acquires national significance. If in eastern Galicia the state, in the service of the Polish landowners, suppresses the Ruthenian peasants and agricultural laborers with blood and iron, should the representatives of the Polish workers support the landowners in order to augment the power of their nation or the Ruthenian workers in order to reinforce the power of their class? But even granted that it were logically possible to strictly separate national and social questions, it is nevertheless psychologically impossible for the workers to struggle with the propertied classes of their own nation for national goods and with the workers of the other nations for social goods. For the nature of the power struggle of the nations has long been determined by petty bourgeois radicalism. Workers who have been seized by this mood of national radicalism are incapable of struggling shoulder to shoulder with their class comrades of the other nations in the trade union and the political struggle.

For those in a state of nationalistic agitation, every question requiring a sober determination of the goal of proletarian struggle and the sober choice of the means by which this goal is to be reached, every question of organization

and tactics, becomes a national question. National power politics and proletarian class politics are logically difficult to reconcile; psychologically, one excludes the other: national contradictions can disperse the forces of the proletariat at any moment; the national struggle renders the class struggle impossible. The centralist-atomist constitution, which makes the national power struggle inevitable, is therefore intolerable for the proletariat. The first demand of proletarian constitutional policy in the multinational state is the demand for a constitution that does not force the nations to struggle for power within the state. Every nation needs power, which means the possibility of having its way, of satisfying its needs. But only centralist-atomist regulation obliges the nations to acquire this power by struggling for direct influence within the state, obliges them to struggle for power. The power of the nations to satisfy their cultural needs must be legally guaranteed if the population is no longer to be forced to divide into national parties, if conflict between national groups is not to make the class struggle impossible.

The politics of the working class are necessarily democratic. The proletariat struggles in the first place for the determination of the overall will of the state by the majority of the people. Capitalism gradually makes the working class the overwhelming majority of the people. If domination by the popular majority is ensured, the working class is guaranteed the ultimate conquest of political power. But in Austria the struggle for democracy is rendered substantially more difficult by the fact that the national power of entire peoples can be diminished by the triumph of democracy. In 1848, it was the non-historical nations—Czechs and Southern Slavs—that allied themselves with the forces of reaction and betrayed democracy. Since 1861 it has been conversely the old historical nations—the Germans, Italians, and Poles—whose national power has been based on the fact that within the state, the provinces, and the parishes a minority has dominated the majority. Every advance of democracy is made impossible by this entanglement with the question of national power. In 1867, for example, when new legislation on the right of association was created, the Chamber of Deputies rejected the requirement that associations be dissolved on the basis of their “constituting a danger to the state.” On the next day, however, the German-Liberal majority reintroduced this requirement, because the ministry declared that without this paragraph it could not break the Czech opposition. The workers’ organizations—for the persecution of which this paragraph has provided the most convenient of pretexts for decades—will easily understand from this episode what a hindrance to the proletarian class struggle is constituted by the struggle for national power. Recently, this experience has again been confirmed for us by the struggle for equal suffrage. How much weaker would the resistance of the German bourgeoisie and the Polish nobility have been had it not been able to arm itself with the argument that equal suffrage would alter the power relations between the nations! And this argument could be overcome only by not

basing the division of electoral districts on any general principle, conferring on electoral geometry the status of a principle. But once the principle of the equality of electoral districts had been abandoned, once the bourgeois-national parties had been allowed to paste together the electoral districts according to their needs, it was a matter of course that the national electoral geometry would meet with the social electoral geometry, that the workers would be disadvantaged by the division of electoral districts. On numerous such experiences is based the demand of the working class for a form of regulating national relations that does not involve the power of any nation's being dependent on the domination of the majority by a minority, that does not involve the national power of any nation's being imperiled by the development toward democracy.

The needs of the working class thus initially determine its constitutional program in a negative manner. This program calls for a regulation of national relations in which the nations are not forced to struggle for state power and in which the development toward democracy does not threaten the power of any nation. However, the needs of the proletarian class struggle also determine its nationalities program in a positive manner. The fact that the workers of every nation have their own interest in the cultural development of the workers of other nations can already be derived from an insight into the conditions of the trade union struggle. The same holds true for the political struggle. The better the education and development of the workers of the other nations, the greater their self-confidence and their consciousness of their personal dignity, the easier it is to gain their support as comrades in the struggle and the more valuable they are as combatants in the struggle against the class state. One result of this is that the position of the workers in regard to the questions of education and language is quite different from that of the other classes.

The German bourgeoisie has no interest in the Czech or Polish schools. The struggle for national power forms the basis of the conviction that the cultural development of one's own nation is impeded by the direction of public revenues to the education systems of the other nations. However, this desire for state resources to be devoted to one's own school system rather than to those of others gradually changes into hatred for the foreign school system. The German bourgeoisie and the German petty bourgeoisie fear that the Czech workers will awaken more quickly from their servile humility, will more effectively threaten the profit of the capitalist and the artisan, the higher the cultural level is to which their education elevates them. The intelligentsia is equally fearful that the extension of the education systems of the other nations will increase their competition. It is quite otherwise for the German workers. They want what the German propertied classes fear. The higher the cultural level reached by the Czech workers, the less the German workers have to fear Czech workers who undercut wages and Czech strikebreakers. For this

reason the German working class has an interest of its own in the expansion of the education systems of the other nations.

The position of the workers in relation to the language question is determined in a very similar manner. The German bourgeoisie and the cliques of the settled petty bourgeoisie in the German parishes have no objection to the Czech worker's not receiving justice from the authorities. The German intelligentsia sees the danger of increasing competition in the use of Czech as a language of administration. On the other hand, the German worker has an interest in the Czech worker's not being helpless when confronting the state authorities and the judges. The more self-confidently the worker is able to confront the organs of state power and the more courageously he can defend his rights, the more his consciousness of personal dignity increases, the more courageously he will also confront the great and powerful in the trade union and political struggle, and the more welcome he is to the German workers as an ally in the class struggle.

For this reason the German workers, as soon as they clearly recognize their interests, want the cultural and language needs of all other nations to be satisfied. And that which applies to the German workers also applies to the proletarians of the other nations. From this arises the demand of the workers of all nations for the regulation of national relations such that each nation is assured the possibility of progressive cultural development and the workers of all nations are guaranteed participation in the national culture. This demand, which is above all based on the sober consideration of the interests of the workers of each nation, finds strong support in the specific ideology of the proletariat, one that springs from its class situation.

Wealth and liberty are the preconditions of all culture. The dominant and propertied classes are therefore initially also the bearers of all intellectual culture. But although, in reality, possession and domination are the supports of intellectual culture, all dominant classes have always attempted to reverse this relationship and to base their claim to domination and possession precisely on their possession of higher education. The landed gentry once appealed to the fact that its education was superior and that, precisely for this reason, it had a right to domination and exploitation. In the same manner, the bourgeoisie within the nation today supports its power by referring to the fact that it is the bearer of high culture. And the argument that initially serves the class struggle within the nation is then utilized in the national struggle. The dominant classes of the wealthy nations defend their right to exploit and oppress the other nations with the argument that their nation is at a culturally higher level and that the other nations are inferior.

The workers cannot accept this supposed legal entitlement to exploitation and oppression. After all, in the class struggle within the nation it constitutes the argument of its opponent. The worker comprehends this immediately and says to his opponent: you say that you have the right to dominate and to ex-

plait us because you are educated; but in reality it is the inverse: because you dominate and exploit us you can participate extensively in intellectual culture. It is not high culture that provides a right of exploitation; rather, it is the fact that you appropriate a part of the product of our labor that gives you high culture. But we confront your legal order with another, in which culture, which is now separated from work, is to be reunified with work, which is its source; in this order, each who works also has a right to intellectual values, and the right of the adult and healthy person to cultural wealth is based exclusively on his work.

If the worker engaged in the class struggle within the nation attacks the concept of high culture as providing a right to exploitation, a right to the labor of others, so too must he oppose it in the national struggle. Here too, in the opinion of the worker, the fact that the German people had their Kant and Hegel, their Goethe and Schiller, at a time when the Czech nation was still being exploited by the German landed gentry and bourgeoisie, and precisely for this reason was incapable of developing a high culture, by no means gives the propertied classes of the German nation the right to exploit and oppress the Czech people. If the German bourgeoisie in the national as well as in the social struggle asserts the notion that high culture provides a right to the labor of others, the workers of all nations oppose this with their own moral concept that all societal work provides a right to one's own culture. The demand that arises from this proletarian ethic is the same as that which we have already derived from the needs of the trade union and political struggle of the working class: a constitution that provides a legal guarantee that the nation can develop its culture and that all workers can share in the culture of their nation.

A constitution that gives each nation the power to develop its culture; a constitution that does not force any nation repeatedly to seize and assert this power in the struggle for state power; a constitution that does not base the power of any nation on the domination of the majority by a minority—these are the national-political demands of the proletariat. These demands cannot be satisfied by the centralist-atomist constitution in any of its forms: either by imperial centralism or by crown land federalism. This constitution is in all respects the opposite of the proletarian ideal. It does not guarantee any nation the free development of its culture; it forces the nations into a power struggle with the state; it forces in particular the old historical nations into a struggle against democracy. The eyes of the proletariat thus necessarily turn to the other conceivable form of regulating the relationships of nations to the state, that form which Rudolf Springer (Renner) has termed the organic conception. Each nation should independently satisfy its own national cultural needs, should govern itself; the state should limit itself to the protection of those interests which are a matter of indifference in national terms, but are common to all nations. Thus, national autonomy, the self-determination of

nations, necessarily becomes the constitutional program of the working class of all nations within the multinational state.

But just as it was no accident that liberalism attempted to order national relations in accordance with the centralist-atomist constitution since this form of regulation was based on its overall concept of the state, so too does the proletarian demand for national autonomy coincide with the working class's overall concept of the task of the polity. One can comprehend the entire struggle of the working class as a struggle for self-determination, for autonomy.

In capitalist society the working class is dominated by the propertied classes. The ownership of the means of production gives these classes the power to appropriate a part of the value produced by the society, to dominate the workers, to subject them to commands and prohibitions. The working class has no influence on the course of economic development and, as a consequence, also no power at all over the direction of cultural development. Only socialism brings people self-determination. It gives the workers the power to control the product of their labor; it has no class that commands the workers; it gives the whole people the power to methodically direct its work and thereby consciously to determine the further development of its culture. It is for this reason that Friedrich Engels called the transformation of the capitalist mode of production into the socialist mode of production the leap of humanity from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom. In this sense the struggle of the working class against capitalism represents a struggle for self-determination, for autonomy.

The first task in this struggle is the conquest of political power. The means to this end are constituted by democracy, the rule of the people. And the struggle for democracy, in turn, represents a struggle against domination by others—against domination by an absolutist monarch, a bureaucracy, a bourgeois minority. The meaning of all democracy is autonomy, the self-determination of the people.

The initial task of liberalism was the creation of the bourgeois legal system. Its greatest achievement was universal codification: the civil code, the commercial code, the penal code, and so on. The old liberalism sought to limit administration by the state to the mere execution of laws; the less the administration did, the better in the eyes of liberalism. Its maxim was that the state should limit itself to safeguarding the personal liberty and the property of the citizen and otherwise not disturb the free play of economic forces. By contrast, the working class does not have to introduce a legal system, but only to give new content to the old bourgeois legal institutions. It does not need to formulate new laws for the protection of personal liberty; rather, it will realize the personal liberty promised by liberalism by placing the economic system under public administration and thereby eliminating precisely that power which enslaves and exploits the personally free worker. The work-

ers will not create a new property law, but will merely replace the owner of private property with the public polity, will give what the society produces to the people, and make it the object of public administration. The proletariat will not create a new legal system, but will change the legal subjects. For this reason the state administrative apparatus is today perhaps just as important for the working class as the process of legislation and, in the great period of transition that will precede the new socialist society, will become increasingly important. For this reason the working class cannot content itself with mastering the process of legislation, but must also make those for whom the administrative apparatus is there organs of public administration. The workers therefore also demand self-government, demand autonomy in this narrower sense.

However, they do this for still another reason. In most states, the bourgeoisie has left the army and the administrative apparatus in the hands of the monarch and his bureaucracy. Springer (Renner) once referred to such a form of democracy as "lame democracy." It is ultimately based on a sheet of paper. At any time, the rulers can eliminate the process of democratic legislation, can scatter the parliament. Their army protects them against the fury of the people. And the state bureaucracy ensures that the state continues to exist contrary to the will of the people, that the machinery of state does not come to a standstill. The proletariat cannot content itself with such a democracy. It cannot attain its goals without damaging the interests of the rulers, without smashing their power. This being the case, its power in terms of legislation requires a firmer foundation than a sheet of paper that those who are supported by soldiers and bureaucrats can tear up at any time. For this reason the working class demands, on the one hand, the transformation of the standing army into a people's militia. For this reason it demands, on the other hand, the replacement of bureaucratic administration by self-government. Democracy is secure against every attempt to overthrow it only if it stands firmly on both feet. Autonomous administration is no less important than autonomous legislation.

Autonomy thus constitutes the essence of all proletarian struggle, the essence of the socialist mode of production, the essence of democracy. Autonomy, also in the narrower sense of self-government, is for the proletariat the means and foundation of the power to which it aspires. This train of thought now falls into line with the proletarian demand for national autonomy. Our so-called crown land autonomy is not a true form of self-government. For it lacks the first precondition of autonomous administration, the relative homogeneity of interests. For the minority it always—thanks to our selective franchise—and for the majority it very often becomes domination by others. The autonomy of the nations constitutes real self-administration, for the development of the national culture is the common interest of every member of the nation.

Of course, within capitalist society and also within each nation, sharp conflicts of interest will exist. The way in which the working class will want to produce and utilize the means required by the nation, organize national schools, and direct the development of the national culture will be different from that which the propertied classes want. National autonomy within our society is only a step on the path to that full self-determination of the nations that is possible only upon the firm foundation of the socialist mode of production.

However, within capitalist society, national autonomy is the necessary demand of a working class that is compelled to conduct its class struggle within a multinational state. The Austrian working class has clearly recognized this. It is gradually overcoming naive cosmopolitanism on the one hand and naive nationalism on the other—even though this development cannot, of course, proceed in the midst of the pandemonium of the national struggle without suffering setbacks. In 1897 the Wimberg Party congress implemented national autonomy within the party.⁶⁸ And even if, as we shall see, the internal structure of the party follows other laws than those of the state constitution, the concept of self-determination has nevertheless contributed decisively to every reorganization of the party constitution. In 1898, the *Neue Zeit* published Karl Kautsky's excellent article on the Austrian nationalities question, which called for the "federalism of nations." In 1899, the pamphlet by Synopticus entitled *State and Nation* appeared, which introduced the personality principle into the discussion.⁶⁹ In the same year the demand for national autonomy pushed its way to the fore in a number of articles in the Austrian party newspapers, above all the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*.⁷⁰ In the same year the Brünn Party congress unanimously adopted its nationalities program, which calls for the transformation of Austria into a confederation and for the legal guarantee of full self-determination for every nation.

National autonomy is not a program devised by clever men in order to rescue the state in its hour of need, but the demand that the proletariat necessarily voices in the multinational state, the demand that arises from the needs of its economic and political struggle, from its concept of a public polity, arises ultimately from its particular ideology, from its concept of the relationship between culture and work. National autonomy is a necessary goal of the proletarian class struggle, because it is a necessary means of its class politics, which are at the same time a particular form of national politics—the national-evolutionary politics whose final goal is that of making the whole people into a nation. For this reason, the working class of all nations in the multinational state opposes the national power politics of the propertied classes with the demand for national autonomy.

4. National Autonomy

THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE

In what follows, we treat national autonomy in the first instance as a proletarian demand. Therefore, we pose this question: how would the proletariat, given that it was in possession of the power to do so, organize in detail the legal self-determination of nations, and through which legal institutions would it guarantee this?

If we pose the question of the concrete application of the general principle of national autonomy, we are not induced to do so by the gratuitous pleasure derived from the play of the imagination that constructs states and destroys them in a vacuum. Rather, we seek to give the general concept of national autonomy tangible content only insofar as the position of the working class in regard to the national struggles of the present is determined by the concept of the constitution demanded by the working class.

The simplest form in which the realization of national autonomy can be imagined is the constitution of the nation as a territorial corporation. The areas of settlement of the individual nations are demarcated from one another. Within their borders each nation forms a state, provides independently for its cultural needs, and regulates the relations of all who reside in this area both to each other and to the whole. All the nations of Austria form a federal state that regulates matters relevant to all nations and that safeguards the interests shared by all nations.

The self-government of the legally demarcated language region is a demand of the national minority in nearly all Austrian crown lands. In Bohemia it is demanded by the Germans, in Galicia by the Ruthenians, in Tyrol by the Italians, and in Styria by the Slovenes. The ruling majorities, however, everywhere refuse to comply with this demand: in Bohemia the Czechs accuse the supporters of national demarcation of the great crime of the "dis-memberment of the land." In the same manner, the Germans in Styria and in Tyrol and the Poles in Galicia reject the demarcation of language regions. It is consistent with the nature of the petty bourgeoisie, whose viewpoint never

extends beyond a narrow local sphere, that the same petty bourgeois national parties that demand national demarcation in Bohemia reject it in Styria and in Tyrol. When Social Democrats call for national demarcation throughout the empire, it makes that which the bourgeois parties have already demanded for the national minorities in the individual crown lands into a principle of the imperial constitution.

National autonomy on the basis of the territorial principle is without doubt a means of demarcating the spheres of national power, a means of arbitrating in national power struggles. But whether it is the most appropriate means is questionable. The argument has been made against the constitution of national regional administrative bodies within the state that a lasting demarcation of regions of national settlement is not possible at all because the linguistic borders are continually being shifted. As a consequence, after a few years the borders of the constituent national states would no longer coincide, and frequent national struggles for a new demarcation would ensue. The supporters of the territorial principle have refuted this theory by showing that the linguistic border is much more durable and shifts much more slowly and to a far smaller extent than is conventionally assumed. The linguistic border is fixed by landed property: insofar as the soil belongs to German peasants an area is German, and insofar as it belongs to Czech peasants it is Czech. Every displacement of the linguistic border presupposes that the German landowner is replaced by the Czech or the Czech by the German. Now, as a rule the peasant's son inherits his father's land. And even when a peasant's land is sold, it is seldom the case that it falls into the hands of someone of another nationality. This provides the basis for the stability of the linguistic border.

However, there are cases where changes in land ownership do have the effect of shifting the borders of the language region. In Bohemia there are many districts from which landowners have emigrated in great numbers—to the German industrial regions of the land, to Vienna, or to America. In such cases, it is not rare for the land to fall to a large landowner who replaces the peasants with agricultural laborers. It can now very well come about that these agricultural laborers belong to a nation other than that of the displaced peasants. There are cases where in this manner the German peasant has been replaced by Czech agricultural laborers with the result that the linguistic border has been shifted to the advantage of the Czechs. More common is the case where the land of the emigrating peasants and cotters falls into the hands of other peasants. There are districts where the German peasants happen to be in possession of better land than the Czechs are. The Czech peasants and cotters emigrate, and the prosperous German peasants buy up their land. Here the linguistic border is shifted to the advantage of the Germans. However, these changes are neither numerous nor significant.

The research of Herbst, Schlesinger, and Rauchberg has convincingly proved that small shifts do indeed occur, in some cases to the advantage of

one nation, in others to the advantage of the other, but that on the whole landed property provides the language regions with their fixed borders. A more rapid shifting of these borders than that stemming from changes in landownership can result from the immigration of wage laborers. If a factory is established in a German village situated on a linguistic border and this factory attracts Czech workers, it is possible that the village initially becomes linguistically mixed and that after only a few years the Czechs form the majority of the population. In this manner the nations can extend their regions of settlement much more rapidly than through changes in landownership. However, history teaches us that such changes occur only seldom, that they are slow and on a small scale. This fact, then, also hardly constitutes a conclusive argument against the territorial principle.

It is in the industrial regions that the great changes in the cohabitation of the nations take place. Industrial capitalism has led the Czech worker to German Bohemia and to Vienna, the Polish worker to Silesia. Many German minorities in the Czech language region have capitalism to thank for their existence. The industrial regions can of course by chance be located on a linguistic border; very often, however, they are located in the midst of a unified region of national settlement. For this reason, we can observe that the most momentous changes to the nationality of a population take place not where the areas of national settlement are adjacent to one another, but far removed from the linguistic border in the midst of a unified language region. It is not where the land of the German peasant borders on Czech land, but in the midst of German Bohemia and in the old German city of Vienna, to which German capital lures the Czech worker, that the national composition of the population changes the most rapidly. The emergence and growth of these language islands is much more important for the development of the nations than the insignificant displacements of the linguistic border.

Apart from these modern language islands generated by capitalism, there are also much older language islands within the unified language regions. In part, these have come into being as a result of peasant colonization in earlier centuries, as in the case of many of the German peasant villages in the midst of the Czech language region of Bohemia.¹ In part they are the remains of old settlements, living witnesses to times past. Thus, in the district of Mies there are four parishes with Czech majorities. They originate from a time in which the city and the rulers of Mies were still Czech. Although both have long since become German, several peasant villages have preserved their nationality and, in the midst of the German language region and without any connection with the Czech part of the land, still recall the old patterns of settlement of the nations that changed centuries ago.² In the same way, the German minorities in many a Czech city are the remains of past times. The German minorities in Prague, Budweis, Pilsen, and the German city of Böhmisches-Aicha, which has no connection with the German language region and is surrounded

by Czech villages, recall a time in which the Czech nation comprised only peasants and domestic servants, whereas the bourgeois upper class everywhere was German. However, all these language islands that originate from the social relations of past times gradually die out. The isolated Czech peasant villages in the German language region will be absorbed into their German environment just as the German peasant colonists and the German urban minorities in the Czech language region are gradually being absorbed by the majority of the population. The modern German language islands exhibit a quite different character. They owe their existence to the social migrations caused by capitalism, and as long as the direction of these migrations remains unchanged, as long as these migrations continually supplement and strengthen these national minorities with a uniform supply, their disappearance is unimaginable. No process of national demarcation, no matter how cleanly implemented, will be able to eliminate these modern language islands.

This fact alone makes it clear that the legally demarcated regions of settlement of the nations will always include important and, in general, constantly growing national minorities. And these minorities will be substantially augmented due to the fact that a clear demarcation of nationally homogeneous administrative regions is not possible everywhere. This is impossible in some locations on the linguistic border solely because the language regions are not clearly demarcated from one another, but instead gradually merge into each other, with the result that between them there is a region with a high degree of mixed nationality. This is particularly the case in Moravia. Nevertheless, this phenomenon is not the rule. Where the nationality of landowning peasants fixes the linguistic border, the language regions are sharply distinguished from one another. In Bohemia (according to Rauchberg) the national minority amounts to more than 10 percent of the population in only 395 villages [*Ortschaften*] (3.08 percent of the total) and in only 253 parishes (3.41 percent of the total). Only 11.4 percent of the inhabitants of the realm reside in parishes in which the national minority forms more than 10 percent of the local population.

It is these facts that provide a platform for supporters of the demarcation of national regions. The number of juridical districts of mixed nationality is certainly large, and that of nationally mixed political districts even larger, but this is based merely on an incorrect distribution of administrative and juridical districts. If we return to the most natural regional unit, the village [*Ortschaft*], we see that only a very small proportion of the villages are nationally mixed. If one now dissolves the old districts and forms the new ones only out of villages or at least parishes that are nationally homogeneous, one obtains administrative and juridical districts with extremely small minorities indeed.

It must be conceded that our district divisions are in need of improvement and that through a new demarcation of the districts the national minorities within them could be substantially reduced. However, it is incorrect to be-

lieve that one could take as a basis for the state administrative and judicial system a form of regional division that slavishly follows the linguistic border.

The state cannot arbitrarily divide up administrative regions as it pleases; its own interests as well as those of the population compel it to incorporate those villages that are linked together by close economic relations into administrative and juridical districts. The legal division is based on the social linking of villages to form economic and commercial units, which in a commodity-producing society are not consciously determined and regulated by any power, but by blindly functioning economic laws. Rudolf Springer enumerates the following forms of economic district:

1. The unit of natural settlement: farmstead and village, small town and city.
2. The local market areas: weekly market areas, a market or a country town including the surrounding villages. Local byways converge on the market. The inhabitants of the surrounding villages go there in order to exchange their agricultural products for the wares of the artisans and small retailers.
3. The large areas served by a country fair. Their center is the large provincial town. The goods imported by the district flow to this point and are delivered by the wholesalers to the small retailers trading in the market areas throughout the district. It is also to this point that the goods exported by the district flow for shipping. The large provincial town together with the whole district, which includes several weekly market areas, constitutes an economic unit.³

To be sure, this form of division is somewhat schematic and no doubt requires a degree of correction. It also readily holds true only for predominantly agrarian regions. In industrial regions it is frequently intersected by another form of division that is determined by the local distribution of the individual branches of industry. A coal-mining district, a wool-weaving district, or a linen district constitutes here a natural economic unit. Be that as it may, the fact remains that there exist such regional economic units independent of all juridical regional divisions. And it is just as certain that administrative and juridical divisions must adapt themselves to these regions. The Czech peasant who has to go into a German town on a weekly basis to sell his wares and buy the goods he needs demands that he also be able to pay his taxes there, deal with the courts, inspect the land register, and lodge complaints against the decision of a parish authority. And this need of the population is also the need of the state. Orderly state administration becomes impossible when administrative divisions disrupt social territorial divisions and pack together population groups that have no form of interaction with one another. In the juridical district of Königinhof, for example, there are twenty-two townships that are either purely or predominantly German. The city of Königinhof itself and the remaining rural parishes are Czech. The German rural parishes border on the German language region, on the districts of Arnau and Trautenau. It would therefore be possible to unify these German parishes

with German administrative and juridical districts, although it is impossible to say at this point which parish would be most expediently unified with which juridical district. However, at least some of these German parishes are connected by close economic ties to the city of Königinhof. The peasants go there in order to sell and to ship their wares; there they purchase the wares they require; there they seek out the physician or the apothecary. Many of them labor as outworkers and are consequently compelled to deliver their fabric there. Can administrative division destroy such an economic unit and, for the sake of national demarcation, unite the German parishes that directly border on the Czech city of Königinhof with a far-distant German city to form an administrative district? It is much the same for the juridical district of Neuhaus, which consists of twenty-one purely German, eight mixed, and forty-seven purely Czech townships. The city of Neuhaus is itself Czech. The German parishes refer to the German juridical district of Neubistritz and would thus be easy to unify with a German administrative district. Here too a number of these parishes could certainly be attached without difficulty to a German district, but would this be to the advantage of all? Is orderly administration still possible at all when German parishes that border directly on the city of Neuhaus and have the closest of economic ties with it are to be administered from a far-distant German location? We have mentioned two cases of German rural parishes the economic center of which is a Czech city. More common is the reverse case. For example, in the Böhmerwald region Czech townships border directly on the German city of Prachatitz. Is it possible to separate them from the juridical district of Prachatitz?

In many places, national demarcation is possible and can be implemented without damaging the interests of the state or the population; and, if it is possible, the implementation of the legal demarcation of the language region is surely a precondition of national self-determination. But it would be a mistake to assume that such a demarcation can be implemented everywhere. If it were possible to shift the administrative center of gravity to the village or at least to the parish, national demarcation would be realized in the overwhelming majority of cases. However, the larger the administrative district we consider, the larger becomes the number of mixed regions. Proportionally, there are more parishes than villages of mixed nationality, more juridical districts than parishes, more political districts than juridical districts: A greater proportion of the parishes than townships are of mixed nationality, a greater proportion of juridical districts than parishes, a greater proportion of political districts than juridical districts. And if—as demanded by specialists in the field—we create a new intermediate link between district and crown land by basing Austrian administration on self-administration at the level of the canton [*Kreis*], a considerable proportion of the cantons would have to be regarded as linguistically mixed.

There are some who do not want to really comprehend the fact that a

purely juridical demarcation of the language region is impossible. And yet it is simple to understand. The borders of the areas of national settlement have been historically handed down from a time when the prevailing economic structure was fundamentally different from ours. The peasants of all peoples settled wherever there was uncultivated land. They maintained only a low level of interaction with the people outside their village. They produced goods not for sale, but for their own needs. Only a small part of the product of their work was sold, and they purchased only a few goods. What a transformation has occurred since then! First, the putting-out system arrived in the countryside and created completely new centers of interaction. It soon came about that the Czech domestic weaver was required to go into the German city, the German domestic weaver into the Czech city, in order to deliver his fabric. Subsequently, the peasant was increasingly drawn into commodity production. Buying and selling gained greater significance for him. Here again, new centers of interaction emerge. The question as to which location becomes the market used by the peasants depends only to a small degree on the nationality of the inhabitants; rather, it is dependent upon economic factors, the geographical situation, and the means of transport. In this way German cities, such as Böhmisches Aicha and Prachatitz, become the market for Czech villages, and Czech cities, such as Königinhof and Neuhaus, become centers of interaction for German villages. Politico-economic measures also alter transport routes and thus exert an effect in national terms. As Pelzel reported already in the eighteenth century, as long as the trade between Bohemia and Saxony was free, the Czech peasants who traded with Saxony had to learn German. This situation changed only when mercantilist policies brought trade between Bohemia and Saxony to a halt by imposing high tariffs and restricted the Czech peasants to trading with the Czech lowlands. From this time onward, the Czech peasants no longer learned the German language.⁴

Finally, capitalism creates new means of transport that again shift the centers of interaction. Through the new railways, Czech townships that once had a Czech center of interaction are now closely linked with a German township, and so on. As a result, the old economic territorial units are dismembered and replaced by new ones without any regard for the old borders of the peasant settlements. The nations have long comprehended the significance of the new means of transport. In 1906 the Magyars prevented the construction of an electric railway from Vienna to Pressburg because it would have had the effect of making Pressburg a "suburb of Vienna." The construction of the new Alpine railways aroused diverse national apprehensions among the Germans, Slovenes, and Italians, because each new railway replaced nationally homogeneous regions of interaction with nationally heterogeneous ones. The continual creation of new centers of economic interaction altered relatively little in terms of the nationality of the population. The

Czech peasant who is brought into close contact with a German city by a new railway still remains a Czech. The community of interaction with his fellow villagers is of course much closer than the occasional interaction with German artisans, merchants, moneylenders, and officials. Nevertheless, he does interact with the city, learns its language, ensures that his children learn its language, and insists that the city, which is the center of his economic interaction, also provide him with access to the administrative authorities of the state, the taxation office, and the courts. Thus, although the linguistic border has not shifted, interaction floods over it. Thus, if one demands that state territorial divisions slavishly follow linguistic borders, one is proposing that the territorial divisions of the present be based on the boundaries of interaction from an epoch of the peasant natural economy. The state cannot support such an anachronism, and for the mass of the population it cannot be desirable. This demand corresponds rather to the need of the intelligentsia, which wants to be spared the trouble of learning the second language of the land by the absolute monolingualism of the administrative district. Not having to learn anything is seen by some students as the most sacred of human rights.

The demarcation of national territory is thus a fundamental demand as the basis of national autonomy. However, we must have no illusions about the fact that it cannot simply be implemented everywhere if the needs of broad sections of the people are not to be sacrificed. We must therefore take into account the fact that for this reason, and because of the language islands continually produced and multiplied by capitalism within the unified language regions, the administrative territory of each nation will include important national minorities. What will now be the fate of these minorities?

Let us suppose that the territorial principle has been consistently implemented. Within the individual national administrative territories the centralist-atomist form of organization applies. The national minorities can ensure the satisfaction of their cultural needs only by gaining power in the legislative and administrative arms of the territorial corporation. But they are always excluded from this power precisely because they are minorities; therefore, if the territorial principle is applied consistently, it appears that they are completely at the mercy of the majority. The territorial principle on the one hand exaggerates the significance of national diversity in that it wants to separate states and administrative territories from one another completely according to linguistic boundaries. On the other hand, however, it expects the nation simply to abandon considerable parts of its people to other nations.

The question of national minorities is a very important one for all nations. As a consequence of the displacement of the population out of the monolingual peasant villages into the industrial districts, which are almost constantly embracing national minorities, the part of the population living

in parishes where the question of minorities does not exist at all becomes ever smaller. Out of one thousand Germans in Bohemia, in 1880, 873.3—compared to 860.2 in 1900—still lived in parishes in which either no Czechs at all lived or the Czech minority formed less than 10 percent of the population. Of the Czechs in Bohemia, in 1880, 91.23 percent—in 1900 only 88.91 percent—lived in purely Czech parishes or in parishes with a German minority amounting to less than 10 percent. The question of minorities is thus of immediate interest for an ever-greater part of the population. Let us remind ourselves that the antagonism between the foreign minority and the settled majority is the root of the national hatred that produces and nourishes petty bourgeois nationalism, and we must therefore guard against underestimating the question of minorities.

In Bohemia, in 1900, 98,548 Germans—that is, 42.2 out of every thousand Germans—lived in parishes with a Czech majority, and 84,598 Czechs—that is, 21.5 per thousand—lived in parishes with a German majority. Were both nations to abandon their minorities, the Germans in Bohemia would lose more than the Czechs in both absolute and relative terms. However, in the German language region the Czech minorities are growing, whereas in the Czech language regions the German minorities are diminishing. Out of one thousand Germans, 49.7 lived in parishes with a Czech population of more than 50 percent in 1880, 47.8 in 1890, and 42.2 in 1900. By comparison, out of one thousand Czechs, 18.4 lived in parishes with a German majority in 1880, 18.7 in 1890, and 21.5 in 1900. As a result, the interest of the Czechs in their minorities is naturally growing constantly, whereas that of the Germans is diminishing. In general, both nations thus have as much to lose as each other in Bohemia by abandoning their minorities.

We come to the same result if we also cast a fleeting glance at the remaining crown lands. The Germans form minorities in all the language regions of the remaining nations. These minorities are predominantly urban. They are, for the most part, made up of old families of officials, of officers and their families, of capitalists and their salaried employees, and finally, of assimilated German Jews. In addition, there are German peasant colonists situated in the midst of regions settled by other peoples, for example, in Galicia, in Bukovina, and in Carniola. The German minorities are most important in national terms in the Czech regions of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, followed by the German minorities in the Slovene districts in Carinthia, which form between 10 and 33 percent of the population, and the many language islands in the Slovene regions of Lower Styria.⁵ But also in the other provinces, even in those on the coast, in Dalmatia and Galicia, there are German minorities. These German minorities are composed predominantly of high-tax-paying and educated elements; abandoning them would thus constitute no small sacrifice for the nation. The German nation also accrues not inconsiderable power from the fact that the German finds fellow nationals everywhere in the

empire. The German share in professions of great importance for the comparative power of the nation—in particular, professions within the state bureaucracy, those of white-collar employees in industry and commerce, and of civil servants in the railway system—would necessarily decrease if the Germans could no longer find German schools everywhere for their children.

The situation of the Italians is similar to that of the Germans. They also constitute an old historical nation and for centuries formed the bourgeois upper stratum in regions occupied by the nonhistorical nations. They would also lose a great deal through the territorial principle. In Istria they form the minorities in the predominantly Slovene district of Capodistria and in all the Croat districts. In Dalmatia they constitute small minorities in all districts. The prosperous merchants and shipowners in the midst of the Slavic population are Italians. This Italian minority is strongest in Zara, where it constitutes 16.76 percent of the population. They do not constitute the majority of the population in any district and would, as a consequence, be at the mercy of the Slavic population under the territorial principle. The situation in Tyrol is otherwise. Here it is Italian workers who form language islands within the German cities. Such minorities are found in all of the larger cities of Tyrol; even in Bludenz in Vorarlberg they constitute 11.69 percent of the population. The territorial principle renders these Italian workers bereft of national rights.

The Poles were also a historical nation in relation to the Ruthenians. For this reason there are only two districts in the whole Ruthenian language region in which no Polish minority has settled. Moreover, the Ruthenian language region includes districts with a small Polish majority: the city and district of Lemberg and the districts of Winniki and Cieszanów. In Bukovina the Poles do not have a majority in any districts, but form minorities everywhere. Finally, in the coal and industrial region of Silesia there are rapidly growing minorities that are composed predominantly of Polish workers.

However, the formerly nonhistorical nations are also interested in the question of minorities. This is above all so in the case of the Czechs. Apart from the Czech minorities in the German regions of the Sudeten, it is above all the extremely rapidly growing minorities in Lower Austria that come into question here. The most recent census lists 132,968 persons who speak Czech as their first language, and this minority is growing very rapidly. In 1880 the Czechs constituted 2.82 percent of the population of the region, in 1890 3.79 percent, and in 1900 4.66 percent. This growth can be traced to the extensive immigration of workers from the agricultural regions of Bohemia and Moravia. According to Rauchberg, among the Bohemian districts that have provided Vienna with more than five thousand persons in absolute terms and, in relative terms, more than 5 percent of their native population, there are six Czech districts, four districts with a Czech majority, and only one German district. According to Meinzingen there are 235,449 persons living

in Vienna who were born in Bohemia.⁶ Of these, 45,615 were born in purely or predominantly German districts and, by comparison, 180,922 in purely or predominantly Czech districts; the birthplace of those remaining is not known. The national character of the Moravian migration is very similar. There are 57,438 persons living in Vienna who were born in purely or predominantly German districts of Moravia and, by comparison, 113,308 persons born in purely or predominantly Czech districts. This immigration is also nothing other than a particular case of a shifting of the population from agriculture into industry. This too will not stop as long as the forces through which capital draws the sons of Czech peasants and agricultural laborers to itself maintain their efficacy. The more rapidly this minority grows, the less the territorial principle is in itself capable of satisfying the Czech nation, which this principle leaves at the mercy of the German majority.

In the same way, the territorial principle alone cannot fulfill the national needs of the Slovenes. In four districts of Carinthia the Slovenes form strong minorities that comprise 20 to 40 percent of the population. In Styria they constitute a minority in two districts. In the coastal areas, they form a minority in Trieste, in the districts of Cormon, Gradiska, and Monfalcone, and in the western districts of Istria. With a better system of district division, several of these Slovene parishes could be amalgamated with other purely Slovene administrative regions, but this is certainly not possible everywhere, and here too the boundaries of the administrative districts could not correspond everywhere with linguistic boundaries.

The Croats constitute a minority in four Italian districts in Istria. Finally, the Ruthenians constitute the majority in the district of Altsandez, which is surrounded by Polish territory, and in fourteen districts within the Polish language region they form not inconsiderable minorities. They also constitute the national minority in the Romanian districts of Bukovina.

These different mixtures of nations can be easily understood in historical terms. They are in part a consequence of peasant colonization in an epoch that had no acquaintance at all with the structures of activity, of means and ends, which we today call public administration, an epoch in which there was no interaction connecting the peasant with people beyond the boundaries of his village, his community [*Markgenossenschaft*], and the feudal manor—an epoch that could therefore easily disseminate people in such a singular fashion. These mixtures have also been inherited from an epoch in which the historical nations and the nonhistorical nations confronted one another, in which the Czech and Slovene peasant had to submit to the German, the Ruthenian peasant to the Polish feudal lord—an epoch in which, amidst a sea of Slavic peasants, there lay small islands of urban life dominated by German or Italian merchants. They originate from an epoch in which Austria was a German state and the German official and the German officer embodied the power of the state throughout the empire. Finally, these mixtures have been

created by modern capitalism, which has uprooted the people from their hereditary soil and has led them into the cities and industrial regions. The national minorities thus reflect the social history of many centuries.

The power of resistance exhibited by the national minorities grows with the elevation of the cultural level of the lower strata of the people. Czech agricultural laborers without culture who immigrated to German regions could easily be Germanized. The modern Czech industrial worker, on the other hand, who has already attended a good Czech school in his homeland, read Czech newspapers, and participated in the political life of his nation, maintains his nationality in a foreign land and endures domination by the foreign majority with difficulty.

The territorial principle in its pure form leaves these minorities everywhere at the mercy of the majority. This corresponds well with the desire of the vexed member of the petty bourgeoisie, for whom the national question is not a question concerning the empire, but a local question, and who therefore sees foreign elements in his city with displeasure. However, this territorial principle subsequently becomes impossible to bear precisely for the petty bourgeoisie. The member of the German petty bourgeoisie in Vienna or in Brüx is happy that the Czech minority is denied the schools it needs. However, the same member of the German petty bourgeoisie will not gladly hear that the Czech majority in Budweis or in Pilsen is able to deny his class comrades schools. Thus, hatred for the foreign minority leads the petty bourgeois to support the territorial principle, although the suffering of his own minorities makes this territorial principle unbearable for him.

The question is quite different for those who wish to see the national question not from a narrow local point of view, but in terms of the whole empire. For them, the territorial principle in its pure form means not only that each nation absorbs the interspersed minorities of the other nations, but at the same time that each nation abandons its own minorities. Thus, on the one hand there is gain, on the other loss. No nation will increase its population to a substantial extent; each nation will merely maintain its population size. But it will do so in the most odious, most protracted, and most painful way possible in that thousands of people from one's own as well as from the other nations will be denied the satisfaction of their most important cultural needs, in that thousands will be compelled to abandon their nationality. Is it not simpler to maintain the population of one's own nation by according the minorities of other nations the possibility of preserving their nationality, and in return claiming this right for the minorities of one's own nation?

Moreover, the territorial principle endangers national peace; for it is quite impossible for this principle to be implemented in a pure form, impossible for each nation to completely renounce any measure of care for its minorities living in foreign language regions. This would mean that the national minorities would lose even those sparse rights accorded them under prevailing laws.

Each nation would therefore attempt to guarantee the rights of its minorities in the regions of settlement through imperial laws. Violent struggles would necessarily break out around the question of which form this legal regulation should take, struggles that would lead anew to the struggle of the nations for power in the state. If a law protecting these minorities were elaborated, every question of interpretation would be fought over anew. Each nation would believe its own minorities to be disadvantaged and would see itself as able to combat the oppression of its own minorities by taking revenge on the minorities of other nations within its region. Thus, national self-determination on the basis of the territorial principle would simply provoke renewed national struggles.

For this reason alone, the territorial principle cannot satisfy the demands of the working class. However, its position regarding the territorial principle will also be determined by other considerations. The question presents itself very clearly for the Czech workers. The Czech minorities in German Bohemia, in the German part of Moravia, and in Lower Austria predominantly consist of workers. The Czech workers' party cannot abandon the national rights of these workers. If the Czech workers are denied Czech schools, they will be kept at a lower level of cultural development, since the Czech child will learn little or nothing in the German school. This is all the more problematic for the Czech workers since they very often do not remain in German areas on a long-term basis but, due to the play of economic trends, are frequently flung back into Czech territory. Research has been done, for example, into how many of the miners reemployed between 1 April and 31 December 1900 following the great miners' strike of that year were still active members of the Central Relief Fund [*Zentralbruderkasse*] for northwest Bohemia. The results yielded by this research are shown in table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Membership data for the Central Relief Fund, 1 April to 31 December 1900

Origin of workers	New members between 1 April and 31 December 1900	Still members on 31 December	No longer members
German districts	1,580	719	861
Districts with German majority	1,053	629	424
Districts with Czech majority	285	116	169
Czech districts	3,113	1,254	1,859

Source: Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*.

Out of 3,113 workers with the right to reside in Bohemia, 1,859 emigrated out of the region of influence of the northwest Bohemian Central Relief Fund. And this was despite the fact that the number of members of the

Central Relief Fund did not change substantially at all. Membership figures were as follows:

End of 1900 31,450
 End of 1901 31,370
 End of 1902 31,353

These figures show clearly enough the great fluctuation among modern wage laborers. Changes in the workforce elsewhere might not be as great as in the coal-mining industry, but there can be no doubt that everywhere a considerable proportion of Czech workers who move into German industrial regions return to their home or move to another Czech district after a shorter or longer time. For the children of these workers, German instruction, which they receive for only a short time and at best for only a few years, is useless. Before they can learn enough of the German language to be able to follow the lesson, they return to the Czech school in their homeland. If these children are denied Czech schools in the German language region, they are denied schooling itself.⁷

All this shows clearly enough that the Czech workers cannot abandon the national rights of their class comrades in the German language region. Denying Czech workers the right to Czech schools means decreasing the level of access to and the quality of schooling for the settled section of the worker force and completely denying it to the fluctuating section. If the means are not provided for Czech workers to be given a proper hearing by the authorities and the courts, even where they do not have a knowledge of German, they are left without rights in relation to the organs of the state. Such a situation would mean restricting Czech workers to a low level of cultural development, as a result of which they would be incapable of conducting their class struggle. The absence of national rights would awaken national hatred in them, and they would be welcome booty for the petty bourgeois national parties. The struggle for the national rights of the Czech minorities can always be only a tiny part of the class struggle of the Czech workers and cannot be allowed to estrange them from the great tasks of this struggle. However, it is without doubt an important instrument in this class struggle, and the Czech workers cannot do without it. Similarly, the Polish workers cannot possibly surrender the national rights of the Polish workers in Silesia and the Italian workers the national rights of the Italian workers in German Tyrol.

The question is somewhat more difficult for the German worker. From the standpoint of the national interest as a whole, no nation has more reason to defend the national rights of its minorities than the German people do. We already know that the highly taxable, cultivated German minorities scattered throughout the empire considerably increase the power of the German nation in Austria. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand why the German workers regard the question of minorities with less interest than the Czech, Polish, and Italian workers. The German minorities in foreign areas of settlement are con-

stituted by workers only to a small extent. They are composed predominantly of members of the bourgeoisie, officials, army officers, and members of the intelligentsia—that is, of strata that are socially alien to the German workers. On the other hand, there are now also certain strata of German workers who move between different language regions in search of employment. The railway workers are one such group. The member of the German bourgeoisie who lives in a Czech city can compensate for the lack of public education with private tuition. The question of the language employed by the state authorities simply does not exist for him, since he can call on a lawyer at any time who can speak the language of the state authorities. The situation is different for the German railway employee who is shifted to a Czech or Polish or Slovene region for a few years. He has to rely on state schools. If he sends his child to a foreign school, the child, who has no command of the language of instruction, will hardly learn anything. If he returns to the German region after several years, his child will have fallen behind children of the same age; a few years of the child's life will have been lost. Other German workers are also driven by the necessary search for employment into foreign regions of settlement. The German mechanic, the German engine fitter, the German foreman almost always appear wherever a new industry arises. But most commonly, it is the German white-collar employees of commerce and industry who constitute the minorities in foreign language regions.

If German workers want to protect their own national minorities, they cannot deny the rights of foreign minorities in their own regions of settlement. But there are also other reasons why they cannot do this. The German worker has an interest of his own in the level of cultural development of the Czech minority: denying Czech workers schools means cultivating Czech workers who will undercut wages and act as strikebreakers. The German worker has an interest of his own in the satisfaction of the particular needs of the Czech minorities as a national group, since a lack of satisfaction of such needs results in the awakening of national hatred. The Czech minorities consequently become incapable of carrying on the trade union and political struggle together with the German workers; they fragment the trade union movement and lend their support to bourgeois political parties. Finally, the national oppression of foreign minorities contradicts the ideology of the German worker. Everywhere, the employer defends the principle of "I sing the song of him whose bread I eat" [*Wes Brot ich ess', des Lied ich sing*], by which he means that the worker eats his bread. The German worker, on the other hand, believes that it suffices that the employer appropriates a part of his labor product; that the employer also wants his soul is something he will not tolerate. The contract of employment should be a contract of sale like any other; it should not give the employer any power of command or prohibition over the worker outside his work, any power to limit the worker's personal freedom. You pay me my wage and I perform my work—you have no other

right to me. This principle springs from the social struggle between the German worker and the German employer. The worker cannot merely abandon this principle as soon as it acquires national significance. When it is the Czech worker who slaves for the employer and should thereby forfeit his rights, is this anything other than a particular case of that presumptuousness of capital that, with a meager wage, wants to buy not just the labor power but the entire human being—that even wants to rob the worker it pays of his nationality? The German worker would be abandoning himself if he did not also want to demand complete national freedom for his Czech class comrades who are forced by the laws of economic life to sell their labor power to German capital in a German land.

Since the division of society into classes, the relation of the human being to the thing has concealed the power of human being over human being. I possess a spinning machine. Apparently this merely means that I possess an object that I utilize as a tool in my work. But in reality, the ownership of the instruments of labor becomes in the hands of the capitalist the power to dominate other human beings, to appropriate their labor product. I possess a piece of land. Apparently this merely means that I have settled on a piece of land in order to live there and to enjoy its fruits. In reality, the ownership of this land gives me the right to ground rent, gives me the power to appropriate the labor-product of others. The territorial principle also wants to base the domination of human beings over human beings on the relationship of the human being to inanimate nature. The property owners of a certain city call a certain piece of land their own. Well and good—may they live upon it and enjoy its fruits. But should the power over a piece of land give them the right to dominate other human beings, to tear other human beings out of their cultural community, and to integrate them by force into another? When the bourgeoisie answers this question in the affirmative, it is merely exhibiting a logical consistency of thought; for its conception of society is founded on the principle that power over things is equivalent to power over human beings. However, the working class opposes this conception of society. It struggles for a social order in which domination of human beings is no longer concealed in the administration of things. For this reason, the principle that the proprietors of land should have the right to deny immigrants without property the fulfillment of their national cultural needs is alien to the working class.

The aspiration to national conquests is the law of all national struggle under the centralist-atomist constitution. Should this nationalities constitution be abolished, the obsession with national conquests will still attempt to maintain a last bastion by claiming that the minorities in the unified areas of settlement of the nations should be sacrificed to the majority. Once again the aspiration to social domination is concealed here in a legal arrangement that is supposed to make national repression possible. Should this also be abolished and should we decide to legally protect the national minorities through

the personality principle, the idea of legal arrangements for the purpose of national conquest will be completely abandoned. National conquests will still remain possible: when a Czech gradually becomes German through marriage, through economic or convivial relations with Germans, the German nation will have won him from the Czech nation. However, the German people will owe this conquest to the natural force of attraction of the national culture, not to the brutal force of a law that denies people of one nation the means of maintaining a cultural community with their fellow nationals in order to force them to attach themselves to another cultural community.

But can we completely renounce the idea of national conquest or at least the help of the law that promotes it? This question has just been answered in the negative on grounds that are enticing for the Germans in Austria. The natural increase of the German population in Austria is smaller than that of the other nations. Do not the Germans have to strive to incorporate the national minorities into their nation so that they will not grow more slowly than other peoples will? We have already answered this question by pointing to the German minorities in the areas of settlement of the other nations. The territorial principle would give to the Germans on the one hand and take from them on the other; it would increase their ability to attack, but weaken their defense; it would Germanize the Slavic minorities in the German region, but abandon the German minorities to the other nations. Whether the Germans would hereby gain or lose more is not something the statisticians can decide. For the Czech worker who lives in Vienna or Reichenberg could still be won for the German people in a variety of ways, even if the right of the Czechs to national schools were no longer denied. The statistician cannot calculate the respective importance of social interaction and the law for the absorption of minorities. He is therefore also unable to say anything regarding whether the Germans will win or lose more than the other nations if the nations do without the aid of the law. But let us assume that which is in fact the case: that the territorial principle weakens the prosperous German minorities less than it does the proletarian Slavic and Italian minorities in the German language region. Let us assume that the territorial principle is in fact a means for the Germans to increase their population at the cost of the other peoples. Does this justify the territorial principle?

In the first place, is increasing the population an objective of national politics at all? Of course, we are not asking if it is advantageous for a state or useful for an economic region to increase the number of its inhabitants. We are inquiring as to the reason why a nation as such desires to increase its population. If we initially focus on the nation in itself, independent of the state in which this nation lives, the assertion that the nation has an interest in increasing its population cannot be accepted without qualification. There can of course be no doubt that, given otherwise equal conditions, increasing the number of members of the nation increases the fruitfulness of national cultural activity.

The economic conditions under which the scholar and the artist who create for a people of eighty million work are quite different from those of their colleagues who can address only a people of six million. The larger a nation is, the more easily and more completely it can develop its education system—from the primary school through to the university—and its other cultural institutions, its theaters, its academies, and its museums. The more extensive the range of scholarly activity, the more science is able to split into different branches and the greater the advantage it gains from this division of labor. The greater the number of people, the greater the probability that each branch of intellectual culture will find those men who promote its growth. But we know that nowhere in our society do the people as a whole have a full and equal share in the national culture. What significance for the fruitfulness of intellectual labor have the millions of peasants who cannot read or write, whose lives unfold from birth to death in eternal monotony, who neither enjoy the cultural wealth of the nation nor take an active part in the productivity of the national culture?

The productivity of national cultural activity can thus be increased not only by increasing the size of the population, but also by raising the level of the participation of the masses in the national culture. The enviable cultural level of the tiny Scandinavian nations provides the best example of this. If it is then certain that the productivity of national cultural activity is dependent not only on the size of the population, but also on the intensity of the national culture, on the degree of cultural permeation among the people as a whole, it follows that the productivity of national activity can never be augmented if the population is increased by means that inhibit the development of the people as a whole into a nation. This goal of the development of the people as a whole into a national cultural community is served by the policy of national evolution, the national policy of the working class. Everything that renders the class struggle of the working class more difficult and damages its class interest thus reduces the participation of the masses in the national culture and thereby reduces the productivity of national cultural activity. Since the latter is the goal and increasing the population merely a means to its realization, rendering the class struggle more difficult for the sake of increasing the size of the population constitutes a privileging of the means over the end.

However, when speaking of the necessity of national conquests, one seldom thinks of the number of members of the nation as increasing the productivity of national cultural activity; one is concerned rather with the expansion of the population because it increases power, increases the political weight of the nation. The aspiration to national conquest within the multinational state is therefore based on good reasons as long as the nations conduct their struggle in terms of the pursuit of state power. The situation alters completely as soon as the atomist-centralist is replaced by the organic regulation of national

relations. Here the state has nothing to offer the nations as totalities, and the power struggle of the nations therefore no longer has any point. The nation is legally assured the power it requires; it no longer struggles to obtain it. In this case, the nation therefore no longer needs to pursue national conquest.

However, these sober considerations will not convince many. The capitalist mode of production transforms every product into a commodity, into an exchange value, and strips it of its qualitative determination, allows it to appear only as a mere quantity, has made the striving for profit, for a particular numerically expressed portion of surplus value the content of human life. It disseminates a mentality that knows no other dimensions than those that can be statistically comprehended, that can be counted, measured, and weighed. That which has been described as a peculiarity of the Americans is characteristic of all capitalist nations, namely, that they confuse "bigness," the measurable dimension, with "greatness," the true inner dimension. Thus, it may be that in our society the numerical size of the nations is manifested not as a means, but as an end in itself. However, even if this is the case, it does not justify the obsession with national conquest and with it the territorial principle.

It is true that the natural population increase in Austria does not particularly favor the German people. But from what does the phenomenon derive? Hainisch has indicated one of the causes.⁸ The marrying age and the number of weddings is everywhere very closely tied to the structure of agriculture. In Austria, the structure of rural existence inhibits the natural propagation of the German people. In the Alpine regions inhabited by Germans the land is in the hands of peasants farming on a larger and medium-sized scale; the property of the great landholders as well as the small plot of land are less important. The peasant's property is maintained as a unit because, rather than being divided up on the peasant's death, it passes to one of the peasant's children, the heir. Apart from the peasant family, there are also unmarried farm laborers and female servants living on the farm. "The large farm as a closed unit limits marriage in two ways: it delays the marriage of the heir until the peasant retires or dies, and it impedes the marriage of the male and female members of the work force employed on the farm on a continual basis." In regions with farms maintained as closed units, the marrying age is therefore high and the number of marriages small. The propagation of the population through the increase in the number of legitimate children is thereby retarded.

To be sure, the number of illegitimate children in these regions is particularly high, but the excess of births over deaths is considerably smaller than in other regions. The former are predominantly inhabited by Germans. The unified farm of our Alpine regions therefore constitutes a dangerous obstacle to the growth of the German population. The regions inhabited by the other nations are not acquainted with this problem of population growth.

In the Karst regions, on the coast, and in Dalmatia the small plot of land predominates, and in the Sudeten, where there is a large number of peasants, there are also many large landholdings and small plots of land. In Galicia the land is divided among the peasant's children on his death, and, as a result, there is a large class of owners of small plots alongside extensive large-scale landholdings. Large-scale landholdings and small plots of land everywhere promote population growth, whereas the unified farm of the Alpine region inhibits it. The fact that the rural structure in the German agricultural regions is based on the unified farm, whereas in the Slavic and Italian regions the large-scale landholding and the small plot of land predominate, is one of the fundamental factors determining the development of the Austrian nations.

There are a series of other causes that contribute to this general effect. The Germans are the people most rapidly seized by capitalist development. All factors that shape the development of the population in a capitalist society have therefore been significant for the growth of the German population. Everything that threatens and shortens the life of the modern industrial worker reduces the German population in Austria. In the German industrial regions, the marrying age in particular is higher than in the agricultural regions inhabited by the other nations. In Bohemia, out of a thousand male Austrian citizens between twenty and thirty years of age speaking German as their normal language of use, 649 were unmarried, compared with only 618 out of a thousand Czechs of the same age; 16.3 percent of the Germans between the ages of thirty and forty were still unmarried compared with only 12.5 percent of the Czechs. The work of women has assumed greater proportions among the Germans. For every thousand German men employed in industry, there are 383 German women, with a corresponding figure of only 243 Czech women employed in industry. At the same time, more married women appear to be entering factory employment. The number of married female textile workers rose from 25,913 to 32,253 between 1891 and 1900 in the district of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Reichenberg, although the number of unmarried and widowed female textile workers did not simultaneously increase over the same period.

The large increase in the number of women performing factory work may explain in part the high number of stillbirths among the Germans, as shown in table 4.2. The infant mortality rate is also far higher in the German industrial region than in the agricultural districts of Bohemia that are inhabited by the Czechs, as can be seen in table 4.3. The overall mortality rate is given in table 4.4. The mortality rate in the German industrial region is considerably higher than in the Czech regions. However, it is sinking in both areas, and the difference between the respective mortality rates is gradually diminishing. The increase in wages and the decrease in working hours that have been won by the trade unions, the legislation on

Table 4.2 Stillbirths in Bohemia, 1891–1900

	Stillbirths per 1,000 legitimate births	Stillbirths per 1,000 illegitimate births
German districts	34.8	42.6
Districts with a German majority	27.8	36.5
Districts with a Czech majority	26.8	32.6
Czech districts	28.8	41.7

Source: Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*.

Table 4.3 Infant Deaths in Bohemia, 1891–1900

	Deaths within the first year of life	Deaths within the first five years of life
German districts	281	358
Districts with a German majority	289	369
Districts with a Czech majority	239	329
Czech districts	237	327

Source: Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*.

Table 4.4 Overall Mortality in Bohemia, 1891–1900

	Deaths per 1,000, 1881–90	Deaths per 1,000, 1891–1900
German districts	308.2	269.0
Districts with a German majority	305.6	283.0
Districts with a Czech majority	267.8	248.2
Czech districts	278.8	246.9

Source: Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*.

social policy, and the progress in the field of hygiene have led to this welcome phenomenon.

This fact demonstrates clearly the path to increasing the German population. The bourgeois-national parties focus on only one means to increase the power of the German people: their aim is to win members from other nations, to Germanize Czechs, Slovenes, and Italians. And yet what is gained in this way is ridiculously small and is bought at far too high a price, since it entails abandoning one's own minorities, as well as the retardation of the social development that alone is able to make the popular masses capable of sharing in the enjoyment of the national culture. The German people could win incomparably more through a decisive and uncompromising social policy. This would increase the number of marriages and decrease infant mortality and the mortality rate in general. This would lead not only to an increase in the

German population in absolute terms, but also to an improvement in the proportional relationship between the Germans and the populations of the other nations. Since the Germans, as the most highly developed nation in capitalist terms, suffer the most under capitalist exploitation, the healing effects of energetic social policy benefit them the most. Herkner has very nicely expressed this idea in his youthful pamphlet.⁹ Rauchberg has supported it with a wealth of factual material. Nevertheless, petty bourgeois nationalism will continue to become agitated when a Czech school is established somewhere and will calmly look on as the housing crisis, the putting-out system, and child labor ruin the race, spread tuberculosis, and cause underage German children in their hundreds to waste away in poverty, squalor, and overwork.

The propertied classes claim that they want to increase the population size of the German nation. Well and good. Then the peasants should demand that the law of inheritance and marriage consent be abolished. Then the great landholders should ensure that bread, meat, and sugar become cheaper. Then the industrialists should intervene to ensure that the state does not hinder the trade union struggle, to decrease the length of the working day by law, and to ban factory work for pregnant women. Then the master craftsman should demand that the state put an end to the shameless exploitation of apprentices and that further professional training be included in the working day. Then property owners should urge parish authorities to ensure the provision of modestly priced and hygienic housing. Then the capitalists should ensure that the exploitation of workers in the putting-out system is mitigated. The German people have far more illegitimate children, in both absolute and relative terms, than the other nations and suffers above all from their dreadful mortality rate. The propertied classes should therefore demand that illegitimate children be granted the legal right of succession and the right of compulsory inheritance from the father, as well as a claim to food, care, and education proportional to the income of the father. The question is whether the propertied classes will decide to support a national policy that contradicts their class interest.

For the working class, however, the path is clearly marked out that it must take if it wants to increase the size of its national population. It cannot abolish the unified farm in the Alpine regions as long as this finds support in the prevailing structure of agricultural production and in the habits of the rural population. However, it can oppose the legal foundation of the unified farm, the right of farm inheritance, and the rules of marriage consent. The working class cannot completely do away with the devastating effects of the workers' exploitation in capitalist industry in the context of our society. However, it can mitigate these effects through the trade union struggle and laws governing the protection of workers. It can attempt to gradually heal the worst wounds of the social body—the immeasurable suffering caused by the putting-out system, child labor and the employment in industry of pregnant women, the

mortality rate of illegitimate children, the lack of housing, the extreme length of the working day, the high price of food, and the low level of wages. The German workforce can do without winning a few hundred children from the Czechs annually through the Germanizing effects of schooling; in return it will be able to snatch thousands of German children annually from death through overwork and hunger.

To rescue for their people the thousands of German men and women who annually succumb to the murderous effects of capitalist exploitation: this constitutes the national conquest aspired to by the working class. It is not the territorial principle, but social policy that represents the means of this national conquest, and in the struggle to achieve this national conquest the German workers are secure in the knowledge that they have allies in the proletariats of all nations.

THE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE

In its pure form, the aim of the personality principle is to constitute the nation not as a territorial corporation, but as an association of persons. The national bodies regulated by public law would thus constitute territorial bodies only insofar as their efficacy could not extend, of course, beyond the borders of the empire. Within the state, however, power would not be given to the Germans in one region and the Czechs in another; rather, each nation, wherever its members resided, would form a body that independently administered its own affairs. It would very often be the case that two or more nations would construct their own national administrative bodies within the one city, erect national educational institutions side by side, but undisturbed by one another—in exactly the same way as Catholics, Protestants, and Jews independently attend to their religious affairs side by side within the one city.

The realization of the personality principle would require the division of the population according to nationality. However, the state would not be able to decide who was to be regarded as a German and who as a Czech; rather, it would be the mature citizen who was accorded the right to determine to which nationality he wished to belong. On the basis of this free declaration of nationality by the mature citizen, national registers would be established containing a list of the mature citizens of each nationality that was as accurate as possible. Naturally, the replacement of the declaration of nationality by those citizens who could not or did not wish to provide such a declaration with a system of juridical approximation would not contradict the right to the free declaration of nationality.

In 1905, the national register first called for by Synopticus (Dr. Karl Renner) was actually introduced in an Austrian crown land. The new provincial legislation and the parliamentary election regulations for Moravia introduced national electoral bodies for the voters of the urban curia, the rural parish

curia, and the general electoral class.¹⁰ The representatives of these curias were, as the law put it, “elected in nationally separate electoral bodies of the Bohemian and German nationalities, for which particular electoral districts are constituted” (section 3b of the provincial legislation). However, this electoral register is not based on the free declaration of nationality. The electoral roles are established by parish authorities. To be sure, each voter can “through the declaration that he belongs to a nationality other than that entered in the role, cause his name to be struck from one list and entered in another list of his choice” (section 71, clause 7, of the provincial electoral legislation). However, it is also possible for the “inclusion of a voter in a national list to be contested in regard to national membership by a voter included in the same list.” In this case, “it is the decision of the parish authority whether the request is to be examined and, where the same seems justified, to carry out the correction” (section 71, clauses 9 and 10, of the parliamentary election regulations). Thus, the parish authority is to decide here according to some objective criteria as to the national membership of the voter!

The Moravian electoral register can also not act as a model on the grounds that no provisions have been made to ensure that the freedom of the declaration of nationality is actually granted. If the national register is to become the foundation of national self-determination, it is imperative that the free declaration of nationality be protected through a system of penalties that contain the influence of the politically and economically powerful.

The Moravian national register can also not be compared with the national register as the foundation of national autonomy on the grounds of its objective. For the declaration of nationality in Moravia today has no other legal consequence than the right to vote in the relevant electoral bodies; nothing is hereby changed in regard to the centralist-atomist nationalities constitution. Here there is the danger that one nation will record a section of its voters in the register of another nation in order to influence the vote in the electoral body of the latter. Were the national register the foundation of national autonomy, this would be impossible. For the declaration of nationality would then have severe legal consequences. Anyone included in the German register would be liable to pay tax to the German nation, and it would be only from this nation that he could demand the admission of his children to state schools and the provision of legal aid when dealing with departments and courts that employ the Czech language. However, the division of voters into national electoral bodies in combination with the continuation of the centralist-atomist regulation of national relations—even leaving aside the danger of abuse—is a completely inappropriate application of the personality principle. Rather than eliminating the power struggle between the nations, it merely distributes the positions within this struggle unequally. The number of deputies from each nation is fixed, with the result that every change in the numerical relation between the nations necessarily awakens

the desire for a redistribution of the mandates, thereby continually leading to a renewed struggle for power within the region.

We call for the national register as a foundation for national self-administration, not as an electoral role for the election of the *Reichsrat* and the provincial assembly. Rather than national electoral bodies, proportional voting rights appear to us to be an effective means of preventing a situation whereby the minority is left without representation following elections for the representative bodies of the international territorial bodies (empire, province [*Land*], district, parish). In all this, it has not yet been mentioned that the personality principle seems to be distorted here due to its having been artificially grafted onto the system of privileged voting rights. The Moravian provincial assembly has only twenty deputies elected by the general electoral class alongside 129 representatives of the privileged curias. Despite all this, this first legislative attempt to base a new form of regulating the public right of the nations on the personality principle is without doubt an auspicious beginning, a clear sign that the conviction is growing that national relations in Austria cannot be regulated purely on the basis of the territorial principle—the first victory of a [genuine] principle.

Establishing the national register would provide the basis of national autonomy. We would only need to constitute the members of a nation within the parish, within the district or canton, within the crown land, and ultimately within the empire as a whole as a public body with the task of attending to the cultural needs of the nation, of establishing schools, libraries, theaters, museums, and institutions of popular education and of providing the nation's members with legal assistance when dealing with the authorities, insofar as they require this due to a lack of command of the language employed by state departments and courts. In return, this body would be granted the right to procure the means required for these purposes through the taxation of the nation's members. National autonomy would thus be founded purely on the personality principle. Each nation would have the power to attend to national cultural development using its own means; thus, no nation would have to engage in the struggle for power within the state. The personality principle would constitute the perfect means of national defense; insofar as national minorities can be safeguarded through legal institutions at all, they would be safeguarded. Inversely, the personality principle excludes national oppression on the basis of law. To be sure, even under the rule of law, the nations would exercise their force of attraction on the members of other peoples. The nations whose cultural development is richer would continue to win some of those striving to better themselves among less developed peoples. The national majorities in the individual regions would always absorb a part of the national minorities through intermarriage, would continue to win a considerable part of the national minority for their cultural community through the close ties forged by economic and convivial relations. However, all such

national conquests would be realized only through the social power of the individual nations, through the force of attraction exerted by their cultures and the natural weight of the larger body—but not by virtue of a legal privilege. Conquest by force would be replaced by peaceful competition.

However, if we imagine the personality principle applied in its pure form, with the nations organized as associations of persons completely outside the state administrative apparatus, as is the case with the religious communities (“the free nation within the free state”), this principle still performs its task only incompletely. It is this aspect that arouses the mistrust—more instinctive than clearly conscious of its reasons—expressed in regard to the personality principle even by many who are in theory supporters of national self-determination. The state may guarantee the nations the power they need through its legal system, but what protects the nations against the state?

If the nations are to base their rights on the power of the state, who is to provide them with the guarantee that the state will always lend them its strong arm? Who can guarantee that the state, supported by its instruments of power, will not one day tear up the piece of paper that attests to the rights of the nations? Must not the nation itself be in possession of state instruments of power? Must it not, if it cannot be an independent state, at least be a state within a federation in order to be guaranteed the power it requires on a lasting basis?

It seems to me that there is another possibility, which combines the advantages of the personality principle in its pure form with complete security of national rights. This solution has been shown to the Austrian people by Rudolf Springer's 1902 work *The Struggle of the Austrian Nations for the State*—by far the most valuable work ever produced on the Austrian nationalities question. We can protect the nations without abandoning the advantages of the personality principle if we place public administration in their hands.

The administrative apparatus is the living reality of the state. Without an administrative apparatus the modern state cannot exist, can neither summon its soldiers nor collect its taxes. The organic regulation of national relations makes the nations dependent on the instruments of power of the state, upon whose power their legal independence is based. However, if the state places administration in the hands of the nations, it will become dependent on the nations. The state secures national rights for the nations, and these rights are guaranteed on a continual basis and cannot be retracted, since if the state destroys national self-administration, it destroys its own administrative system and thus annihilates itself. The bureaucratic administrative apparatus cannot provide a solution to the question of how the power of the nations can be secured against the state when this power rests on the power of the state; democratic self-administration provides an answer to this question.

Springer's system does not represent the pure application of the personali-

ty principle. This is possible in the case of the legal regulation of the religious communities, but the national cultural community has an incomparably stronger hold on the modern individual than do the ties of religion. For this reason the religious communities appear to the citizenry to be amply protected once the independent administration of their affairs without any intrusion by the public administrative apparatus has been guaranteed. Such a guarantee does not suffice for the national associations. They require autonomous administration; but it is only when public administration is also based on this self-administration that the nations are protected from the state. Only then is state power founded just as firmly on the power of the nations as the power of the nations is on the instruments of the power of the state.

Springer sketches the following picture of such a form of regulation of national relations. The foundation of public administration would be independent administration of the canton [*Kreis*]. These cantons would be nationally demarcated, insofar as the requirements of public administration and the interests of the population permitted this. The canton's self-administrative apparatus would be able to assume the most important of the tasks that today are in part the responsibility of the state bureaucracy—the governor and local state administrative bodies—and in part that of the autonomous local administrative apparatus—parish, district representation, provincial commission. This self-administrative body, the organ of which would be the canton council [*Kreisrat*], would at the same time fulfill the needs of the inhabitants for elementary and secondary schools, for orphanages and humanitarian institutions, for theaters and institutions of popular education. Within the canton, the district and the parish would constitute more limited associations and would be administered by the parish and district councils.

In many cases it would not be possible, of course, for cantons to be nationally homogeneous. In such cases the population of the canton would form a self-administrative body for purposes of public administration, the organ of which would be the canton council. However, at the same time, on the basis of the national register, and thus according to the personality principle, the population would be divided into two national self-administrative bodies that would independently deal with national cultural tasks within the canton and levy taxes on the members of their respective nations for this purpose. The organs of these national self-administrative bodies would be the canton delegations.

In the monolingual canton of Eger the canton council would thus take responsibility for all tasks pertaining to both public administration and national administration. In the dual canton of Budweis, on the other hand, the canton council would have responsibility only for administrative tasks which were of a nationally neutral character, whereas national cultural tasks would be the responsibility of German and Czech canton delegations. Using a national

register, the population of the canton as a whole would be divided into a German association of persons and a Czech association of persons. Through the canton delegation elected from its own members, the German association of persons would administer its own affairs, independently building up its school system, raising funds through the taxation of the nation's members. The Czech association of persons would naturally have the same rights within the canton.

Within the nationally unified cantons, national minorities would of course continue to exist, but with insufficient numbers of members to establish an independent national canton administration. Should they so wish, they could also form autonomous bodies based on the national register. Springer refers to these as "concurrences" [*Konkurrenzen*], a term common in Austrian administrative law. The canton of Eger would thus be uniformly administered through the German canton council. But the Czech minorities could, if they wanted, form national associations: parish, district, and canton concurrences. These concurrences would have only two tasks. First, they would guarantee their members legal assistance free of charge when dealing with the German authorities, insofar as their members did not have a good command of the German language. Second, using their own resources, they would maintain elementary schools for their members and for this purpose would have the right to levy taxes on all those having their names entered in the Czech register. The state would not set any limits on the formation of such concurrences. As soon as a minority was prepared to provide for legal protection and its own elementary schools, it would have the right to form such an association. The canton concurrence would become a canton delegation, and the nationally uniform canton thereby a dual canton as soon as the national minority was capable not only of providing legal protection and elementary schooling, but also of maintaining at least one secondary school and the necessary humanitarian institutions (orphanages and similar establishments) on the basis of its own resources.

The cantons would now enter into a dual relation with one another. First, the cantons would form territorial associations charged with dealing with certain affairs of a nationally neutral character. For example, all the cantons in Bohemia would constitute the province [*Land*] of Bohemia, regardless of the nationality of their inhabitants, and would jointly deal with certain territorial affairs. On the other hand, all cantons inhabited by a particular nation as well as the national self-administrative bodies representing this nation within the dual cantons would constitute that nation as a legal entity. All Germans in the nationally uniform cantons and all those Germans within the dual cantons who are entered in the national register would constitute the German nation and elect the national council. This national council would independently administer the national affairs of the Germans, establish universities, museums, and so on, and have the right to levy taxes on the Germans

in the nationally uniform cantons and in the dual cantons. In the nationally uniform cantons the national council would have the right to establish such national institutions without being subject to the influence of any other nation; in the dual cantons, on the other hand, this would be permitted only with the approval of the national council of the other nation.

The national questions that concern the great mass of the population, and not merely a few officials, would thereby be resolved. This would above all be the case with regard to the question of schooling. In the monolingual canton, the parish council, district council, and canton council would provide for elementary and secondary schools. In the dual canton, each nation, whose organs would be the parish, district, and canton delegations, would independently build up its schooling system, whereas the influence of the parish, district, and canton councils administering the region as a whole would be withdrawn from the school system. The nation's universities would be the responsibility of the national council. Minorities in foreign regions of settlement would form national concurrences and maintain their own schooling system using their own resources.¹¹ In this way, the language question would also be resolved. The language of administration would be the language of the majority in the nationally uniform cantons. The minorities would not thereby suffer any disadvantage since the national parish, district, or canton concurrence would guarantee them legal assistance, which would ensure that they were not subject to prejudice due to ignorance of the language of administration. In the dual cantons, each nation would conduct its administration in its own language; it would be only for the administration of those affairs that were neutral in national terms and that concerned the whole region that the tiresome constraint of bilingualism would apply. However, since bilingual cantons would be formed only where the relations between nations made national demarcation impossible, bilingualism based in law would be introduced only where social relations actually necessitated bilingualism in any case.

This constitution proposed by Springer would for the first time put an end to the power struggle between the nations, since it would provide national minorities with the legal power to independently regulate their affairs. The advance of the classes would now no longer be hindered by national quarrels. In the canton council of the nationally uniform canton and in the canton delegations of the dual canton, the classes of a single nation would confront one another. Here there would be no confrontation between nations; rather, the working class would assert its claims against its own nation and demand an increasing share in the national culture from its own nation. In the canton council of the dual canton as well as in the representative body of the state as a whole, the different nations of course would come together. However, the power to determine national affairs would be withdrawn from these bodies; they could give the nations nothing and take nothing from

them; here too the population would be organized according to classes, not according to nations. Here too the way would be clear for the struggle between the classes.

The rights of the nations in relation to the state would be based on a democratic form of administration, on self-administration within the canton. Democratic administration is one of the most important demands of the working class. That which the working class demands for the sake of its own interest thus would become the requirement of the nations. Today the quarrels of the nations are endangering every democratic reform, since the nations fear a shift in the prevailing power relations; in the constitution proposed by Springer, it is precisely democracy which would form the foundation of the power of all nations. Thus, the force of the national will, which today is hindering democratic development, would serve democracy in the new constitution.

The dual administrative system in the mixed cantons and the concurrences of the minorities in the unified language region would also guarantee rights to the minorities in regard to state authorities and the national school. This constitution would thus satisfy the needs of the workers, who want to be able to exercise their rights and to find a school for their children wherever the necessity of finding work takes them. If capitalism has robbed the workers of their homeland, it would never again be able to take their language and customs from them. However, those workers who found employment in their national homeland also would be well served by this constitution. If the law did not deny the foreign immigrant schooling and assistance, if it did not destroy his dignity and did not damn him to ignorance, the workers would no longer need to fear their immigrant class comrades' pushing wages down and breaking strikes. Moreover, immigrant workers would be resistant to the poison of national hatred that undermines the common political and trade union organizations and makes the workers incapable of waging their common struggle shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy. Finally, this constitution would also satisfy the ideological need of the working class, for whom the fact that the worker should sell his soul along with his labor power and abandon his cultural specificity to the employer is unbearable. It would demand that each who creates the conditions for all culture through his labor also have a right to the products of culture, a right to his culture and to the customs of his national community.

Thus, Springer's idea of the constitution of a multinational state, which bases national self-administration on democratic state administration and guarantees the national minorities their national rights by means of the personality principle, is the most complete form of the national autonomy that is alone capable of satisfying the cultural needs of the working class. In creating the legal and psychological conditions for the common class struggle of the workers of all nations, this constitution serves the evolutionary-national

politics of the working class; it is a means that serves the great project of making the national culture into the possession of the whole people and the whole people into a nation.

To my knowledge, only one objection to national autonomy has been put forward that also concerns this constitution. In his *Remarks on the Politics of Bohemia*, Kramář analyzes the notion of guaranteeing the individual nations the right to levy taxes and control over the taxes of their members.¹² Kramář, who is still a supporter of crown land federalism and thus of a particular form of the atomist-centralist regulation of national relations, regards the distribution of taxation revenue along national lines as unnecessary. If this is nevertheless to be put into practice, according to Kramář, it can be done only in accordance with the territorial principle and not the personality principle. The distribution of taxation revenue according to the nationality of the taxpayer rather than that of the region, he argues, would have grave consequences. What would happen, for example, he asks, with the taxes on a railway that traverses a Czech region but belongs to German capitalists and is administered by Germans? Should this taxation revenue really go to the German nation, even though the company that pays these taxes is only the payer, but not the real provider, of these taxes? Furthermore, would it be fair if the German manufacturer in the Czech language region exploited the Czech worker and paid tax on the surplus value produced by the worker only to the German nation? In those areas where the Czech nation almost exclusively consisted of workers and the surplus value produced fell into German hands, would the cultural needs of the Czechs be provided for at all? And what effect would there be on the budget of the affected Czech parishes if a factory owned by a Czech should somehow be taken over by a German capitalist and, as a consequence, the taxation revenue from the enterprise would be suddenly no longer paid to the Czech parish, regardless of whether the whole workforce of the enterprise was Czech?

These considerations can be in the first place objected to on the grounds that Kramář obviously has in mind a very incomplete and in fact unacceptable form of national autonomy. He obviously thinks that our taxation system would remain unchanged and that our profit taxes or at least supplementary charges on them would be allocated to the national self-administrative bodies. However, this is not a procedure of the type we envisage. The national register would not contain any enterprises, properties, factories, railways, or banks; it would contain only people. The organized nations would therefore tax people and not enterprises; the national taxes would be not profit taxes, property taxes, or commercial taxes, but income taxes. The railway, the bank as such, the joint stock company, or the commercial company would not pay any taxes to the nations. Rather, the capitalists, to whom the profits of the enterprises ultimately flow, would pay tax on this income. Meanwhile, the main difficulty still remains. The fact of exploitation also has national significance:

where Czech workers create surplus value for a German employer, the Czech nation would not be able to tax this surplus value and would be forced to rely on the insignificant fiscal capacity of the workers.

The working class must of course take this danger into consideration. This is not only because the working class, opposed to all exploitation, must also oppose this national exploitation, but also because such an arrangement would unquestionably have the consequence that the fiscal pressure on the workers would increase, whereas their cultural needs would only inadequately be met. If the German textile factories in Königinhof, Nachod, Eipel, Hořic, and so on were to pay taxes to the German canton concurrences and the Czech canton council were to have no right to tax them, the children of the Czech workers in these cities would surely not receive sufficient schooling. However, this problem can be surmounted without difficulty using one of several possible methods. It would be possible, for example, to grant the national self-administrative bodies, along with the right to levy income taxes on the members of their nations, the right to a portion of the profit tax paid by the properties and enterprises lying within the region of the self-administrative body. The surcharges on the state profit tax would be levied by the organs of the canton council (or allocated to the canton councils by the state fiscal organs) and divided among the individual nations within the canton (the canton delegations within the dual canton, the canton council and canton concurrence in the uniform language region) according to a specific scale. Given the chief purpose of these taxes, it seems to me that an appropriate basis for this scale would be the number of schoolchildren in the schools of each nation in the relevant administrative districts. The concept, which is not new to Austrian legislation, of the manufacturer's having to maintain schools for his workers (factory schools!) would thus be given a modern basis.

To be sure, a difficulty would remain here if one left the determination of the amount of these surcharges to the canton council. Thus, in the Czech region, in which the Czechs of course would constitute the majority, the canton council would have, for example, an interest in fixing profit taxes at as high a rate as possible; for the largest portion of these profit taxes would go to the Czech nation, and the higher the profit taxes, the lower it would be possible to make the income taxes with which the members of the Czech nation were burdened. Conversely, a German canton council in the German language region that included a Czech minority could fix taxes as low as possible; for the fiscal capacity of the German capitalists would not be lost to the nation, since they would also have to pay income tax. On the other hand, if the surcharges on profit taxes were low, the contribution of the Czech concurrence would also be small, and, as a consequence, it would, in cases where it was made up of workers with a low fiscal capacity, have few resources for Czech schools. In this way, the taxation policies of the canton councils could become the object of national quarrels. They would also result in large differences in production

costs—for the capitalist enterprise, profit tax appears as production costs, whereas income tax does not—and produce not altogether harmless economic shifts. However, it would also not be difficult to find means to counter such abuses. The simplest would be to fix through imperial law a certain relation between the amount of the surcharge on profit tax and the amount of national income tax. With every change to the percentage of surcharge on the state tax on profits, the rate of the national income tax within the canton would automatically rise or fall.

Of course, the superiority of the nations to whom the propertied classes predominantly belong would thereby still be maintained. Even if the profit taxes levied on enterprises were divided among the nations according to the number of their schoolchildren, those nations that count the larger landowners and the capitalists among their members would still retain the higher revenue based on the income tax levied on these classes. Thus, the Germans would have more resources at their disposal than the Czechs and Slovenes—and would therefore be able to either better build up their schooling system or lighten the tax burden on their nationals—the Italians more than the Southern Slavs, the Poles more than the Ruthenians. Without doubt, under the rule of national autonomy in its most complete form, the old historical nations would retain a certain superiority; without doubt, through the dazzling development of their cultural institutions, through the lower taxation burden on their members, they would also exert a powerful force of attraction on the members of other peoples under this constitution and would thereby be able to achieve national conquests in a peaceful way. In this form, the old historical fact that in this land the serving and exploited nonhistorical nations have been subjected to dominant and exploitative historical nations would remain in force. However, this fact is not a peculiarity of national autonomy. In a capitalist society it cannot be transcended; it cannot be eliminated as long as a Czech worker still creates surplus value for a German manufacturer, a Slovene worker for a German landowner, a Ruthenian peasant for a Polish landed noble. National exploitation can disappear only when all exploitation disappears, when the means of production are transformed into the property of the society. Only then will the nations have access to the entire yield of the labor of their members.

NATIONAL AUTONOMY FOR THE JEWS?

In 1905 a group of Jewish Social Democrats left the party in Galicia in order to found their own organization of Jewish Social Democratic workers. The executive of the international Social Democratic organization in Austria, however, would not accept the formation of an autonomous Jewish group within the party and declared that in splitting from the Polish Social Democratic movement, the Jewish Social Democrats—the *separatists*—had also

ended their affiliation with the Austrian International. The immediate cause for this split from the party by a small fraction of its Jewish members was not the issue of the state constitution, but that of party organization. The debate concerned primarily the autonomy of the Jewish group within the party rather than the national autonomy of the Jews within the state. This is not the place for a discussion of the issue of party organization. What *is* relevant is the fact that such an issue cannot be dealt with satisfactorily without confronting the question as to whether the workers should and must demand the autonomy of the Jewish people within the state. If our theory of the nation and national autonomy is to avoid becoming a weapon of the separatists against the party, this question requires some discussion.

The separatists base their demands on a simple line of argument: the Jews are a nation; the Social Democratic movement demands for all nations national autonomy within the state and grants to the workers of all nations national autonomy within the party; this right of all other nations is also owed to the Jews. The attempt to refute this argument takes issue with the initial premise. The Jews, it is argued, are not a nation. The struggle that has ensued from this basic disagreement has focused on the question of whether settlement in one's own territory represents a fundamental feature of nationhood and whether the principle of national autonomy must be based on this territorial principle. In their struggle against the separatists, the Polish comrades have in many cases based their arguments on a theory of the nation that takes common territory to be one *element* of the nation. Further, they have declared the form of national autonomy that they demand to be the self-administration of the nation's geographically defined territory. I regard this theory as incorrect and believe that as a program for the constitution of the state it does not meet the needs of the working class. Nevertheless, the arguments mounted by the Polish comrades against the separatists contain—among many misconceived ideas—a genuine core, and we will attempt to uncover that core here. There is good reason for such an endeavor when we recall that among the Austrian Jews the most recent occupational survey showed 42,681 white-collar workers, 81,455 blue-collar workers, 31,567 day laborers, and 16,343 servants. Furthermore, the 235,775 Jews statistically recorded as independent included a great many proletarian elements, artisans dependent on capital, and outworkers. The issue, then, is important enough to the Social Democratic Workers' Party to justify this digression.

In the feudal society of the Middle Ages, the Jews figured as foreigners. They played no part in its economic system; the fact that the medieval trading communities had emerged from the old tribal kinship systems based on blood relations denied the Jews the possibility of membership. And since it was from the ancient communal units that the governing organizations grew, the Jews also remained outside the sphere of territorial domination. What position, then, could the Jew occupy in the economic system of this epoch?

Neither the peasant nor the feudal lord of the Middle Ages was a producer of commodities. Production was primarily based on one's own requirements rather than on production for the market. Certainly there was exchange of one's surplus, but this exchange was basically foreign to everyday life; it was an exception. Thus during this period neither the lord nor the peasant possessed, as a rule, large sums of money. The greatest part of the individual's wealth consisted of use values in grain, flax, livestock, and so on or in rights to the labor of others. The circulation of commodities, of monetary capital—indeed the monetary economy in general—were essentially foreign to this form of society; monetary capital existed, following Marx's vivid description, only in its pores. It was into these spaces in the society that the Jew now stepped. In the mass of economic transactions that took place during this epoch in farmhouses, in village and farm communities and the feudal estates, the Jew played no part. However, when the peasant did wish to buy something, it was the Jewish peddler who brought the peasant the merchandise. When the peasant wished to sell livestock, it was the Jew who bought it; when the peasant wished to borrow money, it was the Jew who lent it at a high rate of interest. The Jew was thus the mediator of commodity circulation and the circulation of monetary capital in a society founded on the production of goods according to the individual's own needs. The peasant only occasionally sold the surplus of his yield in order to procure other goods with the proceeds; the Jew, on the other hand, always bought in order to sell for a profit. The peasant was the bearer of the natural economy; the Jew embodied the monetary economy. This relationship remains in force everywhere as long as capitalism does not draw the mass of the population into commodity production and the monetary economy. In the countryside of eastern Europe the Jew is still today, as peddler, publican, livestock and grain merchant, broker, usurer, and artisan, the representative of the monetary economy within a society based on the natural economy.

During this period the Jews unarguably constituted a nation. That the Jews maintained the homogeneity of their race to the same extent as did other European nations, that through selection and natural heredity the fate of the ancestors determined the specificity of the descendants and firmly bound the Jews together in a natural community is undeniable. However, it was not only the ties of blood relations that forged a strong bond among the Jews, but also the communal bonds of cultural heritage. They had their own language, their own powerful ideology, their own customs that already clearly distinguished them externally from the peoples among which they lived. Shut off from economic, social, and political life, the Jews played little part in the destinies of the nations in whose midst they dwelt. They dealt with them commercially, but they did not live with them; they had their own fate, their own history, and thereby also their own culture.

“I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you,” declares

Shylock, "but I will not eat with you, drink with you, or pray with you." The bond of commercial interaction that tied the Jew to the peasant was much weaker than the bonds present in the intimate community of social interaction with other Jews. The difference between the culture of the monetary economy and that of the natural economy was incomparably stronger than the commonality produced by the mutual interaction that took place in completing a purchase, a sale, or a loan. Thus, the Jews remained a separate nation living in the midst of other peoples.

However, with the progress of the capitalist mode of production the position of the Jews in the society was also changed.¹³ First, a section of the Jews joined the class of the industrial bourgeoisie. The financial capital they had accumulated, the capitalist psychology that their involvement in trade and usury had cultivated, made this change possible. Mercantilist governments encouraged the efforts made by wealthier Jews to invest their capital in industry. The new Jewish bourgeoisie became increasingly estranged from the modes of life and thought of those Jews who persisted in following the old traditions. They developed an increasingly close affinity to their fellow Christian class members; the traditional ideology of Judaism no longer satisfied them, and they avidly absorbed the ideas and ideologies of the time, the ideas of the Enlightenment. In the eighteenth century the Jewish bourgeoisie began to detach itself from the ancient Jewish cultural community and to integrate itself into the cultural community of the European peoples. The Jewish bourgeoisie began to adapt to the peoples in whose midst it lived, to assimilate.

Gradually this tendency also had an effect on the other classes of the Jewish people. The most rapidly affected was the intelligentsia, but the petty bourgeoisie gradually followed suit. The situation of the Jewish trader in the industrial area or the city was wholly different from that of his grandfather in the village, as the only representative of the monetary economy in a world of the natural peasant economy. The monetary economy had now taken hold of the whole society; the Christians themselves had become Jews. The Jewish trader in the city was a commodity vendor in a society of commodity vendors. He had the competition of his Christian colleagues to fear; he had to adapt to the needs of his customers, had to converse with them in their language, had to satisfy their taste, had to take care not to offend them with foreign manners if he was to be successful. Thus he gradually abandoned the traditional clothing, the traditional language, and the traditional customs of his people and came more and more to resemble his surroundings.

This gradual adaptation of the Jews to their environment was a result of the fact that capitalist commodity production gradually incorporated the whole of the population. Whereas the Jews had once been the only representatives of the monetary economy, the monetary economy now penetrated the whole society. The Jews adapted their culture to the culture of the European

nations since the monetary economy, which once the Jews alone had represented, now constituted the economic system of all European peoples. Since “in civil society the real essence of the Jew has been universally realized and secularized” the Jew has adapted to the universal essence of this civil society.¹⁴

This actual adaptation ultimately brought about the legal emancipation of the Jews, their legal equality with Christians. “The Jews have emancipated themselves insofar as the Christians have become Jews.”¹⁵ This legal equality in turn furthered the actual adaptation. Since the Jew now participated in the public and political life of the nations, the Jewish child now attended the public school, and the Jew now performed military service, the cultural adaptation of the Jews was greatly advanced.

But the decisive moment for the Jews arrived only when the peasant was transformed into the modern farmer, into the pure commodity producer. Only at this point was the peasant emancipated from the Jewish trader and the Jewish usurer. The interaction of the farmer with the city became stronger; he met his needs through purchasing in the city and obtained there the loans he required; he was no longer dependent on the village Jews and the peddlers. The advent of the railway facilitated this development because it brought the peasant closer to the city. However, it was the agricultural cooperatives that, by first making the peasant into a pure commodity producer, by obtaining credit and taking care of purchase and sale for him, mounted the most effective challenge to the village Jews. The Jew had to give up his old role as mediator of the monetary economy in the countryside and turn to other professions. Having engaged in commerce for hundreds of years, the Jew initially carried on commerce in the cities or industrial areas. However, commerce was no longer viable for so many individuals. Capitalist society had long since included commerce in its general concentration of enterprises; a warehouse or retail cooperative replaced hundreds of small traders. Consequently, the Jews were gradually forced into other occupations; they dispersed themselves throughout the country, became active in all branches of production, and everywhere entered into ever-closer economic relations with the population, increasingly adapting to it on a cultural level.

The Jews, then, began to be assimilated into the nations in whose midst they lived. It was a difficult process and was realized only gradually. They had long since forgotten their old Jewish language in central Europe, although they still spoke with a Yiddish intonation; or, if they had ceased to do this, they still spoke the language they had acquired as one who speaks a foreign language, as if learned from a book, without any notion of the local dialect. They no longer wore traditional Jewish clothes, but were still recognizable as Jews by their gestures. They had long since abandoned the old Jewish religion, but did not want to renounce their new reformed Judaism, a form poor in ideas and emotion. They no longer knew the ancient literature and legends of their people, but conserved with great tenacity what meager remains they

retained, such as individual words and certain customs. They mixed with those among whom they lived, but they married only among themselves and had a pronounced consciousness of their specificity and their unity. The process of their separation from the ancient Jewish cultural community and their integration into the cultural communities of the other nations has still not been completed and continues today. For this reason the Jews are still looked on by other peoples as aliens. It is perhaps overstating the case to say that the Jews are not a nation in western and central Europe today; however, one can certainly claim that they are ceasing to be a nation.

In regions where capitalism has rapidly realized its task of radical change, the process of assimilation has advanced quickly. A clear sign of the advance of this process is the disappearance of the old Jewish schools. In Bohemia, for instance, there were eighty-nine Israelite religious communities in 1890, but in 1900 only twenty-eight private schools remained. Of these schools, twenty-seven are to be found in the Czech language school districts; in the German language school districts the Jewish children attend the public schools without exception. However, the Jews in the Czech language districts are assimilating as well; in the last census 55.2 percent of the Jews in Bohemia indicated a knowledge of the colloquial Czech language.

The integration of the Jews into the cultural communities of other nations has been slower in the cases of Galicia and the Bukovina. This is first of all due to the fact that the Jews there live together in greater numbers—of the 1,224,711 Austrian Jews, 811,183 were recorded as residing in Galicia, 96,150 in the Bukovina—and, consequently, closer social relations link these Jews with their own kind. Further, this slower integration can be attributed to the fact that a considerable proportion of the Jews in Galicia belong to the subordinate classes in the population, to the strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat—classes that have more difficulty adopting new cultural elements than the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. However, the major reason for this slower assimilation is the economic backwardness of these countries. The expansion of capitalist commodity production, the transformation of the peasant into an ordinary farmer, is proceeding only slowly; the agricultural cooperatives there have only recently begun to expel the Jewish middleman and the usurer. But whatever the tempo of the assimilation process, there is no question that it is proceeding, everywhere. Everywhere capitalism and the modern state are working to destroy ancient Judaism. This also applies to the Russian Empire, where this process has been retarded by the backwardness of economic development, the lack of public life, and legislation that has artificially crowded the Jews together rather than favored their dispersion throughout the realm. Yet according to the most reliable sources, there too social development is tearing apart the old bonds that have held Judaism so strongly together over the centuries.¹⁶

The process of assimilation, as already discussed, has affected the different

classes in different degrees. In all cases it is the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia that have been the first and the most strongly drawn into it. In western and central Europe the petty bourgeoisie and the white- and blue-collar workers are also being affected. In eastern Europe, on the other hand, there still live millions of unassimilated Jews who are predominantly from the lower levels of society. The Jewish petty bourgeoisie and workers in Russia, Poland, and Lithuania, in Galicia and the Bukovina, in Romania and so on, today constitute the Jewish nation. They have preserved the traditional Jewish language and ethos. Such nations, which consist only of the exploited and dominated classes and to which the wealthy and powerful do not belong, represent a type with which we are already familiar. Insofar as the Jews in Europe today still constitute a nation, it has the character of a nonhistorical nation. Because those classes that, in a class society, are the primary bearers of cultural development do not belong to these nations, their culture has atrophied, their language degenerated, and they have no national literature. As we are aware, the nineteenth century has now awakened all nonhistorical nations to new life; will the twentieth century now also bring the Jewish nation the possibility of a new, independent cultural development?

In the last decade a new movement has in fact been established that opposes the assimilation process and aims to make the Jews into an independent, "historical" nation. This national movement is usually viewed as a consequence of anti-Semitism, and in fact anti-Semitism may well have been the immediate cause of its emergence. However, just as surely as anti-Semitism strengthens it and has awakened participation and understanding among the assimilated Jews—in particular the Jewish intelligentsia—with regard to the nationalist currents among the unassimilated Jews, the movement as a whole is clearly driven by deeper social forces.

The same forces that have awakened other nonhistorical nations to new cultural life are driving this new movement. First, there is the social awakening of the lower classes, the awakening of their self-consciousness. The Jewish worker now no longer feels himself more or less worthy than the wealthy, educated Pole or the wealthy Jew who has absorbed Polish culture. And since this consciousness awakens in the Jewish worker a sense of personal dignity, he is also proud of showing his own specificity and is no longer ashamed of his language and his idiosyncratic manner. Since the beginning of the Russian Revolution, Europe has witnessed, with astonishment, the change in the outlook of the Jewish worker. From among the timorous, humble Jews of the ghettos have emerged the most heroic fighters of the great revolution. These masses no longer apathetically carry on their lives within the bounds of tradition. They need a new culture, and they have begun to create one. Jewish organizations have come into being at whose meetings new cultural values are passed on to the masses in the Jewish language. A Jewish language press has been created, translations of the literature of the European nations into

Yiddish have been begun, and, in their wake, the first steps toward a new, independent Jewish literature.

Now the new revolutionary spirit is also gripping the intelligentsia. It too has begun to place its energies at the service of the new cultural movement; those who once only mocked and derided the unassimilated Jews now see in them the exploited proletarian and the revolutionary fighter. They want to learn the workers' language and, when they do, learn it as they would a foreign tongue, for they have long since forgotten Yiddish. They turn to the Jewish masses with the written and spoken word, and it is they who begin to create the literature of the masses. We have already described this process when presenting the case of the Czech people's awakening from nonhistorical being. Do we not also see the same forces at work here? The awakening of the subordinate classes to a new self-consciousness; the advance of the revolutionary spirit, which also takes hold of the upper classes and prevents those who achieve wealth, cultivation, or social honor from seeking access to a new, foreign, cultural community and being lost to the national one; the formation of a *public* for the new national intellectual culture; the emergence of a new national literature? Will not the same forces that, in the first half of the nineteenth century, awakened the Czech nation to a new cultural life now call forth a new bloom of national culture in the case of the Russian, Polish, and Lithuanian Jews, thus signaling an end to the process of assimilation?

It is undeniable that the forces that drew the Jews of central and western Europe out of the old Jewish cultural community and incorporated them into the cultural communities of the other nations are now having an increasingly strong effect in the east. However, on the other hand, we are now also seeing in the east a tendency at work that strives to elevate those still unassimilated Jews to the status of a historical nation. We are seeing, then, the clash of tendency against tendency. Which of these two developmental trajectories will be the stronger?

It is perhaps easiest to answer this question if we compare the preconditions for the cultural development of the national Jews with those social conditions under which the Czech nation negotiated the path from nonhistorical to historical being. The actual site of the Czech renaissance was the geographically defined territory of the Czech people. Here, the Czech masses experienced social contact only with their own kind, not with foreign nations. Only those Czechs rising to the upper levels of society were Germanized. The cause of the national movement here was the psychological transformation of the masses brought about by radical social change. For the masses, made up of the Czech petty bourgeoisie, peasants, and workers, the awakening of the nation did not mean a change in their nationality, but only meant a change in the nature of their nationality. The place previously occupied by the apathetic transmission of an ancient national cultural heritage was now occupied by the need for a new national culture, the capacity to create and enjoy a new cultural heritage.

The parameters of the Czech situation were thus fundamentally different from those now experienced by the Jews. The Jews have no geographically defined territory. Admittedly, in some Russian and Polish cities, they live together in great numbers. But the large majority of them live as small minorities among other peoples, and there is a clear tendency for these still tightly unified Jewish masses in the east to become dispersed. Even if several of the larger Jewish towns can be preserved, the broad mass of the Jews will live as small minorities among other peoples. As we have already discussed, these Jews will now come to increasingly interact with the rest of the population around them. The community of interaction that links them with those among whom they live and work and whose language they speak, to whose needs they must adapt, will become increasingly intimate. If the old Jewish trader or usurer could maintain his national specificity in the midst of a peasant society based on the natural economy, today the modern Jewish industrialist, businessman, lawyer, doctor, artisan, or worker is entering into ever more intense interaction with his Christian colleagues and customers. This closer interaction compels the Jews to provide their children with the same education, to incorporate the same cultural orientations, to adopt the same habits as those of the Christians around them. The interactive community thus necessarily becomes a cultural community.

It is clear, then, that the conditions for the national development of the Jews are very different from those for the Czechs. The awakening of Czech culture entails not a change in the community of interaction, but only a change in the nature of interaction in that, in the place of the simple transmission of a meager cultural heritage, the creation of new cultural forms becomes part of the interaction. Doubtless the Jewish nation would also be capable of such cultural development. Were the Jewish interactive community to remain so narrowly confined to the Jews and their interaction with other nations to remain so meager that the Jews would be able to remain a nation, without doubt this nation would develop from a nonhistorical into a historical nation. However, fortunately or unfortunately, the Jews are being forced into an ever-closer interaction with other nations such that they are unable to maintain their cultural specificity. And if cultural specificity cannot be maintained at all, the progress of national culture is not possible. The Jews could become a historical nation if they were to remain an actual nation; but capitalist society does not allow them to exist as an actual nation.

We are now in a position to test the accuracy of the claim that the Jews cannot remain a nation because they do not have their own territory. It is generally incorrect to claim that a geographically defined territory is the precondition for the preservation of a nation. The history of the Jews, who for so many centuries have claimed the status of a nation without possessing their own territory, discredits this opinion. However, we now know how this was possible. The Jews, as representatives of the monetary economy in a world

based on the natural economy, although they lived in the midst of European peoples, maintained such a loose interactive community with these peoples that they were able to preserve their own cultural community. Capitalist society, which everywhere destroys the old natural economy and, through capitalist commodity production, makes the monetary economy generally constitutive of society—and, in the process, as Marx says, makes the Christians into Jews—also makes the Jews into Christians. Territory is not the condition of national being insofar as the community of domicile is still not the same as the community of interaction. However, the moment the Jews and the Christians no longer embody different economic principles and must all act as organs of the same economic system—the capitalist mode of production—the community of domicile produces such an intimate community of interaction that the ongoing preservation of cultural specificity within this community is impossible.

It will now be argued against us that other nations have been able to maintain themselves as minorities in foreign territories and that it is precisely we who have called for the legal conditions for their preservation. In fact the Czech minorities in the German-speaking territories are not disappearing, but are growing larger by the day, and they are undoubtedly playing no small part in the cultural development of their nation. However, there is need here for a definite distinction. In reality, where these minorities receive no influx from the geographically defined territory of the nation, they gradually dwindle. This will still happen even if their national autonomy is safeguarded through national schools and legal assistance. Close interaction with the majority brings about a dwindling of the minority, a factor that also extends to the peasant minority, for all the tenacity with which the peasants preserve their peculiarities. The German farming colonists in the Czech part of Bohemia are gradually disappearing, as are the last remaining members of the former Czech settlement in the Mies district. This phenomenon is, of course, found to a much greater degree among the middle-class and proletarian minorities in the cities.

If the Czech minorities in German-speaking territory are not only maintaining, but even increasing their numbers, this is because they are constantly receiving influxes from the Czech territory that replace those absorbed into the national majority. The new immigrants bring the Czech culture of their homeland with them into the German territory. An interest in public life, in the cultural development of the nation, has already been awakened in them. They have been linked to the body of the Czech people through close cultural interaction. When they now move to the German territory, they have a need to foster this interaction, of which they have grown fond. They read Czech newspapers and books and establish Czech associations. It is on this basis that the Czech minorities become more difficult to Germanize the further capitalist development progresses. The greater the part played by the

Czech masses in the national culture, the stronger is the bond of cultural interaction that links them with the nation as a whole, the stronger the force with which they resist the appeal of the majority.

The national tenacity of the Czech minorities in German territory is, then, rooted in the internal cultural development of the Czech territory from whence the workers and the petty bourgeoisie emigrate to German-speaking territory. It is the force of national development in the homeland that maintains their nationality in the foreign land. After only a few years, a number of these emigrants return to their Czech homeland; their time among the German-speaking majority is too short for them to be won over to the German cultural community. In this case, it is the relationship to the Czech territory, the possibility of return, that is directly responsible for maintaining a consistent Czech minority—for if hundreds of Czechs return every year from the German-speaking region, they are simultaneously replaced by hundreds of new immigrants who, in turn, after a few years make way for new compatriot immigrants. However, when these Czech immigrants remain in German territory, they also strengthen the capacity for resistance of the already existing national minority. The new immigrants always seek out interaction with their compatriots who are already settled in the town, thereby providing these settled Czechs with continuing contact with their own kind. Through this contact the ties binding the settled minority with their compatriots are strengthened and their capacity to resist the appeal of the majority is increased. Nevertheless, the economic interaction into which this minority is continuously drawn gnaws away at its membership; yet it maintains its numbers due to the continuing influx from Czech territory. This is the secret of the capacity for resistance of the Czech minorities: that the process of migration from agrarian to industrial areas occurs constantly, that it is reinforced by every favorable conjuncture, and that it never ceases completely.

The same situation can of course be observed in the case of the Jews. Here too there are numerous cases of movement by unassimilated Jews from the east into Jewish communities whose majorities are already caught up in the process of assimilation. And here too the process of assimilation is hindered by this influx. Interaction with their unassimilated national comrades tends to keep the Jews of the west at a lower level of cultural adaptation to the European nations. Nevertheless, this can only slow down the process of assimilation; it cannot prevent it. The force that compels the Jews to interact with the majority of the population and thereby to adapt culturally is stronger than this hindrance. However, it is clear that the rapidity of the process will be immeasurably increased if this obstacle is removed. In the case of the Jews of western and central Europe this is now already the case, generally speaking. The cultural distance separating them from the eastern Jews has the effect of preventing them from developing any significant interaction that could slow down their assimilation, including that with eastern Jews

who immigrate to their countries. However, due to this situation, new unassimilated minorities continue to appear in the large Jewish communities, whose adaptation to their environment is retarded by the continuous influx from the east. However, if we imagine for a moment that capitalism changes the economic relationships predominant in the east, that the Russian Revolution gives the Jews freedom of movement, that democracy increasingly brings the Jews into the public life of the nations in whose midst they live, the assimilation process would then also begin in the east, and, consequently, this source of ever-new influxes into the unassimilated minorities of the west would dry up.

Thus, although the Czech minorities in German territory draw their strength from the direct movement of immigrants and from the culturally interactive relationship with the geographically defined Czech-speaking territory, the Jews cannot call on this source of strength. In this sense, it is correct to claim that the Jews cannot preserve their nationality because they do not have their own common territory. However, this does not mean that common territory is in every case the precondition of national preservation. Only as a condition for the interactive community does common territory become a factor in regard to national existence. As long as Jews and Aryans embody different economic systems, the interactive community produced by the commonality of domicile is not so intimate as to force the minority to adapt culturally to the majority. As soon as they come under the laws of *one* economic system, the common domicile ties an interactive bond around them that links the Jews and Christians of one land more firmly together than the Jews of different regions.

The process of the assimilation of the Jews and the awakening of non-historical nations both stem from the same cause: the transformation of the old society by capitalist commodity production. The process that leads the nonhistorical nations to a new cultural life also takes hold among the Jews. Here too the tendency emerges in which a people lethargically passing on an old ossified culture is awakened to new life and given a new living, progressive culture. However, this process cannot maintain the Jewish national culture. It can only change the nature of that culture insofar as the culture itself is maintained. But the same historical upheaval that leads to a transformation of the Jewish national culture also tears aside the barrier that separates the Jews from their surroundings, brings them into an ever-closer economic relationship with the broad mass of the Aryan population, and ultimately incorporates them into the other nations. With the progressive development of capitalism and the modern state, the Jews of the east will also cease to constitute a nation and will be absorbed into other nations just as the Jews of the west have long since been. This whole process will be promoted by the independent development of the Slavic nations in the east. As long as these peoples constitute nonhistorical nations with limited cultures, they will not be able to

absorb their Jewish minorities. Should the Ruthenians, however, awaken to a new, energetically progressive cultural life, they will be able to exercise over the Jews of eastern Galicia just as great an integrative force as the Czechs today have begun to exercise over the Jews of Bohemia and Moravia.

One should not of course overemphasize the speed of this process. In the Russian Empire the economic and legal preconditions for assimilation are still lacking. Consequently, the Jewish population there is being much more slowly affected by this process. As a result, the new Jewish cultural movement there will still have considerable scope for development for some decades. The *Bund* will further organize the Jewish workers and give their lives new content; the Jewish press and the new Jewish literature will enjoy a great deal of progress.¹⁷ However, the closer Russia comes in economic and political terms to the states of western and central Europe, the more rapidly the conditions fundamental to the development of an independent Jewish culture will disappear. The revival of Jewish culture in the east is possible only in a phase of transition. It corresponds to a stage of societal development that, although already dragging the lowly placed masses of the Jewish people out of their cultural slumber and awakening them to a new cultural life, does not yet integrate the Jews into the community of interaction and culture of the other nations. The old Judaism, the particular culture of a Jewish population tied to the monetary economy in the midst of the peasant natural economy is already dead. The new society, which draws all peoples into the orbit of the monetary economy, which makes all Christians into Jews and thereby all Jews into Christians, does not yet exist. In this transient moment the new national culture of the eastern Jews comes into being. However, just as surely as capitalism will not remain at the developmental stage it has reached up to this point in eastern Europe, just as surely as the peasant's son will become a laborer and the eastern peasant a simple farmer, so too will the Jews of the east ultimately be absorbed into the nations of the east. Here and there the new Jewish national sentiment will perhaps psychologically hinder the process of assimilation. However, the exigencies of the prevailing economic relations are more powerful than all sentimental wishes. From a historical point of view, the awakening of the eastern Jews to a new cultural life is nothing but a precursor to ultimate assimilation.

Only at this stage, having determined the character of developmental tendencies, can we formulate a position on the national autonomy of the Jewish people. It must be stated once again that the issue here is the question of autonomy within the state and not within the party. Moreover, the present discussion is limited to the question of whether the national autonomy of the Jews in Austria should be promoted. We are not in a position to decide whether this question can be answered in the same way in the case of the Russian Empire as in that of Galicia and Bukovina.

Should, then, the Jewish workers themselves demand national autonomy

for their people? It is evident that in western Austria those Jews long since assimilated or wholly immersed within the current of the assimilation process will not renounce that community of culture they share with the nations in the midst of which they live. For these Jews Yiddish has long been a foreign language, the customs of the eastern Jews a foreign culture in which they play no part. The question of national autonomy can thus be posed only for the unassimilated Jews in Galicia and Bukovina and, at most, for the small Jewish minorities in Moravia and eastern Silesia. If we wish to answer this question, we cannot proceed from the cliché, attractive as it is empty, of the natural right of all nations to self-determination; rather, we must determine the purposes of national autonomy and examine whether the needs of Jewish workers would be served by national self-administration.

The legal and civil organization of national minorities fulfills essentially two tasks: the cultivation and administration of the national minorities' schooling system and the provision of legal assistance to those compatriots who have no knowledge or inadequate knowledge of the language of the authorities and the courts. This language problem does not arise in the case of the Jews. Because the Jews live in the midst of other peoples and come into ever-closer economic contact with them, they must be capable of speaking—whether well or badly—the language of the majority. The Jew who works in a workshop with Poles, who buys from or sells to Poles, will also be able to defend his rights before the authorities and the courts in the Polish language. Thus, there remains for the autonomous organization of the Jewish national community only one important task: settling the issue of the national schooling system. The question of the national autonomy of the Jews is fundamentally a question of schooling. At present, even in Galicia Jewish children already attend the public schools. Together with other children, they learn the language of the land. The school is naturally also an extraordinarily effective means of assimilation. Thus, whoever demands national autonomy for the unassimilated Jews of Galicia must answer the question as to whether in fact the Jewish children should be removed from the public elementary schools and an independent Jewish educational system from elementary to university level be established.

We believe that Jewish workers in Galicia and in Bukovina cannot, to the extent that they recognize their true interests, demand separate Jewish schools. In the first place, the segregation of Jewish children is contrary to the economic interests of the Jewish workers. The modern worker requires freedom of movement. Yet no one requires this freedom more than the Jewish worker himself. The Jewish proletariat is made up for the most part of those Jews or their descendants for whom modern commodity production has made it impossible to seek their livelihood in those occupations that the Jews have pursued for centuries. These Jews, driven from the villages and small towns, have initially sought their livelihood in a limited number of cities and occupa-

tions. Further developments will force them to disperse themselves throughout the country or to seek their livelihood beyond its borders; they will distribute themselves across the widest possible range of occupations. As part of this process, the Jewish workers must adapt themselves to the culture of the nations in the midst of which they must pursue their livelihood. The Jewish worker in Galicia is not yet really a modern industrial worker; almost everywhere, he still bears the traces of his origins in Jewish small business, Jewish craftwork, and Jewish usury. He occupies the economic position, but does not yet wholly embrace the cultural type, has not yet lost the psychology, of the Jew in the old epoch of the natural economy.

The most important task of the Jewish workforce is its own education. The Jewish proletarian must become a genuinely modern worker. As soon as the Jew achieves this, a powerful obstacle to his dissemination into other regions and different branches of production is placed in his path. This obstacle is not only the particular language of the Jews, but rather their whole being. In many enterprises today, Christian workers still do not tolerate Jewish colleagues. This aversion stems not from a political anti-Semitism, but rather from a naive instinct opposing the foreign manner of the unassimilated Jew. The possibility of the Jews' achieving positions in all branches of production entails the necessity of their becoming culturally similar to the modern workers of other nations. As long as the sound of their language, their gestures, their clothing, their customs offend their Christian class comrades, their foremen, their employers, the old economic opposition between the peasant and the Jewish merchant is transmitted in the form of an instinctive aversion, an aesthetic displeasure, to the descendants of both. This is the case even though the descendant of the Christian peasant has become a worker, as has the descendant of the Jewish merchant. As long as the geographical and economic distribution of the Jewish proletariat is impossible, the Jewish workers—whose number is growing rapidly as a consequence of the ruin of old Jewish commerce and industry—remain restricted to the limited labor market of a few industries in a few regions. Only when the Jewish workers have culturally adapted to their environment will they really have achieved freedom of movement. Only then can they find a role in any place, in any industry where the blind action of capitalist forces creates increased work opportunities. Only then will the misery particular to the Jews disappear, and they will be left with the shared misery of the proletariat, which they will struggle against and triumph over shoulder to shoulder with their Aryan colleagues.

However, in order to be at all capable of this struggle, the Jew's mode of behavior must become like that of the Christian worker. Imagine for a moment Jewish children in their own schools being taught in the Jewish language. What spirit would rule over these children? To be sure, a new Jewish culture is emerging and would certainly develop were there still time for the Jewish people to develop a new, living culture. However, this culture is only

in the process of emerging; it has not yet been realized. On the other hand, the Jewish people possess another culture. It is the culture of a nonhistorical nation, the culture of people who remain outside the ethos of the European peoples, who pass down from generation to generation a whole world of long-dead thoughts, desires, and customs. Can there be any doubt that it is this old, ossified culture that would, for many decades to come, shape the character of Jewish schools, rather than that new, still nascent culture that is itself now struggling for influence within Judaism and that speaks to us from the new revolutionary Jewish literature? Jewish children would thus be artificially bound by the spirit of long-past epochs. These children who are supposed, as modern workers, to seek jobs and take up the class struggle, would inherit the worldview of the Middle Ages, be stamped with the psychology of a bygone economic system, maintain the habits of the Jewish innkeeper living in the midst of the natural economy of the peasants and supported by their labors. To be sure, life in general is a more powerful influence than schooling, and from these children, too, could emerge strong individuals who would fearlessly enter the class struggle. But can the Jewish workers actually want a school that seeks to instruct their children in an intellectual system that the experience of life must then transform and overturn? For the Jews, the Jewish school represents first and foremost the artificial preservation of their old cultural specificity, one that limits their freedom of movement and consequently increases their suffering. And second, it represents the reinforcement of their old ideology, their old social psychology, which must first be overcome in order that they might be capable of entering the class struggle.

If we do not want specifically Jewish schools, the national autonomy of the Jews makes no sense. National autonomy is not, as claimed in empty phrases, the legal form of the existence of the nation; it is rather a means to particular ends. What tasks such an autonomy should fulfill, if Jewish children must attend Polish, German, or Ruthenian schools, is incomprehensible to me. National autonomy cannot be a demand of the Jewish workers. The German workers want the same things for their Jewish class comrades that they want for the Czech proletarians: higher wages, a proud self-consciousness, and the ability to participate in the international class struggle. In order to achieve this end, the German workers must afford the Czech workers national autonomy, even within German territory; to achieve the same end they must deny this to the Jewish workers. The legal framework necessary to render the Czech worker capable of class struggle, to win over the Czech worker to the class struggle, would augment the suffering of the Jewish proletarian, would bind him to the psychology of the Jewish merchant of a past or passing epoch, impede his transition into modern industry and the modern class struggle. It is not a matter of achieving for all nations the same juridical framework, but rather of culturally elevating all nations, of enlisting them all in the great international army of the struggling proletariat. That the German worker demands nation-

al autonomy for the Czech but refuses it to the Jewish nation derives from the fact that the capitalist mode of production elevates the Czechs to the rank of a historical nation, whereas the same mode of production transcends the Jews as a nation and leads them into the cultural community of the European nations.

Those who are trapped in a nationally based system of evaluation, who profess a conservative national politics, and for whom the conservation of national identity is the end goal of political will may find this perspective alarming. In the context of the present discussion, such a reaction is perhaps more comprehensible than in other cases. For, although the national-evolutionary political position outlined earlier normally demands only the gradual transformation of national culture, it demands from the Jews the abdication in principle of cultural specificity. The surge of sentiment with which conservatives respond to this suggestion can perhaps be allayed by pointing to the many assimilated Jews who live on in the history of all great European nations. The fate of the Jewish people has, in a dual sense, united the Jews as a nation: first, through national heredity, and second, through the transmission of a cultural heritage. If the Jewish cultural community is destroyed, the natural community, the race, remains. By virtue of his education, the assimilated Jew is a child of that nation whose culture he has absorbed. However, in his natural predisposition, the fate of the Jewish people remains present as an active force, a fate that, through natural selection, cultivated in his ancestors a strongly pronounced physical type and a specific intellectual disposition. Such names as Spinoza, Ricardo, Disraeli, Marx, Lasalle, Heine, and many others, without which the economic, political, scientific, and artistic history of the peoples of Europe is unimaginable, show that the Jewish people has everywhere produced its highest achievements where the inherited predisposition of the Jews and European cultural tradition have mutually nourished one another. The Christian nations hate the unassimilated Jews with the hatred of the peasant for the usurer; on the other hand, a number of assimilated Jews live on in Christian memory as numbering among those great individuals in whose person the driving forces of history have first been condensed into individual acts and have thereby influenced over centuries the fate of whole nations.

Certainly there remains the question as to whether the Jews, once integrated into the cultural community of the European nations, will be able to maintain even their natural community. Will not intermarriage gradually mix Jewish blood with the blood of other nations? And what effect will this mixing of blood produce? We are confronted here with questions that the science of our epoch cannot answer. Only a dilettantish pseudoscience, one that draws a system of rash conclusions from a few individual observations, makes the boast of having solved this puzzle. It has been observed that the assimilated Jews are often drawn together again by the instinct of the race, implying thereby that the Jewish race, despite all cultural assimilation, will maintain its

purity. However, the observation of a few individual cases is not sufficient to support such a claim, not the least because, although the process of assimilation is advanced in some countries, it is nowhere fully realized. Our knowledge as to whether the mixing of Jewish and Aryan blood will produce a more or a less gifted race is even more limited. History reveals examples of favorable rather than unfavorable effects of such racial combination. We do not know the law controlling these individual cases. Hence, as far as the effects of racial mixture are concerned, we can make no concrete claims in advance; here, experience must decide. And here too a few individual observations will not suffice.

Today's science, then, is not capable of deciding whether the integration of the Jews, not only into the cultural community, but also into the natural community of the other nations, will be advantageous for coming generations or not. This decision must be left to the mysterious force that, in the case of both animals and human beings, brings male and female together, which has united the human species up till the present and which will continue to do so: the force of sexual selection. The amorous strivings of young men, the amorous choices of young women, will decide this last of all the Jewish questions.

5. The Developmental Tendencies of the National Struggles in Austria

THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRIA TOWARD NATIONAL AUTONOMY

Up to this point we have examined which form of national autonomy the working class must demand. We will now turn to the question of whether, in the context of our social system, this demand will remain a utopia or whether it can be proved that the development of the nations and national struggles is moving toward a replacement of the centralist-atomist regulation with the organic regulation of national relations. We commence with an examination of the developmental tendencies within Austria, in the "kingdoms and lands represented in the *Reichsrat*."¹ Thus, we are assuming that the Austrian nations will remain in the state association in which they now coexist, and we will examine the question of how the nations within this association will establish their relations with one another and with the state. Particular attention is given to the question of whether this state association will remain in existence or whether there are forces visible that will lead the nations of Austria into another form of the state.

We have already presented the history of the national struggles in Austria up until the complete paralysis of the legislative body under the ministers Badeni and Koerber. We know that the struggle of the nations for state power ended with the powerlessness of all nations, which, due to the obstruction of the *Reichsrat*, conferred absolute power on the bureaucracy, but also with the powerlessness of the state, whose bureaucratic apparatus was hindered in every aspect as a result of the legislative process's being brought to a standstill. The self-dissolution of the centralist-atomist constitution of the nations through the national obstruction marked the end of the power struggle between the nations.

To be sure, under the ministry of Gautsch, the situation has suddenly changed due to the electoral reform.² The momentum of the great concept of reform has momentarily silenced the quarreling about the language of the courts and parallel classes. And it is conceivable that in the new parliament

based on equal franchise the nations will be able to work together peacefully for several months. But no one with any sense can place their hopes in a continuation of this peace. Will the Germans vote for the use of Czech as the language of internal administration and for the establishment of a Czech university in Brünn? Will the Czechs abandon this demand? Is it not possible that national fury will be rekindled at every sporting event taking place on the borders of the language regions, suddenly bringing an end to this hard-won national peace? Will the national slogans suddenly disappear from election campaigns given that they are the bourgeois parties' most effective weapon in the struggle against a working class that has become more powerful due to equal franchise? Will it not be the petty bourgeois masses, the real bearers of national hatred, that continue to win the majority of the electoral districts? Is it not the case that the idea of the national power struggle has long contaminated even the peasantry and a section of the working class?

For those who see the national struggle as the necessary concomitant of a violent historical transformation, the idea of a miraculous change among the nations locked in the struggle for power that results in their suddenly becoming reasonable, sober, and capable of compromise and alliances is out of the question. Several months of peace are possible, even under the prevailing form of constitution and administration. However, if these are allowed to remain as they are, within a short time the state will be in the position it was under Badeni and Koerber. It is not a case of the national parties' becoming reasonable, but of the law's finally adapting itself to the altered national relations and giving each nation the power it needs; only then can the struggle for power between the nations come to an end. Only then will national hatred cease to constitute the content of Austrian politics, because the national struggle will have no target to attack. Are there really forces in Austria that are strong enough to establish national peace through national autonomy?

National peace is in the first place a necessity for the state. The state cannot tolerate the paralysis of legislation by ludicrous language questions, by every argument between agitated individuals living on a linguistic boundary, by every new school. However, the state is an abstraction. It can fulfill its needs only if these needs become the will of the citizenry. But where are the forces that can support the necessities of the state?

The need of the state becomes the need of the nations. The power struggle of the nations has resulted in their powerlessness. Each nation is strong enough to prevent the others from obtaining their rights, but no nation is strong enough to ensure that the state will fulfill its needs. This situation is initially more bearable for the old historical nations than it is for the peoples who have been awakened to new cultural life only by the economic developments of the last century. Germans, Poles, and Italians might at least be able to tolerate the fact that the state merely maintains the prevailing rights of nations, the fact that it is not possible to establish new schools, that nothing can

be changed in regard to language rights. For they have always been owners, and their principal function in national terms is to safeguard their assets, not to acquire new ones. It is different for the formerly nonhistorical nations. They demand that the state adapt itself to the new situation that has been the source of their cultural growth. Their national policy is one of attack rather than defense. The Czechs, Slovenes, and Ruthenians cannot tolerate the paralysis of the machinery of legislation or the principle that nothing can be altered in regard to national assets. Of course, it is precisely these nations that are filled with the senseless, violent extremism that breeds all national oppression; it is precisely these nations that tend toward a politics of the great utterance, the pointless demonstration, and the emotive gesture. But the necessity of satisfying the needs of the nation will ultimately prove stronger than the unpolitical mood of the nations. Just as over the years within the Czech nation the clever levelheadedness of Eim, Kaizl, and Kramář has gradually overcome the all-powerful character of the extremist phase, so too will these nations increasingly realize that it is precisely they, the importunate, the unsatisfied, who cannot afford to support the paralysis of the machinery of legislation.³ They will begin to comprehend the necessities of the state as national necessities. Only then will they be ready to abandon the old chauvinistic formulas; only then will they learn that it is impossible for them to dominate other nations, that it is impossible for an arrangement of parties in the Chamber of Deputies or even a constitutional reform in the direction of crown land federalism to give the Czechs power over the Germans, the Ruthenians domination of the Poles, the Southern Slavs power over the Italians. Only then, when it is clear that they cannot dominate the old historical nations and do not want to be dominated by them, will they be ready for the idea of national autonomy.

However, the old historical nations will ultimately also be unable to tolerate the nationalities struggle. To be sure, they have assets to defend and not only new ones to win. Insofar as their relationship to the other nations comes into consideration, the maintenance of the status quo constitutes their natural political program. But the life of the nations does not merely amount to their contact with other peoples. All nations require internal development. The institutions that serve their cultural development must be organized and reorganized, and it is precisely the wealthy, the economically and culturally differentiated nations that cannot permanently tolerate the paralysis of the legislative process, the autocratic rule of the bureaucracy. However, it has long become impossible to ensure the continued existence of the state through the subjugation of the nonhistorical nations. If the Germans, the Poles, and the Italians want the state machinery to function and if they do not want to fall under the domination of the Czechs, the Ruthenians, and the Southern Slavs, they too must learn to bring an end to the aspiration of all nations to rule over other peoples by ensuring that the law constitutes the nations as corporations

under public law and allocates them a legal sphere that is protected against any attacks by other nations.

Thus, the nonhistorical nations as well as the historical nations will ultimately have to comprehend the necessity of the state as their own necessity. The parliamentary obstruction or the incessant threat of obstruction that prevents any modification of national relations is the ultimate stage in the struggle between the nations for power. The clumsy procedure represented by the obstruction suffices to prevent the development of the other nations, but it is unsuitable where the concern is the development of one's own nation. A constitution that replaces the power struggle of the nations with legally safeguarded spheres of national power is therefore a requirement of all peoples. Harsh necessity will teach them to translate need into a political program and this program into political action.

Let us now divide the nations into their elements, into the social classes and the individual strata within these classes, and ask which part of the nation is capable of supporting this national need. Here we confront the significant fact that the power of the two classes that have initially assumed the leadership in the national struggle and have given it its content is gradually declining.

The political weight of the large-scale landholding has lessened since the migration of large masses of the people from the countryside to the cities, where the reputation of the nobility pales before the wealth of the bourgeoisie, and since the peasant has come to see himself as a citizen and ceased to regard the landed proprietor as the hereditary supreme authority. Since the large-scale landowners themselves have become industrial entrepreneurs, their political interests have also changed. The question of sugar premiums is today more important to them than crown land federalism. The politics of the large-scale landowners do not so much serve the goal of regaining exclusive class domination as their very immediate economic interests. This makes clear for the first time that which was previously disguised by constitutional formulas: that the politics of the landowning class serve not the common aspirations of the nation, but the limited and particular interest of the class. The mass of the population clearly sees the class character of these politics and is shaking off the political leadership of the large-scale landowners.

The electoral privilege of this class has continued to artificially provide it with a political significance that no longer corresponds to its social influence. As soon as the system of curial voting rights is abolished, the diminution of the political influence of the large-scale landowner will be directly visible. The leadership of the nations will be taken out of the hands of the noble gentlemen and pass to the broad mass of the population. The political program that once served the class struggle of the landowning class against the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy—the dispute over centralism and crown land federalism—will thereby gradually decline in significance.

The political fate of the intelligentsia is very similar. Its power is also declining because the growth of popular education has given the masses the ability to conduct their own political struggles. However, their former leadership role is becoming not only unnecessary, but untenable the more pronounced the class contradictions within the once politically unified nations become. How can the intelligentsia settle disputes between capitalists and workers over the length of the working day, between petty bourgeoisie and workers over certificates of qualification, between peasants and workers over grain duties? The intelligentsia has no interest of its own in these struggles, which leave it perplexed. Individual intellectuals may side with one or another of the classes and offer the service of their knowledge and abilities. However, the intelligentsia as a class loses its role in the political leadership as soon as the struggle between nations is replaced by the struggle between the classes within each nation. Furthermore, the political interests of the intelligentsia have changed as a result of changes to its economic position wrought by capitalist development and its consequences. For many a physician, the "free choice of medical practitioner" is today more important than the use of German as the language of the state. As a result, the individual professional groups among the intelligentsia—physicians, lawyers, technicians, officials—are starting to struggle for their particular interests. And the more a class directly and visibly champions its particular interests, the more difficult it is for it to maintain its leadership of the whole people as a unified party.

Here too the system of electoral privilege has artificially preserved a degree of social power for the intelligentsia that no longer corresponds to its influence within society. Universal suffrage will transform it into an insignificant section of the electorate and give intensified political expression to class antagonisms. Like the large-scale landowners, the intelligentsia is now also losing its leading position within the nation once and for all. As a result, schooling and language questions will now also assume another form. It is now no longer the wishes of officials, but the needs of the popular masses that will decide the language employed by the authorities and the courts; now the construction of the elementary school will no longer be forgotten in the quarrel over universities and high schools. Only now, after the political power of the classes that until now have determined the content of the national struggle has been reduced to a measure befitting their influence within the society, can the great classes of bourgeois society—the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and the workers—proceed with the task of regulating national relations themselves.

Political leadership is without doubt now falling in the first instance into the hands of the bourgeoisie. It is the beneficiary of the national dispute. This is the case for a young bourgeoisie, such as the Czech one, simply because the national dispute constitutes a means of competition. However, every bourgeoisie, not least the German one, needs national discord in order to mask class

antagonisms. In the industrial districts of German Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, the workers often constitute the majority and in all cases represent a significant section of voters in the new electorates subject to universal suffrage. How is the upper bourgeoisie to conduct its struggle against the workers' party here? Should the candidates of the bourgeoisie simply declare that they wish to represent the interests of the upper bourgeoisie? Nationalist ideology in this case constitutes an indispensable ally of the upper bourgeoisie. What an advantage it is for the bourgeoisie when an election campaign is dominated by questions of Czech schools and Czech as the language of administration instead of by issues of the eight-hour day and the protective tariffs with which it protects its cartels! The bourgeoisie of all nations needs the national dispute and will fan the flames of national quarrels during election campaigns in order to mask class antagonisms.

However, although the upper bourgeoisie welcomes the national struggle, it also represents a danger to its own power. The state has long been an indispensable tool of the bourgeoisie's economic interests. It wants to directly influence customs policy, railway tariffs, and fiscal legislation. It does not want to abandon questions concerning the Compromise [*Ausgleich*] of 1867 with Hungary or questions of economic legislation to a bureaucracy that it can influence only indirectly. It requires power within the state, and this power is endangered by the struggle of the nations for power, which repeatedly places all decisions in the hands of the bureaucracy. The bourgeoisie cannot tolerate the stagnation of legislation. It wants a reform of taxation on shareholdings—but the parliament is engaged in a dispute concerning the Czech University in Brunn. It requires the construction of a canal—but the parties have still not come to an agreement on the use of Czech as the internal language of administration. It demands export premiums—but the parliament is engaged in a discussion of some Czech festival or other in Troppau and its world-historical consequences. It wants the consular corps to serve export interests—but in the delegations the struggle between the Germanic and the Slavic races is taking up discussion. The domination of the bourgeoisie within the state and forms of legislation and administration that promote capitalist development: these are the vital interests of the bourgeoisie. And because the national struggle makes both of these impossible, paralyzing legislation and delivering power over to the bureaucracy, the bourgeoisie becomes hostile to the national struggle and longs for national peace. Thus, two souls struggle, alas, in its breast.

The bourgeoisie needs the national struggle in order to mask class antagonisms. And it needs national peace in order to make the state into a tool of its power. During elections, the German industrialists in Bohemia and Moravia struggle against the international Social Democratic movement as an enemy of the German people and support, using both licit and illicit means, the election of the candidates of national parties. However, when the elected rep-

representatives then paralyze the parliament through their obstruction, when the machinery of legislation comes to a standstill, when the parliaments do not have the time to adopt even the most important bills and the bureaucracy can attend to only the most urgent necessities of economic life, the industrial associations yammer about the “unproductive national quarrel.”

The position of the petty bourgeoisie is very similar to that of the bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie is the real bearer of national hatred. It too needs the national ideology in order to wage its class struggle against the workers. However, the petty bourgeoisie also has certain wishes in regard to legislation and is highly dissatisfied when the national dispute leaves the parliaments no time to deal with the regulation of trading practices or with a law against unfair competition. Within the different parts of the petty bourgeoisie, these different, contradictory tendencies can be found with varying degrees of intensity.

It is in the Sudeten that the interest in the national struggles for power is most marked. This is, first, because the national opponent is very close by and because the immigration of the Czech minorities repeatedly arouses national hatred. Second, this is because the number of workers in these industrial districts is high, the class struggle particularly intense, and the need for an ideology that masks class antagonisms and therefore impedes the class struggle of the workers particularly pronounced. The petty bourgeoisie of the Sudeten is therefore imbued with the ideas of the national struggle for power.

The petty bourgeoisie of the German towns in the Alpine lands is of a quite different character. Certainly national hatred is to be found here too—at its most intense on linguistic boundaries such as in South Tyrol, where the Germans and the Italians clash with one another, and in southern Styria, where the clash is between the Germans and the Slovenes. In the industrial regions of the Alpine lands, in Graz, in the Styrian iron industry region, the bourgeoisie also very keenly feels the need to mask class antagonisms with national ideology. But in general, the upright bourgeoisie of the Alpine lands is threatened neither by the foreign minorities nor by the workers of their own nation to the same extent as the German petty bourgeoisie of the Sudeten. Their political thought is dominated by a quite different conflict. Here, where agriculture has been altered in its essence to a far lesser extent by capitalist commodity production, where the peasant still maintains his traditional outlook, a deep gulf divides petty bourgeois and peasant. It is less the conflict of class interests than that of class ideologies that separates the population of the Alpine lands into two sharply divided groups, into the clerical peasantry and the liberal petty bourgeoisie. Here, the petty bourgeoisie does not lack an ideology of sufficient force to form a party; it can more easily do without national ideology because it still has recourse to the anticlerical ideology. The question of the dissolution of Catholic marriage interests the electoral masses here no less than questions of national schooling and language.

Whereas petty bourgeois politics in the Sudeten urgently requires the national ideology because it would otherwise necessarily be exposed as a politics of class interests, the anticlerical bourgeoisie of the Alpine lands still has recourse to an ideology of sufficient force to form a party even if the national struggle dies away. The bourgeoisie of the Alpine lands can thus more easily opt for a peaceful national politics than can the petty bourgeoisie of Bohemia and Moravia, which is imbued with national hatred and threatened by the workers. However, the fact that this bourgeoisie does not invest the same energy in the politics of national power means that it is more sensitive to the needs of the state.

As a result of its slower economic development, the bourgeoisie of the Alpine lands is still relatively undifferentiated. The bourgeois and the artisan who is dependent on capital are not clearly distinct from one another; rather, the bourgeoisie as a whole, undivided economically and socially by large differences in income, constitutes a unified stratum, the mass of which is composed of petty bourgeois individuals whose leadership is firmly in the hands of the parish cliques. This relatively undifferentiated bourgeoisie has a strong desire for political power. Social hatred is not as strong here as the desire to see a compatriot at the head of the parliamentary majority or in the royal council, who can obtain preferential treatment for the town or a local railway for the region or promote the careers of his compatriots within the civil service. The relatively undifferentiated bourgeoisie of the Alpine lands is far more receptive to all these small enticements than is the socially strife-torn bourgeoisie of the highly developed industrial regions. And if the bourgeoisie of the Alpine lands is less receptive to national hatred, and to the same extent has less need of a national ideology, its lust for political power is all the greater. However, whoever aspires to political power under the given conditions must be prepared to meet the needs of the state. Of course, the bourgeoisie of the Alpine lands can also be drawn into the fury of the national struggle. But the desire will repeatedly assert itself to order the state such that the national dispute does not paralyze legislation, does not abandon state power to the bureaucracy, such that the bourgeois parties have the possibility of obtaining economic advantages in the parliament for their constituency and of supporting their compatriots through their influence over the administration. Although the petty bourgeoisie of Bohemia sees in the heat of national and social struggle only Brüx, Dux, and Prachatitz, the bourgeoisie of the Alpine lands sometimes also sees the state.

The character of the petty bourgeoisie of Vienna is in turn different from that of the upright bourgeoisie of the Alpine lands. It is largely made up of artisans dependent on capital and small traders. Its feeling of national hatred is still negligible. On the one hand, as a result of heavy immigration from the Czech regions and the rapid and peaceful Germanization of the immigrants due to the force of attraction exerted by the city, it is strongly interspersed

with elements that, although they are being gradually integrated into the German cultural community, have still not forgotten their Czech origins. On the other, it has quite different demands, quite different ideologies. This petty bourgeoisie initially puts forward a middle-class political agenda: the state should rescue struggling small-scale industry and the small-scale commerce. The small-scale trader in the city experiences the competition of the emporiums and consumer associations, the small-scale artisan the pressure of commercial capital far more directly than do his colleagues in the provincial town. Scholarship may have proved a hundred times that the small rules of the "commercial politics of the middle classes" cannot save the enterprise and economic forms of the past, but the "small man" needs to live a lie. The struggle for the creation of the certificate of qualifications can fulfill this function just as well as the national dispute. And the petty bourgeois quickly finds here the scapegoat he needs. The opposition to Jewish commercial capital has driven this petty bourgeoisie to anti-Semitism: just as in the Sudeten it is the Czech, so here it is the Jew who is the source of all the evils of this world. Finally, the struggle against liberalism has gradually led this petty bourgeoisie back to clericalism. As a result of the rapid growth of the city, the strong presence of elements that have still not abandoned the peasant ideology means that the population of the city is very receptive to clericalism. All these facts have distracted the Viennese petty bourgeoisie from the consideration of national questions. Engaged in the struggle against the Jews, the struggle for the Christian school and the Christian marriage, the struggle for the creation of the certificate of qualifications and compulsory cooperatives, it has little concern for the quarrels of the national parties. Any amendment to trading practices therefore seems far more important to it than the university of Brünn; it yammers about the unproductive national dispute and is thus far less adverse to the idea of national peace than the other strata of the petty bourgeoisie. This tendency is further strengthened by its "patriotism," a phenomenon that is easy to explain in the case of the petty bourgeois lovers of spectacle in the imperial city. The Viennese petty bourgeois is a "good Austrian" and does not want his Austria torn apart by the national dispute.

We have seen how in the consciousness of the petty bourgeoisie national hatred, the will to embrace the struggle for national power in its most irreconcilable form, emerges just as necessarily as does the desire for power within the state, which presupposes that the state can survive, that the activities of legislative bodies will not be prevented by the national struggle. Closer examination shows us that these two orientations of will, which are found everywhere in the petty bourgeoisie, are of differing strengths in the different strata of the class. In the petty bourgeoisie of the Sudeten it is national hatred that predominates, whereas among the artisans dependent on capital and the small traders of Vienna it is the tendency to arbitrate the national dispute by finding reasonable compromises for national antagonisms. The bourgeoisie

of the Alpine lands stands approximately midway between the radical-national petty bourgeoisie of Bohemia and Moravia and the Christian Social petty bourgeoisie of Vienna.

We find similar differences among the peasants. The peasants of the Sudeten have already been seized by petty bourgeois nationalism, but this is not the case among the peasants of the Alpine lands. Tied to old traditions, they are good Austrians and already for this reason little inclined to the national struggle. Their strongest ideology is the clerical ideology, and, as we already know, clericalism is cosmopolitan in origin and has no interest at all in the national struggle. Of course, it has had to gradually learn to reckon with the fact of national struggles. But the national dispute remains an unpleasantness for it, one that it takes into account only reluctantly.

We thus see in the case of all propertied classes—the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the peasantry—two contradictory tendencies. The prevailing social relations produce in the consciousness of these classes the desire for national struggle just as necessarily as they do that for national peace. Each class and each stratum of these classes exhibits these two tendencies—although with different degrees of intensity. This fact ensures the ultimate triumph of national autonomy. Were all classes pervaded only by the desire for national peace, the nations would be able to get along with one another even under the centralist-atomist nationalities constitution. But this is not the case. Powerful social forces that repeatedly drive them into irreconcilable national struggle dominate all propertied classes. But as soon as the struggle is inflamed anew due to some trivial cause, completely paralyzing the Chamber of Deputies and the provincial assemblies, rendering all classes, all nations, and the state itself powerless, the forces of national peace, which are also present in all classes, gain strength and the need for the peaceful coexistence of the nations becomes increasingly strong. It is this coexistence that first creates the possibility for all classes of struggling for power within the state, of making the state serve their class interests, of infusing legislation and the administrative apparatus with the spirit of their class. It is for this reason that for a long time every period of violent national struggle in Austria has been followed by a short period in which the nations just manage to tolerate one another.

However, every resurgence of the national struggle increases the embitterment of the nations; it is only with increasing difficulty that the national parties, caught in the trap of their own slogans, are able to make concessions to their opponents. Peaceful compromise is thus becoming increasingly difficult for all nations. The graceful alternation of national obstruction and short periods of peace is becoming permanently impossible. Each new intensification of the national struggle gives a more precise form to the contrary tendencies that call for national peace and are present in all classes. These must ultimately take the concrete form of the demand for a legal regulation of the power struggle of the nations, of the demand for national autonomy. It is not from

the peaceful disposition of peoples and classes, but from incessantly growing national hatred, from the increasing embitterment and violence of national struggles, from the complete paralysis of legislative bodies that the contrary tendencies, which favor national peace, gain growing force, a more precise content. The national struggle produces national autonomy. This is the situation that we have already characterized as the self-annulment of the centralist-atomist constitution. The fact that the centralist-atomist constitution necessarily incites the national struggle for power, that the national struggle for power ultimately renders all nations, all classes, and the state itself powerless, and that no nation, no class can abstain from making the strong arm of the state serve its aims becomes, in this form, an effective historical force.

Any nomination of a judge, any establishment of a school excites national instincts. The radical members of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry in the Sudeten, the industrialists who see in the national struggle an antidote to the class struggle of the workers take over the leadership of the German propertied classes. The German citizens of the Alpine lands follow them willingly, and finally the clerical peasants and the Christian Social artisans and small traders can also not elude the national struggle. National hatred blazes, ministries fall, parliaments and provincial assemblies are paralyzed by obstructionist tactics. But now, because the whole machinery of state is at a standstill, the tendencies toward national peace within the propertied classes gain strength. The industrial associations, which cannot tolerate the standstill of legislation, clerical peasants, and the Christian Social bourgeoisie gain predominance, unite with the bourgeoisie of the Alpine lands, and in the end force the bourgeoisie and the peasantry of the Sudeten to moderate their position. A period of national peace ensues. However, some unforeseen cause soon brings the national idyll to an end again.

Once the national parties have completed this delightful cycle several times, the notion gradually forms among the propertied classes that this situation cannot continue! The state cannot exist under permanent threat of notice to quit! We need a program that finally enables us to overcome this standstill, that prevents the eternal return of the periods of national struggle, that does not allow the continual failure of the aspirations of all nations and all classes to national power due to some insignificant object of national dispute. It is not theoretical insight but bitter necessity, the inexorable necessity of the life of the state, that will finally make the social strata that are today already inclined to compromise, to reconciliation in the national struggle, into the bearers of the idea of national autonomy.

The working class now turns its energies to serving this development. For this class, national autonomy is not a necessity of the state, which is of course the instrument of its adversary's power, but a necessity of the class struggle. The working class spreads the idea of the legal self-determination of the nations among the masses. Although it was the class struggle of the landed nobles

against the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy that led to the formulation of the opposition between centralism and crown land federalism, the intelligentsia that made the questions of schooling and language the object of national dispute, and the petty bourgeoisie that gave the national struggle its irreconcilable character, it is the working class that now plants a new flag in the midst of the chaos of the national struggles, the banner of national autonomy. If the working class does not want to exclude itself from the prevailing political struggles, it must find an answer to the question that is so passionately stirring the emotions of all those involved. And the very essence of its being means that it can find no other answer than that of national self-determination. The more loudly the national struggle rages, the more loudly the working class announces its program. Unceasingly, untiringly it announces this great concept to all the peoples of Austria, with the result that this idea gradually permeates the masses. Every Social Democratic newspaper, every worker's assembly forces the national politicians to take a position on the demand for national autonomy. The old formulas for struggle pale in the face of this new idea. The desire for domination felt by every bourgeois national party is exposed as soon as it rejects national autonomy. The idea of national self-determination is thus also penetrating the consciousness of the propertied classes. All those strata in which national hatred has not yet obscured the awareness of the necessities of the state and the society, has not yet killed the desire for power within the state, are gradually accepting the new constitutional program.

However, it is not only the situation in the empire, but also the struggles of the nations in the provinces [*Länder*] and parishes that are pushing toward national autonomy. The Germans still dominate the representative bodies of some parishes in which they constitute only a minority of the population. This position, which they owe to the plutocratic parish electoral system, is today under threat everywhere. On the one hand, the working class is weakening the electoral privileges of the bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie; on the other, due to the development of a Czech bourgeoisie, the Czechs are also forcing their way into the privileged electoral body. The Germans have thus lost their dominance in the Moravian provincial assembly and in the parishes of Prague and Pilsen and now find themselves under threat in Budweis. This development cannot be stopped. If the Germans do not want to find themselves at the mercy of the new Czech majority, they must secure a sphere of power for themselves through the principle of national autonomy. For this reason the last German majority in the Moravian provincial assembly decided to institute a register of nationalities. For this reason the Germans in Budweis are today calling for national autonomy at the parish level. In the same way, the Poles in the east and the Italians in the south will have to call for national autonomy within the local administrative bodies in the not-too-distant future if they wish to avoid being abandoned without any defense to their national opponents in the regions they

have ruled for centuries as minorities. National autonomy is thus becoming the demand of the old historical nations, whose dominance is being broken by the development of historical existence out of nonhistorical existence.

However, behind all this stands a more general problem. All experts agree that administrative organization within Austria no longer fulfills the needs of a modern state. The old Austrian dual administration—a peculiar mixture of the tradition of the estates, bureaucratic centralism, and liberal “self-administration”—is now bankrupt. This is undeniable in the case of autonomous provincial administration. It is already bankrupt in the financial sense, with the problem of provincial finances becoming more difficult to solve by the day. But it is also politically bankrupt. It is impossible to constitute the province [*Land*] as a unified administrative territory. It may be a historicopolitical entity, but it is not a social or national entity. The allegedly autonomous administrative apparatus has become a ruthless form of domination by a foreign majority—that is, the majority of the privileged electoral body, not the majority of the population. In the nationally mixed provinces this leads to continual complaint from the minority. But even in the nationally uniform provinces, the population has long been accustomed to calling on the bureaucracy for help against the domination of the majority party in the provincial assembly. The allegedly autonomous administration of the provinces has hopelessly discredited the idea of local self-administration in Austria.

However, autonomous administration at the parish level has also failed to fulfill the great expectations of liberalism. The parishes in most of the provinces are too small and too poor to be able to fulfill their tasks. Everywhere, the system of electoral privilege has left them at the mercy of one or more parish cliques. In the end, they have been subordinated, if not to the state bureaucracy then to the provincial assembly and the provincial commission. In all the crown lands, however, the “autonomous” provincial administrative body misuses its power to political ends. Every approval of a loan or an increase in parish taxes is granted only as a reward for political services to the parish council. In Lower Austria, the Christian Social provincial administration has cultivated this political corruption to the level of an art. As Brockhausen very accurately puts it, in Austria, due to a peculiar chain of circumstances, “autonomy” has become the grave of parish freedom.⁴

Things are no better for the state bureaucracy than they are for the autonomous parish administrative body. The administrative tasks of the state grow not only as a result of the increase in the population, but also as a result of the radical economic changes that legislation must take into account every day. Each new law provides it with a host of new tasks. And these new tasks must be fulfilled everywhere by the same governing bodies—in small crown lands such as Bukovina and Salzburg just as in large, highly developed ones such as Bohemia. In the larger and most highly developed crown lands, truly

monstrous administrative authorities have developed that no longer administer at all, but are merely capable of producing dossiers. Every industrialist who has aimed to found a new enterprise has something to say about the working methods of these authorities. The notion that the governor who heads these authorities is capable of actually directing them is completely misplaced; he has enough to do putting his signature to the documentation. And it is also impossible for the central offices of these gigantic bodies to exercise any control. As Springer has written:

The office of the governor in Prague comprises eighteen departments, that is, more departments than the ministry of the interior. What a monster of an administrative authority is this intermediate instance! It comprises four hundred officials and has a budget of over one million crowns, that is, more than the ministries of culture, trade, and agriculture! And a sole governor is responsible for everything this scribbling army does. This gigantic ink enterprise deals with a quarter of a million matters a year, which amounts to 750 documents per day for the governor! And it is said that the gentleman still finds the time to go hunting! How is one ministry to oversee, to control such an enterprise? The government is an impenetrable wall behind which every form of nepotism, every form of autocratic capriciousness is possible. The leadership gains access to the internal workings of this enterprise only in the case of an appeal to law. How can a responsible ministry and parliamentary control be envisaged in the face of this? And what sense does a ministry as third scrutinizing instance make if its competence does not far exceed that of the second?"⁵

Local state administrative bodies [*Bezirkshauptmannschaft*] are, as Springer has shown, no more capable of fulfilling their functions than is the provincial government. The areas covered by the political districts are far too small for a number of the tasks with which they are charged; here we require larger administrative areas the administrative bodies of which can call on a greater number of specialist officials concerning each individual administrative task. "Although in matters of civil law involving more than a thousand crowns, the collegially organized court of justice decides in the first instance, the decision regarding the approval for an industrial complex is taken by a—let us say, partially legally educated—sole official on the basis of an evaluation made by the district medical officer, although the welfare of the whole district is dependent on the prospering of industry and extensive capital investments may be involved."⁶ For still other tasks, the areas covered by the political districts are too large, particularly as the official, socially cut off from the population, is not capable of becoming familiar with the needs of the district. "Every road, every toll, every trade has an individual significance for the district. And the district administration is merely a brief, hastily taken preliminary step for the rising aristocratic stars who, through the isolation of their rank and the brevity of their sojourn, are prevented even from grasping the real

situation and thus from providing impetus to stimulate professional activity and to unleash the forces of the people.”⁷ In fact, all the newer administrative instances have detached themselves from the divisions defining the administrative sectors; Springer cites the examples of the road concurrence districts, the offices of provision, the poor-relief districts, the military districts, the district health insurance funds, the concurrences for the transport of prisoners. “There is a veritable flight of legislation and the population from the district administration.”

We are undeniably facing the attempt to reform the apparatus of internal administration. It is now up to the working class to ensure that this reform is achieved not by bureaucratic means, as planned by the Koerber ministry, but democratically. The working class has to demand that local corporations, elected according to the proportional voting system based on universal, equal, and direct suffrage, attend to internal administration. Although the bourgeoisie is content with its social influence on the bureaucracy, the working class always experiences the rule by the bureaucracy as alien domination. Although the bourgeoisie is satisfied with a lame, purely legislative democracy, the working class wants to put this still-limping democracy firmly on its two feet. The working class, and only the working class, grasps the true meaning of the statement made by Niebuhr that liberty and equality rest more on the administration than on the constitution.⁸

However, we should certainly not deceive ourselves as to the prospects of such a fundamental reform. That a state in continental Europe will adopt the English system of internal administration within the capitalist social order is highly improbable. The effect of the historical factors that have placed the administration of the modern state on the Continent in the hands of the bureaucracy is still too strong. To this is added the fact that the further capitalist development progresses, the greater the fear among the aging bourgeoisie of all democracy. However, economic development in Austria has still not progressed enough for the domination of the bourgeoisie in almost all the provinces and districts to be threatened by democratic administrative reform. And yet in the national struggle a remarkable chain of circumstances has created a strong ally of such reform. It is certain that Austria will not place internal administration completely in the hands of local self-administrative bodies. But the shared administration of cantons [*Kreise*] by an “Imperial and Royal” canton officer and a canton council, as Springer has described it, is entirely possible.

If there is a utopia here, it is the idea of maintaining our existing administrative organizations. However, any attempt to alter them immediately uncovers national antagonisms. Every administrative reform takes on national significance, alters the power relations between the nations. This fact ensures the failure of bureaucratic administrative reform in Austria. An attempt to call for a redivision of districts in Bohemia will immediately collide with the old

discord over national demarcation. The quarrel of the nations, in the final instance guaranteed on both sides by the weapon of parliamentary obstruction, will without doubt prevent any redivision of the political districts. However, if the redivision was combined with the introduction of self-administration within the canton, things would become quite different. Would the Czechs prevent an administrative reform that for the first time provided the Czech bourgeois and peasant masses with the chance to administer their own affairs? What would be the significance of the dispute over the language employed by officials if the office itself was brought into question? What would be the significance of the old slogan "tearing apart the land" if for the first time the Czech nation was offered the power to govern itself, to attend to its own cultural and economic needs? All reform of our decayed administrative apparatus will be hopeless if the power of the democratic idea does not tear down national barriers.

If local self-administration within the canton is introduced in Bohemia, it cannot be refused in Moravia. However, it becomes clear here that purely geographical demarcation is impossible. The abandoning of the canton minority to the majority is likewise out of the question. This leads us to Springer's concept of the dual canton: the autonomous administration of affairs that are regarded as nationally neutral by the territorial canton council, the autonomous administration of the cultural affairs of each nation by the national canton delegation. And once we have the canton councils and canton delegations of each nation, I am sure that they will unite within the state as a whole to form the sovereign national council. If democratic administration is given a piece of land, it will drive the state with compelling force to implement national autonomy.

Surely, these are nothing more than utopias. Yet in 1899 the national register was a utopia—in 1905 in Moravia it became law. We have seen how the paralyzing of the legislative bodies by the national dispute strengthens the tendency toward national autonomy. But let us assume that the Chamber of Deputies and the provincial assemblies will be able to work in peace for a few years under the prevailing constitution. In this situation the process of radical upheaval will be even more inevitable. For every new law will mean new administrative tasks. Each year administrative reform will consequently become more urgent. However, a fundamental reform will be impossible because it will raise all national questions at the same time: every question of national demarcation, constitutional areas of competence, the internal and external language of administration. Administrative reform will become more urgent, but will be hindered by the national dispute. At this point the working class will enter the fray and raise the issue of democratic local administration. It will show all nations that autonomous local administration places administrative power directly in the hands of the people. It will respond to the dispute over the language of reports with the question of whether it is necessary at all

for the official who is a stranger to the people to decide on our most important concerns. It will compel a part of the bourgeoisie to take a position; in turn a part of the bourgeoisie will be unable to resist the power of the democratic idea. At this point the state will also be drawn into this situation. The bureaucracy will not resolve to abdicate in favor of the canton councils produced by equal voting rights. But the state will prefer to allow its civil servants to share power with autonomous self-administrative bodies rather than bring its administrative apparatus, its very existence, to a complete standstill. In this way, due to the national dispute, the necessity of administrative reform drives toward democracy, and the necessity of democracy in turn leads to national self-determination.

Is it to be doubted that the bureaucracy will make this sacrifice? In other states, peoples have had to fight hard for parliamentary ministries. But in Austria, now the ministries of civil servants are no longer capable of leading a Chamber of Deputies torn by the national dispute, the bureaucracy begs the national parties to form a ministry from its representatives, and the Crown itself must declare it a "patriotic sacrifice" when a Prade or a Pacák graciously condescends to become a minister.⁹ For the state, the necessity for survival is stronger than the bureaucracy's desire for power. At the point at which the bureaucracy is no longer capable of administering a fissured Austria, it will itself call for the participation of the people in administration. What would the governor give to see the responsibility for many a difficult decision assumed by the majority on this or that canton council?

From whatever aspect we consider the multinational state, we see everywhere the forces at work that will realize national autonomy. The national dispute paralyzes legislation and hinders administration; the distress of the state becomes the distress of all classes, all nations; only national autonomy restores to the state its viability in that it legally guarantees the power of the nations. Because the state cannot do without national autonomy, the latter will become the program of all nations and all social strata that cannot do without the state.

Is it surprising that the development of national relations should lead to such an immense transformation in the old Austria? It would seem more surprising to us if the immense transformation of national relations were to leave the old legal forms intact. Our constitution is based on two principles: on the atomist-centralist regulation of national relations, which necessarily drives the nations toward the struggle for power, and on the displacement of power relations through privileged voting rights to the advantage of the old historical nations. However, the previous century radically altered all national relations. Since then, all Austrian peoples have been awakened to historical existence; since then, all classes within all the peoples have successively deployed themselves. The national struggle, once a dispute between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy on the one hand and the landholding nobility on

the other, has become a struggle between the great mass of the petty bourgeoisie, the peasants and the workers; since then, capitalism has radically transformed traditional social relations, has uprooted and restructured the population and built up a terrible social hatred everywhere, which has been transformed into national hatred in diverse ways. All power relations have been altered; how could the legal order remain unchanged? Electoral reform has already, if not eliminated, then certainly attenuated the privileges of the old historical nations. Every further step toward democracy endangers the traditional power of the Germans, Poles, and Italians within the state; however, under the prevailing constitution, only power over the state guarantees the nations the ability to satisfy national cultural needs. The old historical nations thus cling to the present situation, fearing every change. However, the maintenance of this situation is insupportable for the rising nonhistorical nations, insupportable for all the classes in bourgeois society that cannot tolerate any stagnation, insupportable for the state itself, the legislative machinery of which cannot stand idle, the administrative structure of which cannot survive unchanged. Under our constitution both development and stagnation are equally impossible. If the legal order concedes autonomy to the nations, this will result in nothing other than the legal system's adapting itself to the new power relations that have been created by the awakening of the non-historical nations and the social differentiation of all peoples.

Certainly, it is hardly probable that national autonomy will be the result of a great resolution, of a single, bold action. In a slow process of development, in long struggles that repeatedly paralyze legislation and maintain the rigidity of the administrative apparatus while also undermining its ability to survive, Austria will develop step by step in the direction of national autonomy. Rather than a great legislative act, it will be innumerable individual laws for the individual provinces and parishes that produce the new constitution. But whatever the case, those for whom the national struggle is not the foolish malice of rabble-rousers but the necessary effect of altered national relations, those for whom the legal order is not an arbitrary piece of paper but the precipitate of power relations, can confidently repeat the words: "If Austria is to exist, then so too must national autonomy."

AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

Until now we have attempted to show which forces within Austria itself are determining the development of national autonomy. Rudolf Springer has pointed out that these forces will find a strong ally in movements that aim to provoke a confrontation between Austria and Hungary. If we wish to examine this viewpoint, we must first briefly discuss the Hungarian question.

Hungary fell to Austria at the same time as Bohemia. However, the internal development of Hungary took a quite different course from that of Bohemia.

Although Bohemia lost its nobility as a result of the defeat of the estates, the Magyar nobility survived. In the first place, this means that the national cultural development of the Magyars has differed from that of the Czechs. The Magyars never became a nonhistorical nation like the Czechs. They were not subjected to the domination of a foreign ruling class, but themselves enslaved and exploited the nonhistorical nations in their own land—the Romanians, the Slovaks, the Serbs, and the Ruthenians. The same fact also distinguishes the political development of the two lands. In Bohemia, the Habsburgs destroyed the estates [*Stände*], and legislation and administration fell into the hands of the state and its bureaucracy. In Hungary, on the other hand, the estates asserted their power over legislation and administration and only gradually transformed themselves into a modern parliament—a process that in fundamental terms has still not been concluded.

The Hungarian constitution placed all power in the hands of the Magyar nobility.¹⁰ Hungary could consequently also not escape the struggle between state authority and the estates. The result was the ongoing struggles of the “nation”—against “Vienna,” that is, against absolute state authority—a struggle in which the “nation” allied itself with other countries and to which “Vienna” responded with death sentences and executions.¹¹ The whole ideology of the Magyar nobility is today still charged with the memory of this brutal, unremitting struggle of the state with the estates.

This struggle was based on powerful conflicts of economic interest. In the epochs of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, the state aimed to protect the peasants against exploitation by the landed nobility in Hungary, too. The Magyar nobility paid no taxes, and the peasant was thus the principal contributor to taxation. Here too the concern for the “royal and imperial contributors” led to a policy of peasant protection. This was all the more necessary due to the fact that the peasants had been left entirely at the mercy of the landed nobility following the defeat of the great peasant revolt of 1514, and their legal and economic situation was hardly better than in neighboring Poland. However, the state’s first attempt (1764 to 1765) met with bitter resistance from the Hungarian *Reichstag*. The empress therefore had an “Urbarium” [agricultural code] drafted by royal court committees between 1766 and 1768; but the estates opposed its implementation with all their power, seeing this attempt to rule independently through the authority of the state as an infringement of the constitution. The abolition of serfdom, which Joseph II implemented in Transylvania in 1783 and in Hungary in 1785, again irritated the estates. However, when fiscal and agricultural regulation under Joseph II proposed transforming seigniorial claims on peasants into cash payments and significantly reducing such claims in general, the resistance of the nobility turned into open rebellion. Joseph himself was forced to retract the law for Hungary. The nobility had successfully affirmed its national right—the right to the exploitation of the peasants, both Magyar and those of other nations. In 1790,

the estates accepted the Theresan agricultural code, which was far more advantageous for them, although only provisionally. However, in practice it remained completely ineffective.¹²

Apart from the right to unlimited exploitation of the peasants, the estates regarded their exemption from taxation as their most sacred national right. The Habsburgs repeatedly attempted in vain to convince the nobility to renounce this privilege. Since the nobility refused to comply, absolutism took its own form of revenge. Hungary was virtually treated as a colony. Within the dualistic estate-state system, commercial legislation and customs policy were entirely under the control of the emperor. Mercantilism did not promote the development of manufacturing and the putting-out system in Hungary, but consciously restricted them in order to guarantee Austrian enterprises the Hungarian market. Import duties on raw materials for industry were thus fixed at a higher rate for Hungary than for Austria. When, for example, the customs tariff for 1775 was being discussed, Count Blümegen declared: "If one imposes a tax of 5 percent on dye and indigo in the German hereditary lands, then these articles will have to be taxed at 30 percent in Hungary, since this is the only means of preventing Hungary from constructing factories."¹³ In order to guarantee the Austrian capitalists the Hungarian market, the import of foreign goods into Hungary was impeded. This was achieved by means of Austrian transit duties and the requirement that foreign goods could only be imported into Hungary at certain major customs stations, whereas Austrian goods could be imported at any border station. On the other hand, the export of Hungarian goods to countries other than Austria was prevented. If Hungarian goods were exported to other destinations via Austria, export duties were doubled. The policy was most ruthless where there was competition between Hungarian and Austrian goods; for example, anyone who wished to export a certain quantity of Hungarian wine to another country had to export the same quantity of Austrian wine in order to ensure that Austrian viniculture did not suffer any disadvantage due to Hungarian competition.¹⁴ The emperor not only determined customs legislation in Austria, but also, as king of Hungary, had the power to legislate on economic matters in the lands under the crown of Saint Stephen.¹⁵ These rights were now exercised exclusively to the advantage of the hereditary lands.

One must understand this connection in order to comprehend Hungary's fury over this policy, which meant that the rights exercised by the king of Hungary exclusively served the interests of Austria. Of course, the Hungarian nobility was not really justified in objecting to this policy. Its own refusal to forego its exemption from taxation was, after all, to blame. Since the Hungarian landed noble paid no tax and the peasant, ruthlessly exploited by the landed nobility, could pay for only a relatively small proportion of public expenditures, there was hardly any other way of extracting revenue from the land than through customs duties. This connection can be proved through

reference to sources. On 30 December 1785, Joseph II wrote to the Hungarian chancellor, Count Pálffy, that he would treat Hungary in the same way as Austria, in particular by promoting the establishment of factories, if the Hungarian nobility renounced its exemption from taxation.¹⁶ But the Magyar nobility was not prepared to make this sacrifice. If the economic development of Hungary remains even today not only far behind that of the western European lands, but even behind the capitalist development of Austria, there are also many other reasons for this—one needs only recall that Hungary was liberated from Turkish domination only two centuries ago. But to no small extent it owes this backwardness to the Hungarian nobility, which sacrificed the development of the country for the sake of its privilege of tax exemption.

Yet, although today scholars of history may clearly comprehend this connection, the Hungarian population never understood it. It saw only that the king of Hungary exercised his constitutional rights to the disadvantage of the land and to the advantage of a foreign state. These facts still have repercussions today. The struggle of the estates, which lasted for centuries, cultivated a political ideology in the Magyar nobility that perceived its sole political task as lying in the struggle against absolutism, the struggle against “Vienna,” the struggle for the freedom and sovereignty of the Hungarian estates. And the treatment of Hungary as a colony increasingly cast the Magyar nobility in the role of fighter for the interests of the entire kingdom against a foreign power that aimed to enslave and exploit Hungary.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, this antagonism was experienced with increasing intensity. In 1843, List’s *National System of Political Economy* was translated into Magyar. The “development of the productivity of the country” became a favored slogan. In 1844, the estates demanded the right to legislate on customs matters. In the same year a national protectionist association was founded, the members of which solemnly swore to sell only products manufactured in Hungary.

The nobility cleverly saw how it could turn to its own advantage the indignation of the country at the fact that absolutism was preventing its economic development with the aid of economic legislation. But it also saw other means of presenting the struggle of the estates in the guise of a national struggle. One of these means was the struggle for the use of the Magyar language. The struggle over language began during the reign of Joseph II. In Germany at this time the German language had long replaced medieval Latin in legislation, administration, the dispensation of justice, and the sciences. In Hungary, on the other hand, Latin remained the language of the state. Now the movement calling for the replacement of Latin with the living vernacular gradually spread to Hungary. However, Joseph II wanted to replace Latin not with Magyar, but with German. The Latin language was the language of the estates and the estate administration; the German language was the language of the imperial bureaucracy. It is therefore not surprising that the emperor,

who wanted to eliminate all estate constitutions and thereby all the privileges of his "kingdoms and lands" and make the entire monarchy into a "uniformly governed mass," strove for the extension of German-speaking territory over Hungary as well. The estates opposed the introduction of the "*lingua peregrina*" with all their might; the struggle against the German language became an effective means of waging their class struggle against the authority of the state. The year 1792 already saw the prescription of Magyar as the language of instruction in all the schools of the land. With the laws of 1836 and 1844, Magyar replaced Latin as the Hungarian language of state.

And the nobility quickly recognized that there could be no better means of giving the struggle of its estates the appearance of a struggle of the entire nation than that offered by the struggle over language. The foreign language in the mouth of the official, the judge, and the officer rendered foreign domination tangible. The demand that the state employ the Magyar language necessarily won the support not only of the Magyar bourgeoisie, but also that of the Magyar peasantry. The instinct of the masses suspects that the organs of the class state dominate them as a foreign power; but they childishly suppose that they are able to eliminate this foreign domination, which is after all the essence of every class state, by simply excluding the foreign language from administration, the courts, and the army. As if the state would no longer have confronted the Magyar peasant as an alien power if its organs had conversed with him in Magyar! The struggle over language thus performed the miracle of drawing the Magyar peasants into the political retinue of their cruellest oppressors.

It is extremely interesting to observe how the ideology of the nobility, repeatedly cultivated and strengthened by the incessant struggle between the authority of the state and the estates, gradually became itself more powerful than the nobility's class interests. Class ideology is always a product of the particular conditions under which the class lives. It is always born out of class interest. But once it has emerged, an ideology continues to live, undergoing its own particular development and, by virtue of its own logic, moving beyond the conditions of its own emergence. Thus, given the right conditions, it can come about that a class ideology can outlive the class interest to which it owes its existence, that the class remains tied to its ideology even though it no longer corresponds to its interests. Such a state of affairs may only be conceivable as a transitional phase, since the altered class interest will ultimately also alter the class ideology. But, for a time, this contradiction between class interest and class ideology exists and has historical efficacy. This was the situation of the Magyar nobility shortly before 1848 and during the revolution. The ideology of the nobility was that of national freedom. The class interest of the nobility in the maintenance of the dominance of the estates, which included the total subjugation of the peasants and guaranteed its exemption from taxation, had driven it into the struggle for national liberty. However,

this idea acquired such force in the minds of the Magyar nobility over centuries of struggle that it still maintained its influence even after it had ceased to correspond to the interests of this class.

The economic policies of absolutism, hostile to Hungary, could not be combated if the nobility did not renounce its exemption from taxation—and a part of the nobility finally decided to vote for this sacrifice. The struggle against absolutism could not assume the guise of the struggle for liberty as long as the nobility waged it alone. Thus, a part of the nobility decided to share power with the bourgeoisie. The struggle of the Magyar nobility brought it closer to the bourgeois freedom fighters throughout Europe. It adopted the great idea of the bourgeois revolution; the demand for the rule of the estates was gradually replaced by the demand for parliamentary rule, the principle of estate privilege by the bourgeois concept of equality before the law. To be sure, the majority of the nobility defended itself against the consequences of its own ideology as soon as a contradiction with its own interests emerged. However, the younger, more energetic part of the nobility, inflamed by the ideals of the struggles of its class, held fast to this idea and finally led it to victory as soon as the revolution had torn down all hindrances. As a consequence, the Magyar nobility's struggle for liberty could appear to the revolutionaries throughout Europe as identical with their own struggle, although those fighting in Hungary were the heirs of a nobility for which estate rights had been nothing more than a means of guaranteeing its own exemption from taxation and the exploitation of the peasants against intervention by the state.

The long struggle between the state and the Magyar nobility finally ended in a compromise, the celebrated "Compromise" [*Ausgleich*] of 1867. Under this arrangement, the German bureaucracy and bourgeoisie shared power within the empire with the Magyar nobility. The crown contented itself with the fact that a unified army assured it of power over the entire empire and that the empire appeared to the outside world to be a unified state; moreover, it granted the Magyars the power to establish a national state. The non-historical nations were left defenseless in the hands of the Magyar nobility.

However, the Compromise did not mark the conclusion of this development as a whole. In the old dualistic estate-state system, the Habsburg lands formed a unit insofar as the power of the emperor prevailed, and each crown land formed an independent state insofar as the law of the estates prevailed. The more powerful the provincial prince, the stronger became the bond that linked the provinces with one another; the more the power of the estates decreased, the more the crown lands lost the character of independent states. For this reason, the struggle of the estates against the state assumed the appearance of a struggle of federalism against centralism, and thus, in Hungary, the struggle against the crown that of a struggle against the close association with Austria.

This struggle did not cease with the agreement of the Compromise. The

traditional political ideology was all too inviting for Hungary as a tool to exploit. Hungary and Austria had different interests. First, their interests were different regarding the question as to which part of their shared financial burden, the cost of the army and the interest on their shared public debt, should be borne by each of the two states. Second, there was a clash of interest over every question of economic policy: every new trade agreement necessarily gave rise to the question of the extent to which the industrial interests of Austria and the agricultural interests of Hungary should be taken into account. Finally, there was a conflict of interest regarding numerous political questions. What degree of influence should Hungary and what degree should Austria exert on their shared foreign policy? In this conflict between the two states, Hungary acted as if it was making a great sacrifice in even accepting coexistence with Austria. Thus, in every dispute between the two states, Austria had to give way in order to avoid Hungary's rejecting this common ground altogether. Thus, Hungary had a material interest in the existence of parties that cultivated the old tradition of struggle and opposed coexistence. Hungary owed many a victory over Austria in the struggle over quotas, over customs and trade agreements, and over influence on foreign policy to its opposition in the domain of constitutional law. The struggle against coexistence had originally been a means employed by the estates in their struggle against the authority of the state. Following the Compromise, Hungary carefully cultivated the ideas traditionally associated with this struggle; these ideas now became a means of struggle in the conflict of interest with the other half of the empire.

The struggle against coexistence initially manifested itself as a struggle against the imperial community: against coats of arms, flags, and the German language. Most significant then and still today was the struggle over language. The ruling class had a direct interest in this struggle: Magyar as the language of the army would reserve the officers' positions in the Hungarian army for this class by eliminating the competition from Austrian officers. However, over and above this, the dominant lesser nobility, the gentry, already had to strive for the exclusive dominance of the Magyar language because its power was based on the subjection of the nonhistorical nations. To begin with, its aim was to impose the Magyar language on the Romanians, the Ruthenians, the Serbs, and the Slovaks, but also on the Germans in Hungary. But this struggle had little popularity; it contradicted the traditional ideologies that gave the struggle of the nation the appearance of a struggle for liberation; it contradicted the ideology of the broad masses of the Magyar nation, which, themselves exploited and oppressed, were opposed to all oppression. This struggle thus brought with it the danger for the ruling class of losing the political support of its own nation. It was thus necessary to give the struggle over language the guise of a struggle for liberty. For this reason it was directed against Vienna, against the crown. The struggle for the exclusive

dominance of the Magyar language in state life, a tool of the gentry for the purpose of subjugating the nationalities, manifested itself as a struggle of the parliament against the crown—and the friends of liberty in Hungary and throughout Europe applauded it.

It was not difficult to win the support of the broad masses for this struggle. In a country with a very slow rate of economic development, the traditional ideologies of the classes are tenaciously preserved. How great was the change in the social and political ideals of the German people in the wake of the revolution! In Hungary, on the other hand, the name of Kossuth still sounds to the Magyar peasants today like a political program, as it did in 1848.¹⁷ Only a short time ago the masses of the Magyar people were still unfamiliar with political ideas other than those inherited from the epoch of the struggle of the estates: the struggle against Vienna. And today it is still not difficult to present the German language to the peasants as a symbol of foreign domination. To be sure, the Hungarian army would still not be an army of the people if the peasant's son were drilled to serve the class state with orders issued in Magyar. On the other hand, orders issued in German render concrete and directly perceptible the fact that the Magyar peasant's son must undergo a laborious time in the service of a foreign power. Is it then surprising that his instinct to oppose the army of the class state, which at every harvest is sent in against striking agricultural workers and at every election against oppositional peasants, initially expresses itself in a naive hatred of the German military language?

The struggle against the imperial community has thus arisen from the class interest and the class ideology of the ruling landowning class, which realizes the importance of keeping alive the ideas inherited from a time past among the slowly developing Magyar bourgeoisie and the Magyar peasant masses in order to ensure their support for the interests of the dominant nobility. It is undoubtedly the case that Hungary is determined to construct a purely Magyar national state and to create its own Magyar army. The common economic zone no longer exists in legal terms. From a legal point of view, Hungary could simply levy import duties on the Austrian border tomorrow. Will it make this legal possibility into concrete reality?

Even Rudolf Springer is of the opinion that in Hungary only "a few founders and petty bourgeois arrogance" oppose the unified customs area.¹⁸ I regard this to be erroneous. Very powerful forces are driving Hungary toward separation from Austria in economic terms as well. In 1900, of the working population as a whole, only 17.5 percent were employed in mining, iron and steel production, industry, commerce, and transport, whereas 71.13 percent were engaged in agriculture. The exchange of goods between Austria and Hungary is fundamentally an exchange of Austrian industrial products for the products of Hungarian agriculture and stockbreeding. In 1905, the goods that Hungary exported to Austria were made up, in terms of value, of 58.2

percent raw materials, 7.2 percent semifinished products, and 34.6 percent finished products, whereas Austria exported 10.3 percent raw materials, 11.8 percent semifinished products, and 77.9 percent finished products. What effects does such a relationship have on the Hungarian economy?

In an agrarian society, less value is produced overall in relation to the size of the population than in an industrial country. Agricultural work is seasonal. Agricultural labor power is therefore left unexploited for a large part of the year. Capitalism first destroyed the old practice of production in the home—the secondary occupation practiced by the peasants to meet their own needs. In Hungary this process was very slow. Even today, weaving and even spinning in the home to meet the peasant family's own needs have not been entirely displaced. However, with the development of the forces of production through capitalism, the products of industry penetrate into the countryside and destroy the old practice of production in the home. In other countries production in the home was replaced by the putting-out system: peasants and cotters began to produce as homeworkers in the pay of capitalists. But precisely during the period in which the putting-out system was being established, Hungary was under the yoke of the economic policy of Austrian mercantilism. It was not in Hungary, but in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia that the capitalist putting-out system emerged, the products of which were bought by the Hungarian peasant. The Hungarian agricultural population was thus deprived of its old secondary occupation without replacement of this by a new one. For the Hungarian economy as a whole this has meant that less labor is performed by the society and thus less value is produced. For the agricultural population itself, unable to live from agriculture, it has meant it is also unable to remain in the country and is thus forced to emigrate. In fact, emigration from Hungary is increasing from year to year. The value of this emigrant labor power and the surplus value that it would have been able to produce in the country is lost to the economy as a whole.

The exploitation of the Hungarian agricultural workers is extreme. If the harvest is poor, typhus linked to famine spreads even in the most fertile parts of the country. The Hungarian government seeks to perpetuate this destitution of the rural population, which in the most fertile parts of the country is of course not due to natural adversity, but to excessive exploitation, by preventing the rural population from organizing, by putting down every attempt to halt production by force of arms, and by itself ensuring that there is a ready supply of strikebreakers. Since the price of labor power is so low, the economy as a whole is dependent on what happens to the surplus value.

A considerable part of this surplus value flows into other regions. A major reason for this is the fact that large areas of the land are in the hands of foreign landowners, who consume the surplus value in other regions; these proprietors include the imperial family, Bohemian and foreign landowners, and Austrian cloisters.

But quite apart from this, every region where capital has a low organic composition must cede a part of its surplus value in the process of exchanging commodities with a region where capital has a higher organic composition. We have already referred to the reasons for this important phenomenon in the discussion of the antagonism existing between German Bohemia and Czech Bohemia. When Hungary exchanges grain for cotton, the fact that more social labor is embodied in the grain than in the cotton means that Hungary produces surplus value for Austria.

To be sure, this rule is also broken here by the phenomenon of ground rent. If the grain that Hungary delivers to Austria is harvested from poor soil, the production of this grain has entailed more labor than the production of a quantity of cotton that secures the same price. However, Hungary also has better soil, and the grain harvested from fertile soil secures the same price as the product of the poorest soil, the yield of which is still needed by the economic zone. If the products of the better soil are exchanged, they contain no more, perhaps even less, labor than the cotton that Austria provides in exchange. Nevertheless, the surplus labor that Hungary must produce for Austria (as must every land with a lower organic composition of capital for the more highly developed land) is thereby merely reduced, not eliminated. The reason for this is that a considerable part of the ground rent flows to other lands, in particular to Austria. A considerable part of this ground rent is in fact always paid as interest to the mortgage creditors of the landowners.

In this manner, a not inconsiderable part of Hungarian ground rent flows into the hands of those Austrian capitalists who directly or indirectly (as mortgage bondholders) grant the Hungarian farmers mortgage loans. This revenue of foreign capitalists is taxed in Hungary, and, insofar as the mortgages are in the hands of the common central bank, the state also has a share of the profit; but to the extent that the mortgage interest flows to private capitalists, most of it does not remain in Hungary.

In Hungary the mass of the value produced in relation to the size of the population is small; because the level of exploitation of the worker is very high, surplus value constitutes a considerable proportion of this value as a whole; however, a large part of this surplus value does not remain in Hungary. This fact necessarily restricts the accumulation of capital within the country. To this is added the manner in which the owners of the means of production employ the proportion of the surplus value remaining in the country. The capitalist divides his surplus value into two parts. He consumes one and accumulates the other, that is, transforms it into capital again and utilizes it to purchase labor power and the means of production. We refer to the relation between the accumulated and total surplus value as the rate of accumulation. The higher the rate of accumulation, the more rapidly the country's stock of capital increases. It is well known that the industrial capitalists accumulate a far greater part of the surplus value they acquire than the

landowning nobility. In highly developed countries, the competition between American and Russian grain may have drummed economic sense even into the landowners, the dominant capitalist class may have imbued even the landowning nobility with ideology, may have infected it with its greed for profit, but in Hungary this is by no means the case. Every year, the Magyar nobility still squanders the largest part of the surplus value it seizes. And since the largest part of the total surplus value of the country flows into the hands of this class, the rate of accumulation in Hungary is still very low and, as a result, its stock of capital also grows very slowly.

This fact is expressed in the cultural wretchedness of the whole country. To be sure, the Magyars eagerly point to the dazzling development of the capital city. But the growth of Budapest and a few other cities cannot compensate for the cultural backwardness of the land as a whole. It is incidentally very much open to question whether the externally dazzling growth of the capital city does not in fact reflect the economic sickness of the land. The city is, of course, above all, the center of surplus value consumption. The splendor of the capital is the external manifestation of the low rate of accumulation. It is not without reason that pleasure-loving Budapest is the most important customer of every Austrian luxury industry.

It is undeniable that the Hungarian national economy has made enormous steps since 1867. But if one compares Hungary with any developed industrial country with the same population size, Hungary appears poor, culturally backward, and weak in terms of its fiscal capacity. The majority of Hungarian state loans are still in the hands of foreign, in particular Austrian, capitalists. It is still the case in Hungary that the development of a modern industrial enterprise almost always involves the immigration of Austrian capital into the country.

Due to these facts, industrial development is perceived in Hungary as in the interest of the whole economic zone. For this reason, Hungary is already applying all the tools of mercantilist policy; for this reason, it is attempting, by means of subvention, taxation exemptions, and railway tariff policies, to attract foreign capital into the country; for this reason, it also aspires to a separate customs area, in order to accelerate its industrial development through tax incentives. To be sure, the industrial development of the country is possible only if foreign capital immigrates to Hungary, resulting in an initial flow of industrial profit into the hands of foreign capitalists. However, the economic history of every country confirms that foreign industrial capital gradually becomes indigenous. In Austria, too, capital from England, Belgium, and Germany that has established industrial enterprises has either become Austrian or has been superseded by Austrian capital. In recent decades, we have been able to observe this phenomenon of the nationalization of foreign capital on a large scale in Italy and to an even greater degree in the United States. In Hungary, too, the foreign capital that is establishing indus-

trial enterprises will ultimately acquire local status. The Kohns and Pollaks who today are involved in cotton weaving in Bohemia and who tomorrow will be involved in cotton weaving in Hungary will feel no less comfortable in Budapest than in Vienna.

The erection of a customs border between Austria and Hungary is thus initially perceived as a need of the state. It is seen as such by those social strata whose social position is based entirely on the apparatus of public administration: the professional politicians, the journalists, the bureaucrats, and the younger sons of the Magyar nobility who appear in the legislative bodies as the born leaders of the nation and occupy the sinecures in the county administrative bodies. In the same way, the entire intelligentsia is becoming the advocate of the interests of the state; the knowledge that industrial development will increase the prosperity of the land is combining with the traditional historical ideology of the class that sees in the establishment of an independent state system, in complete separation from Austria, a triumph over "Vienna," the triumph of liberty.¹⁹ The intelligentsia is thus being won over to the idea of an independent customs area. This is all the more significant due to the fact that in Hungary, as in every economically backward land, the political power of the intelligentsia is very great.

The Hungarian bourgeoisie is allying itself with this stratum of the intelligentsia in the struggle for an independent Hungarian customs area. It expects the establishment of a customs border to bring with it numerous opportunities for supplementary profit and for the sale of its commodities, enticing investment spheres for its capital and an assured market for its products. Manufacturers and merchants are the core division of this army that is fighting for protective tariffs against Austria. The influence of these social strata is very great. In the first place, the present electoral system favors the towns. And within the urban population, the bourgeoisie, due to its economic power and its social standing, forms the leadership for as long as capitalism does not incite the rebellion of the petty bourgeoisie. Hungary has even today still not reached this stage of development, when the petty bourgeoisie temporarily separates itself politically from the bourgeoisie (a stage that Austria had already reached at the end of the 1880s). As a result, the petty bourgeoisie is providing support for the bourgeoisie in its struggle for a separate customs area. As influential as the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie already are in Hungary today, they are nevertheless unable to achieve economic separation from Austria while faced with the opposition of the entire power of the landowning nobility. The gentry is after all even today the ruling class in Hungary. Of course, the gentry is no longer a unified class.²⁰ A part of it makes up the intelligentsia, the bureaucracy, the politicians, the journalists, the occupants of county sinecures, who we already know to be supporters of a separate customs area. Another section is interrelated with the bourgeoisie, sits in the administrative councils and the boards of banks and industrial

companies. But the majority of the lesser nobility, like the high nobility, has an interest in the export of grain and meat. The following figures prove just how strong this interest is.

The Hungarian export statistics for the year 1904 are shown in table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Hungarian Exports, 1904

	Quantity produced (in quintals)	Total exports (in quintals)	Exports to Austria
Wheat	39,984,951	3,944,680	3,932,307
Rye	11,663,819	2,056,342	2,056,035
Barley	11,365,234	2,583,398	1,821,749
Oats	9,823,997	2,064,834	2,052,820
Maize	17,974,937	2,243,104	2,097,986

Moreover, in the same year Hungary exported 7,193,653 quintals of flour, which included 6,121,834 quintals to Austria. Grain export to Austria decreases only to the extent that flour export increases. Livestock exports to Austria are also very high. The figures for 1904 are shown in table 5.2.

Table 5.2 Hungarian Livestock Exports, 1904

	Total exports (number of animals)	Exports to Austria (number of animals)
Cattle	301,668	251,782
Pigs	372,975	372,635

Added to this is a considerable quantity of animal and fat products and so on. These figures show clearly enough the enormous interests at stake for Hungarian agriculture and stockbreeding in regard to the issue of a separate customs area. A very large proportion of their products seek buyers outside Hungary, and, compared to the enormous sales on the Austrian market, the quantities purchased by other countries from Hungarian farmers and stockbreeders are insignificant.

A separate customs area threatens the landowning nobility in Hungary with a decrease in ground rents. Furthermore, the division of the customs area will also have the effect of lowering the price of land. Since the price of land is nothing but capitalized ground rent, it is dependent on two factors: ground rent and the interest rate. If ground rent sinks, that is, the value yielded by the land is lower, the price of the land sinks. If the rate of interest rises, the same ground rent corresponds to a smaller quantity of capital and, in turn, the price of the land sinks. The separation of customs areas will not only lower the ground rent in Hungary, but without doubt also increase the rate of interest. The price of land will thus sink for these two reasons, which, for the landowning class, is equivalent to a massive loss of capital. Moreover, the

more rapid development of Hungarian industry with its high demand for money capital will also increase the rate of interest on mortgages. Despite the falling price of land and sinking ground rent, the debt burden on agriculture will thus not become any less. If one reflects on the significance of this fact, it is reasonable to doubt whether it is even conceivable that Hungary's ruling class will introduce a separate customs area.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that customs separation, if it on the one hand harms the landowners, can on the other be of some benefit to the largest of them. In particular, it will facilitate the development of agricultural subsidiary industries. The sugar industry and beer brewing could certainly develop more quickly with the protection of a customs border than has been the case in recent years. It is precisely the large landowners who have an interest in the development of these industries, which regularly appear as agricultural subsidiary industries. In fact, it is precisely these industries that the Hungarian government initially wants to protect against Austrian imports, and, in the context of the struggle for measures serving this end, a number of the Hungarian landowners will certainly commit themselves to the program of customs separation. However, this carries little weight. Austrian sugar exports to Hungary amounted to only 329,727 quintals in 1905, beer and mead exports to only 288,917 quintals, and this is already being confronted with a considerable level of importation of these goods from Hungary. Thus, the hope of promoting agricultural subsidiary industries through protective tariffs imposed on Austria can hardly alter in any significant way the significance of the fact that the economic interests of the nobility are antagonistic to customs separation.

Anyone who believes that Hungary will carelessly decide to abolish its economic ties with Austria, that one fine day a Hungarian parliament will, without encountering any opposition, decide to establish a customs border with Austria, will have cause to reflect after studying these figures. The question of customs separation will not be solved within Hungary itself without intense struggles. But despite all this, it is probable that in these struggles Hungary will decide in favor of a separate customs area.

Certainly, customs separation contradicts the interests of the large- and medium-sized landowners in Hungary. However, customs separation is supported by the ideology of these classes. The Magyar nobility has been waging its class struggle against Austrian absolutism for 380 years. These centuries have cultivated an ideology in the Magyar gentry, for which the complete independence of the Hungarian state, complete separation from Austria, is the ultimate goal of all political strivings. This ideology cannot be underestimated. It has already resulted in the transformation of the estate struggle of the nobility for its privileges into its complete opposite, the revolutionary struggle for the bourgeois concept of equality before the law. And it remains an active force today. It is in this conceptual universe that the children of the Magyar

ruling class are educated; it impregnates all social life, all intellectual culture; it alone has given form and content to the political struggle of the Magyar nobility for centuries. This ideology certainly emerged from the interest of the class; but once it had emerged and was subsequently strengthened by four centuries of continuous struggle, it became woven into the consciousness of the Magyar nobility. It cannot simply be dispelled today or tomorrow on the grounds that it no longer corresponds to altered class interests. Certainly, a large proportion of the Magyar nobility will oppose customs separation with all their power. It is not the farmers and livestock breeders, but the intelligentsia, the professional politicians and journalists, the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie of the Hungarian towns who will be the leaders in the battle for the independent customs area. But the resistance of the nobility is broken by its own ideology; it is ensnared in its own slogans. The class interest of the bourgeoisie will triumph over the class interest of the nobility by allying itself with the class ideology of the nobility itself.

The independent customs area already exists in legal terms, and initially people will be satisfied with the empty legal form, with the replacing of the trade alliance with a trade agreement in which both states guarantee each other free trade. Then duties will probably be levied on individual goods—products of agricultural subsidiary industries. But customs separation is only the beginning. An internal logic will then drive trade policy measures beyond the boundaries they have established. Some trivial issue will lead one state to levy duties in order to add pressure to an economic demand on the other half of the empire, and the other state will answer with countermeasures. Excited public opinion on both sides will call for stronger means of forcing the neighboring state to comply; “Away from Hungary” will be heard here; “Away from Austria” will reverberate over there. The classes that hope to exploit the struggle—the landowners in Austria, merchant and industrial capital in Hungary—will fan the flames of the dispute. Thus, the path leads from “reciprocity” and “retortion” to complete separation of the economic zones. Is it really conceivable that Austria and Hungary will peacefully annually renew their trade agreement, in which they guarantee each other complete freedom of trade, and that they will continue to conclude concurring trade agreements with other countries (for this too is a precondition of the free exchange of goods between the two lands) despite the fact that all the states on the Continent close their borders with tariffs, despite the fact that in both halves of the empire influential classes call for customs separation, despite the fact that for centuries the only class in Austria whose interests point it toward the unity of the customs area has been dominated by no other idea than that of the struggle against Austria, of separation from Austria?

The direction of development is thus toward the complete separation of the two halves of the empire. If we imagine the realization of separate customs areas, it becomes clear that the community of “pragmatic” affairs—the

common army and a common foreign policy—cannot be preserved. Only then will the impossibility of dualism become clear to even the stupidest observer; only then will it become clear that, as Rudolf Springer has so brilliantly demonstrated, an organic community is not possible without a unity of will.²¹ Austria and Hungary are different states with different, often opposing, interests, different wills. But these different wills should be represented by a minister for external affairs, an ambassador, a consul; these different interests should be defended by an army. How can two different, conflicting wills utilize the one organ in regard to the same issue without fighting over this organ, without finally tearing it apart? If one imagines Austria and Hungary as independent economic zones divided by a customs border, one must ask, how can a common foreign policy be possible when, after all, foreign policy can be *nothing other than an instrument of economic policy*? The day that the dualistic arrangements (a customs region, common consumption taxation, and so on) collapse, the unity of pragmatic affairs (army, foreign policy) will also be condemned to death. Then nothing will remain in common other than the person of the sovereign. But he is also nothing more than an organ of the state, and he too will thus experience the fact that an organic community is impossible without a community of will. As independent economic zones, Austria and Hungary require different foreign policies, different alliances, have different friends and different enemies. Should the king of Hungary fight the allies of the emperor of Austria? Will the emperor of Austria conclude an alliance with a state that lives in enmity with Hungary? Which state will realize its will with regard to the sovereign of both states? Is it to be the will of the emperor of Austria or that of the king of Hungary that decides? The questions of foreign policy, of economic policy for the two halves of the empire are incomparably more difficult, more complicated than they were for Sweden and Norway. And yet it has already been shown there that the union in one person of two states with divergent interests cannot form a durable entity. Is the House of Habsburg in reality facing the fate of the House of Bernadotte?

Anyone who is convinced that the dualism of the two halves of the empire is moving in the direction of complete separation must reckon with the fact that the crown also recognizes these facts and will not stand by and allow the pact to be torn apart, a pact that was its victor's booty in the great Turkish wars. The stronger the forces are that want to tear Austria and Hungary apart, the more animated will become the desire to "reconquer" Hungary. Will the crown be able to do this?

The first effect of customs separation will be an intensification of class antagonisms within Hungary. First, as we know, the establishment of a customs border will not be imposed without bitter class struggles; with each step toward a separate customs area—the establishment of each customs duty, the conclusion of each trade agreement—at least some of the large- and

medium-scale landowners in Hungary will defend their gravely threatened class interests. They will be opposed by the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, ideologues from all classes. The unity of the ruling class will be torn asunder. Even more significant is the fact that the resistance of the lower classes to the ruling class will rapidly acquire new force and new forms. The epoch of the accelerated industrialization of Hungary will be preceded by a "foundation period" [*Gründerperiode*], which, as everywhere else, will arouse the envy and the moral indignation of the petty bourgeoisie in Hungary; rapid industrialization will deprive many members of the petty bourgeoisie of their livelihoods; the numerous failures of inappropriately or precipitately established enterprises will also ruin many members of the petty bourgeoisie; the increase in the price of industrial products as a result of protective tariffs and the increase in rents in the towns and industrial centers will provoke the discontent of the petty bourgeoisie.

A few years after the implementation of customs separation—probably even earlier—Hungary will experience the rise of the politics of the middle classes, the revolt of the petty bourgeoisie against the bourgeoisie, and will have its own Schneider and Lueger.²² At the same time the industrial workforce will gain strength. The growth in demand on the labor market will increase its power, its organizations will expand, and it will claim a share of the fruits of industrial growth. But those in power will fear the harm to the young industries of Hungary that a reduction in working hours and an increase in wages might cause; they will therefore attempt to impede the struggle of the workers with all the means of state power at their disposal. Class antagonisms in the countryside will increase even more quickly than in the towns. For the Hungarian farmer and the livestock breeder, customs separation represents serious economic losses; they will attempt to pass on the costs of customs separation to the already burdened agricultural workers; they will defend the ignominious emergency laws as a precious national asset against the agricultural workers, will not only refuse every wage increase, but attempt to lower wages still further. The effect on the agricultural workers will be all the harsher since protective tariffs and the boom of the foundation period will increase the price of all the industrial products they buy.

As it has done everywhere, encroaching industrial capitalism will also trigger bitter class struggles in Hungary, all the more so when finally, as soon as the nation has won a decisive victory in the struggle for state independence, the tension that maintains the spirit of the struggle against "Vienna" dissolves. The way will now be free for the class struggle; now the political struggles in Hungary will have lost their traditional content; now the rostrum will reverberate with the sound of classes locked in conflict. And it goes without saying that the most highly developed nation in Hungary, the Magyar nation, will be the first to feel the effects of this process of social differentiation.

But at the same time, the rapid development of industrial capitalism will

lead to the acceleration of another process: the awakening of the nonhistorical nations. Hungary is no more a nationally uniform country than Austria. The official census of 1900 provides the figures in table 5.3 regarding the respective strengths of the nations of Hungary.

Table 5.3 Numbers of Persons in Various Language Groups in the Kingdom of Hungary, 1900

Mother tongue	Numbers of people	Percentage of total population
Magyar	8,742,301	45.4
German	2,135,181	11.1
Slovak	2,019,641	10.5
Romanian	2,799,479	14.5
Ruthenian	429,447	2.2
Croatian	1,682,104	8.7
Serbian	1,048,645	5.5
Other	397,761	2.1
Total	19,254,559	100.0

Thus, according to these figures, in the kingdom of Hungary 8,742,301 Magyars face 10,512,258 members of other nations. The Magyars are a minority within their own land. At the same time, no one doubts that these statistics are false and that the Magyars appear to be stronger here than they in fact are. Moreover, more than a few of those who have declared Magyar to be their mother tongue could doubtless be just as quickly lost to the Magyar nation as they were won. This applies primarily to the very numerous turncoats who have become Magyars for the sake of their daily bread, in order to obtain a post in the public service. The Germans of Austria are more than familiar with the value of such turncoats. The same goes for the Jews. 70.32 percent of the Jews in the kingdom have indicated that Magyar is their mother tongue and 25.45 percent German; only the very small remainder have declared themselves to be members of the other nations. If we recall that it is scarcely possible for the Jews in a slowly developing land to have achieved a particularly high level of assimilation, we could reasonably expect that when the nonhistorical nations of Hungary awaken to independent cultural life the Jews in Transylvania will become Romanians, the Jews in Upper Hungary Slovaks, just as the Jews in Bohemia are beginning to become Czechs. The population that the Magyars can consistently count on is thus considerably smaller than that suggested by official figures.

In Hungary itself—excluding Croatia and Slovenia—8,588,834 Magyars face a mere 8,132,740 members of other nations; here the Magyars constitute 51.4 percent of the population, that is, a majority, although to be sure a very small one. If we subtract the Jewish component from each of the nations

(which is justified given that only a small number of Hungarian Jews can be regarded as completely assimilated), 7,994,383 Magyars face 7,896,029 Germans, Slovaks, Romanians, Ruthenians, and Serbo-Croats; the Magyar majority thereby becomes minuscule. If we recall the violation of the nationalities by the Magyar administrative authorities in regard to the census and the large number of persons who declared themselves members of the dominant nation for reasons of economic pressure or to obtain economic advantage, we are justified in saying that in Hungary proper—excluding Croatia and Slovenia—the Magyars represent a minority.

In spite of all this, only Magyars and Croats have national rights in Hungary. All the other nations are oppressed. Their languages are not afforded any rights by the state authorities or the courts; even their old towns have been renamed by the state. They are not only denied universities and secondary schools, but are also subject to attempts, although against the law, to force their children to attend Magyar elementary schools. They are barely represented in the parliament, have no role in official bodies, and are dominated in the parishes and counties by the Magyars and their retinue, which consists of national turncoats and Jews. Only the Magyar has a right to the aid of the state; only he has access to every part of the state administrative apparatus. Every national and political movement of the nationalities is treated as high treason. The crimes that genocidal Russia has committed against its nationalities, which Prussia has committed against its Poles, and perhaps still worse crimes, are here committed by a minority against the great majority of the country. The Magyar ruling classes can allow themselves this since the subject nations belong exclusively to the dominated and exploited classes; they are the nonhistorical nations.

However, the process of the awakening of the nonhistorical nations has also begun here. Every advance of capitalist development will accelerate this process. No form of political persecution can arrest it. If the Magyars in Hungary have until now been able to maintain the subjection of the nationalities, whereas the Germans in Austria have been unable to maintain their supremacy, the Magyars owe this merely to the backwardness of the country. Capitalism and the modern state have awakened the nations everywhere. As soon as the economic development of Hungary is accelerated by its industrial policy, by the independence of its customs area, the Magyars will experience with their Romanians and Slovaks that which the Germans have experienced with the Czechs and Slovenes. The day on which the customs border between Austria and Hungary is established will represent the death of exclusive Magyar hegemony in the country!

This will be the face of Hungary following customs separation: the dominant classes of the country will wage a passionate struggle in the parliament, inflamed by the most powerful class interests; in the workshops there will be strikes, on the streets demonstrations by the industrial workers, whose wage

struggle the government will try to impede; within the petty bourgeoisie there will be a lively and spiteful form of agitation against the dominant parties; in the countryside revolts by the agricultural workers will be continually and brutally put down. And throughout the country there will be national struggle; the awakening nations embittered by the injustice perpetrated against them by their rulers, the dominant classes of the Magyars driven by fear to a policy of ruthless force, of the cruelest repression of national movements, which in turn will increase the passion, the indignation, and the hatred of the oppressed peoples—this is the face of a Hungary poised to enter into battle with the Crown. This will be the Hungary that the Crown, whose sovereignty is threatened by the disintegration of dualism, will want to subjugate.

In the epoch of the Russian Revolution [1905], no one will dare to attempt to subjugate a country torn by class and national antagonisms. However, the internal antagonisms of the country will provide the Crown with other instruments of power that it will have to use if it wishes to avoid the fate of the House of Bernadotte. It cannot be the organ of two wills and still hope to rule over Austria and over Hungary; it must thus ensure that Hungary and Austria have a common will, that they constitute the *one* empire. Hungary's internal disunity presents the Crown with the possibility of realizing this goal. It will send its army into Hungary in order to reconquer it for the empire, but it will inscribe upon its flags: Uncorrupted universal and equal suffrage! Right of coalition for the agricultural workers! National autonomy! It will oppose the idea of the independent Hungarian nation-state with the idea of the *United States of Great Austria*, the idea of a federative state, in which each nation independently attends to its national affairs and all nations unite in the defense of their common interests. Necessarily and inevitably, the idea of the federative multinational state will become the instrument of the Crown, whose empire is being destroyed by the disintegration of dualism.

Many years have already passed since Rudolf Springer first presented his theories on this subject in a lecture to Viennese students. At that time, the Liberal Party was still in government in Hungary and the notion that the Independence Party could achieve a majority in the Hungarian *Reichstag* was ridiculed. The politicians of the day still had no insight into the crisis of dualism. But Springer already had the "secular facts" in view. Dualism, the community of instrumentalities without a community of will, necessarily drives toward the decay of the empire. If the Deák constitution falls, the Crown will have to look for allies that can save its sovereignty; such allies can be found not in the Magyar nobility, but only in the nationalities.²³ Dualism cannot maintain itself; the absolutist form of imperial unity is impossible. For the sake of its own interests, the Crown must thus grant the nations free self-determination if it is not to lose its dominance within the empire.

The Viennese students followed this logical train of thought with interest and curiosity. Yet what they heard all seemed so distant from the present; the

monarchy appeared at least to be holding its ground. Was what they were hearing anything more than the fantasy of an enlightened individual?

Sometime later Friedrich Naumann sojourned in Vienna.²⁴ He too had a presentiment that, given the present situation of the monarchy, democracy represented the only source of help for the Habsburgs. Caesarism, the alliance of the old imperial power resting on the force of arms with the force of the ideas of universal suffrage and national freedom, also seemed in his view to be the only possibility. However, he doubted that the Habsburgs would take this path:

In my political discussions in Austria, I could not avoid thinking that a Napoleon is needed here. It does not have to be Napoleon I; a Napoleon III would suffice. Such an Austrian Napoleon would first have to have the present Chamber of Deputies sent home and then tell the people that he had put a well-deserved end to the absurdity of a falsely constituted parliament, that he intended to have the population express their support for this beneficial step through a plebiscite, and that he subsequently intended to govern with a representative body elected by universal suffrage rather than one drawn from the estates; since the army was with him, he would request that unnecessary complications be avoided. This would be revolution in favor of the state. It would be of benefit to the land, but it will not occur, for—the Habsburgs are not revolutionary.²⁵

Then came the crisis of dualism. Springer now presented his ideas to a larger audience. But he met with the same response as Naumann: what nonsense to expect a revolutionary policy of the Habsburgs, the pillars of the principle of legitimacy! Caesarism without the Caesars! And what folly to regard the Hungarian parliament, the most influential body in the whole monarchy, as having no real power!

It was at this point that the military conflict broke out. The coalition, the majority of the Hungarian parliament, demanded that Magyar be established as the language of the army. The Crown refused to grant this. The parliamentary majority attempted to break the resistance of the Crown by paralyzing legislation and opposing the ministry of the king using the methods formerly employed in the struggle waged by the estates. The minister Josef Kristoffy then threw the catchword of universal suffrage among the masses.²⁶ At the same time, the Fejervary ministry had the proud Hungarian parliament dispersed by the Honved captain Fabrizius at the head of a company of Hungarian soldiers.²⁷ And throughout the land no one lifted a finger; the population did not defend the once-so-powerful parliament with even the smallest of street demonstrations. Here we have for the first time the disparate alliance of Crown, force of arms, and democracy. Are the Habsburgs really not revolutionary? Are we lacking the Caesars necessary for Caesarism?

To be sure, the Crown finally concluded, if not peace, then an armistice with the coalition. However, it insisted on the introduction of universal suf-

frage in Hungary. And to ensure its implementation, the Crown yielded to working class pressure in Austria, since it was clear that the dominant classes in Hungary could not refuse the masses universal suffrage once it had been implemented in Austria. The Crown thus brought its own power to bear in order to break the resistance of the privileged within the Austrian Chamber of Deputies.

This is incomprehensible from the point of view of individual psychology. The seventy-six-year-old man who declared that elections could not be conducted again according to the old electoral law and who demanded of Kosuth and Apponyi that Hungary adopt universal suffrage is really no revolutionary.²⁸ But conditions are stronger than wishes and opinions. The events of the last years represent the beginnings of a Caesarist policy. I am familiar with few examples of a political prediction's being so thoroughly confirmed as Rudolf Springer's has been. The economic forces that determine the development of nations and the fortunes of states make every person, every family, into its willing tools.

Since then, Springer has set down his ideas in his work *Foundations and Developmental Goals of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy*, which we have already cited several times. We have much to object to in regard to some aspects of this work. It seems to us that Springer, on the one hand, underestimates the forces that are pushing toward a complete division of the two halves of the empire—in particular, his opinion that there are not real and powerful interests calling for the separation of the customs area is without doubt incorrect—and that he, on the other hand, underestimates the rapidity of development within Hungary itself. The Magyars are socially less differentiated than he presumes and the decline of the gentry as a class less advanced. Above all, however, the process of the awakening of the nonhistorical nations has not made as much headway as Springer believes. It therefore seems probable to us that the forces pushing toward division will initially prove stronger than the "imperial idea," that we will see at least a first attempt at the separation of the economic zones before the Caesarist policy can become effective. However, this will change nothing in terms of the final result; it is precisely the development of capitalism in Hungary, accelerated by customs separation, that will intensify class and national antagonisms and thereby first make possible the politics of Caesarism. And it is precisely customs separation that will make the system of shared instrumentalities completely impossible, will completely do away with dualism, and will therefore force the Crown to embrace a Caesarist policy. If the union constituted by the monarchy is to survive at all, if an external power is not to put an end to the struggles within the monarchy, the day will certainly come when the Crown has to offer autonomy to the nations of Hungary, beginning the transformation of the whole empire into a multinational federative state. But the process of development toward national autonomy will take a long time, and it will

pass through violent struggle between the two halves of the empire—from complete separation to complete reunion. We will have occasion to see that this insight is not unimportant.

The decay of dualism due to the antagonism between Austrian and Hungarian interests will force the Crown to adopt a Caesarist policy; the conditions for its implementation will be created by the decomposition of Hungarian society due to the effects of industrial capitalism into a series of social and national parties engaged in passionate struggles with each other. But at the same time, powerful forces will also compel the Crown to adopt the same policy on this side of the Leitha.

For the Austrian bourgeoisie the question of imperial unity will be one of the unity of the economic zone. For many Austrian industries, in particular for the textile industry, the clothing and linen industry, the production of leather goods, instruments, clocks, and haberdashery, of machinery, glass, and earthenware, customs separation represents a genuine catastrophe. Hungary is by far the most important purchaser of all Austrian industrial products. If Austrian industrialists are already yammering about the effects of mercantilist policy in Hungary today, how loudly will they complain when, with customs separation, the Hungarian government is provided with the most effective tool of promoting its industry? As soon as the idea of replacing dualism with an imperial constitution based on national autonomy assumes a tangible form, it will become the program of the Austrian capitalist class. For this class, national autonomy within the empire represents the unity of the economic zone.

The position adopted by the Austrian bourgeoisie for reasons of class interest has also been adopted by the peasants of the Alpine lands and the petty bourgeoisie of Vienna on the basis of their class ideology. The peasants, dominated by traditional values, and the petty bourgeoisie in the royal capital, eager for spectacle, are Austrian *patriots*, the bearers of the old imperial idea. For them, the Magyars are still rebels, and the alliance of the "Black and Yellows" with the Hungarian nationalities appears to them to be a continuation of the old Jellačić policy of 1848.²⁹ However, it is not only as Austrians, but also as clericalists, that they hate the independent Hungary, which is dominated by a Calvinistic nobility and a Jewish bourgeoisie. The rabble-rousing propaganda against Hungary thus also suits the needs of the petty bourgeoisie, which is incapable of giving vent to its embitterment in a purposeful class struggle and which always requires a scapegoat for its suffering, the causes of which it does not understand.

Finally, the imperial idea will also win the support of the national parties. The intensification of national antagonisms cannot continue without influencing the Austrian nations. The persecution of the Germans, the Slovaks, the Ruthenians, the Romanians, and the Serbs in Hungary will awaken rage against Hungary among their national comrades in Austria. All the oppressed

nations of Hungary have brothers on this side of the Leitha, whereas the Magyars—except for a small minority in Bukovina—have no fellow nationals here. National autonomy throughout the empire represents for every Austrian nation (with the exception of Poland) the liberation of hundreds of thousands of their fellow nationals from Magyar domination. Can the Germans of Austria, who would like to tear apart the whole state on account of a Czech school in the most wretched of villages, remain indifferent when two million Germans are struggling against Magyar domination in Hungary? Can the Czechs, who do not want to abandon the smallest of minorities in the German language region, be indifferent to the fate of two million Slovaks in Hungary? Will the Austrian Ruthenians abandon their half a million fellow nationals in Hungary? And what else could be the political goal of the Croats, Serbs, and Romanians in Austria than the union with their compatriots on the other side of the Leitha? As soon as the struggle of the nationalities in Hungary takes a fiercer turn, all the national parties in Austria will be compelled to take care of their fellow nationals on the other side of the state frontier. And what other form of help can they offer than the idea of the unitary imperial constitution founded on national autonomy?

With the Crown forced to adopt the policy of national autonomy by the decay of dualism and under pressure within Austria itself from the bourgeoisie, clericalism, and finally all the national parties, with the demand for national autonomy being voiced in Hungary by the oppressed nationalities and the resistance of the Magyars broken by the class antagonisms within the nation—is the imperial idea, the *multinational federative state* stretching from Lake Constance to Orsova, really a utopia?

All of the forces that are pushing toward an organic regulation of the nationalities question throughout the empire have gained yet another strong ally in the form of the necessities of foreign policy. The constitution of every state is conditioned by its foreign policy. The dualist system, too, was designed to serve, as we have seen, the foreign policy of the monarchy, which at that time was the policy of Great Germany. Since the battle of Sedan, it has no longer been backed up by any necessity of foreign policy. Rather, it has long been a serious obstacle to the foreign policy required by the Austrian bourgeoisie. Capitalism strives everywhere to expand the area it dominates, to acquire new spheres of investment and new markets. The geographical situation of Austria and the historical transmission of age-old trading relations designate the Balkan Peninsula as the natural target of Austrian capitalism's expansionist efforts. In Austria, these expansionist aspirations, which determine the foreign policy of every capitalist state, will become stronger, not weaker, as a result of customs separation. Austrian industry will seek compensation in the Balkans for its losses on the Hungarian market. These aspirations will be severely hampered by the oppression of the Romanians and Serbs in Hungary. The more inflamed the national dispute in Hungary becomes,

the greater will be the passionate hatred for the monarchy awakened by reports of the tyranny of the Magyar ruling class in Romania and Serbia—a climate that those competing with our industry, our trade, and our banks in the Balkans will certainly exploit.

For this reason alone, capitalism, which has brought Austria its economic predominance in the Balkans, will therefore certainly favor the liberation of the Romanians and the Serbs in Hungary. The situation will become quite different as soon as Romanians and Serbs are constituted as nations within the monarchy. If it is the case that there are better Romanian and Serbian schools within the empire than in Serbia and Romania, our youth will no longer look to Bucharest and Belgrade; instead the youth of these poor, only slowly advancing countries will come to us, becoming acquainted with and learning to respect us. If the Romanians and Serbs in Austria are guaranteed the development of their national culture to the same extent as in the kingdoms of Romania and Serbia, the monarchy will be distinguished from these states only by the fact that it offers these nations the enormous advantage of an extensive economic zone. The empire will then exercise a powerful force of attraction upon these nations. The need for an extensive economic zone, one of the driving forces in western and central Europe leading to the establishment of modern nation-states, could lead here to the expansion of a multinational state, to the incorporation of the Balkan states into the Austrian multinational federative state. Peace between the nations within the empire thus constitutes a means of capitalist conquest of the Balkans.³⁰

Forces within the empire are pushing toward Caesarism, which makes the idea of democratic equality and national liberty an instrument of the power of the Crown. The expansionist requirements of capitalism are pushing everywhere toward imperialism, toward an alliance of the Crown, which wishes to be the “augmenter of the empire,” and the army, lusting for military glory, with capitalism, which requires new spheres of investment and ensured markets. In Austria, Caesarism will become the instrument of imperialism. The Crown will liberate the nationalities of Hungary because it wants to dominate the nations of the Balkan Peninsula; the capitalists will struggle for the self-determination of the nations because they want to incorporate the peoples of the Balkans into their sphere of exploitation.

Utopias, nothing but utopias? The Habsburgs, Naumann assures us, are not revolutionary, and the petty bourgeois citizen, who regards as eternal everything that has existed for thirty years, cannot believe that something on the map of Europe could be changed. Yet, on the day when the customs area is divided, when the decline of dualism calls the rule of the Crown into question, when the Austrian capitalist class loses its most important market, when the Hungarian nationalities call for struggle against the dominant minority, when the dissolution of Turkey confronts Europe with the necessity of solving the national questions in the Balkans—on this day, the constitution of

the Hungarian "nation-state" will be nothing more than a worthless piece of paper.

To be sure, there are powerful countertendencies opposing this evolution. The inertia of the given state of affairs is a powerful historical force. But however the struggle of Caesarism against the Hungarian state might end, the emergence of Caesarist tendencies will certainly have a powerful influence on the development of national relations in the western half of the empire. The forces that aim to realize national autonomy within the empire must first implement it on this side of the Leitha. Universal suffrage has become government policy in Austria at a time when the Crown requires it in Hungary. The Crown, all the classes, and all the nations that the ruling classes in Hungary want to suppress will have to demand national autonomy in Austria. National autonomy in Austria will thereby become the policy of the Crown, which fears for its sovereignty in Hungary, the policy of the clerical peasantry and the Christian Social petty bourgeoisie, who wish to save the empire from the heretical rebels of the bourgeoisie, who tremble for the sake of its markets in Hungary and who want to conquer the Balkan states in economic terms, of the nations that want to stand by their subjugated fellow nationals in the other half of the empire.

The development of Austria toward national autonomy does not depend exclusively on the Hungarian situation. We know that there exist forces within the state that are strong enough and that are pushing the state in this direction. However, the momentum these forces attain will be increased enormously by the Hungarian question. In Austria, the desire for national peace must first, through a long historical process, overcome national hatred and take on the form of the demand for national autonomy; consideration of the Hungarian question will greatly accelerate this process. That which still divides the peoples of Austria will appear ridiculously small when the existence of a great empire, the future of Austrian industry, and the fate of hundreds of thousands of compatriots beyond the Leitha are at stake.

This development will force the propertied classes to provide Austria with the type of constitution the working class requires for reasons of its own interests and its class struggle. Rather than being an extraordinary accident, this coincidence is easily explained. The same forces determine both the constitutional agenda of the working class and the developmental tendencies of the old empire. Capitalist development has confronted Austria with both the national question and the social question. Whereas the ruling classes of the old historical nations once subjugated the nonhistorical nations, capitalism and the modern state have now awakened all the nations to new cultural life and led them onto the historical stage. Dualism was the last constitutional form whose aim was to maintain the domination of the nonhistorical nations by the old historical nations. Germans and Magyars divided the empire among themselves, the Germans granting the Poles, the Magyars, the Croats a small

share of power whereas the other peoples came away empty handed. The moment all nations have been awakened, the moment there is no longer a nation that endures national oppression, this pact will fall to pieces. The moment there are no longer any nonhistorical nations, there will also no longer be any national domination or national oppression. The autonomous nations will unite in the multinational federative state. The transformation of the monarchy into a multinational federative state is an effect of capitalist development, which enlarges the cultural community of all nations and thereby also awakens the nonhistorical nations to new cultural life, to an independent political will.

We have dealt with the Hungarian question here only to the extent that its importance for an understanding of the developmental tendencies of the national struggles in Austria seems to us to merit such treatment. The position taken by the Austrian working class regarding the Hungarian question is a completely independent problem that needs to be clearly distinguished from the analysis of the developmental tendencies of the state.

The Austrian workers initially interpreted the Hungarian question as a problem of their constitutional policy. Dualism, which withdraws power over foreign policy and the instruments of military power from the *Reichsrat*, is intolerable for every democratic party. For this reason, the Austrian workers must demand the abolition of the shared administration of "pragmatic" affairs and complete constitutional separation from Hungary.

However, we are gradually learning to also comprehend the Hungarian question in terms of political economy. The division of the customs area represents a grave threat to the Austrian working class, a threat hitherto underestimated in the party press. It represents for us a lessening of employment opportunities, an increase in the price of bread and meat, and the retarding of Austrian industrial development. The Austrian working class thus demands the retaining of the unity of the customs area.

Austria and Hungary as constitutionally completely independent states, but permanently bound together in a single economic zone: this is the policy ensuing from the interests of the Austrian working class. The reunification of Austria and Hungary in a single, nationally federated state is *not* the policy of the working class. But as soon as it becomes the policy of the dominant classes within the monarchy, it will be our task to use this favorable situation in order to promote the present interests of the Austrian workers; the moment will then have arrived to win national autonomy on the basis of local democratic administration, to secure a lasting safeguard for the unified economic zone. But it will then be no less our task to combat the dangers brought by Caesarism to the democratic constitution of the state and the democratic cast of mind of the masses.

The discussion of this difficult tactical task lies outside the framework of this study, since such a discussion deals no longer with a national problem,

but with the general problem of the tactics of the proletariat in its opposition to Caesarism. The most important aspect of this issue has been addressed by Ferdinand Lassalle, who wrote in 1859: "If Louis Napoleon takes up an important and thoroughly popular cause in order to fraudulently obtain a few pennies of popularity from the echo that this cause finds in the hearts of the people, one should refuse him these pennies and thereby render the result he has resolved to achieve for reasons of personal gain useless in terms of personal gain. But how, given the most basic common sense, can one want to take up swords against this cause? How can one now aim to struggle against that which one hitherto wanted, desired, and aspired to?"

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6. The Transformation of the Principle of Nationality

NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

We have already explained how the principle of nationality has become an active force that has destroyed the traditional state forms of Europe. We concluded that a number of multinational states have nevertheless held their ground, after a fashion, against the onslaught of this principle, and we spent a considerable time considering one of these multinational states, Austria. However, we have not yet dealt with the question as to whether these multinational states will in fact be able to maintain themselves. Rather, we have merely inquired as to what form relations within the multinational state take as long as it continues to exist as such. In this context, we encountered the development of national autonomy. It is thus precisely this investigation that has shown us the principle of nationality in all its enormous strength. For national autonomy is nothing other than the principle of nationality applied within the state. As long as the principle of nationality is still not strong enough to destroy the multinational state and to establish independent nation-states in its place, there is a tendency within multinational states toward a constitution that affords each nation relative independence. Whereas we first encountered the principle of nationality merely as a maxim of state formation, we now also know it as a principle of the state constitution.

It is very instructive to compare these two modes of the principle of nationality with one another. The principle of nationality as the foundation of state formation places all instruments of state power in the hands of the nation. The principle of nationality as a principle of the state constitution denies the nation these instruments of power. To be sure, national autonomy also provides the nation with an assured sphere of power based directly on the prevailing system of laws and thus indirectly on the power of the state. This is the guarantee of all systems of law. To be sure, it is possible to protect this system of laws even against the state itself through a system of democratic administration. The state is then unable to rob a nation of the sphere of power it once granted that nation without, in the process, destroying its own

administrative apparatus, its own physical existence. However, national autonomy does not provide the nation with its own economic zone; rather, it retains the nation as a part of a larger economy. It thus does not even provide the nation, to the extent that this is possible at all within a social order based on the private ownership of the instruments of labor, with free reign over the development of its economy, something that is, of course, the foundation of the development of a national culture. It does not place the instruments of external power, the power of the army, in the hands of the nation, and thus it denies the nation the ultimate guarantee of its existence as a nation. National autonomy within the multinational state thereby appears to be an imperfect substitute for the nation-state.

However, in another respect, national autonomy within the multinational state is superior to the nation-state. The state is necessarily a territorial entity. It must incorporate a territory that lends itself both to the constitution of a more or less independent, self-sufficient economic zone and, in strategic terms, to being defended against every external enemy. The state can therefore never implement the principle of nationality in its pure form. It must constantly force fragments of foreign peoples to submit to its power and abandon parts of its own people to a foreign power. All these considerations do not exist for the autonomous nation within the multinational state. It can delimit its region of settlement without taking into consideration economic or strategic units; it can incorporate the fragments of its people living as minorities in foreign regions of settlement by means of the personality principle and can meet their cultural needs. The principle of nationality, when applied as a principle of the state constitution, can thus be realized in a much purer form than when applied as the foundation of state formation.

To where is this historical development leading? Will multinational states continue to exist, with the principle of nationality implemented within these states only in the form of the organic regulation of the relations of nations with each other and with the state, or will the principle of nationality continue to act as the foundation of state formation, thereby destroying the traditional state structures that include many nations? For us in Austria, the question is as follows: will Austria continue to exist as an independent state such that the forces that we have described increase in strength and prove able to transform the old Austria into a multinational federative state? Or will the principle of nationality destroy Austria; will the old empire "disintegrate"? We must attempt to answer this question by examining the forces that aim to dissolve the multinational state and those that aspire to maintain it. Furthermore, we must attempt to conduct this investigation with an impartial scientific objectivity. What we would like and not like to be the case does not even come into question in the following investigation. In this connection, we will in the first place attempt to answer this question as it applies to the duration of capitalist society. The question of how the communi-

ties of a socialist society will delimit themselves from one another is a separate problem.

In other countries, the Austrian often hears the opinion expressed that the old monarchy will disintegrate as soon as the old emperor dies. This is of course the foolish opinion of ignorant people who have no idea of the real power that this monarchy still embodies. The forces and the facts guaranteeing the continued existence of Austria are today still quite distinct from the degree of notice taken by the European heads of state of an aging monarch.

In the first place, there are entire nations with an interest in the continued existence of the monarchy. This applies directly to all those nations that do not have compatriots in large numbers outside the monarchy. Thus, it applies in Austria to 5.9 million Czechs and 1.2 million Slovenes and in Hungary to 8.7 million Magyars, 2 million Slovaks, and 1.7 million Croats. There is nothing for these nations to gain from the disintegration of the monarchy. The other nations—Germans, Poles, Ruthenians, Serbs, Romanians, Italians—might hope for unification with their compatriots outside the monarchy following the disintegration of the empire, but for these 19.5 million, this hope does not exist. For them, the political idea that Palacký has called the “Austrian State idea” still applies today. As independent states, they would be too weak to be able to effectively guarantee their national existence and their material interests. In any other state system they would be weaker than they are in an Austria populated by many peoples, in which no nation can dominate the others; for this reason, they require the continued existence of the monarchy.

However, the other nations, which make up the majority of the empire’s population, do not constitute a unified force capable of destroying the old monarchy. In the first place, certain interests oppose the disintegration of the empire. It is above all the industrial bourgeoisie that has a strong interest in the continued existence of the empire. In the course of two centuries, through a policy of protective tariffs, we have developed industry that is at present assured a market in the form of the monarchy. If protective tariffs were abolished, a part of the capital and the labor power in the branches of production in which German industry is superior to our own would be withdrawn and would have to be transferred to those branches of production offering more favorable conditions for Austrian industry. This would mean severe economic crises and the elimination of a great deal of value in terms of means of production and qualified labor power. If need be, the bourgeoisie will therefore certainly defend the continued existence of the empire, which is an ensured sphere of exploitation for it. Today, the fact that a manufacturer in German Bohemia may be “Pan-German” does not represent a danger since the continued existence of the empire is not seriously threatened. It is in fact useful for the manufacturer, since he hopes to draw the attention of the workers away from the class struggle by means of the nation-state agenda. At the moment, because it would seriously threaten the customs frontier with

the German Empire, the bourgeoisie would think very carefully before playing with the idea of the nation-state.

Just as the bourgeoisie becomes a defender of the monarchy by virtue of its class interest, so too do the clerical peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie assume this role by virtue of their class ideology. They cling to the empire with the unconsidered love of those cocooned in tradition. This attitude is reinforced by the influence of the Church, for which the disintegration of Austria represents the destruction of the last great Catholic power. To those 19.5 million members of nations with an interest in the continued existence of the monarchy are thus added the German bourgeoisie and the German clericals. Any objective consideration of the question of the collapse of the empire will therefore have to include the fact that at least half the population of the monarchy is definitely in favor of the continued existence of the empire.

It is on this fact that the military force of the empire is based. At least half of the Austro-Hungarian army will enthusiastically fight for the continued existence of the empire. At this point, one should recall the fact that modern militarism has realized, by means of its particular form of organization and education, how to make mindless machines out of living people, how to transform a popular army into an instrument of powers alien to the people. If half the population of the empire is prepared to fight for the monarchy, the cadres of our army can be considered reliable; with its support, those in power, through the force of example and rigorous discipline, will also force the others to engage in the struggle. No sensible person can doubt that, if the empire were forced to fight for its existence today, the German, Polish, Ruthenian, Serbian, and Romanian soldiers would also not refuse to obey.

There can be no doubt that the conflict between the two halves of the empire and the struggle of the nations within both states will in the future give rise to a series of severe crises that could provide the opportunity for foreign intervention. It is precisely for this reason that we regard as important our conclusion that the development of national autonomy can be envisaged only as an extremely painful and lengthy process. Furthermore, the organic regulation of national relations within the empire and the overcoming of dualism will proceed not from a growth of insight, but from harsh struggles that will render the present constitution unacceptable. Our conclusion shows that there will certainly be times when conditions within the monarchy will be such that foreign powers will see opportunities for intervention. But even our cursory examination of the internal forces on which the monarchy can count makes clear that the monarchy will not succumb as a result of these internal struggles. If it collapses, this will be a result not of being torn apart by the nations that inhabit it, but of intervention by some outside power. Only if a foreign power allied itself with the forces inside Austria that might strive for the collapse of the empire could the empire be destroyed. The Austrian nationalities question thereby becomes a question of European politics. The

question with which we now find ourselves confronted is thus as follows: are there forces outside the monarchy that have the intention and the strength to destroy the monarchy?

The first state to which we will turn our attention here is the Russian Empire. The idea is an old one that the monarchy constitutes a necessary counterbalance to Russian power and that it will fall apart as soon as the internal development of Russia destroys the old Czarist Empire. In April 1848, in his celebrated circular letter to the "Committee of 50" in Frankfurt, Palacký wrote: "Imagine Austria would dissolve into a mass of larger and smaller republics—what a welcome foundation for the universal Russian monarchy!"¹ Friedrich Engels was also of the opinion that the breakup of Austria would be disastrous "prior to the imminent victory of the revolution in Russia, following which it will become superfluous since the Austria that will then have been made superfluous will collapse of its own accord."²

Today, now that the Russian Revolution no longer merely represents the hope of the future, but instead constitutes the most significant event of our time, we are able to see its consequences for the continued existence of the monarchy more clearly than Engels could. The Russian Revolution, like the Austrian Revolution of 1848, is not only a social and political, but also a national, revolution. Russia is also a multinational state incorporating a large number of nations—historical nations such as the Great Russians, the Poles, the Germans, the Swedes and nonhistorical nations such as the Ruthenians, the Bielorrussians, the Lithuanians, the Latvians, the Estonians, and many others. The modern state and the penetration of capitalism have also awakened the nonhistorical nations of this gigantic empire to new life. Here too the contradiction between the changed national cultural and power relations and an ossified legal structure are pushing toward revolution.

The picture offered by the history of the Czechs in the first half of the nineteenth century is repeating itself today among all the nonhistorical nations of the great Russian Empire, although the difference here is that the nations have not been subjected to the same level of capitalist transformation and have therefore not attained an equally high level of national development. But there can be no doubt that all the nonhistorical nations of Russia, just as the nonhistorical nations of Austria have done before them, will awaken to new, independent cultural life. As it is doing everywhere, modern capitalism is bringing about an expansion of the cultural community, which means a cultural reawakening of those nations that are composed only of the exploited and enslaved classes of the society.

How quickly this process will proceed we do not know. It will be enormously accelerated if the revolution is able to break the power of the czar. And even if Russian absolutism should once again prove the master of democracy, it will no longer be the same as it was before those glorious days in October 1905—just as little as the absolutism of Bach is identical with the

absolutism of Metternich. Just as certain as the fact that the Russian Empire cannot continue to exist without capitalism is the fact that all the nations there are awakening to a new cultural existence. And just as certain as the fact that the psyche of all peoples is changed by capitalism is the fact that the subjugation of the nations by czarism will one day prove intolerable and impossible. Sooner or later, Russia too will become ripe for national autonomy.

Today, in the midst of the revolutionary events, it is not yet possible to discern which forms of the state will derive from this process of social development, which here assumes the form of a process of national development. We must consequently limit ourselves here to the discussion of the question as to what influence this great transformation will exert on the continued existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

In the first place, it is necessary to refute the widely held opinion that as soon as its nations are assured of the free development of their national cultures Russia will exert a powerful force of attraction on all the Slavic nations of the monarchy. This idea was formerly disseminated by the German bureaucracy and still is today by the Magyar gentry, who are frightening their rulers with the specter of Pan-Slavism in order to demonstrate that the enslavement of the Slavic nations is of vital interest to the monarchy. It is supported with childish demonstrations by Slavic politicians who play with the idea of breaking away from Austria in order to blackmail those in power into granting concessions to their nations. In reality, as long as the monarchy exists the danger is very small that Czechs, Slovenes, and Slovaks will ever experience a great desire to belong to the Russian Empire. Pan-Slavism was initially merely a means of enlivening the awakening national sentiment of the young Slavic nations in Austria. The unhappy situation of the Czech people in the 1830s and 1840s did not lend itself to the kindling of national sentiment. Thus, the image of a great Slavic nation was conjured up for the people. This character can be found, for example, in the idea of Pan-Slavism in the poetry of Kollár. However, the further the individual Slavic nations have progressed and the more they have become aware of their national specificity, of their distinctiveness in relation to other Slavic peoples, the more the illusion of a unified Slavic nation has paled before the reality of autonomous national life. Thus, among the Czechs, Havlíček already confronted the Pan-Slavic effusion with the self-assured words "*Čech, né Slovan*" (I feel myself to be a Czech, not a Slav).³ If the Czechs, whether in Austria or in a great German Empire, had no choice but to live under foreign rule by the Germans, they would certainly prefer membership in the Russian Empire to German rule. However, as long as the monarchy can maintain itself and the more it develops toward the realization of national autonomy, the Czechs will have no choice but to defend the continued existence of the monarchy. In no other state structure and in no form of Pan-Slavic empire could the Czechs be stronger than they are in Austria.

The monarchy thus does not have to fear the awakening of Pan-Slavism as a result of the victory of the Russian Revolution. But a quite different danger will confront it if the peoples of Russia win their freedom. The monarchy and Russia have two nations in common: the Poles and the Ruthenians. The moment these nations gain their freedom in Russia, we will be confronted with the question as to whether they are also prepared to take up the struggle for national unity.

The way in which the initial successes of the Russian Revolution have changed the relationship of the Ruthenians to Austria is indicative of this. As long as the Ukrainian nation did not see any hope of liberation in Russia, the Ruthenians constituted a strong support for Austrian power. So convinced were the rulers of their trustworthiness that they could completely abandon the national interests of the Ruthenians to the Poles without any fear of a Ruthenia irredenta. Today the situation is quite different. The awakening of the Ukrainian nation in Russia will without doubt also accelerate the revival of the Austrian Ruthenians. Should the Ukrainians in the Russian Empire win national rights, the rule of the Polish *szlachta* in eastern Galicia will no longer be tenable. Austria will then have to grant its Ruthenians national autonomy if it does not wish to have a nation hostile to the state on its constantly threatened eastern border.

In the meantime, the Ruthenian people have until now only relatively slowly traversed the path toward a new living national culture. Far earlier than the Ruthenian question, it is the Polish question that will confront Austria with a series of difficult problems. The foundations of a scholarly discussion of the Polish question have been laid by the commendable work of Rosa Luxemburg.⁴ She has shown that the Polish question has to be considered quite differently today from the way it was in 1831 or 1863. Anyone who studies the Polish question today will have to proceed from the fact of the extraordinarily rapid industrial development of the kingdom of Poland.

The development of large-scale industry occurred in the years from 1850 to 1870. The capitalist development of the country was accelerated by the elimination of the customs frontier between Russia and Poland in 1851, the development of the railway system from 1862 onward, and the abolition of serfdom in 1864. Since 1877, Polish industry has been favored by the tariff policies of the Russian government. These developments have constituted the foundation for the emergence of the kingdom's large industries: the textile industry in Lodz and its environs, coal and iron production in the Sosnowitz region, machinery construction and the sugar industry in the Warsaw region. Apart from the Saint Petersburg and Moscow industrial regions, Poland is today the most highly developed capitalist region of the Russian Empire.

Rosa Luxemburg has pointed to the fact that the interests of the Polish capitalist class oppose the separation of Poland from Russia. A very large part

of Polish industry works for Russian markets. According to an official inquiry, half of the products of Polish industry are intended for sale on the Russian market. In 1886, 141 of the biggest factories in the country are said to have sold 53 percent of their commodities in Russia. In 1898, the Polish textile industry is reported to have exported at least 50 percent of its products, to the value of 135 million rubles, to Russia. According to Zukowski, the iron-processing industries exported three-fifths of their production onto the Russian markets. This exportation of industrial products is matched by a considerable importation by Poland of foodstuffs and raw materials for industry from Russia. Were Poland to be separated from Russia by a customs frontier, this would mean the end of many enterprises, economic destruction for a large section of the capitalist class in Poland, and also a decrease in employment opportunities and an increase in the price of food for the workers. This leads to the conclusion that the separation of Poland from Russia is unthinkable while capitalist society continues to exist. The liberation of Poland from Russian domination would harm the interests of the capitalists and the workers, hinder the capitalist development of the country, and stop the broadening of the national cultural community. The Poles must therefore, it is said, abandon all hope of founding an independent nation-state in the era of capitalist society.

I regard this line of reasoning to be extremely important and remarkable. Nevertheless, there is a good deal more that scholarship has to say on the Polish question. It does not suffice to establish that classes have been created by capitalist development whose interests are opposed to the reestablishment of a Polish state within capitalist society. What should rather be investigated is how the intellectual being of the people, their opinions, desires, and ideas, have been altered by the changed conditions of production and how the changed mentality of the nation is changing the position of the masses on the question of the Polish nation-state. The politics of each class are determined not only by its class interests, but also by its particular class ideology, which is produced by the conditions of social existence.

Here too capitalist development has brought about the displacement of the masses from the countryside into the towns and industrial centers. In 1857, the kingdom of Poland had a population of 4,734,000, in 1897 a population of 9,457,000 inhabitants. During these forty years, the urban population grew from 1,130,600 to 2,978,000, that is, from 23.5 percent to 31.5 percent of the total population. But within the towns, it is the actual industrial centers that have grown the most rapidly as shown in table 6.1.⁵ A rapidly growing section of the population lives in the larger towns, the actual locations of Polish industry.

But at the same time, the composition of the urban population is also changing, as shown in table 6.2. Thus, already since 1880 the number of factory workers has been greater than that of artisans; today it is at least twice as

Table 6.1 Polish Towns of More than Ten Thousand Inhabitants and Their Populations, 1857–97

Year	Towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants	Number of inhabitants of these towns
1857	7	246,000
1872	15	524,000
1897	35	1,756,000

Source: Koszutski, *Rozwoj ekonomiczny krolestwa Polskiego*, 201.

Table 6.2 Composition of the Urban Population in Poland for Selected Years, 1855–1900

Year	Artisans (in thousands)	Factory workers (in thousands)
1855	85.9	56.4
1866	94.9	69.2
1880	104 to 110	121.8
1888	124	160 to 168
1900	130 to 140	300

Source: Koszutski, *Rozwoj ekonomiczny krolestwa Polskiego*, 201.

great. If we remember that among those counted here as artisans there are also many proletarians and others dependent on capital, we see that the proletarians are increasingly stamping their character on the towns and industrial regions.

How, then, do these social changes affect the position taken by the Polish people in relation to the demand for a Polish nation-state? In the first place, we are interested here in the position of the industrial working class on the Polish question. We have seen how the revolutionary mood gives rise to naive cosmopolitanism among the workers of the historical nations and naive nationalism among the workers of the nonhistorical nations. The Polish nation finds itself in a curious intermediate position. On the one hand, it is a historical nation, incorporating not only oppressed and exploited, but also ruling and exploiting classes, the Polish nobility, and, already today, the Polish bourgeoisie. On the other hand, however, the Polish nation is an enslaved nation that suffers under the yoke of Russian foreign rule. The contradictory position of the Polish workers on the national question is a result of this.

On the one hand, the Polish worker is conscious of his class opposition to the Polish nobility and the Polish upper bourgeoisie. Exploitation does not coincide here with foreign rule. Whereas the Czech worker labors for a German industrialist, the Polish worker confronts in his immediate class adversary a Pole—the large-scale landholder, and, already today, the industrialist. The nation-state ideal is initially manifested here as an ideal of the nobility and the bourgeoisie. The worker has nothing in common with these two

groups. On the other hand, he sees in the Russian, German, and Jewish workers comrades in suffering and struggle. The revolutionary instinct of the Polish worker thus leads him, like every worker of a historical nation, to naive cosmopolitanism.

However, on the other hand, the Polish nation lives under Russian foreign rule. The class state, which guarantees the system of exploitation and dispatches its police and soldiers against the workers engaged in struggle, takes the form of a foreign, Russian power. The revolutionary worker's desire for liberty produces the yearning to throw off the yoke of the foreign state. The revolutionary instinct of the Polish worker thus leads him, like every worker of an oppressed nation, to naive nationalism.

Two fundamentally determinant factors thus struggle with each other in the minds of the Polish workers. And it is the forming of each of these general determining factors—both of which arise from the revolutionary instinct of the working class—into a political agenda that has given rise to the two socialist workers' parties of Poland, the "Polish Socialist Party" (PPS) and the "Social Democratic Movement of the Kingdom of Poland" (SD). The contradictory sentiments of the Polish proletariat are reflected in the antagonism between the two socialist workers' parties. The internal contradiction inherent in the fact that the Poles are not a nonhistorical but a historical nation and nevertheless an oppressed nation is manifested in the conflict between the two parties.

It is foolish to see the split in Polish socialism as the personal fault of the comrades engaged in struggle and to deplore it as the product of "Marxist intolerance," as some say, or as the result of economic ignorance, as others say. Both the workers' parties in Poland have emerged equally necessarily in that each has become the expression of one of the contradictory sentiments of the Polish working class. But because each of these two sides of the consciousness of the Polish proletariat has been embodied in a particular party, this difference assumes a starkness that corresponds no longer to the character of proletarian consciousness, but to the doctrinairism of the intelligentsia. The Polish working class, for which czarism still makes education within a working organization impossible, requires, as does every young proletariat that has just awakened, the leadership of the socialist intelligentsia. But this intelligentsia has learned in a hard school. Excluded for decades from any direct practical influence and driven abroad by the thugs of the czar, it has acquired that peculiar doctrinairism that we know so well from our own history. The Polish intelligentsia has all the merits of the German rationalism of the forties. The passionate striving for knowledge, for the theoretical deepening of every problem, the salutary contempt for the narrow-mindedness of the bourgeois *Realpolitik* that is prepared at any moment to sell the great idea of the working class for a plate of lentils, and the fierce determination to engage in a struggle full of sacrifices once the correct goal has been recognized. But it also

has all the vices that accompany these virtues: the incapacity to unite all forces in pursuit of the nearest goal, the inclination to split the forces of the working class today in disputes over schools of thought that will be significant only for the resolutions of future decades, and the inclination to sacrifice the necessities of the class struggle for the sake of the critique of theoretical errors. The intelligentsia, in which the misery of exile, of enforced inactivity, has cultivated these virtues and vices, has now seized hold of the internal contradiction in the prevailing mood of the working class.

Only against this background can we explain those curious phenomena that are barely comprehensible to Western European workers. In an era when the power of czarism has not yet been broken, in which the fighters of the working class are incarcerated, shot, and hanged daily, the workers of Warsaw and Lodz are quarreling over whether the relationship between Russia and Poland should be regulated by the constitutive assembly in Saint Petersburg or by the constitutive provincial assembly in Warsaw, whether they should demand the eight-hour day from the Russian Duma or from the Polish assembly, whether Poland needs Russia's markets or not. At constant risk to life and liberty, meetings are held and newspapers and leaflets secretly printed that oppose not czarism or capitalism—but the opposing socialist party.

The Polish working masses, however, do not understand this struggle. The reports of both parties are in agreement that often enough the same workers applaud the speaker of the SD one day and the spokesman of the PPS the next. This is not, as the parties are wont to complain, due to the immaturity, to the still low level of schooling of the Polish proletariat. How could the individual worker comprehend the struggle of the parties when one gives expression to one side of his being just as well as the other does? It is rather the case that the immaturity of the Polish workers caused by capitalist exploitation and state oppression lies behind their inability to put an end to the fratricidal struggle that is diminishing the power of their class. But the more the proletariat is educated by the struggle itself, the faster the proletarian organizations grow, and the more the intelligentsia is forced to test the formulas finely honed in their former period of exile in the daily class struggle, the stronger becomes the need of the Polish proletariat for a unified class politics. The emergence of the "new course" within the PPS was, although it may have initially led to further divisions, certainly a clear sign of the strengthening of the movement for unity in the Polish working class.

The primary aim of this unified proletarian policy in relation to the national question can be nothing other than the autonomy of Poland within the framework of the Russian Empire. This autonomy has become necessary due to the cultural development of the Polish nation under the influence of capitalism. Here too the development of capitalism has a tendency to widen the cultural community. The Polish worker is linked to the nation by bonds that are quite different from those that linked the Polish peasant to the nation in

1863. And the Polish peasant is also being gradually incorporated into the nation. The progress of the medium-sized property at the expense of the small proprietor and the *szlachta* over recent years will here too form the foundation of the capitalist reorganization of agriculture, of the close integration of the peasant into commodity production, of the transition to more intensive cultivation. Even though the peasant in Russian Poland today can hardly be regarded as a modern farmer in the Western European sense, capitalist development will undoubtedly create the modern farmer here as well. The circle of fellow nationals is thus being extended here, too, as it is among all capitalist nations, on the one hand due to the fact that the sons of peasantry are becoming workers and, on the other, due to changes to the nature of the peasant economy, and thereby to the psychology of the peasantry as well. However, it is as a result of this that the effects of national oppression are for the first time becoming visible to the popular masses.

It is now no longer the nobility alone, but also the great mass of the people, that have an interest in the development of the national culture and in establishing a national education system. At the same time, the self-awareness of the great mass of the people is also increasing. Hating all oppression, they will now tolerate least of all oppression in its most visible form, that of foreign rule. The struggle for the rights of the Polish language has now become their national struggle. The Polish socialists must themselves become the spokesmen for these demands, which, although once only the demands of the nobility, have now also become, through the extension of the cultural community and the increase in the self-awareness of the masses as a consequence of capitalist development, the demands of the workers. Were they not to do this, the national-bourgeois parties would give the workers a place within their ranks. A socialist party that does not want to make itself the spokesman for the national demands issuing from the class situation of the working class would be neglecting its first duty: the constitution of the working class as an independent political party. However, if the Polish socialists want to ensure for their nation the unrestricted development of their national culture, they can do so not through an atomist-centralist constitution on the Austrian model, but only through national autonomy. Like the workers of all the nations in Austria, the Polish workers in Russia will also initially have to fight for national autonomy.

The very diverse cultural levels of the individual parts of the Russian Empire are also forcing the Polish workers into the struggle for national autonomy. The social composition of Poland is fundamentally different from that of the other parts of the empire that have a low level of capitalist development. Were the whole Russian Empire to form a unified administrative region, the Poles would be inhibited by the weight of the great peasant masses of the empire and would be artificially maintained at a lower cultural level than that corresponding to their own economic development. It is precisely the fact

that Poland is more advanced in capitalist terms than most other parts of the Russian Empire that is becoming the driving force of the struggle for Poland's autonomy.

It is not our task to inquire into the question of which constitutional forms could satisfy this need of the Polish workers for national autonomy. We are interested rather in the question of whether we can regard national autonomy as the final result of Polish development within capitalist society or whether this development will push still further to the complete separation of Poland from Russia.

Let us first assume that the Polish workers manage to gain national autonomy within the Russian Empire. If this were the case, the development of Russian Poland would hardly raise the Polish question in the context of capitalist society. The needs of the class ideology of the workers and peasants would be satisfied; class interests would prevent the bourgeoisie and the working class from completely severing the ties still linking Poland with Russia. The dream of Polish unity would still not be forgotten, just as the Germans of Austria have not forgotten the Great German idea. But it would initially lose its immediate political force in Russian Poland. The center of gravity of the Polish question would lie not in Russian Poland, but in Prussian Poland. The day the Russian Empire has to grant the Poles national self-administration, the oppression of the Poles in Prussia will no longer be tolerable. Perhaps no one understood this as early as Bismarck, who in 1863 already opposed the pro-Poland party in Saint Petersburg because he had already recognized by then the danger for Prussia that lay in peace between Russia and Poland. On the day after the realization of national autonomy in Russia, the Polish question will essentially be no longer a question of the internal development of Russia, but a question of the internal development of Prussia. What form this development will take we do not know. It is certainly not inconceivable that in the context of a great world war in which Germany would become involved as a result of its imperialist policies, a Polish rebellion would emerge, dragging in its wake large sections of the populations in the Polish parts of the Russian Empire and Austria. At present no one can say whether this will happen, whether at such a moment of warlike upheaval the Poles will also have the possibility of creating a national unified state. This can be decided just as little by intellectually stimulating essays on the theme of the necessary aspiration of every state toward an independent state existence as it can by penetrating economic analyses of the class interests of the bourgeoisie in Russian Poland.

It will be quite a different matter if the Polish workers in Russia do not manage to gain national autonomy. The struggle of the Polish people for national autonomy will not then come to an end. It may be possible to contain the Polish workers for a few years with prisons and gallows, but their struggle will always come to life again. The contradiction between an intolerable

constitution and the cultural development of the nation pushes repeatedly toward revolution. But where this struggle for national autonomy will lead, no one can say. Through struggle the masses make the idea of national liberty their own. It may be the case that at a favorable point in time they gain national freedom within the framework of Russia. But who can deny that they could well come to despair of winning their freedom in Russia and that, at a suitable moment, perhaps again in a time of war, they may seek the conclusive answer to both the question of national freedom and that of national unity with weapons in their hands? At such a moment, the proletariat will not consider whether it needs the Russian markets; the class ideology developed over decades of struggle will be at this point in time stronger than all sober consideration of class interest. And if Polish peasants and Polish workers, despairing of Russian democracy, were once again to risk the bloody struggle for the freedom of Poland, even the resistance of the bourgeoisie would be fruitless. During a revolution borne by the proletariat, no bourgeoisie can dare to oppose the all-powerful ideology of the entire nation.

For Austria, the Russian Revolution is above all a Polish question. These considerations thus show that the opinion of Engels that Austria will collapse under its own weight following the victory of democracy in Russia is not tenable. If Russian democracy triumphs and national autonomy is realized within the Russian Empire, Austria will have to accelerate its own development toward national autonomy for the sake of its own Poles and Ruthenians. A new force will then add itself to the tendencies with which we are already familiar and that are leading toward the organic regulation of national relations within Austria. However, in this case, a Polish rebellion can ignite no longer in Russia, but only in Prussia. If one imagines a scenario in which the collapse of Austria is initiated by an uprising of Austria's Poles, this threat will come not from the Russian Revolution, but from a Prussian revolution. The situation will be different if the revolution in Russia is defeated. The struggle of the Polish people in Russia could then turn into a national revolution, which could possibly spread to Austria. The continued existence of the monarchy is thus threatened not by the victory, but by the defeat of the Russian Revolution. However, even in this case, this threat will emerge only if a particular constellation of world politics makes a Polish uprising conceivable.

To be sure, one frequently encounters other conceptions. In Austria certain politicians play with the idea of placing the Polish question in the service of Austrian policy, as was advocated by some diplomats during the Crimean War and during the Polish uprising of 1863. Some Polish politicians are placing their hopes in Austria's declaring war on Russia during a Polish uprising, liberating Poland, and unifying it with Galicia to form a Polish kingdom ruled by an Austrian archduke. In this case, the Polish question would thus not only not initiate the dissolution of the Danubian empire, but would, on the contrary, considerably supplement its power. I regard this plan, sometimes still delighted in by Austrian patriots and Polish revolutionaries, to be com-

pletely pointless. In the first place, one must not forget that, as we know, the monarchy still faces harsh struggles between the two halves of the empire and between the individual nations before it will be able to implement national autonomy. Thus, the internal situation hardly permits it such a bold foreign policy. One must also not forget the strength of dynastic solidarity, which would hardly allow the Habsburgs to ally themselves with the Polish and Russian Revolution. We must also have a clear understanding of the fact that were Austria to want to reestablish an independent Poland, it would undoubtedly face an adversary not only in Russia, but also in the German Empire. At the same time, the moment would come for Italy to address the question of the ownership of Albania and Trentino. Thus, if Russia and Austria were locked in conflict, war in the Balkans would also ignite. And how would all this affect the nations of Austria? Would the Germans willingly enter a war that was directly or indirectly also a war against the German Empire? Would the Southern Slavs let their troops be sent in against the Slavic Balkan states? It may be highly lamentable that we cannot hope that Austria will place its sword in the service of the revolution in the Russian Empire. But it has to be said that we must abandon this hope once and for all, since, incomprehensibly, otherwise level-headed politicians are still pinning their hopes on this dream.

The other contingency, still mentioned on occasion, is not much more probable: that Russia will liberate its Poles, conquer Galicia, and then form a Polish kingdom out of Russian Poland and Galicia. The Russian government is known to have entertained this plan in the 1870s—prior to the Russo-Turkish war. But this course is not practicable for Russia before it grants its Poles autonomy and satisfies the desire for freedom among its own peoples at least to some degree. Today, this path could certainly be taken not by an absolutist Russia, but only by a Russia that was, if not already democratic, then at least constitutional. However, a constitutional Russia will surely be occupied for some time with concerns quite different from that of a war with Austria. Apart from anything else, Russia's financial problems constitute a barrier to such a policy. And for Russia, too, this policy would not be free of danger; without doubt, it would have to conduct this war not only against Austria, but also against the German Empire. However, as improbable as the idea may sound today that the Russian Empire will have its army corps go to war in order to realize Poland's liberty and unity, it is far more plausible than the hope held by some Poles of an Austrian intervention on their behalf. But for such a Russian policy, the liberation of the Poles and Ruthenians living in Austria would certainly constitute not an end, but a means. Its aim would be to inflame the passions of the people with the agenda of national freedom in order to drive the people into a war of conquest. One would talk of the Poles and Ruthenians and mean Constantinople and Salonika. It is thus clear that such a policy would entail not the old principle

of nationality we have discussed, but a completely new one, issuing from other forces and serving other ends.

A defeat of the Russian Revolution could transform the struggle for autonomy by the Poles within the Russian Empire into a revolution for complete liberty and unity given that there is a prevailing constellation in world politics that promises victory to a new Polish uprising. A victorious Russian Revolution would make the Polish question above all into a Prussian question. A Polish rebellion would still remain possible, but only—as long as capitalist-militaristic rule prevails in Prussia—in the moment during which the forces of the German Empire are tied down by the intrigues of world politics. Finally, it is conceivable that in the distant future a democratic or constitutional Russia will undertake a war against Austria in order to separate the Poles and the Ruthenians from the monarchy. However, this too would be possible only if Russia were to avail itself of the Polish and Ukrainian question in order to give a war of capitalist expansion the appearance of a war of national liberation. The Russian Revolution in the context of bourgeois society is thus not yet pushing toward the separation of Austrian Poles and Ruthenians from Austria; in itself, it will thus also not lead, as Engels argued, to the collapse of Austria, toward which the separation of Galicia would perhaps constitute the first step. The Russian Revolution does not in itself represent a threat to the continued existence of the monarchy; this will be the case only if the tensions in the east are resolved by a great upheaval at the level of world politics. It is neither the Polish nor the Ruthenian question that will tear Austria apart; it is rather the case that the Polish and Ukrainian question will be resolved when Austria is torn apart, torn apart by the upheaval made possible by the policies of capitalist expansionism.

We thus find ourselves faced with a new task. We must examine the essence of modern imperialist politics and thereby the essence of modern foreign policy in general. Here we can of course contribute only a brief sketch to this difficult investigation. Nevertheless, it will become clear that this investigation is worth the effort. By inquiring into the roots of modern foreign policy, by uncovering the internal social antagonisms that give rise to it, we will at the same time show how the foreign policies of the highly developed capitalist states give a new meaning to the principle of nationality. By raising this question, we will see to what extent capitalist society is generally capable of realizing the principle of nationality, of satisfying the needs of the nations for an independent state. Only on this basis can the socialist nationalities policy be completely defined.

THE ROOTS OF CAPITALIST EXPANSIONISM

The foreign policy of modern capitalist states always serves economic policy interests. Foreign policy seeks to promote concrete economic interests by

bringing the weight of state power to bear. Since the power of the state is an indispensable instrument for the attainment of the ultimate goal of foreign policy, it can readily come to pass that, over a period of several decades, states perceive no other political goal than that of maintaining or improving the balance of power between themselves and other states and that, over decades, there is consequently no mention of the fact that the desired balance of power constitutes merely a tool of economic policy objectives. An example of aspirations toward political power temporarily becoming independent of their economic policy foundations is offered by the era, now partially obscured by subsequent historical events, in which the system of European equilibrium appeared to be the sole objective of all foreign policy. However, now that the problems of a small Europe have paled in the face of the great issues of world politics, it is again being revealed, even more clearly than in the past, that the power aspirations of the capitalist states always harbor economic policy aspirations.

The economic policies of the capitalist states always serve the objective of ensuring capital spheres of investment and markets. In the capitalist economy of a country, a portion of the monetary capital of the society is always removed from the circulation of industrial capital. To be sure, this released monetary capital flows into the banks and is from there guided into the sphere of production again. But a period of time always passes before the monetary capital removed from one part of the social production process is employed in another part of the social production process to purchase instruments of labor and labor power. Thus, at any one time a portion of the monetary capital of the society is brought to a standstill and lies fallow.

If a great deal of monetary capital is brought to a standstill, the reflux of the released fragments of capital into the sphere of production proceeds only slowly, and the demand for means of production and labor power sinks. This means an immediate fall in prices and profits in the industries producing the means of production, a hindering of the trade union struggle, and a reduction in wages. However, both phenomena also have an effect on those industries that produce consumer goods. The demand for goods that directly serve human consumption sinks because, on the one hand, the capitalists who draw their income from industries producing the instruments of labor realize lower profits and because, on the other, higher unemployment and falling wages diminish the spending power of the working class. Prices, profits, and wages thereby also decrease in the consumer goods industries; thus, the removal of a large part of the monetary capital from the circulation of capital results in falling prices, profits, and wages and increased unemployment throughout industry as a whole.

However, once established, this movement itself engenders forces that decrease the income of the capitalists as well as that of the workers still further. For, if the possibilities of sale diminish for all goods, the turnover time for

capital increases; it takes a long time for finished products to find buyers and thereby to change into money again for the capitalists. The greater part of the total social capital thereby assumes the form of commodity capital, whereas the lesser part has the form of productive capital. Put in another way, within the turnover time for capital, the production time constitutes the lesser part, the circulation time the greater part.⁶ The prolongation of the turnover time for capital results in the same capital's being converted less often, in its setting a smaller number of hands in motion and therefore producing less value, and, given a constant rate of surplus value and an unchanged degree of exploitation of the workers, its producing a smaller quantity of surplus value; thus, the rate of profit sinks. The demand for labor power is hereby also diminished—for it is only productive capital and not commodity capital that purchases labor power; it is only during production time, not during circulation time, that capital requires human labor power.

Every change in the relationship between unproductive capital and invested capital, between productive capital and capital in circulation, between production time and circulation time thus completely transforms the face of capitalist society. Labor is the creator of all value. However, capitalist society temporarily reduces the quantity of labor executed in the society by leaving capital fallow instead of using it to purchase labor power. It accumulates unproductive capital on the one side and an army of the unemployed on the other. It is temporarily unable to provide the unemployed with work because it leaves its capital lying fallow; and it cannot utilize its capital because it leaves people idle who are capable of and willing to work, shuts them out of the production process and thereby out of the circulation process. In that it deprives them of the goods of this world, it denies itself the possibility of increasing its wealth.⁷

This insight is very important for our purposes, since only now are we in a position to understand the goals of capitalist economic policy. It strives to acquire spheres of investment for capital and markets for its commodities. We can now see that these are not separate tasks, but in fact one and the same task. If I open a sphere of investment to unproductive capital, tempting it into the sphere of production with the prospect of additional profits, I bring about commodity sales. For it is not unproductive monetary capital, but productive capital, which purchases goods. In the first place, it purchases instruments of labor and labor power; it provides workers with employment and thereby increases the demand for consumer commodities; it grants its owner surplus value, thereby increasing his spending power and further increasing the demand for commodities. If I open up spheres of investment to capital, I thereby provide commodities with a new market. And inversely, if I open up a new market for commodities, the turnover time of capital is shortened, profits increase, an increased demand emerges for disposable capital, and unproductive capital flows into the sphere of production. If I open

up a new market for commodities, I also create new spheres of investment for capital.

Protective tariffs constitute an important means to this end. If a tariff is to protect an existing industry against foreign competition, its immediate aim will be the safeguarding of commodity sales. However, in this case it also indirectly constitutes a safeguard for the sphere of investment for capital; if local industry were to be defeated on the market by its foreign competition and lose its market, a part of the capital invested would necessarily flow out of the threatened industry and the quantity of unproductive capital would increase. Thus, if a tariff is to protect an existing industry, its immediate goal will be the safeguarding of the market and its indirect goal the safeguarding of the sphere of investment for capital. The inverse applies if a protective tariff is to provide the basis for the creation of a new industry in the country. In this case, capital is lured into the production sphere by the prospect of high additional profits. And once a part of the capital rendered unproductive has found a productive area of investment, this results in a growth in demand on the commodity market, in a direct growth in the demand for instruments of labor, and finally also, since the purchasing power of both the capitalists and the workers has increased, in a growth in the demand for consumer goods. The protective tariff thus always serves the development of spheres of investment as well as the safeguarding of markets; its ultimate objective is to better structure the relationship between unproductive and productive capital, between the production time and the circulation time of capital.

At the stage of capitalist development which the states in the European cultural sphere have reached in the last two decades, tariff protection changes its function considerably.⁸ Modern tariff protection is in the first place tariff protection of cartels. It aims to enable the capitalist of the economic zone, protected against foreign competition by tariffs, to form a cartel. As soon as this has been achieved, the tasks of tariff protection expand again. It has no longer the function of protecting the local market against foreign competition, but that of promoting exports, of supporting the struggle for the world market. Let us attempt to comprehend this curious phenomenon.

Let us imagine a trust that, shielded by a wall of tariffs, completely controls the market in one country. How will such a trust fix the prices of its commodities? It will sell the commodities not at the highest price attainable, but rather at that price at which it makes the highest profit. The profit that it makes on 100 kilograms of its commodity is equal to the difference between the price of the 100 kilograms and the cost of the production of the 100 kilograms of the commodity. The total profit is thus equal to the product of the quantity of the commodities sold and the difference between the price and the cost of the unit of weight. If we call the number of units of weight sold q , the price of the unit of weight p , the cost of the unit of weight c , the total profit P , then $P = q(p - c)$. The higher the price of the unit of weight, the

smaller becomes the quantity of commodities sold; and the smaller the quantity of commodities that can be produced, the higher the cost of each unit of weight. The greater p is, the smaller becomes q , but the more c rises. The trust will thus seek to set the price p such that the product of $q(p - c)$ is as great as possible. It cannot set p too high, since the diminution of q and the increase of c will reduce its profit. But also not too low, since in the case of a low price for the unit of weight, the profit per unit of weight is also low and therefore, despite the increasing quantity of commodities sold, the volume of profit will not be high enough.

If we imagine, instead of a trust, a cartel composed of independent enterprises, the determination of price is much more complex. Here, the larger factories with modern equipment, for example, will want to fix the price at a lower level, because, with a lower price, they can rapidly increase the quantity of commodities sold, can rapidly reduce the costs of production, and thus, a price that is not too high will mean a very high product of $q(p - c)$ for them. On the other hand, smaller or technically backward factories will press for a high cartel price, because they are unable to substantially increase their production or to reduce their costs to any great degree and can thus increase their profit only by way of a high price per unit of weight. As a result, a struggle of interests emerges within the cartel in regard to the fixing of prices; the fixed price is a result of power struggles. The cartel price is here a resultant of pressures exerted by the individual enterprises in regard to the determination of prices, whereby the pressure exerted by each individual enterprise is oriented to fixing p such that the product of $q(p - c)$ it realizes is as high as possible. Thus, the cartel is also confronted with the problem of how it can keep the price as high as possible without reducing sales and increasing costs.

The cartel solves this problem by selling its commodities at a lower price abroad than at home. Let us assume that the cartel resolves to sell its products abroad at cost. It does not then realize any profit abroad. However, sales abroad enable it to produce on a large scale, with the result that its costs per unit of weight sink. This makes it possible to maintain prices at home at a higher level. For, as we know, the raising of prices is always in conflict with the consideration of the quantity of sales, on the one hand, and the consideration of the costs of production, on the other. As soon as it is possible to maintain the costs of production at a low level through cheap sales abroad, although the domestic price is high and the saleable quantity of commodities therefore relatively small, one of the two factors restricting price increases—namely, the consideration of production costs—no longer applies. Only the consideration of the quantity of commodities that can be sold at a high price at home remains. Cheap sales abroad thus permit the fixing of the domestic price at a higher level than would otherwise be the case while at the same time suppressing costs. Cheap sales abroad thus constitute a means of increasing profits on the domestic market. This practice is naturally even more

advantageous when it is possible to sell the commodities sold abroad at a profit, too, even if this is a smaller one than at home. However, if the expansion of production rapidly reduces costs, it is even advantageous for the cartel to sell below cost, since the losses on the foreign market are more than adequately balanced by the higher profits at home that this export practice makes possible.

These considerations everywhere lead the cartels protected by tariffs to sell more cheaply on the foreign market than on the domestic market. This practice is less significant in times of a favorable business climate; on the other hand, it assumes an ever-increasing relevance in times of depression. Should an economic crisis develop, a cartel restricted to the domestic market will have to reduce its prices. Far too few commodities can be sold at the high prices of the boom period, the low volume of production will also increase costs, and the profit of the enterprises in the cartel will thereby be reduced. The possibility of selling more cheaply abroad prevents a reduction in the prices set by the cartel at home: the cartel sells off a part of its product at a low price abroad and is thereby able to continue to produce on a large scale, with the result that its costs do not increase. This enables it to maintain its prices at home almost at boom levels without any substantial increase in costs. Radically cutting the price of exports, the infamous practice of "dumping," thus constitutes an unavoidable tool of the prices policy employed by the cartels protected by tariffs.

This prices policy also appears useful to the economy as a whole when one examines the relationship between unproductive and productively invested capital. Selling abroad at a low price creates a market for production and an outlet for the economy's commodities; production can take place on a large scale, and capital thus remains tied to the sphere of production. Selling abroad at a low price thus also means a sphere of investment for domestic capital. The diminution of unproductive capital here, however, means, as it does everywhere, an increased demand for all commodities, including labor power, and thus higher profits, prices, and wages. We thus arrive at the unexpected result that it is advantageous for the entire economy if we sell our coal, our iron, and our sugar abroad at a lower price than that paid by the domestic consumer.

This fact is now acquiring an enormous importance in terms of the world economy. In the states that already have tariff protection there is no longer any talk of reducing tariffs. The most powerful capitalist groups, the capital united in the large cartels, and the large banks that dominate these cartels now have a substantially greater interest in tariff protection than before. The victims of this prices policy, however, are the free trade countries. The price of steel in England, and therefore also the conditions of competition in the English steel industry, depend no longer at all on internal production conditions, but on whether the American steel trust or the German steelworks association

finds it necessary to sell its commodities at a lower price on the world market in order to increase its profit on the domestic market, which is protected by tariffs. In England, this means rapid and sudden changes to the prices of iron and steel, rapid changes to the conditions of competition in English industry, and the wiping out of considerable sums. The tendency to establish protective tariffs is thus also emerging in the free trade countries—in the first place, to protect the domestic market against the effects of foreign cut-price exports, but also to provide local capitalists with the possibility of uniting in a cartel and themselves utilizing the instrument of cut-price exports on the world market to increase their profits.

Competition on the world market is thus becoming increasingly bitter; the shifts in the conditions of competition occur suddenly, in fits and starts. As a result, every economic zone seeks to secure for itself sales areas on the world market that are shielded from this competitive struggle. The inherent tendency of capitalism toward continual expansion, to continually strive to open up new sales areas and spheres of investment, thereby gains new strength. The instruments of state power are placed at the service of this tendency in different ways, from the formal integration of colonies into the local customs area to "*pénétration pacifique*."

It is in the first place the instruments of military power that are placed at the service of these aspirations. The army and navy protect, on the one hand, local capital against the peoples whose territory is subject to exploitation by the capital of the highly developed capitalist nations; the army and navy protect, on the other hand, the dominant capitalist country against the competition of the other capitalist countries. Protected by the instruments of state power, the capital of the dominant country in the first place flows into these colonial territories. There it builds railways, roads, and canals, establishes banks and commercial companies, opens mines, and grants credit for agricultural production in these countries. This means at the same time the opening of new sales outlets; for it goes without saying that, for example, English capital that has been invested in Egypt in the first place buys English commodities: English rails, railway wagons and locomotives, machinery, and so forth.

This opening up of new sales outlets, in turn, means new spheres of investment for capital. If the English iron, machinery, and railway wagon industries are supported by exports to the colonial territories, new quantities of monetary capital are invested in these industries in England itself. The expansion of the production apparatus of these industries, the increase in the number of employees, the growth of their profits also increases sales of the commodities produced by other English industries at home, thus also creating greater employment opportunities in other industries and new spheres of investment for capital there. The subjection of economically backward countries to exploitation by the capitalist class of a European country has two series of effects: in direct terms, spheres of investment for capital in the colo-

nized country and thereby increased sales opportunities for the industry of the colonizing country; in indirect terms, new spheres of investment for capital also in the colonizing land itself and increased sales opportunities for all industries. The quantity of capital brought to a standstill in the country at any one moment is thereby reduced; prices, profits, and wages rise in the country, and capitalist expansionism thus also appears to be in the general economic interest.

However, this policy has a further significance. The rate of profit in the less developed countries that are the object of the expansionist policy of capitalism is initially higher than in Europe. Now, capitalist competition always strives to equalize rates of profit; capital always flows to where the rate of profit is highest. In Europe, this equalizing of profits has become possible only since the creation—through the establishment of administrative and legal structures—of large economic zones within which capital enjoys freedom of movement. Through the agency of modern armies and navies, the legal conditions are being created in the countries not yet subjected to capitalism to enable capital to seek spheres of investment there, too. In this manner, the entire globe is being subjected to the tendency to equalize rates of profit. That which has been brought about by the establishment of legal and administrative structures within the lands of Europe is now being created everywhere by modern militarism and navalism.⁹ The navies of the European states are, as it were, a world police force, creating everywhere the legal conditions to enable European capital to seek investment there. Capitalist expansionism thus appears here, too, to serve the interests of the entire population of the dominant capitalist country. Since the rate of profit in the subjugated countries in foreign parts of the globe is higher than in the highly developed capitalist regions of Europe, larger sums of surplus value annually flow from there to European capital than it could ever have appropriated if it had been invested within its own country in Europe. The wealth of the European nations is thus substantially increased through this expansionism.

We can now also understand the claim incessantly repeated by the friends of expansionism that the capitalist countries of the European cultural sphere need expansionism because they would otherwise be unable to feed the growing populations inhabiting their confined area of land. When the colonized country hands over the surplus value destined for the colonizing country in the form of foodstuffs and consumer goods, when it, for example, exports grain, meat, coffee, cotton, and spices to the colonizing country, this is immediately understandable. Expansionist policy here directly increases the wealth of the colonizing capitalist country in terms of those goods that serve to feed and clothe the bulk of the population. But even when the subjugated country does not produce any such goods, expansionism nevertheless appears directly to serve the same goal. For it increases the wealth of the colonizing country in terms of disposable value, thereby strengthening its spending

power and allowing it to buy from other countries those goods that it requires to feed its population.

Only now can we comprehend the overall significance of capitalist expansionism. The aspiration to new spheres of investment and new markets is as old as capitalism itself; it existed in the capitalist city republics of Italy during the Renaissance just as it does in England and in Germany today. But the force of this tendency has grown enormously in recent decades. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that the advanced concentration of industrial capital, the formation of modern cartels and trusts, has transformed tariff protection from a means of defense into a means of attack, thereby intensifying and embittering competition on the world market enormously. On the other hand, it is due to the fact that the concentration of capital in the modern major banks has progressed to a massive extent. The banks quite directly perceive the relationship of unproductive to invested capital, the constitution of the turnover time of capital in the movement of the interest rate; they quite consciously make a more favorable structuring of this relationship the goal of all economic policy. As the largest contributors to taxation, the largest state creditors, as masters of the most influential branches of industry, they can easily impose their will. But it is also they who first make expansionism possible in that, thanks to the quantity of capital available to them at any one moment, they are able to plan and direct the emigration of capital into the subjugated regions. The force of modern capitalist expansionism is rooted in those changes to the forces of production that find their expression in the centralization of capital—in the centralization of industrial capital in the cartels and trusts, in the centralization of monetary capital in the modern major banks.

Supporters of capitalist expansionism accuse the working class, which opposes this policy everywhere, of being incapable of recognizing its true interest. The opening up of new sales outlets and new spheres of investment for capital, it is argued, also increases the demand for labor power, thus favoring the interests of the working class. When the workers struggle against modern imperialism, it is said that they do so not because this policy contradicts their class interest, but because they are allowing themselves to be dominated by the ideology of a bygone epoch. And this ideology, it is said, is not even proletarian, but bourgeois: it is the mental universe of the old Manchester liberalism, which is bourgeois and hostile to the workers. Only those accustomed to seeing merely the technique, the means, and not the objectives of the political-economic system can confuse the struggle of the working class against imperialism with the struggle of the liberals against mercantilism. If we consider the objectives, we recognize that it is rather the modern capitalist policy of expansionism itself that is the heir of the old liberalism.

When free trade triumphed in England, England was by far the most highly developed industrial state in the world. The dismantling of the cus-

toms borders was seen as promoting English exports and opening up new sales outlets for English capital. But it was also seen as allowing English capital to invest abroad, and it has in fact done this to no small extent. New sales outlets and new spheres of investment, a more rapid flow of unproductive monetary capital into the sphere of production, an extension of production time within the social turnover time of capital, a balancing of rates of profit on an international level, an increase in the value flowing to English capital through investment abroad—all these constituted the objectives that England sought to achieve through the establishment of free trade. The objectives have remained the same, only the means have changed. Since then, the other states have developed their industry behind a protective wall of tariffs. The original educational tariff has ultimately become a tariff protecting the cartel. The aim of the tariff is no longer to keep English commodities out of the domestic market, but has instead become a means of combating English commodities on the British market itself and on the world market. Wherever English capital seeks sales outlets, wherever it seeks spheres of investment, it encounters the competition of the other capitalist states. Thus, like every other state, England must today take other paths in order to reach its old objective.

The old system of English free trade was cosmopolitan. It tore down customs borders, aiming to unite the world in a single economic zone. The international division of labor was seen as uniting all peoples; it was to be no longer bloody armed quarrel, but rather peaceful competition through which the peoples were to test their strength on each other.¹⁰ This system was quite different from modern imperialism. Modern imperialism does not want to form a unified economic zone that includes all countries, but rather encloses the economic zone of the individual country within a customs border. It opens up the less developed countries and secures spheres of investment and sales areas there for the capitalists of its own country and excludes the capitalists of other countries. It does not dream of freedom, but prepares for war. It does not believe in the possibility of uniting the whole of humanity in free and peaceful exchange and competition, but seeks to help its own land at the cost of the others by arming itself with tariffs, with navies, and with soldiers against the other countries. And the interests it defends appear to it, as we have seen, to be the necessary interests of the entire economy and the entire state, interests that in the nation-states of the West are national interests. The political-economic objectives have not changed since the days of Cobden and Bright; but through the change in the instruments of capitalist economic policy, the cosmopolitan liberals have become national imperialists.¹¹

Yet it was precisely cosmopolitan liberalism that inscribed the principle of nationality on its banner. It was precisely this doctrine that wanted state independence for the Greeks, the peoples of South America, the Italians, and the Magyars. This is hardly any wonder, since every land that cast off the shackles

of absolutist and feudal servitude became a market for its commodities, a sphere of investment for its capital. The English liberals thus enthused, as Grillparzer spitefully mocked, with an enraptured expression “about the liberty of the lands, those—without factories.”¹² In this case, too, we are confronted with a completely changed picture: today, that which assures the capitalism of the developed industrial states of sales outlets and spheres of investment is no longer the freedom, but merely the subjugation, of less developed regions. The ideal of modern capitalism is therefore no longer the nation-state, but the multinational state, but a multinational state in which only the citizenry of the dominant state commands and exploits while the other peoples are left at its mercy. Its model is no longer the English nation-state, but the British world empire.

These changes become all the more significant when, along with the methods of capitalist expansion, the whole ideology of the capitalist class changes. The liberal bourgeoisie, which struggled against absolutist oppression, against feudal exploitation, against mercantilist constraint, loved liberty. It made the maxim of its action, determined by its class needs, a general law in promising the nations the liberty it won for the citizens. The modern bourgeoisie is different. It fears the working class of its own country and is determined to defend its property and its power, with force if necessary. The instruments of power that, as an oppressed class, it hated have become very dear to it, since they have come to support its own domination. It now regards liberty as a childish dream, the will to power as a moral duty. And this mentality, which already flows from the consciousness of the class antagonism within the nations, is being enormously strengthened by the daily practice of capitalist expansionism. Intoxicated by the riches pouring out of the colonies into its coffers, the bourgeoisie mocks the moral ideals of its past. Politically subjugating millions, robbing them of their lands, overworking them excessively—it thinks of this merely as the right, even as the duty of the “superior culture,” of the “superior race.” This is the mentality painted in Kipling’s gloriously colorful poetry, which expresses itself in the speeches of a Cecil Rhodes, of a Joseph Chamberlain, which professes enthusiasm for the powerful, independent personalities of the Renaissance, which recasts world history as the drama of the “racial struggle.”¹³ In this soil, the ideal of the unity and liberty of the nations withers. The domination by a capitalist master nation of millions of the subjugated is the ideal of the state of mature capitalism.

We thus already see here, if only in broad outline, how the old bourgeois principle of nationality is supplanted by a new imperialist-nationalist principle of state formation. It is no longer the liberty, unity, and state independence of each nation that is the ideal of late capitalism, but the subjugation of millions of members of foreign peoples to the rule of one’s own nation. No longer are the nations to vie peacefully with one another in the free exchange

of commodities, but instead each nation is to arm itself to the teeth in order to be able to maintain its oppression of the subjugated peoples at all times and to keep foreign rivals away from its own sphere of exploitation. This complete transformation of the principle of state formation within capitalist society ultimately springs from the fact that, with the concentration of capital, the methods of capitalist economic policy have changed.

If we wish to fully understand this new position of the capitalist class in relation to the principle of nationality, we must dispel the illusion that capitalist expansionism serves a unified interest of the entire economy and the entire state. We have to demonstrate how it is precisely capitalist expansionism that creates antagonisms within the nation, how the struggle over imperialism becomes a class struggle. Only then will we understand how the class antagonism within the nation pushes toward the external antagonism of the nations in their relations with one another, toward the domination by one nation of the other peoples.

THE WORKING CLASS AND CAPITALIST EXPANSIONISM

We have seen how modern capitalist expansionism ultimately aims, using all the means at its disposal, to achieve nothing other than the transformation of the relationship between productive and unproductive capital, between production time and circulation time. The struggle for markets serves this objective just as does the struggle for spheres of investment. The reduction of unproductive capital, the acceleration of its flow into the sphere of production, the extension of production time within the turnover time appear, however, to be in the general interest of all classes. Even the interest of the working class seems to be served. If the quantity of the monetary capital that is at any one moment removed from the circuit of capital is reduced, the demand for labor power grows, the power of the workers on the labor market grows, and, as a result, wages increase. For this reason it is argued that the “producer interest” of the workers favors tariff protection and expansionist policies. There is no doubt that these effects of modern capitalist policy are useful to the working class; it is questionable, however, whether expansionism does not also lead to other effects that do more harm to the working class than the reduction of fallow capital does good.

Bourgeois economics has observed that modern tariff policy and colonial policy are changing the circulation of capital and that these changes are producing the tendency toward an increase in prices, profits, and wages. For this reason, capitalist expansionism seems to bourgeois economics to be just as beneficial to the interests of the working class as it is to the interests of the capitalist class. This observation is correct, but incomplete. It must be supplemented by the examination of the changes that the economic policies of imperialism produce in the sphere of production. For capitalist expansionism

not only accelerates the flow of unproductive monetary capital into the sphere of production, not only reduces the turnover time and, in particular, the circulation time of capital, but also changes the distribution of productive capital among the individual branches of production. It extensively influences in this way the distribution of the value produced among the classes of our society.

Tariff protection in the first place brings about a change in the division of social labor. In the case of free trade, capital would be distributed only among those branches of production in which the natural and social conditions of production in the country were more favorable; the products of other branches of production would be obtained by the society through exchange with other countries. Tariff protection, on the other hand, compels the society also to produce those goods for which the conditions of production at home are less favorable. Tariffs thus diminish the productivity of the labor of the society. This is manifested in the high price of commodities. The purchasing power of wages is thereby reduced and the working class thus disadvantaged. However, as soon as tariffs assume the form of cartel tariff protection, the price of commodities is increased even above this limit, since, shielded by tariffs, trusts and cartels are formed that dominate the market as monopolies. This increase in price is based no longer on a diminution of the productivity of labor, but on the altered distribution of the value produced, a large part of which the cartel magnates, thanks to tariffs, are able to appropriate. Finally, as soon as cartel tariff protection begins to serve as an offensive instrument and the cartels deploy cut-price exports, the commodities from the cartelized branches of production increase in price again. The consideration of the increase of costs due to the reduction of sales at home now no longer inhibits the increase of prices; prices can thus be fixed at a higher level than would be possible without cheap exports to other countries. The distribution of the social value produced is thereby again turned to the advantage of the cartelized enterprises and to the disadvantage of the working class. Higher commodity prices and less purchasing power for the same wages are the first effect of capitalist tariff policies on the working class.

Do wages really remain unchanged? The supporters of tariff protection see that tariffs accelerate the flow of capital into the sphere of production and thereby also increase the demand for labor power. Tariffs thus have a tendency to increase wages. But we see that tariff protection not only alters the structure of the social turnover time, but also modifies the distribution of productive capital among the different branches of production. Certainly tariff protection has the effect of driving a larger part of the capital in the society into branches of production with a high organic composition and thus a low capacity to incorporate labor than these branches would have been able to absorb without tariffs. The branches of production that require a great

deal of constant capital and little variable capital are those that are first subject to cartelization.

The export practices of these cartels, which are supported by tariff protection, do harm to the domestic branches of production with a low organic composition. If, for example, the cartels in the German iron industry sell their commodities much more cheaply in England than on the German market, the iron-processing industries in England have access to cheaper raw materials than their German competitors. The English export of iron, steel, tin, wire, piping, and semifinished products has diminished or at least not increased; here England is confronted by the superior competition of the German and American monopoly organization. On the other hand, the level of exports of all the iron-processing industries in England—for example, the export of locomotives, rails, machines, knives, and hardware—is increasing very rapidly. The development of English shipbuilding has been just as extensive. This growth in English exports has in no small measure been made possible by the fact that Germany and America are supplying these industries with exceedingly cheap raw materials. Moreover, if the German cartels supply the English with cheaper iron and steel than they do their German customers, this means that the English industries have cheaper machinery at their disposal than do their German competitors. The competitive capacity of the Lancashire textile industry is based in no small measure on its cheap machinery. When the German iron cartels sell their commodities at a lower price abroad in order to keep the price of iron high at home, they thereby reduce the competitive capacity of the German iron-processing industry and indirectly the competitive capacity of all German industries on the world market.

Now, these industries that are put at a disadvantage by the tariff protection of cartels are all branches of enterprise with a much lower organic composition of capital and thus with a greater capacity to incorporate labor than the iron industry. If we compare the distribution of productive capital under the influence of tariff protection with the distribution of productive capital that would prevail under conditions of free trade, we see a greater part of the social capital in branches of production that, given the same capital expenditure, employ less labor power than the other industries. Tariff protection thus reduces the demand for labor power, aggravating the situation of the worker on the labor market. Moreover, the industries favored by cartel protection are those industries in which capital has reached the highest level of concentration, in which freedom of movement has been all but abolished, and in which the trade union struggle is hindered in the extreme. The mechanical engineer in a relatively small engineering works has a very different position in relation to his employer than does the worker in the blast furnace or steel-works of a Rhine-Westphalian iron king. In that it favors "heavy" industries and damages the iron-processing industries, tariff protection pushes capital

into branches of production that offer the trade union struggle less favorable conditions.

It is certainly correct that tariff protection favorably influences the circulation of capital, but it also alters the distribution of productive capital; this means, on the one hand, a reduction in the productivity of labor, an increase in commodity prices, and a reduction in the purchasing power of wages. On the other hand, it means a shifting of capital into branches of production with a low capacity to incorporate labor, a reduced demand for labor power, and a hindering of the trade union struggle. As long as we consider merely the circulation of capital, tariff protection appears to favor the general economic interests of the entire population; if, on the other hand, we consider the distribution of productive capital, we see immediately that for the working class, faced with tariff protection, quite different points of view come into question than for the capitalist class.

Capitalist policies of expansionism are founded on the modern system of tariff protection. These policies demand in the first place enormous military instruments of power. Immense sums are sacrificed to militarism and navalism. An objective observer will be able to justify imperialist policies, then, only if the economic return is greater than the economic sacrifice. This question, too, is posed for the working class in quite different terms to those for the bourgeoisie. For in every case, the part of the wage that is sacrificed to militarism is greater than that of the surplus value. The expenditure of large sums on the objectives of navalism and militarism in fact constitutes an enormous increase in social consumption; it reduces the number of productive workers and increases social consumption. As a result, it could very easily reduce the rate of social accumulation. However, the capitalist states fear the reduction of the rate of accumulation; they therefore endeavor to impose the costs of armaments on the working class. The rate of accumulation is prevented from sinking in that the part of the wage that is accumulated is far smaller than the part of the surplus value accumulated.

When the worker has to hand over a considerable part of his wage in the form of taxes to the state (consumption taxes, customs duties), the individual consumption of the worker is replaced by the consumption of the state, in the form of military expenditure. If, on the other hand, it were the surplus value that had to bear the costs of militarism, capital would be consumed that would otherwise in part have been accumulated. Consideration of the level of the rate of accumulation already leads all capitalist states—leaving aside the power relations within the capitalist state, which of course drive taxation policy in the same direction—to raise the requirements of the army and navy through indirect taxation and financial duties, which burden the working class far more in relative terms than the propertied classes. Even assuming that imperialism increased the mass of wages to the same extent as the mass of surplus value, the working class would still not be interested in

the capitalist policy of expansionism to the same extent as the propertied classes, since the former has a considerably larger part of the costs of imperialism to bear.

Protected by the military instruments of power, European capital seeks investment in distant parts of the globe. A considerable part of the surplus value accumulated each year in Europe emigrates. It operates railways in America, mines gold in South Africa, builds canals in Egypt, and opens up coal mines in China. Every year, Great Britain increases its capital investments abroad by some fifty million pounds sterling, that is, by some one thousand million marks (Armitage-Smith).¹⁴ Its capital investments abroad appear to grow more rapidly than at home. In any case, between the years 1865 and 1898 total British revenue only doubled, whereas revenue from abroad increased ninefold (Giffen).¹⁵ Germany's capital investments in overseas states are also growing very rapidly; investment is said to have amounted to between 7,035 and 7,735 million marks in 1898, as early as 1904 to between 8,030 and 9,225 million marks.¹⁶ Of the stocks and bonds traded in Germany, two to two and a half thousand million marks are tied to overseas regions. The major German banks have organized and planned the export of German capital.

The export of capital brings about a reduction in demand on the European labor market. It may be that the capital that flows into foreign regions would have temporarily remained unproductive if this outlet had not been provided. But no capital remains permanently unproductive; this exported capital would ultimately have found its way into the sphere of production at home, too. If one does not wait for this, but instead makes it possible for the capital to emigrate abroad, this capital is thus lost to the domestic labor market permanently. If I possess a quantity of capital, this means that I have performed a certain amount of social labor or that I have appropriated a certain amount of social labor performed by wage laborers by virtue of my possession of the instruments of labor. I now have the right to claim a quantity of other social labor performed by others, the right to buy social labor. If I now invest this capital in South African gold mines, I assert this claim to the labor of others. But rather than buying the labor power of English or German workers, I buy that of Chinese coolies. The diminution of the labor burden of a nation in the context of capitalist society means, however, a diminution of the demand for its labor power, a deterioration of the situation of the worker on the labor market. Insofar as imperialism promotes the emigration of European capital to other parts of the world, it quite directly threatens the "producer interest" of the workers. By broadening the scope of the tendency to a leveling out of rates of profit, imperialism strives to replace the European worker with the cheaper labor power of the less developed nations, thus representing the tendency toward—as Kurt Eisner once put it—a "general lock-out of the European workforce."¹⁷

Certainly, the emigrating capital is only in part variable capital; insofar as it becomes constant capital, becomes embodied in instruments of labor, it creates new sales for the industries in the mother country from which these instruments of labor are drawn, thereby also creating new spheres of investment for capital in the mother country itself. Thus, the demand for labor power is further increased here, since the flow of unproductive capital into the sphere of production is also accelerated in the mother country itself. However, we are also interested here in the distribution of capital among the different branches of production. For when a part of the capital of a European country flows abroad and the demand of this capital for instruments of labor in Europe itself then leads to the expansion of the production apparatus of the society, the capital in the mother country is also distributed differently among the different branches of production than would be the case without the preceding export of capital made possible or even promoted by imperialist policies. It is very particular branches of production that are promoted by these new markets; capital is devoted at home to the production of arms and artillery, to shipyards and shipping companies, is invested in canals, port facilities, docks, and so forth. These are branches of production with a high organic composition of capital, branches of production that are capable of producing only a low level of demand on the labor market. When the worker is compelled to hand over a part of his wage to the state in the form of taxation, the demand for weapons, ships, and railways rises. However, at the same time, there is a comparable reduction in the demand for the products of those industries that produce the worker's clothing, housing, and food. And those branches of production being promoted have a smaller capacity to incorporate labor than those being damaged.

These are, then, the first effects of capitalist expansionism: on the one hand, the rapid transfer of unproductive monetary capital into production; on the other, however, the movement of a part of the available capital abroad and a redistribution of the rest of the capital at home, with the result that the branches of production with a lower capacity to incorporate labor gain a larger share of capital. On the one hand, there is an increase in the productive capital in the country due to a reduction in the amount of unproductive capital and shortening of the turnover time. On the other hand, however, there is a reduction in productive capital in general, as a consequence of the export of capital, and a still more rapid reduction in the capital expended on wages in the society. The capital that has remained in the mother country assumes a higher organic composition.

Since the rate of profit in the colonial countries acquired through imperialism is higher than in the mother country, imperialism has the effect of substantially enriching the mother country. However, this is expressed in the mother country merely in the fact that the amount of surplus value flowing to the capitalist class increases. The working class has no direct share in the

growing wealth of the society. The increase in the surplus value flowing to the capitalist class can benefit the working class only indirectly. A part of this surplus value is accumulated; since the mass of surplus value as a whole has grown through the investment of capital abroad, the mass of the surplus value accumulated each year, given an unchanged rate of accumulation, will also have grown. I use the term *accumulation difference* to designate the difference between the sum of surplus value that is accumulated in one year by the capitalist class in the mother country and that which would have been accumulated by it if the mass of surplus value accruing to it had not been increased by capital investments abroad, in particular in the colonial regions. Again, a considerable part of this quantity of value has no relevance at all for the European workers; a large part of the accumulation difference is immediately reutilized in the form of capital invested abroad. We know that a large part of the interest and dividends flowing to English capitalists from investments abroad does not go to England at all, but remains abroad, where it increases England's capital investments. However, a part of the accumulation difference is productively accumulated in the mother country itself; a part of this part becomes variable capital and thus increases the demand for labor power in the mother country.

Those who want to investigate to what extent capitalist expansionism is improving the situation of the European worker on the labor market cannot take into consideration all the gigantic sums flowing to the capitalist nations from the countries they have subjugated in other parts of the world. They can consider only the relatively small part of these sums, namely the part of the accumulation difference that is productively invested in Europe itself and here assumes the form of variable capital. The exploitation of other parts of the globe by European capitalism without doubt increases the wealth of the capitalist nations; but in a capitalist society this in no way means that the wealth of the working class of these nations grows at all, let alone to the same degree.

It is finally not only the absolute size of the sum of the surplus value flowing from the colonial regions to Europe that is significant, but also the use values in which it is embodied. It is the most advantageous for the working class when the subjected colonies have to pay their tribute to the capitalist nations in the form of grain, meat, and cotton. In this case the prices of the most important foodstuffs for the workers fall and the purchasing power of their wage rises. Here the policy of expansionism favors the "consumer interest" of the workers. Yet it is precisely these beneficial effects that do not suit imperialism. In Great Britain, it is precisely the imperialists who want to impose import tariffs on grain and meat. In the German Empire, it is precisely the industries with the greatest interest in imperialism that are allied most closely with the landowners and that buy their support for cartel tariff protection by granting the Junkers agrarian tariff protection.

But the good most passionately coveted, not only by the individual capitalist but also by the whole capitalist class, is gold. The discovery of new gold mines has always been an important objective of imperialist policy. It has always given rise the most rapidly to the beneficial effects of expansion. New finds of gold always mean gigantic new spheres of investment, rich new markets, and a rapid increase in capitalist production. But by establishing new gold mines, by bringing Europe closer through roads, railways, telegraphs, and steamer lines, by introducing modern mining techniques in the gold mines, and finally by procuring cheap labor power, imperialism lowers the costs of production. However, if the production price of gold sinks, the production price of all commodities rises. If in the last years the rapid and ongoing rise in commodity prices has been steadily lowering the purchasing power of wages, if the rise in the price of foodstuffs has been robbing the workers of that won for them by the trade unions, the European workers without doubt can in no small measure attribute this to the fact that the policies of British imperialism have lowered the production costs of gold. Is it not a surprising example of the international solidarity of workers' interests that the exploitation of the most wretched and most despised worker of the world, the Chinese coolie, has very directly harmed the workers of all countries.

An examination of the effects of capitalist expansionism thus provides us with a very complex picture. On the one hand, imperialism promotes the prosperity of the working class. By accelerating the flow of capital into the sphere of production, shortening the circulation time of capital, increasing the mass of the capital active in the society with a part of the accumulation difference, it increases the demand for labor power; by having the subjugated peoples cede grain and meat, cotton and wool to the capitalist master nations, it increases the purchasing power of the wage in Europe. But on the other hand, the working class is severely harmed by imperialism. Through tariff protection, behind the walls of which powerful trusts and cartels are established, through customs duties and indirect taxation, which have to bear the costs of a policy of conquest, and finally through the reduction of the production costs of gold, imperialism raises the price of foodstuffs for the workers and thus reduces the purchasing power of their wage. Through the flow of immense amounts of capital abroad, which it makes possible, through the promotion of branches of production with a low capacity to incorporate labor, by means of protective tariffs as well as the opening up of new foreign markets, it reduces demand on the labor market. Through the shifting of capital into those branches of production in which concentration is most advanced, through the promotion of this concentration by means of customs duties, it hinders the trade union struggle.

The initial result of this is that the working class has a far smaller share than the propertied classes of the riches flowing out of the colonial regions. The capitalist class appropriates by far the largest part of the growth in wealth:

they benefit from all the favorable effects of imperialist policies, are spared all or almost all the unfavorable repercussions. For the proletariat, on the other hand, every favorable effect of expansionism is matched by a series of unfavorable repercussions. One sees how little imperialist policies really serve the ends that they profess to serve: to provide food for the growing population of the large capitalist regions. It is precisely the class whose number is growing the fastest that has the smallest share of the increase in wealth. But it is not only the surplus value flowing out of the colonies into the mother country that is unequally divided between capitalists and workers. In the mother country itself the distribution of the value produced also changes. If tariff protection makes possible the formation of employers' associations that provide the united capitalists with enormous sums of surplus value while at the same time increasing the price of foodstuffs for the workers and hindering their trade union struggle and if the reduction in the production costs of gold lowers real wages while commodity prices and therefore also capitalist profits rise, this means that at home, too, the lion's share of the annual growth in the proceeds of domestic production goes to the propertied classes. However, other causes may determine the distribution of the value produced. If we observe the effects of imperialist economic policy in isolation, we see that it grants a far greater share of riches flowing out of the colonial regions to the capitalists than to the workers as well as altering the distribution of the value produced by domestic production to the disadvantage of the workers. Imperialism thus reduces the share of social wealth distributed to the working class. It shifts the relationship between the amount of value going to the propertied classes and the amount of value appropriated by the working class to the disadvantage of the proletariat and thus increases the exploitation of the worker.

If we inquire as to the effects of imperialism on the extent to which the working class shares in the wealth of the society, we obtain a precise, unequivocal response. This is not the case when we investigate its effects on the absolute extent of the prosperity of the working class. Here it can occur that the unfavorable effects of capitalist expansionism counterbalance the favorable effects, that the prosperity of the working class remains unchanged and that the growth in wealth takes place exclusively to the advantage of the propertied classes. It can occur that the series of favorable effects are more powerful than the unfavorable effects, that the working class thus also gains an advantage from capital expansionism, albeit a far smaller advantage than the capitalist class. Finally, the opposite is also possible, whereby the relative prosperity of the working class sinks, not only in relative but also absolute terms, under the influence of capitalism, whereby the unfavorable effects are more powerful than the favorable ones.

It is all this that determines the position of the working class in regard to imperialism. Its view of imperialism everywhere is a sober one. It calculates in

each individual case whether the beneficial effects of imperialism are really worth the sacrifice. Its circumspection turns into mistrust, since it sees that it is difficult in the individual case to calculate in advance the force that will be exerted by the individual series of effects arising from the development of new markets and spheres of investment. The working class thus remains sober, whereas the capitalist class becomes intoxicated with the idea of rivers of gold flowing to it from distant countries. The proletariat thus remains circumspect, whereas the ruling classes jump for joy at the prospect of dominating the millions and millions of defenseless people whom imperialism subjects to capitalist exploitation.

This mistrust felt by the working class for imperialism intensifies to the point of conscious hostility as soon as it considers the political and general cultural effects of imperialism. In the first place, imperialism reduces the power of legislation in relation to administration. If today even the power of the king in England is increasing again, this is due to the fact that the United Kingdom is increasingly becoming merely a part of a great world empire, one that no parliament can govern. However, at the same time, imperialism places terrible instruments of power in the hands of the rulers. It compels every nation to acquire powerful armaments. The armies that it raises must be obedient to those in power. They must be ready and willing to be used, today in Africa and tomorrow in India, today to exterminate a Negro tribe root and branch and tomorrow to struggle against the white soldiers of another nation. Today they must protect the owners of large gold mines against the rebellion of their foreign workers and tomorrow dispense bloody punishment to the Egyptian peasants for beating their arrogant conqueror. Such armies cannot be popular armies composed of individuals with their own opinions and free will. For this reason, the ideal form of the imperialist army is an army of mercenaries, greedy for booty and keen for adventure. But wherever competition between states compels imperialism to increase its armies to the extent that mercenary troops no longer suffice, it must of course arm the youth of the entire population. Nevertheless, through the mechanics of drilling and the suggestive power of its ideology, it ensures that the armed populace does not become a popular army, that the armed people remain an obedient instrument of its rulers. On the one hand, imperialism demands the acquisition of ever-greater stocks of armaments; on the other, it does not tolerate any popular armies and prevents all democratization of the defense system. It thus places ever-greater numbers of armed men reduced to instruments devoid of will at the disposal of those in power. It thereby becomes a danger for democracy.

It is a peculiarly unreasonable demand that, as has often been the case, calls on the working class to forego the struggle for the democratization of the army in exchange for democratic reforms. Surely a democratic system of defense is a fundamental and necessary element of all democracy and is no

less important than universal suffrage and autonomous local administration. For behind the law stands the power of the army. Full democracy exists only where it is the case not only that the will of the people becomes law, but that it is the lawmaking people that alone has the power to guarantee the validity of the law. For this reason, there is no truly popular army in the large developed class states. If modern popular armies one day burst the shell that disguises the nature of class domination, social production will be stripped of the capitalist form that today conceals it. By hindering the democratization of the defense system, imperialism diminishes the power of the working class and threatens the hopes of the proletariat for the future.

However, it is not only the political class interests of the proletariat, but also the specific ideology determined by its position in the society, that conflicts with imperialism. We are already familiar with the ideology of imperialism: the exhilaration of power, the pride of the master, the idea of the right of a superior culture. But we also already know that the working class necessarily opposes this mental universe. In the ideas supposedly justifying the subjugation of foreign peoples, the working class finds the same arguments that constitute the weapons of its opponents in the class struggle within the nation, which supposedly justify its own exploitation and oppression. The ideology of imperialism is at the same time the ideology of agitation.

The working class is thus brought into conflict with imperialist economic policies by its economic and political class interest as it is by its class ideology. However, this also qualifies it to represent general human interests against specifically capitalist interests. The youth of the working class forms the core of the modern popular army. How could the workers forget the question of whether the increase of profits is really such a precious good when it must be bought with the death of thousands and thousands of hopeful young people? The working class hates the capitalist pursuit of profit as a terrible force that constantly places limits on its own struggle for a share in the riches of our culture, that exploits its children and lets its aged starve, that today forces it to work beyond all limits and tomorrow throws it into the street unemployed, that reduces its wages and increases the price of its foodstuffs. How is the working class not to raise the question of whether it is really proper to sacrifice whole countries, whole nations, to this cruel and perpetually hungry force?

The working class everywhere thus becomes the enemy of imperialism. This is true not only of the Social Democratic movement, but also of the workers of those countries that, due to a particular chain of circumstances, have until now continued to put up insurmountable resistance to the penetration of socialism. Thus, in England it was the workers who, amid the din of the South African war, spoke up in favor of the Boers, the workers who damned the slavery of the Chinese in Africa, the workers who voted down Chamberlain's plans for the system of customs duties, the workers who, in the days following the terrible defeat of Russia, the most dangerous adversary

of Great Britain, called not for the imperialist exploitation of a favorable situation, but for the reduction of British armaments on land and at sea.

Within the German Empire, it is thus also the case that the attempt made by competent men to win over the German workers to the idea of imperialism has suffered ignominious defeat. Naumann set out to replace Social Democracy and to win over the working class to the idea of capitalist power politics; he landed in the "Liberal Alliance" [*Freisinnige Vereinigung*], the party of the German banks, the stock exchange, and large-scale commerce. Naumann's imperialism, incidentally, favored free trade, as did the imperialism of the stock market, of commerce, and of the shipping companies. But modern imperialism as a rule favors tariff protection. The foundation of modern imperialism is modern financial capital, which, due to the fact that the relationship between banks and industry is becoming increasingly intimate, has an interest in tariff protection for industry; modern imperialism corresponds to an epoch in which tariff protection has become an offensive weapon in the struggle for the world market. The conclusion that Naumann failed to draw has been drawn by Schippel¹⁸. When he argues for tariff protection, when he derides the "militia faithful," when he pokes fun at the "dogmatic" rejection of colonial policies, he is advising the German workers to embrace imperialist policies. Compared to Naumann's policies, his policies have the advantage of consistency, were it only the case that they were not proletarian, but capitalist, not social democratic, but national-liberal policies. He justifies them with the "producer interest" of the workers; however, he sees the sole interest of the producers as lying in changes to the turnover time of capital, because he is accustomed to comprehending the economy exclusively from the standpoint of the circulation of capital and does not see at all the primary effects in the sphere of production.

That which is referred to in the great capitalist nation-states as the anti-national politics of the working class is nothing other than its anti-imperialist politics. But it is through these "antinational" politics that the working class gains a very close relationship to the principle of nationality. The working class becomes the protector of all peoples whose liberty imperialism wants to sacrifice to the capitalist pursuit of profit. In the struggle against a violent, genocidal imperialism that increases its exploitation, reduces its political power, and does harm to its class morale, the working class announces its demand for the liberty and self-determination of all nations.

We are thus faced with a new turn in the fortunes of the principle of nationality. The development of the modern forces of production has altered the methods of capitalist economic policy. Greedy to exploit these new methods and to increase its profits, the bourgeoisie has betrayed its old ideal of the nation-state. It is no longer the nation-state, but the imperialist multinational state, to which it aspires. However, the idea of national liberty and unity is not thereby lost. It emerges again at the opposing pole of the society. In the

struggle against imperialism, the working class now inscribes its banners with the grand demands for the liberty, unity, and self-determination of the nations. In the age of mature capitalism, in the age of the cartels, the trusts, the great banks, the principle of nationality, betrayed by the bourgeoisie, becomes the secure property of the working class.

IMPERIALISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

We have hitherto seen how modern expansionism intensifies class antagonisms and how this is expressed in the different positions of the classes in regard to the principle of nationality. The working class adopts the old bourgeois ideal of the political independence of the nations, whereas the capitalist class strives to realize the multinational state dominated by one nation. But the struggle of the classes over the nature of external economic policy not only alters the position of the classes in regard to the principle of nationality; the principle of nationality itself becomes an instrument of the class struggle.

The simplest example of this is offered by modern British imperialism. The point of departure for the imperialist movement in Great Britain led by Chamberlain centers on the question of customs policy. Many English industries, in particular the powerful iron and steel industry, regard themselves as threatened by the development of competing industries abroad that are protected by tariff barriers, by the export policies of the cartels and the trusts. In periods of depression, the German iron and steel associations and the American steel trust become dangerous for the industry of Staffordshire, of Cleveland, and of Scotland not only on the world market, but also on the British market itself. The large industries therefore demand tariff protection. Such protection, they argue, should shield them on the domestic market from the cut-price exports of their foreign competitors, should permit them to unite in cartels or trusts, and should provide them with the means to make use of modern methods of export promotion. However, the demand by large British industries for tariff protection is confronted by powerful opposing interests. On the one hand, this demand is opposed by the capitalists in those industries where raw and auxiliary materials become cheaper due to imports from abroad and who, as a consequence, fear the increase of production costs. On the other hand, it is opposed by the working class, which fears that tariff protection will increase the price of clothing and foodstuffs, restrict the development of industries with a high capacity to incorporate labor in favor of industries with a higher organic composition of capital, facilitate the formation of employer organizations and thereby impede the trade union struggle. These interests are backed by the force of ideologies, a force that is difficult to uproot in a democratic country; since the days of Cobden and Bright, free trade has acquired the status of a national creed among the bulk of the English population. Thus, on one side stand a few thousand capitalists, on

the other the bulk of the English population. The cause of tariff protection appears a hopeless one.

The idea of tariff protection, therefore, allies itself with another force. The large British colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, inhabited by white populations, are independent states. They create a barrier between themselves and the mother country by means of tariff protection in order to promote their own young industry, increasingly separating themselves politically and economically. Is the day far away when they will break completely free from it, causing the great British World Empire to disintegrate? The feeling of national solidarity is too weak to bind them to the United Kingdom; the mother country and the colonies must be linked by a bond of interest if the British Empire is not to disintegrate. An opportunity to maintain this link would be created if England merely abandoned the obsolete system of free trade. The mother country should surround itself with a customs border and impose lower tariffs on the products of agriculture and stockbreeding than on the competing commodities of other states; in return, the colonies should grant the mother country preferential tariffs. This would not only secure the British market for farmers and stockbreeders in the colonies and the colonial market for British industry, but also safeguard the existence of the British World Empire and guarantee the Britons in their homeland and those overseas continuing national unity. In vain the realist Balfour warns against such a plan, which could be realized only if the workers decided to vote for tariffs on grain and livestock.¹⁹ Chamberlain understands better the possibilities of modern tariff protection: in a highly developed capitalist country, the transition from free trade to protectionism cannot be made as long as the masses realistically calculate their interests. What is required is the suppression of the question as to the price of bread and meat, of clothing and housing. Here, the power of the national idea proves itself. "Learn to think imperially!"²⁰ Forget your petty concerns and think of the great World Empire, Chamberlain calls to the English workers. Agree to a small sacrifice in order to save your great empire, to save the political unity of your people! New wind now swells the sails of the big capitalists who have invested in blast furnaces and steelworks, who quake in the face of the American steel trust and the German steelworks association and who envy their fortunate rivals in tariff-protected regions due to the high profits generated by the latter's monopolies. The idea of national unity has now become a driving force serving their objectives.

However, British imperialism, like any other form, wants not only to create new spheres of investment for capital by securing sales outlets, but also to open up sales outlets for capital by creating spheres of investment. It thus strives incessantly for capitalist expansion. Its last big success was the conquest of South Africa. There it planted the British flag over vast territories. It first robbed the savage Negro tribes of their soil and then subjugated the

Boers. It built its railway and telegraph lines through vast territories. And now immense riches flow to it from the diamond and gold mines of the country, in which the dirty yellow coolies extract the gleaming treasure from the quartz. All this means new spheres of investment for British capital, new sales outlets for its industry, and—not the least important—ample opportunity for speculation. But here, too, capital meets with the resistance of the working masses. It is they who bear the cost of the Great War against the Boers. They experience this burden on the labor market in that immense amounts of capital flow to South Africa in order to employ not European workers, but undemanding coolies. In the continual increase in the price of their foodstuffs they experience the effect exerted on the commodity market by the artificial lowering of the production costs of gold; finally, the servitude of the Boers and the slavery of the Chinese is inconsistent with their mental universe.

But imperialism knows how to smash this hindrance as well. The subjugation of foreign nations is a need of the British brothers overseas. Whoever wishes to bind them firmly to the mother country, whoever does not wish to drive them into independence, must fulfill their demands. The subjugation of the Boers, the slavery of the coolies must be desired by those who want the Britons to be nationally united in a great world empire. “Learn to think imperially!” Do not think of your own concerns here! All Britons in the mother country and in the colonies bound closely together, and under them four hundred million subjects—Egyptian fellahs, Chinese coolies, but above all the millions of Hindus—and from the hot, rich countries of these peoples, a continual stream of gold flowing to the British master nation—is this not an image before which the petty antagonisms within English society itself pale? The idea of the unity of one’s own nation and of the domination of foreign nations thus here again becomes a tool of capitalist economic policy. To the working masses, whose ideas of morality are given a slap in the face by the policy of violent conquest, who want to soberly examine whether the immense sacrifices indeed raise the standard of living of their class, the spokesmen for capitalist economic policies respond with the words: What is all this sober calculation supposed to achieve? National unity, national power, national sovereignty are an end in themselves. Does Middlesex ask if Surrey is worthwhile?²¹ The idea of the unity of one’s own nation and its domination of foreign peoples in the service of industrialists lusting after cartel profits, in the service of finance capital craving the supplementary profits to be had in young foreign lands, in the service of stock market jobbers hungry for speculation—this is imperialism’s principle of nationality.

Only now can we return to the question of whether capitalist expansionism will bring about the dissolution of the existing multinational states. For us in Austria the question is: will imperialism bring about the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire?

For nearly a whole century, Europe has been witnessing the gradual disintegration of the Turkish Empire. Should Austria-Hungary be dragged into the turmoil of imperialist world upheaval, the disintegration of Turkey will no doubt be the immediate cause of this. For reasons that can be excluded from the present discussion, the Turks have not created a modern state based on capitalist commodity production. To be sure, Turkey has not been able to do without all the elements of a modern state: railway lines crisscross its territory; it has created a modern army for itself; it has also had to develop its system of state borrowings. However, the railways have been built by foreign capital, and the state's creditors are foreign capitalists. A part of the value wrung from the population flows into the coffers of foreign, in particular French and English, capitalists. The smaller capitalists in Turkey itself are likewise not Turks, but Greeks, Armenians, and Spaniards. Every one of these knows how to ensure the favor of the authorities with gratuities; but they do not form a class that the state could compel to adopt capitalist economic policies. The ruling class is made up of the Turkish landowners, officials, and officers. The bulk of the population is made up of peasants of different nationalities enslaved by the landowner, bled dry by the usurer, cheated by the tax collector.

Gradually, this population is also being subjected to the effects of radical economic change. The railways that bring the commodities of the capitalist countries into Turkey are altering the old, primitive system of trades in the country. The neglected agricultural sector is failing to provide food for hundreds of thousands in the country. They are moving to neighboring regions, already separated from Turkey, to Serbia, Romania, Greece, but in particular to Bulgaria, and encountering social relations there that, as backward as they may seem to the European, differ favorably enough from the deteriorated relations in Turkey. If they return to their homeland, they bring with them discontent. The change in economic relations brought about by the railways and contact with the Christian Balkan states is gradually giving rise to a national movement in Turkey. The immediate cause for this is obvious: above the Bulgarian and Serbian peasant sits the Turkish landowner, the Turkish official; economic exploitation and political servitude thus take the form of domination by a foreign nation. Now the process of the awakening of the nonhistorical nations is gradually beginning. Of the nations inhabiting the Turkish Empire, the Turks bore the character of a historical nation on account of their nobility, the Greeks on account of their bourgeoisie and civil servants, and, at best, also the Romanians on account of their nobility. The Serbs, on the other hand, lost their nobility following the Turkish conquest because their nobility integrated with the dominant people; they became a purely peasant nation. In the same way, the Bulgarians bore the character of a nation composed only of oppressed classes. This situation has been changing since these nations formed independent nation-states that now are gradually devel-

oping a national civil service and a national bourgeoisie. This is, in turn, gradually having an effect on their national comrades in Turkey.²² However, as soon as these nations within Turkey form classes that are able to create a lively national culture, Turkish oppression will become intolerable.

In the meantime, the economic and therefore also the cultural development of Turkey is far too slow for the development of the national culture of Christian nations on Turkish soil to be able to shatter the Turkish state. Turkey is condemned to decline because it has not developed itself into a modern state based on capitalist commodity production; however, the dissolution of Turkey is proceeding only slowly because the slow rate of economic development there is only very slowly producing the forces capable of shattering the old state. The fact that there is no Turkish capitalism explains the curious phenomenon whereby Turkey cannot survive and yet is expiring so slowly.

This slow internal development is now, however, being accelerated by the policies of the Christian Balkan states. They know that the disintegration of Turkey must finally come. They are hoping that the European *vilayets* will then become their heritage.²³ They are striving to prepare the ground for this conquest by seeking to awaken their national comrades in Turkey to national self-consciousness and to expand their power. The result is the emergence of the violent national struggles of the Bulgarians, the Greeks, the Wallachians, and the Serbs. The struggle of the Christian nations with one another is of course crippling the common attack on the Turks, but it is nevertheless having the effect of increasing the dissatisfaction with the prevailing state of affairs and of expanding the schooling system in the country, as a result of which the process of the awakening of the nonhistorical nations is being accelerated. It is thus possible to say today that, however much the great powers might retard this process, the dissolution of European Turkey cannot ultimately be prevented. Macedonia and Albania will finally detach themselves from the ailing body of Turkey, just as Greece, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Egypt have detached themselves from Turkey.

However, at the same time violent changes are looming in Turkish Asia Minor. In 1902, German capital obtained the concession to build a railway line from Konya via Baghdad to the Persian Gulf. The opening up of Asia Minor by railways will initially strengthen Turkish power, since the improved means of transport will make uniform administration possible for the first time. However, the newly opened lands will without doubt soon attract the covetous gaze of imperialism in the highly developed capitalist states. The Baghdad line passes through a fertile region that was once the site of Babylon, a seat of high culture from earliest recorded history until the fall of the Abbasids. The canalization system built by the Babylonians, which fell into disrepair following the invasion of warlike nomadic tribes, could now be restored within a few years using the means of modern capitalism and modern technology. This region could then provide European capital with enormous

amounts of surplus value in the form of grain, cotton, wool, and naphtha. Should the capitalist states want to appropriate these riches, the prospect of violent conflict will be imminent. German capital is building the Baghdad line; Russia is also looking toward the "warm water" in Asia Minor; for Great Britain, the distribution of power in the Middle East cannot be a matter of indifference, since it rules Egypt to the west of this region and India to the east.

We are thus seeing in Europe as in Asia many forces at work that will ultimately bring about the dissolution of the Turkish Empire. This means that the potential for gain in this region by way of imperialist policies of conquest is enormous. How will these radical changes affect Austria-Hungary? In the first place, Austria-Hungary will probably also consider pursuing a policy of conquest here, albeit to a modest extent. Austrian expansionism, too, will probably seek to ally itself to the national idea. We have already shown how the idea and the realization of national autonomy can become a means of conquest in the Balkans.

However, if Austria-Hungary announces claims to a part of the Turkish heritage, it will meet with the resistance of other states, initially probably that of Italy, which is without doubt considering the prospect of conquering Albania. Given this fact, a peaceful settlement with Austria-Hungary will surely not be easy to achieve. If Albania is Italian, Italy will dominate the Strait of Otranto, which connects the Adriatic with the Mediterranean; at the same time our route to Salonika (the significance of which will increase considerably through the opening up of Turkish Asia Minor) will be restricted in the west by Italian Albania, in the east by Serbia and an enlarged Bulgaria. Italian imperialism, lusting after conquest, will easily be able to carry the Italian masses with it. It, too, is allying itself with the national idea. One will speak of Trente and Trieste and mean Albania. Appeals will be made to the historical traditions of the nation, which won its liberty through its struggle with Austria. It will thus no doubt be possible to present an imperialist war of conquest to the Italian masses as a war of national liberation.²⁴

Just as for British imperialism the idea of a close alliance between all the colonies inhabited by Britons and the mother country constitutes a means of capitalist expansion and domination, so too the idea of the *Italia irredenta* here constitutes a means of rousing the masses into action in order to open up new markets and spheres of investment for the young capitalism of Italy.

The dissolution of the Turkish Empire, however, has the capacity not only to embroil Austria-Hungary in a war with Italy; in particular, it will also trigger dangerous conflicts of interest with the Russian Empire. Russia will hardly renounce possession of its "house key," its military domination of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. If Austro-Hungarian imperialism looks toward Salonika and Russian imperialism toward Constantinople, while at the same time the Christian Balkan states quarrel over the Turkish heritage, it will not be an easy task to peacefully fix the frontiers between the Austro-

Hungarian and the Russian spheres of influence. Russian imperialism will perhaps also make use of the national idea against Austria-Hungary. We have already discussed the possibility of Russia's inscribing its banners with the liberty of Poland and the Ukraine if it seeks to conquer Constantinople. Here too the idea of national unity is a means of capitalist expansion.

Thus, once the dissolution of the Turkish Empire can no longer be halted, Austria-Hungary will face danger in the first instance from Italy and from Russia. What it might mean for the Danubian Empire, which is still facing violent internal struggles, if its army were to be once again defeated probably does not even need to be formulated. In such a case, the German Empire could ultimately also see itself as obliged to intervene in Austria. The arguments against the Greater Germany policy of the Hohenzollerns, arguments repeatedly set out so clearly by Bismarck, are losing their force from year to year. Although Germany may give little thought to conquering German Austria today, this question will surely appear in a quite different light to the rulers of the German Empire when confronted with the great crisis that could be initiated by the collapse of Turkey. Here we must include in our calculations the fact that the danger threatening Germany from its western border is lessening from year to year: due to its modest rate of population increase, France is becoming a less dangerous adversary by the year.²⁵ France has hitherto been able to compensate for this in part by devoting resources to militarism out of all proportion to the size of its population. However, if the French economy loses a considerable part of its capital and revenue as a result of state bankruptcy in Russia, something that today can be regarded as not improbable, France will no longer be in a position to devote such enormous sums to its military arsenal. The German Empire will then have a far freer hand on the continent than has hitherto been the case.

But in the interior of Germany, too, enormous changes have taken place since the days when Bismarck declared the continued existence of Austria to be a necessity. The bulk of the German population is today much more conscious of the antagonism between the classes than any other nation. For this reason, the attitude of those in power in Germany toward Catholicism has changed completely. During the decade of the *Kulturkampf*, Germany had no desire to increase the number of its Catholic citizens. Now, Catholic clericalism has proven itself to be the most secure of bulwarks against the onslaught of Social Democracy. The more powerful German Social Democracy grows, the closer moves the danger that those in power in the empire will employ the old tactics of Caesarism and strive to prevent the impending internal revolution through external involvements. What greater chance of success could the ruling classes in the German Empire have in diverting the eyes of the masses away from social questions than by calling upon them to liberate their German brothers in Austria, to realize the idea, cherished by every German, of German unity?

But in addition to all this is yet another argument. The dissolution of Turkey also provides a goal for German imperialism. To be sure, in the European *vilayets* there will be hardly anything for Germany to take; but the German imperialists are today already looking greedily to Anatolia and Mesopotamia. And the more energetically German capitalism seeks sales outlets and spheres of investment in Asia Minor, the more the German Empire feels itself to be a Mediterranean power. To what degree this is already the case was revealed by the conflict over Morocco.²⁶ It is thus not inconceivable that German imperialism will aspire to the possession of a Mediterranean harbor. However, the route to the Mediterranean leads over Vienna and Graz to Trieste. It is quite possible that Germany will stumble upon this fact. Will not the rulers in the empire think, as did the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848: an attack on Trieste means war for Germany?

However, the interest in the Mediterranean alone can hardly suffice to induce the German imperialists to adopt such an ambitious and perilous policy. Another force will emerge that will lead them to link the concept of capitalist expansion with the Great German idea. At whatever point the German imperialists attempt to induce the German Empire to adopt a perilous and bellicose policy in Asia Minor, they will certainly be confronted with the powerful resistance of the German working class. Other interest groups will support the struggle of the German workers. It is not very probable that German landowners will rejoice in the opening up of a land whose wheat and barley production could threaten their ground rent. A sober expansionist policy that does not disguise its objectives cannot be asserted in Germany. Here too the expansionist need of capital must enlist the services of the national idea if it wants to make the masses serve its purposes. Just as British imperialism paints the gloriously colorful picture of an empire of four hundred million ruled by a united British nation for the electoral masses while thinking of the cartel profits of the iron magnates and of the speculative profits of the London stock exchange, just as Italian imperialism, in order to secure sales outlets in the Balkans for the industry of Upper Italy, helps itself to the great tradition of Garibaldi, just as Russian imperialism will perhaps one day announce the liberty and unity of Poland and the Ukraine in order to open up new markets for the industrialists of Saint Petersburg, Moscow, and Lodz, so too German imperialism must present itself as an heir of the Great German idea of 1848, must strive to realize the one great German fatherland, if it wants to sacrifice the lives of German workers and the sons of the German peasantry in order to provide capital with new sources of wealth on the Tigris and the Euphrates.²⁷

We can thus see quite new dangers arising for the multinational state on the Danube. The force that gives rise to these dangers is the change to the forces of production that is manifested in the concentration of capital. The concentration of capital has changed the methods of capitalist economic poli-

cy. However, the capitalist class must necessarily ensure that its policies appear in the form of the policies of the whole nation. For this reason it links these policies with the idea of national unity and liberty, which is itself produced and reinforced through capitalist development. The imperialist principle of nationality—unity and liberty for one's own nation and domination of other peoples—necessarily becomes an instrument of power for capitalist economic policy. This policy thereby becomes dangerous for the multinational states in which dispersed parts of the great capitalist nations coexist. We are thus seeing forces emerge that will lend the principle of nationality new force and that will therefore also threaten the existence of the old multinational states; however, in terms of both its content and its social roots, the principle of nationality has changed. The dangers that threaten Austria today are of a quite different nature to those that threatened it in 1848, in the epoch of the liberal principle of nationality.

In the fact that the dissolution of the Turkish Empire in Europe and Asia Minor will give rise to these new dangers, we can also see the end of a long process of historical development. The Danubian Empire came into being at a time when modern states were developing upon the foundation of commodity production. The colonial empire in the southeast was seen as transforming Germany into a state. But in the process of its emergence, another task fell to this empire: its territories formed a close alliance with one another in order to combat the Turks. As the Turks penetrated Europe, this empire came into being; if Europe now penetrates Turkey, the national questions of the southeast will be provided with a solution and the empire will face the threat of disintegration. And its heir will be the German colonial empire of the northeast, which established the bases of its power in the century in which the struggle against the Turks diverted the southeastern colonial empire from its original task.

However, all these considerations can show only that it is not the caprice of an idle imagination, but powerful historical forces that are producing tendencies threatening the continued existence of the monarchy. But whether these tendencies will be strong enough to assert themselves against the powerful opposing tendencies that exist is another question. Of the imperialist currents that could prove dangerous to Austria, it is above all the Italian current that is active today. Russian imperialism will become possible in a constitutional Russia only once a solution to the most important internal questions has been initiated and financial concerns have been alleviated. The obstacles that also face German imperialism are no less significant. In the first place, it is not at all certain how much more time will be granted to a capitalist political system in a country of rapid capitalist development and very stark class antagonisms. We also do not yet know which path German imperialism will take. After all, the German imperialists have cast an eye over southern Brazil and also not least over Shantung, whereby it can of course be said that the development of

imperialism in North America and the powerful development of Japan make the South American and Chinese plans of the German imperialists appear less promising than was previously assumed to be the case. However, even if German imperialism concentrates its forces on Asia Minor, there still remain great difficulties to be overcome: internal difficulties, social conflict, and a ponderous federal constitution that does not favor a policy of conquest, the threat of a Polish uprising in its own land; but above all it faces external difficulties. If the German Empire wants to take possession of Austrian soil, it has to be aware of the fact that it will have to suppress the bitter resistance of the Slavic nations and even a section of the Germans. France will certainly not accept such a radical shift in power on the continent without a struggle. In Asia Minor, Germany will be confronted by Russia and Great Britain, in Austria by Russia and Italy. The attempts by Great Britain to isolate Germany show what the empire can expect if it wishes to become a Mediterranean power. One can thus see that such a bold policy would be possible only given particularly favorable circumstances, in an alliance with one or more of the great capitalist powers, and after defeating the other great states.

It is therefore simply foolish for French and Pan-Slavist visionaries to accuse the German Empire of now already lusting after the Habsburg heritage. The rulers in the German Empire know quite well that they cannot afford another defeat, that a failure, the possibility of which such a bold policy must always take into account, would necessarily reopen not only the question of the state constitution, but also that of the structure of society itself. It will risk an attack on Austria only if no other course is open to it: if Italy or Russia reopens the Austrian question on the battlefield, if the German capitalist class fears losing the last sphere of exploitation it can conquer and the resistance of the working class cannot be broken any other way than by presenting an economic war of conquest in the form of a war of national liberation, if the German Empire already sees the threat of social revolution before it and the rulers decide to risk all in order to save all. No one can know today if such a situation will emerge in the sphere of world politics. We can only see forces that are pushing German imperialism to reopen the Austrian question; and we can also see no less powerful forces at work that are striving to prevent this. It is impossible to foresee the result of the play of these forces and counterforces. We can only say that it is conceivable and possible that the German Empire will one day attempt to resolve the Austrian question by force of arms; but it is far from certain.

These considerations are indispensable to the task of fully determining the position of the working class in regard to the nationalities question. For anyone who does not close his eyes to the demonstrable facts will have to admit that the hope that Austria will collapse or the fear of this eventuality influences the position taken by many individuals and many parties in regard to the national question.

The Austrian patriots are aware of the sole means that they can utilize to support the continued existence of the Danubian Empire. They must secure a legal sphere of power, through national autonomy, for every nation and bring an end to the power struggle between the nations; if the cry for help by the Austrian nations is no longer heard abroad, foreign imperialism will lose its most effective means of winning the support of the masses of its respective nations for its policy of conquest. Through national autonomy we can reduce the danger of European capitalism's using Austrian soil as bait for the working masses of its respective countries in the struggle for spheres of investment and markets. For this reason, national autonomy must necessarily be the program of all nations, classes, and parties that have an interest in the survival of Austria.

But those who long for the disintegration of Austria as the fulfillment of their national hopes now know how fragile this hope is. Every considered person must strive to find a workable form of coexistence for the nations within the given state framework. No one can be allowed to withdraw from the struggle for a solution to the Austrian nationalities question by consoling himself with the belief that a great transformation in world politics will produce a solution to the national questions within this empire. It is no accident that the party advising the Germans of Austria to adopt such a policy is led by men with a noticeable lack of a sense of responsibility, by the true heirs of the German *Burschenschaft*, which Bismarck once called the "combination of utopia with a lack of education."²⁸

The workers, too, are unreasonably attributed an irresponsible catastrophist politics when called upon to place their hopes in the disintegration of this empire. Yet they must pursue their class struggle on the terrain that is historically given. Their nationalities policy must serve the task of creating the conditions within the multinational state of undisguised class struggle, which constitutes, of course, the particular national politics of the workers of each nation.

If Austria disintegrates within the epoch of capitalist society, it will not be torn apart by the old, liberal principle of nationality. Rather, it will disintegrate only if capitalist expansionism is able to bring the national will to serve its cause. The collapse of Austria presupposes the triumph of imperialism in the German Empire, in Russia, in Italy. But the triumph of imperialism will also mean the defeat of the working class in these countries. Should the workers of Austria place their hopes in the success of the capitalist class of neighboring countries in destroying the class consciousness of the workers, in beguiling the workers such that they no longer see their own class interests, in stealing their class ideology and diminishing the power of their class? Should a brand of politics that hinders the process of liberation of the working class be perceived by the workers as a national politics? But it is not only the interest in the class struggle of the proletariat abroad, but also the need of the class

struggle on home soil that opposes the nationalities policy of imperialism. If a victorious imperialism occupies the Austrian territories, if it integrates the small nations into the great nation-states, a terrible national struggle will erupt here—between Germans and Czechs, Germans and Slovenes, Italians and Southern Slavs, Poles and Ruthenians—which will make all class struggle impossible for some time. The national policy of the working class knows only *one* means, the class struggle, and only *one* goal, that of the transformation of the entire people into an autonomous national cultural community. The Austrian workers cannot place their hopes in German, Italian, and Russian imperialism, which is the enemy of their brothers abroad and the victory of which would diminish their own power at home. The politics of nationalist imperialism cannot be the politics of the working class.

Thus, the prime objective of the workers of all the nations of Austria can be not the realization of the nation-state, but only that of national autonomy within the given state framework. If Austria continues to exist, it is national self-administration that will create the most favorable conditions for the class struggle of the Austrian working class. And should the hour come in which the armies of the great states adjoining Austria cross its borders, the working class will certainly confront victorious imperialism with the demand for national self-administration in order to prevent the national struggle from stopping the deployment of the classes. National autonomy based on autonomous local administration is for the working class the law of the coexistence of the nations inhabiting this soil—regardless of the state framework into which these nations are forced.

It is thus only imperialism that can bring about the disintegration of Austria in the epoch of capitalist society. The workers cannot rely on this victory, since it is uncertain; they cannot demand it, because it will be decided not in Austria, but in the class struggle within the great capitalist nations. They cannot hope for the victory of imperialism, because the victory of imperialism presupposes the defeat of the working class abroad and would decimate the advance of the proletariat in Austria itself. The national political program of the Austrian workers can thus be nothing other than that of national autonomy. But in that the Austrian workers accept the state framework as given and seek to solve national questions within this historically given framework, this state does not as a result become *their* state and the solutions found within this state do not become *their* solutions. It is not from capitalist imperialism that the working class expects the definitive solution to these questions, but from proletarian socialism.

SOCIALISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

The response of the French proletariat to the Franco-Prussian War was the Paris Commune. The response of the Russian proletariat to the Russo-Japanese

War was the Russian Revolution. A future imperialist world war will also inevitably give rise to a revolutionary movement. If, in the struggle for markets and spheres of investment, capital sets in motion gigantic modern armies made up of millions of combatants, it will have reached the peak of its power; one more step and it will tumble into the abyss. It is precisely the imperialist shaking of the world that will initiate the socialist transformation of the world. Imperialism will thus never be able to realize its nationalist principle in a pure form. From the day the proletariat first takes over political power in one of the great capitalist states of the European cultural sphere, new forces will emerge that will completely transform the laws governing the coexistence of the nations. These new laws will initially come into conflict with the old laws of the collapsing capitalist world. However, just as capitalist commodity production finally triumphed over the feudal manorial system, just as its principles of state formation and delimitation—albeit after centuries of struggle—finally asserted themselves and destroyed the feudal state structure, so too will socialist society finally realize its principles of the formation and delimitation of the polity upon the ruins of the old capitalist states.

From a formal juridical point of view, the modern state constitutes the sovereign territorial corporation. Nothing will change in this respect when the working class takes over power within the state and transfers the instruments of labor to the property of the state and to the smaller local associations within the state that are ruled and administered by it. The polity of the future will also be unable to do without the attribute of sovereignty; in this case, sovereignty will mean that the polity is the highest authority in relation to all production and distribution. The proletariat will not initially alter legal norms; rather, it will alter the subjects of the law and the efficacy of legal norms. However, as a result, the state will become a quite new social structure. The modern state first emerged with the monetary economy, which is itself a manifestation of commodity production. The socialist polity, on the other hand, will be based no longer on taxation, but on the fact that it is itself in charge of production and the distribution of the products of labor; the state will no longer secure for itself, by means of taxation, a share of the value derived from commodity production, but rather will itself decide in its role as proprietor as to which share of the social labor product it will devote to achieving its own goals and which share it will allocate to the members of the polity. The modern state is everywhere an instrument of the class domination of the bourgeoisie; for it was only in the form of capitalist commodity production that commodity production could become the general form of social production, thus enabling the money economy, the basis of the modern state, to spread. The socialist polity of the future, on the other hand, will abolish the antagonism between the classes and thereby also the class domination of the capitalists; it will be only now that the totality of the citizenry is called upon

to form the collective will. By seizing hold of the modern state, the working class will abolish and transform it into an entirely new social structure.

But in that the state dominated by the working class will transform its own nature, it will contrast not only with the modern state, but also the state in general. The state came into being as a territorial corporation in a process by which territorial organization undermined and finally eliminated the ancient clan structure.²⁹ From a formal juridical point of view, nothing will change here. For the polity of the future will also be a territorial corporation; the soil, the most important means of production and the foundation of all production, will be the natural basis of its efficacy. However, the nature of the territorial corporation will now change completely. For today it is in the power of the state over the soil that the domination of the propertied over the propertyless is concealed. By doing away with the private ownership of the means of production, the socialist polity will also abolish all class domination. The territorial sovereignty of the state will now no longer conceal the domination of people over people, but will be rather a pure relation between the person and the thing. The socialist polity thus will contrast not only with the modern state, but with all historical forms of the state. Whether this polity is still to be described as a state is a trivial question of terminology.

Every new form of economic organization creates new forms of state constitution and new rules governing the delimitation of the political structure. How will the polities distinguish themselves from one another in socialist society? Will the nationality of the citizens also determine the frontiers of the polity? If we want to answer this question of the relationship between socialism and the political principle of nationality, we must proceed from the fact that it is socialism that will first provide the totality of the members of a people with a share in the national culture. With the uprooting of the population by social production, with the development of the nation into a unified community of education, of work, and of culture, the restricted local associations lose their power, whereas the bond embracing all members of the same nation becomes increasingly stronger. Today, the Tyrolean peasant is closely tied to his compatriots by the particular peasant culture of the region and clearly distinguished from the Germans outside the region. This fact of national being is reflected in the national consciousness. The Tyrolean peasant feels himself in the first instance to be a Tyrolean and seldom recalls his Germanness. For the Tyrolean worker the situation is already quite different; he shares less in the particularity of the Tyrolean peasant and is tied to the German nation by far stronger bonds. By making every German a product of German culture and providing all Germans with the possibility of enjoying the progress of German culture, socialist society alone will eliminate the particularism within the nation. Without doubt, this development will strengthen the power of the political principle of nationality.

Another series of phenomena are driving development in the same direc-

tion. The peasant masses are fettered to tradition: they hold the household goods of their ancestors dear and hate all that is new. Their love for the values of bygone days also has political import: it constitutes the root of their clerical cast of mind, their local patriotism, their devotion to the dynasty. We saw how significant this is when we investigated the forces guaranteeing the continuance of Austria. The peasants, unable to free themselves from the fetters of centuries-old tradition, are one of the pillars of the state. If the socialist mode of production, on the one hand, integrates the masses into the national cultural community and thereby strengthens their national consciousness, on the other hand, it will eliminate the love for the ideologies of bygone centuries, which prevents the pure implementation of the principle of nationality. It thus will not only strengthen the driving force of the principle of nationality, but also remove the obstacles standing in its way.

However, all this will only prepare the ground for the triumph of the principle of nationality. This principle will actually be realized only by that tidal wave of rationalism that will sweep away all traditional ideologies when the dam of capitalism is broken. In the great period of transition from capitalism to socialist society, in which all that is old is destroyed, all old authorities are overthrown, and finally even the old property relations are eliminated, the old, the traditional, will lose its aura. Only now will the masses learn to overthrow the old in order to erect upon its ruins new structures dedicated to the realization of *their* goals. This revolution in the consciousness of the masses will be guaranteed by daily praxis within socialist society, which will for the first time provide the masses with the power to determine their own destiny, to decide, by means of free discussion and freely determined resolutions, their own future, which will transform the development of human culture into a considered, decided, and conscious act of human beings. It will be made possible by socialist education, which will provide every individual with the cultural wealth of the whole nation, indeed with a good part of the cultural wealth of the whole of humanity, thereby liberating the individual completely from the traditions of restricted local circles, broadening his outlook, making the individual for the first time capable of setting goals and astutely choosing means for their realization. Thus, for the individual in socialist society, no state frontier drawn for the purposes of a bygone era will be sacred. Only now will the masses of all the peoples be ready for the question that in the nineteenth century concerned only the educated, the question of the relationship between internal community and external power, which is manifested in the conflict between the nation and the state. In that the power of the restricted local associations within the nation will be reduced, whereas the national cultural community will closely embrace all members of the people, the national community will become for them a definite and immutable fact; external power, on the other hand, will now be comprehended as a means that must serve and adapt itself to human ends. The principle of

the adaptation of external power to the internal community, the basis of the principle of nationality, will thus become something that lives within them.

In terms of its content, the principle of nationality expresses the rule that external power is to bind together and serve the internal community. But in causal terms, as a motive, this principle will attain efficacy only when the procedures and relations governing labor render the traditional state structures, which do not correspond to this principle, unbearable. This was the case when the traditional small states no longer corresponded to the needs of the bourgeoisie, which, as a consequence, took up the cause of the principle of nationality. And it will once again be the case when the transformation of social production from its capitalist into its socialist form transforms the spirit of the people, destroys their old cultural values, and enables them to pose the question as to the *natural* frontiers of the state.

If the masses see the free national polity as their goal, it is socialism that will open up the path to this goal; for socialism will necessarily rest on democracy. Such a democratic polity will also compel its minorities to bow to the collective will, irrespective of whether it does so by means of direct force or indirectly, by excluding them from participation in the process of production and a share in its rewards. But in no case will such a polity be able to include entire nations that do not want to belong to it. If the masses of the nations are in full possession of their national culture, are equipped with rights of participation in legislation and of self-administration, and are armed—how could such nations be compelled to bow to the yoke of a polity to which they do not want to belong? All state power rests on the power of arms. But the popular army of today is, thanks to an artificial mechanism, still an instrument of the power of a person, a family, a class, just as were the armies of knights and the armies of mercenaries in former times. The army of the democratic polity of a socialist society, which will consist of highly civilized people who no longer obey the orders of a foreign power in their workshops and who are called on to fully participate in legislation and administration, will, however, be no longer an independent power, but nothing other than the nation at arms. In this way, the possibility of the domination of one nation by another will disappear.

However, the multinational states in our society rest not only on the fact that entire nations do not have the power to realize the nation-state to which they aspire, and also not only on the fact that large sections of many nations that remain under the influence of the ideologies of the past and that are not included in the cultural community of their nation struggle against the idea of national unity and liberty. The implementation of the principle of nationality in its pure form is also hindered by the fact that the modern state is also an economic zone. Is it not the case that the state must strive to incorporate a territory capable of constituting an at least partially independent economic zone? Would not the productivity of labor sink if a socialist polity, in order to realize

the principle of national delimitation in its pure form, sought to enclose only a small economic zone without giving any consideration to production?

Here we must recall the fact that it is only socialism that will be able to implement the international division of labor in a logically consistent manner. Simple commodity production increased the productivity of human labor to an enormous extent by implementing the division of labor, initially within a narrow sphere, such as a town and its surrounding zone of activity. Capitalism then implemented the division of labor within large economic zones, thereby increasing anew the productivity of labor to an enormous extent. It also already laid the foundations for an international division of labor. Classical economics then provided a theoretical foundation for the proposition that the productivity of labor in every economic zone and the wealth of every economic zone increases when the inhabitants of each zone produce only those goods for the production of which their region offers favorable conditions and exchange their products for the other goods they need. In theoretical terms, this idea cannot be disputed. Nevertheless, capitalist society has realized neither the free exchange of commodities nor the international division of labor and will not succeed in doing so. For the goal of capitalist economic policy is not the greatest possible increase in the productivity of labor, but the greatest possible maximization of profit. It pursues this goal not by distributing productive capital to the individual branches of production such that labor is rendered as productive as possible, but by accelerating the flow of unproductive capital into the sphere of production and by continually expanding markets and spheres of investment. It is only where the demands of the international division of labor by chance coincide with the demands of capitalist economic policy—as was the case in England until recently—that freedom of trade is realized within capitalist society.

In socialist society, on the other hand, in which the means of production are no longer capital, capitalist economic policy will lose all sense. Socialist society will therefore be able to realize for the first time the international division of labor and the distribution of labor corresponding to it within the individual economic zones. To be sure, this will not come about as the result of a sudden transformation. If a state has cultivated an iron industry with the help of the protection of tariff barriers rather than utilizing the richer iron ore of other countries acquired by means of the free exchange of commodities, a socialist society will not be able to suddenly close down the blast furnaces and steelworks that already exist. But every year the number of working people and the production apparatus of the society will increase. The society will direct the new workers, the new means of production into those branches of production for which the country offers favorable conditions of production and will exchange its products for those of other countries. The socialist polity will thus, within only a few decades, be able to implement the division of labor between states that is called for by classical economics.

It is only in this way that the greatest obstacle to the implementation of the principle of nationality will be removed. For now even the smallest nation will be able to construct an independently organized national economy. Although the large nations will produce a variety of goods, the small nation will devote its whole labor force to the production of one or a few types of goods and will acquire all other goods from the other nations by means of exchange. It will thus, despite its size, have access to all the advantages of the large concern. Even those peoples whose territory has been provided with mineral resources by nature to a very meager extent will be able to form an independent economic unit. Ricardo has proved irrefutably that even the economic zone least favored by nature is assigned its own particular task by the international division of labor. It will produce those goods in the production of which all other countries, in relative terms, are least superior and will have to exchange these goods for the products of all other economic areas. Through the international division of labor, the whole of civilized humanity will thus become one great organism; it is precisely in this way that the political liberty and unity of all nations will become possible. In a society in which every polity is autarkic, in which each is to meet its own needs, the implementation of the principle of nationality in its pure form is impossible. National liberty necessarily remains denied to the small nations, the nations whose territory of settlement offers less favorable conditions for production. However, when the international division of labor includes all peoples, the most important barrier preventing the adaptation of the political division of humanity to its structure as historical communities of culture will be removed.

The shifts within social labor will also acquire a completely new character in socialist society. For the migrations of the individual that, ruled by the blind laws of capitalist competition, are almost completely devoid of conscious regulation will now come to an end. They will be replaced by the conscious regulation of migrations by the socialist polities. These will bring in immigrants where the increased number of workers increases the productivity of labor; they will induce a part of the population to emigrate where growing numbers of people are contributing to sinking returns from the soil. In that emigration and immigration will thus be consciously regulated by the society, every nation will acquire for the first time power over its linguistic borders. Thus, social migrations will no longer be able to continually override the principle of nationality against the will of the nation.

It is no accident that the realization of the principle of nationality is tied to the victory of socialism. In the age of clan communism, the polities—at least originally—were nationally homogeneous. Even where a tribe was subjugated by a foreign people, it did not initially lose its form of political organization, but merely became dependent as a polity on the polity of the victors and was obliged to pay tribute. It was only with the disintegration of the old

communist nation into restricted local associations that the political fissuring of the nation also began. And it was only with the division into classes, with the splitting of the nation into members of the nation and tenants of the nation, that domination by a foreign nation also became possible. The opposition between the ruling and the ruled, the exploiting and the exploited classes assumed the form of the domination of the nonhistorical nations by the historical nations. From the time of the development of social production in the form of capitalist commodity production onward, political particularism was repressed. The need for a division of labor within the large economic zones led to the erection of the great nation-state upon the ruins of innumerable small states. This same development, however, rendered domination by a foreign nation unendurable. The nonhistorical nations awakened to historical life and also aspired to the realization of the nation-state. Finally, social production will shed its capitalist skin. It will be only now that the national community of culture is realized; it will be only now that all particularism within the nation disappears and the domination by one nation of other peoples becomes impossible. It will be only now that the division of labor encompasses the whole of humanity and that, for this reason, there is no longer any obstacle standing in the way of the political structuring of humanity into free nations.

The political structuring of humanity mirrors its national cultural being, which is in turn determined by the development of the procedures and conditions of labor. Political particularism and foreign domination are the political manifestations of an age that is characterized, in national terms, by the division of the nation into members of the nation and tenants of the nation, by the disintegration of the nation into restricted local associations and, in economic terms, by settled agriculture, private ownership of the means of production, and the manorial system; the principle of nationality is the principle of state formation of the unified and autonomous nation in the age of social production. The construction of the great nation-states in the nineteenth century merely heralds the realization of the national community of culture in its pure form by socialism, just as social production in its capitalist form heralds cooperative production by the society and for the society.

Socialism thus holds the promise for all nations of the realization of their desire for political unity and freedom. This also applies to the German nation. For this reason, the German workers have no part in the infantile games of the Pan-Germans, no part in the antiworker machinations of German imperialism. They know that their class struggle with the capitalist class is also a struggle for the political unity of their people. For this reason the German workers, far removed from the frivolous machinations of the Pan-German adventurers, with the calmness born of the certainty of victory, address the German people in the words of the poet:

Patience! The day will come where one will hang
A single canopy over the whole of German land!³⁰

But because it is precisely from the progress of social production and the international division of labor that the principle of nationality emerges, it is soon confronted by its own limits. Already within capitalist society, ever-closer interaction links the different states; a generally valid form of regulation of this interaction becomes even more necessary, a legal system the validity of which extends beyond the borders of the individual states. The increased interaction between states resulting from the development of the capitalist economy, the emergence of the great modern states, and the expansion of the power of the European nations over the colonial territories abroad has given rise to international law. In the first instance, the states regulate their relations through treaties. To the old pacts of alliance and peace are added agreements concerning the laws of land and naval warfare. Economic relations also gradually come to be regulated by agreements between states. Thus emerges the diverse system of treaties that constitutes the foundation of modern international law: agreements concerning inland and maritime shipping, trade and customs duties, railway traffic, postal and telegraph systems, and measures, coinages, and weights. But international law soon reaches beyond the sphere of immediate economic interests. Thus, today agreements between states regulate the policing of sanitary conditions, in particular in regard to the struggle against epidemics, and the struggle against both the white and black slave trade; thus, there is the attempt to initiate through agreements parallel systems of regulating civil and procedural law.

Out of all these agreements there emerges a series that creates a quite new structure, the international authority. Wherever the foundation of common administrative activity is to be established, the states create a common organ, an authority that, by virtue of its international mandate, is permanently to fulfill the tasks assigned it by the treaties between states. Such a character is borne by the international health commissions, the international commissions for the monitoring of the financial administration of individual states, the international rivers commissions. These are granted rights that are otherwise accorded to sovereign states and that even the theory of the state has therefore attempted to construe as a particular form of the state, as river-states. But by far the most important among the international authorities are the so-called administrative communities. These have been emerging since the 1860s and are based on agreements to which every state is in principle free to accede. Among them are, for example, the International Postal Union, the International Telegraph Union, the Community of States for the Protection of Commercial Property, the Association of States for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Union of States for the Struggle Against the Seizure of Slaves, the Central Office of International Transport, the Office of the Standing Sugar Commission, and so on. Some of these authorities

have already been granted judicial power, for example, the Health and Rivers Commissions, the offices of the International Postal Union and the Community of Railways; in addition, since 1899 The Hague has housed the permanent Court of Arbitration.

As imperfect as these individual structures are, they carry within them the healthy seed of new social organisms. The interaction between the different states has already become so close that the law and organs of the state are proving to be no longer enough. The direction of development is toward a legal system that stands above state rights and binds the states themselves; it is creating organs the activities of which will no longer be hindered by any state frontier. State treaties and international authorities today satisfy this need. But they are beset by an internal contradiction. The community of international law has statutes and organs, but has not itself yet been constituted as a legal entity. We have statutes and are ignorant of the collective will that establishes them and whose power guarantees them; we have international organs and are ignorant of the body whose organ they should be.

In socialist society, the agreements between the polities and the international organs will without doubt rapidly grow in number. At the same time, the increasing interaction between the different polities will in the first instance compel the implementation of the international division of labor. However, international regulation to a far greater extent will become possible and necessary only when the social processes that are today composed of innumerable decisions and actions of individuals are consciously regulated by the different polities. For example, large migrations will be possible only on the basis of international treaties. Finally, in socialist society the planned regulation of international interaction will also be necessary due to the fact that every disappointed expectation, every inappropriate calculation affecting the individual merchant, the individual emigrant, will quite directly affect the whole society. One can imagine, for example, the consequences when a socialist polity organizes itself for the production of a good that is to be exchanged against the products of the other nations and finds this expectation disappointed. The international division of labor is impossible if the exchange of goods and interaction is not directed and regulated on an international basis.

Interstate agreements and administrative communities will thus ultimately not be able to meet the needs of the society of the future. Statutes that are not guaranteed by an organized collective will and organs that cannot be regarded as the organ of any entity will not suffice for this society. It will ultimately have to constitute the community of international law as a legal entity and provide it with permanent representatives. This will come about the day the national polities establish an international office to which they entrust supreme authority over the exchange of goods between the polities and thereby indirectly also supreme authority over the production within every

polity. Just as the development of capitalist commodity production linked the manorial estates and the towns isolated during the Middle Ages to form the modern state, so too will the international division of labor create in socialist society a new type of social structure above the national polity, a *state of states*, into which the individual national polities will integrate themselves. The *United States of Europe* will thus be no longer a dream, but the inevitable ultimate goal of a movement that the nations have long since begun and that will be enormously accelerated by forces that are already becoming apparent.

We have seen that socialism will necessarily lead to the realization of the principle of nationality. However, in that socialist society will construct a federative state above the national polities into which the polities are in turn gradually incorporated, the principle of nationality will change into national autonomy, the principle of nationality as the rule of the formation of the state into the principle of nationality as the rule of the constitution of the state. The socialist principle of nationality is the superior unity of the principle of nationality and national autonomy.

As a consequence, the socialist principle of nationality is able to combine all the advantages of the bourgeois principle of nationality as well as those of national autonomy. By organizing the nation as a polity it will confer upon it the power of self-legislation and self-administration, control of its instruments of labor and its products of labor and the force of arms. However, by incorporating the nation into a community of international law constituted as a corporation, it will also guarantee the nation power beyond its territorial frontiers. Let us assume, for example, that a future socialist society sees that it can increase the productivity of labor in Germany by lowering the number of workers there and can increase the productivity of labor in southern Russia by increasing the number of workers there. It will thus seek to transfer a part of the German population to southern Russia. But Germany will not send its sons and daughters to the east without safeguarding their cultural independence. The German colonists will consequently enter the polity of the Ukraine not as individuals, but as a corporation under public law. If the national territorial corporations unite to form an international polity, planned colonization will give rise to foreign-language associations of persons within the international polity, associations that in some respects will be legally bound to the territorial corporation of their nation, and in others to the polity of the foreign nation whose soil they inhabit. Socialist society will thus without doubt present a colorful picture of national associations of persons and territorial corporations; it will be just as different from the centralist-atomist organization of our states as the equally diversely structured society of the Middle Ages.

It is not our wish here to depict a fantasy of the coming society. That which has been said here concerning this society is derived from a sober assessment of its nature. The transformation of the human being through the

socialist mode of production will necessarily lead to the organization of humanity into national polities. The international division of labor will necessarily lead to the unification of national polities in a social structure of a higher order. All nations unified in the shared domination of nature, but the totality organized into national polities called upon to independently develop and freely enjoy their national cultures—this is the socialist principle of nationality.

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7. The Program and Tactics of Austrian Social Democracy

THE NATIONALITIES PROGRAM OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' PARTY

Modern socialism first emerged in the great nation-states of Western Europe. It was thus the social structure and political position of these nations that initially determined modern socialism's position regarding the nationalities question. In the first place, the working class of these nations opposes the national form of evaluation employed by the conservative classes with the rationalist form of evaluation. It opposes the ideal of the preservation of national specificity with the idea of the development of the entire people into a nation. Expressed in positive terms, the politics of the working class are thus national-evolutionary politics; expressed in negative terms, they represent the rejection of national-conservative politics—that is, *cultural cosmopolitanism*. However, because the development of the entire people into a nation must be won not through a struggle with other peoples, but through the class struggle within the nation, the working class does not become aware of the national content of its politics. On the other hand, it correspondingly becomes all the more acutely aware of the negative aspect of its politics, of the rejection of the national form of evaluation, of national historiography, and of national-conservative politics. Cultural cosmopolitanism is thus the prevailing mood of the struggling working class in the case of the French, the English, and the Germans within the empire.

These nations are historical nations. Here, the workers are engaged in a struggle against the propertied classes of their own nations. In the context of this struggle, the workers do not see that they are linked to their class opponents by the bond of the national community of culture; correspondingly, they see all the more clearly that the workers of the other nations are their comrades in labor, suffering, and struggle. As a consequence, their view of national differences becomes blurred, and the result is a renewal among the workers of the old idea of humanity. The prevailing mood that emerges among them is thus one of *naïve cosmopolitanism*. This mood is gradually refined

into a conscious internationalism, that is, into the knowledge that the progress of the working class of every nation is conditioned by the progress of the proletariat of all nations. The idea of humanity is replaced by the knowledge of the solidarity linking the interests of the workers of all nations.

This knowledge now of course leads to action. The workers of each nation seek to support, insofar as this is possible, the struggles being waged by the workers of other nations—and here this means other states. On the other hand, the idea of internationalism cannot serve here as a program for state formation: the existence of the nation-state is incontestable. In this context, the workers do not see the positive aspect of the nation-state—they do not perceive it as the *natural* state, as the external organization of the power of an internal community. Rather, they see only its negative aspect—they perceive it as a class state, as an organization of the power of the propertied classes. The idea of internationalism also does not assume the concrete form of a program for the state constitution. National education already exists and thus cannot constitute a demand. The workers thus do not become conscious of the positive elements within it. They perceive education not as a means of producing a national community of culture, but see only its negative aspect: they perceive advanced education as a privilege, primary education as an instrument of the power of the propertied classes. The issue of whether the working class must demand the use of the national language within the apparatus of administration and before the courts also cannot arise here, since the dominance of the national language in the state bureaucracy is indisputable. And here again, the workers see only the negative aspect of this phenomenon. It is not the language of administration that is questioned, but the administrative apparatus itself, which the propertied classes have made into an instrument of the subjugation and exploitation of the workers.

It is only in the context of its opposition to imperialism that the internationalism of the workers of the great nation-states attains a certain definition. To be sure, the immediate concern here is not the relationship between their own nation and foreign peoples, but the relationship between their own state and other states. However, if it is the aim of imperialism to realize the nationalistic idea of hegemony, it is with the idea of national liberty that the workers oppose this imperialist aim. The political principle of nationality becomes the ideology of the working class due to the fact that the nationalistic principle has become an instrument deployed in the struggle waged by capitalist expansionism. Thus, during the war in South Africa, the European workers enthusiastically supported the cause of liberty and political independence for the Boers, condemned the oppression of the Indians, and even did justice to the rebellion of the Boxers. If the capitalist class aspires to the large multinational state ruled by one nation, it is the old bourgeois idea of the free nation-state that is taken up by the working class.

These are thus the elements of proletarian internationalism within the

great nation-states: its prevailing mood is that of cultural cosmopolitanism; its content is the knowledge of the solidarity of the workers of all nations; it attains growing definition through the struggle against imperialism, through which the liberty and self-determination of every nation becomes the demand of the workers of all nations. All these elements were already present in the old *International*. The problems of the state constitution, the national school, the use of the national language in public life could not possibly have arisen here. The working class is first confronted with these questions when socialism penetrates the multinational states from the nation-states, the non-historical nations from the historical nations. The working class must find an answer to these questions. Socialist theory must investigate the forces which, in affecting millions of individual workers and thousands of individual union delegates, will ultimately determine this answer. If today the old formulations of internationalism are no longer sufficient for us, if we aspire to a more comprehensive and more thorough investigation of the relation of the working class to national problems, to a derivation of a particular nationalities program from the general ideas of internationalism, this is, in the final analysis, an effect of the fact that the capitalist mode of production and thereby also the socialist cast of mind of the workers is being transmitted from one country to the other. It was Austrian Social Democracy that first searched for a specifically proletarian position regarding concrete national questions. Today, internationalism is already searching for a concrete definition of content within the Russian Empire.

We have already commented on how in Austria naive cosmopolitanism on the one hand and naive nationalism on the other are gradually being transformed into a conscious internationalism. It is not uninteresting to observe how this process initially finds expression in nebulous formulations in the party press and in workers' assemblies. Thus, in recent years we have been given to understand by German Social Democrats in Austria, for example, that the workers are also "good Germans." However, if I say of someone that he is a good German, this means in the first instance nothing more than that he belongs to the German community of culture, is determined by German culture, and is thereby linked to his fellow German nationals in a community of character. In this sense, the workers are not good Germans. For national misery within class society is based precisely on the fact that the bulk of the working population is almost completely excluded from the national community of culture, the fact that the propertied classes appropriate and withhold from the working class not only the material goods that the workers produce, but also the national culture that is founded on the labor of the proletariat. The attempt to convince the workers that today they are already good Germans disguises the antagonism between the classes, masks the exploitation of the workers, and glosses over the misery of the working class. On the contrary, it is because the workers cannot be good Germans at all today

that we aspire to a form of society in which all workers share in the national culture and are thereby joined together in a national community of culture. The workers are not good Germans, but we are struggling to make them into good Germans!

It will now be objected that such remarks are not at all meant to be understood in this way. It will be argued that these remarks are not to be understood as asserting the full participation of the working class in the national community of culture. Their aim is merely to characterize the political position of the working class in regard to the national question, to express the fact that the workers are also *national*. Now, the politics of the propertied classes are national-conservative politics; the politics of the working class are national-evolutionary politics. In Austria, the politics of the propertied classes are national power politics; the politics of the working class, by contrast, are the politics of national autonomy. The propertied classes expect the definitive solution to the national question from capitalist imperialism, which is supposed to erect a multinational state for them in which their own nation dominates the other peoples. The working class, by contrast, expects an end to the national struggles through the advent of a proletarian socialism that unifies each nation in an autonomous community while also integrating it into the community of international law organized as the supreme social body. We can see how in every issue of nationalities policy the working class is opposed to the national policy of the ruling and propertied classes. Can there be any sense, then, in saying that the workers are *also national*? Does it serve any purpose to characterize with the same word two orientations of the will that oppose each other on every issue? Is that which one would now like to call the policy of the working class something other than the concrete form of its old international policy?

The internal value of these formulations, which have become so popular in recent years, is thus very low. Nevertheless, their surfacing, if our interpretation is correct, indicates a great advance in the development of the working class, namely the step from naive cosmopolitanism to *conscious* internationalism. The workers were once told that it was not a question of whether we were Germans or Czechs, for we were all people; later they were instructed that it was a matter of indifference which language we spoke, for we were all exploited and struggling workers. Gradually one becomes cognizant of the fact that one cannot silence the demands of an interest group by having them disappear in a larger totality, by having their concept submerged in a broader concept. Today we know that we can derive the international policies of the workers in no way other than by showing that the German workers cannot fight for their interests without promoting the interests of the workers of all other nations. Rather than disregarding the national diversity of the workers, we are showing how the workers of every nation have an interest in the satisfaction of the national cultural needs of the workers of other nations.

But this development from cosmopolitanism to internationalism is not achieved by theoretically formulating and justifying internationalism; the new idea must gradually conquer the consciousness of many thousands of individuals and repulse the old ideas that dominate that consciousness. In the struggle of the new with the old within hundreds of thousands of minds, a multitude of confused situations and a frequent lack of clarity arise for individuals and for the party, the collective will of which is determined by such individuals. Such a period of transition readily expresses its internal lack of clarity in meaningless or contradictory formulations. When it is said that the Social Democrats are also “good Germans,” that they are *also national*, the aim of the speaker is really to express the fact that Social Democracy does not want to disregard the empirical fact of national diversity and the national struggles and that it, too, has a particular response to the question of nationalities. The predilection of some party comrades for such formulations can thus teach us to understand a great historical process.

But although conscious internationalism is only gradually overcoming naive cosmopolitanism in the consciousness of the individual party comrades, it has long since achieved theoretical victory. This occurred in 1899 at the All-Austrian Party [*Gesamtpartei*] Congress in Brünn, which adopted the following nationalities program:

Because the national turmoil in Austria is paralyzing the political progress and the cultural development of the people, because this turmoil is to be traced back first and foremost to the political backwardness of our public institutions, and because, in particular, the continuation of the national dispute is one of the means by which the ruling classes are safeguarding their power and preventing the real interests of the people from achieving forceful expression, the Party Congress declares:

The definitive regulation of the nationalities and language questions in Austria in the spirit of equality of rights and reason is above all a cultural demand and is therefore in the vital interest of the proletariat;

This is possible only within a truly democratic polity founded on universal, equal, and direct suffrage, in which all feudal privileges have been eliminated within the state and the provinces [*Länder*], for it is only within such a polity that the laboring classes, which are in reality the elements maintaining the state and the society, can express themselves;

The cultivation and development of the national specificity of all peoples in Austria is possible only on the basis of equal rights and the denial of all forms of oppression, and it is therefore above all necessary that all bureaucratic-state centralism be combated, as must be the feudal privileges of the provinces [*Länder*].

Under these conditions, and only these, it will be possible to replace the national discord in Austria with national order, a process requiring recognition of the following guiding principles:

1. Austria is to be transformed into a democratic federative state of nationalities.
2. In place of the historical crown lands, nationally defined self-governing bodies are to be constituted whose legislative and administrative needs are to be attended to by national chambers elected on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage.
3. All the self-governing territories of one and the same nation together are to constitute a nationally homogeneous unit that attends to its national affairs completely autonomously.
4. The rights of national minorities are to be safeguarded by a specific law passed by the Imperial Parliament.
5. We do not recognize any national privilege and therefore reject the demand for a language of state; the extent to which a single language of communication is required will be determined by the Imperial Parliament.

The Party Congress as the organ of the international Social Democratic movement expresses the conviction that, on the basis of these guiding principles, an understanding between the peoples is possible;

It solemnly declares that it recognizes the right of every nationality to national existence and national development;

But it also declares that the peoples can further the progress of their cultures only in close solidarity and not through petty quarrels with one another, that, in particular, the working class of all languages, in the interest of each individual nation as in the interest of the totality, must hold to the international alliance of friendship and struggle and must conduct its political and trade union struggle with one voice.¹

The most sensitive shortcoming of this program lies in the fact that it fails to comprehend the question of nationalities in Austria in a global context. A Social Democratic nationalities program must derive its concrete demands from the position of the working class within the society, must integrate the particular national problems in Austria into the great social question. If one attempts this, the inevitable result will be the formulation of the socialist policies of the working class as its actual national policy, for which its constitutional and administrative policies serve as a mere instrument. The political nationalities program will thereby also acquire greater content; for the working class will not be able to content itself with demanding, upon the historically given soil of its struggle, the constitution that clears the way for its class struggle; it will also have to inform the peoples of the type of political structure its victory in the class struggle promises the nations. The fact that the Social Democratic nationalities program must indicate the position of the working class regarding the principle of nationality, that it cannot evade the

question of the principle of nationality, was also revealed at the Brünn Party Congress, where the delegates of the Polish and Ruthenian workers presented a programmatic declaration stating that the political unity and independence of their nation is and remains a goal of their struggle.

The resolution thus essentially represents only a contemporary national program. In its first three principles, the idea of national autonomy is outlined very enthusiastically. More questionable is the fourth principle, which deals with the rights of national minorities. The initial draft spoke only of the protection, not of the rights, of the national minorities. The delegates at the party congress clearly felt that such protection corresponded only to the centralist-atomist regulation of national relations in its liberal variant, which protects the citizen against legislative and administrative intervention by means of rights guaranteed by the basic law of the state. As a result, "protection" was replaced by the "rights" of the national minorities. The closing remarks of the speaker Seliger prove very clearly that here one must consider the constitution of the minority as a corporate body even if this was not explicitly referred to.²

There is thus a flaw in our nationalities program. We have not answered the question of national minorities, but merely explained who is to bear responsibility for determining it. The timorousness with which this question is avoided is of course understandable; nevertheless, the party can by no means do without a minorities program, since it is precisely the national minorities that are the object of the most violent national struggles. We believe we have shown that the working class cannot answer this question in any way other than with the demand for the constitution of minorities as corporate bodies under public law on the basis of the personality principle. If in Brünn there was a lack of resolution in regard to this demand, this was due not only to the particularly perilous character of the question of national minorities, but certainly also to the lack of awareness of any alternative to a personality principle completely detached from the state administrative apparatus. The adherents of the personality principle imagined the nations as constituted entirely outside the sphere of public administration, such as in the case of the religious communities. In their draft program, the Slovenian Social Democrats declared quite specifically: "Territorial divisions have a purely administrative character and have no influence on national relations."³ It was only after the Brünn Party Congress that Rudolf Springer's *The Struggle of the Austrian Nations for the State* was published. It was shown there how local public administration could be placed directly in the hands of the nations without this entailing a denial of the autonomy of the national minorities.

The fifth principle of the program seems to me to be less important. The language of communication is a requirement of the state, the satisfaction of which the working class must certainly grant the state, but it is not a need of the proletariat, the satisfaction of which would have to be demanded by the Social Democratic program.

If in the not-too-distant future the party sees itself as compelled to reexamine its nationalities program, it will thus have to integrate its Austrian constitutional program into the general social program of the working class and express the content of its class struggle and its objective; it will further have to supplement the constitutional program itself through the demand for the autonomy of the national minorities. If we were to briefly summarize the results of our investigation in the form of a program, we would formulate them, for example, as follows:

A. In capitalist society, the working class is excluded from the national community of culture. The ruling and propertied classes alone appropriate the cultural wealth of the nation. The Social Democratic Workers' Party aspires to make the national culture, produced by the labor of the entire people, the property of the whole people and thereby to join all the members of a people together in a national community of culture, to realize the nation as a community of culture.

When the working class fights for higher wages and reduced working hours, when it wants to extend the education system so that the school provides access to the treasures of the national culture for the children of the proletariat as well, when it demands complete freedom of the press, of assembly, and of association, it is fighting for the conditions of the extension of the national community of culture.

However, the working class knows that the workers within capitalist society can never achieve full enjoyment of the national culture. It is for this reason that it will capture political power and transfer the means of production from private property to social property. Only in a society founded on social property and cooperative production will the entire people be called on to participate in the enjoyment of national cultural wealth, to actively participate in the national culture. The nation must first become a community of labor before it can fully and truly become a community of culture that determines itself. It is for this reason that the socialization of the means of production is the goal, the class struggle the instrument, of the national policies of the working class.

B. In this struggle, the workers of each nation confront the propertied classes of their own people as irreconcilable adversaries. On the other hand, the economic, political, and cultural progress of the workers of each nation is conditioned by the economic, political, and cultural progress of the proletariat of all the other nations. The working class of each nation can thus win economic and political liberation and incorporation into its national community of culture only in battle with the propertied classes of all nations and in close alliance with the working class of all the peoples.

C. In Austria, this class struggle is hindered by the centralist-atomist constitution. This constitution compels all nations to struggle for power within the state. The propertied classes abuse these power struggles by casting their class and competitive struggles in the form of national struggles; they thereby dis-

guise class antagonisms and place the masses of the exploited and subjugated peoples in the service of their power interests. The centralist-atomist constitution, whether it appears in the form of state centralism or that of crown land federalism, is thus intolerable for the workers of all nations. The working classes of all nations demand a constitution that brings an end to the power struggles of the nations by assigning to each nation a legally guaranteed sphere of power, a constitution that provides each nation with the possibility of freely pursuing the development of its culture and makes it possible for the workers of all nations to win a share in their national culture. The Social Democratic Workers' Party thus demands the complete reorganization of Austria according to the following principles:

1. Austria is to be transformed into a democratic federative state of nationalities.
2. In place of the historical crown lands, nationally defined self-governing bodies are to be constituted whose legislation and administration is attended to by national chambers elected on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage.
3. All the self-governing territories of one and the same nation are together to constitute a nationally uniform association, that attends to its national affairs with complete autonomy.
4. The national minorities within each self-governing territory are to be constituted as corporations under public law, which, with complete autonomy, provide for the education system of the national minority and which grant legal assistance to the members of their people in their dealings with the authorities and the courts.

D. The working class can conduct its class struggle only within the historically given framework of the state. It refuses to hope that a solution to the question of nationalities will come from the uncertain victory of an imperialist world transformation, because the victory of imperialism presupposes the defeat of the working class in the great neighboring capitalist states and because it would unleash violent national struggles within Austria itself that would inevitably retard the class struggle and thereby also the cultural development of all the nations.

It is not from capitalist imperialism, but from proletarian socialism, that the working class expects the realization of the political unity and liberty of all nations. Like every form of society before it, the socialist social order will completely transform the principles of the formation and delimitation of the polity. It will destroy the forces inherited from the epoch of feudalism and early capitalism that still sustain the multinational state. It will divide humanity into nationally defined polities that, in possession of their means of production, will freely and consciously control the development of their national culture.

But at the same time, socialist society will also implement the international division of labor; it will thus also link the independent national polity to numerous international administrative communities that will ultimately become organs of the community of international law constituted as a corporation. It will thus gradually integrate the national polities as autonomous members into a great international polity of a new type. The unification of all of civilized humanity in the common task of mastering nature and the division of humanity into autonomous national polities that enjoy their own national cultural wealth and that consciously control the development of their national culture is the ultimate goal of the international Social Democratic movement.

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The Social Democratic nationalities program is the common property of the class-conscious workers of all nations. For this reason it is possible for the workers of all the nations in Austria to be organized in a unified party. Nevertheless, the international workers' party in Austria is not subdivided into local but into national groups; the Austrian Social Democratic movement is composed of the German, Czech, Polish, Ruthenian, Southern Slavic, and Italian international Social Democratic workers' parties. This subdivision was not devised by a theorist and decreed by the Wimberg Party Congress. It is rather the case that the party congress was forced to implement this subdivision in 1897 in order to prevent the young Social Democratic parties of the non-German nations from increasingly cutting themselves off from the unified party and ultimately breaking away completely. The work of the Wimberg Party Congress was not the separation, but the organic federation, of the Social Democratic workers' parties of the different nations.

How can it be explained that the international party is necessarily subdivided into national groups? In the first place, it is necessary to refute the idea that we must grant autonomy to the workers of every nation within the party because we are striving for national autonomy within the state. We often encounter this putative argument in party discussions. Thus the Czech comrades, for example, base their call for the realization of national autonomy even within the trade union organization by pointing to the Brünn Program. However, this argument is not cogent. Social organizations as diverse as the state, the party, and the trade union also require different organizational principles. If the international Social Democratic movement in Austria has to divide itself into national groups, this cannot be explained by the fact that the party aspires to national autonomy within the state.

The division of the party can be attributed in the first place to the fact that it must employ different means in its agitation work among the different nations. It must address the workers of each nation in the assembly, the press,

and the organization in their own language. The party thus requires particular spokesmen, particular organizations, particular authors for the workers of each nation. The body of the party thereby naturally divides into language, and thus national, groups. In dividing the party into national groups, the statutes of the organization thus merely express in the form of a rule that which is an inevitable fact in the daily life of the party.

In addition, each nation is divided into different political parties that express the different social subdivisions and the cultural development of the nation. Even if the entire working class strives to attain the same goals by the same means, the workers of the different nations are confronted with different parties. The workers of the different nations are thereby also confronted with different tasks in their struggle. The Czech workers are confronted with quite different parties from those confronting the German workers, and they must consequently wage a quite different struggle. Thus, in the context of the political struggle, the army of the proletariat actually divides into different groups according to the nationality of the combatants, and, in turn, the statutes of the organization must adapt the formal subdivision to the actual division.

However, behind all this lies an even more fundamental reason. Socialism enters into conflict with the traditional ideologies of every nation that embraces it, and, precisely through its struggle with these ideologies, socialism is positioned within a relationship to the entire history of the nation. For this reason, despite all points of agreement, the socialist sphere of ideas of the German comrades is different in terms of its details from the sphere of ideas found among the Polish or Italian comrades. Thus, there emerges within each nation a more limited socialist community of culture and thereby also a socialist-national community of character, one that can be distinguished just as clearly from the overall national community of character as it can from the overall socialist community of character. In terms of their ideas and temperament, the comrades of different nationalities are not completely the same, and, as a consequence, they will not decide in completely the same way in a particular case. Here too, this in turn results in an effective subdivision of the proletarian army. The statutes of the organization can adapt to this effective division only if they constitute the different internal communities of the party as particular members of the organization. We thus see that the division of the party into national groups is the principle of organization that is appropriate to it, even if the goals and means of the struggle of the workers of all nations are identical and even if there is no fear of power struggles between the workers of the individual nations within the party.

However, all this merely furnishes the formal principle of division. What matters are the functions that are allocated to the individual national groups and those that are allocated to the *Gesamtpartei*. When the division of the party along national lines was decided at the Wimberg Party Congress, this

distribution of functions was no doubt envisaged such that the Austrian Social Democratic movement would remain in the form of a unified party that would merely be subdivided into national groups. The position of each of these national groups in relation to the *Gesamtpartei* would in principle be barely different from that of the territorial groups in relation to the party in the great nation-states. In the last years, however, another conception has gradually been imposing itself. Increasingly, the Social Democratic groups of the individual nations are assuming the appearance of independent parties and the *Gesamtpartei* that of an alliance of independent parties. As a rule, these parties act in concert. But if a question arises on which they adopt different positions, the minority is not obliged to subordinate itself; rather, each party proceeds independently, even if this entails acting against the comrades of another nation. It was this conception that, during the Brünn parish council elections in 1905, led to the fact that the German and Czech comrades competed with one another for seats on the parish council and to the fact that the German workers voted with the German bourgeoisie against the Czech workers and the Czech bourgeoisie. Anyone who has followed the development of the Austrian party in the last years cannot doubt that we are faced with the following question: Do we want a unified, nationally subdivided party or a loose alliance of independent national parties?

One could easily draw the conclusion that the party congress of 1897 already decided in favor of the second eventuality. In fact, even if the party congress had not wanted to create anything more than "a unified party of Austrian Social Democracy, which is composed of the different nationalities," as comrade Němec expressed it at the time, the party congress did not completely fulfill its task.⁴ For the party congress provided only for the federation of the party as a whole; it provided it with unitary organs: the All-Austrian Party Congress [*Gesamtparteitag*], the All-Austrian Party Delegation [*Gesamtvertretung*], and the permanent All-Austrian Party Executive [*Gesamtexekutive*]. On the other hand, the congress failed to provide for the federation of the nationally divided comrades of the individual districts, constituencies, and provinces. However, the next *Gesamtpartei* congress, which took place in 1899, decided to take the first steps toward an organic federation of the comrades in the individual districts and constituencies. It decided that:

In all constituencies where territorial relations do not render it totally impossible, the organization of the comrades for public elections of any kind is to be carried out not on the basis of separated national groups, but on a communal and unitary basis.

The subdivision of the Social Democratic Party into national groups decided upon by Vienna party congress of 1897 has created completely new forms of organization, which must now be integrated in order to ensure unified and common action, particularly where political matters are concerned. The party congress has therefore decided that the national groups must be mutually rep-

resented in all organizations at the level of the province [*Land*], the constituency, and the district in order to ensure that political organization is carried out in a collective and unitary manner.⁵

It is clear that even these resolutions cannot be sufficient for a genuinely unified party. For even in this case, the organizations still act as one power toward another; a unified party cannot do without (as the history of the past two decades has surely clearly proved) a permanent organ in the individual constituencies and districts, the decisions of which within the borders of its jurisdiction are binding on all comrades regardless of their nationality. In fact, at the Vienna party congress of 1903, the organization of one Vienna constituency proposed a motion for a closer linking of national groups within the constituency. However, rather than adopting this motion, the party congress contented itself with recalling the resolutions already adopted in Brünn. The Austrian Social Democratic organization is thus a contradictory construction. At the highest levels of the party, so to speak—in the *Gesamtpartei* Congress and the *Gesamtpartei* Delegation—we have unitary organs that pass resolutions that are supposed to be binding on the comrades of all nations. In the district, in the constituency, in the province, on the other hand, we have independent national organizations that work independent of one another, deal with one another as separate powers, and have no permanent common organ. If we are to develop ourselves into a unified party, we also need common organs in the administrative districts of the party, organs that in certain questions concerning the whole of the party of the district or constituency are able to pass resolutions with a majority of votes that hold for all comrades within the district or constituency. On the other hand, if we develop ourselves into a loose alliance of independent national parties, the majority principle will scarcely be able to assert itself even in the *Gesamtpartei* Delegation and at the *Gesamtpartei* Congress. In fact, the suggestion that the *Gesamtpartei* Congress should be abolished has already appeared in the press. If one allows the national groups to take root in separate soils and to grow independently and without restraint, one will scarcely be able to bind them together in their fully developed form.

However, it would be a great mistake to conclude from this that the development of the party is thus dependent on some future party congress's improving or supplementing the old principles of organization. On the contrary, if the party develops itself into a closed unity of national groups, it will already know how to find the appropriate form of organization. But if the national groups become independent parties with independent policies, even the best organizational statutes will not be able to prevent the collapse of the party.

The development of Austrian Social Democracy does not depend on its organizational resolutions; it is also not a question of the program of the party, for in this regard the workers of all the nations are in agreement—if

one leaves aside certain differences of opinion on the question of the national minorities, about which, however, not even all the comrades within each national group hold the same opinion. Whether the Austrian workers' party will remain a unified party containing national subdivisions or become a loose alliance of independent national parties depends rather on the position it adopts in regard to the concrete issues of the day. It also depends on the position adopted by the individual national groups within their own particular frameworks on the basis of the common program; it is thus a question of national tactics. When Austrian Social Democracy sets about determining its tactics in regard to the national power struggles in Austria, it is dealing with nothing less than the unity of the party.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN THE TRADE UNIONS

The history of the trade union movement reflects the history of capitalist development. As long as each city constituted an independent social formation with its own commodity and labor markets, as long as the gaze of the craft worker did not extend beyond the borders of his city, the workers organized in local professional associations. The English "trade clubs" of the eighteenth century bore such a character. But the more closely each individual city became intertwined in the economic workings of a large capitalist economic zone, the more the economic zone also became a unified labor market due to the immigration of capital and labor power, and finally, the more the worker in large-scale industry was forced to move from place to place by the play of the economy, was brought closer to his colleagues all over the country through the development of the means of transport and the press, and learned to understand that his progress was conditioned by the progress of his colleagues throughout the economic zone, the less the local organizations could suffice for him. Initially, loose federations of local professional organizations emerged, associations of local organizations that did not yet have any central representation or administrative body, but each year had their common affairs administered by another local organization, the "governing branch." Only gradually did these federations form themselves into large imperial associations with a unitary constitution, unitary policies, and common finances into which the once-independent local organizations were incorporated as mere local branches with relatively limited powers.⁶ In Austria, too, the trade union organization developed from the local and provincial organization into the imperial association (an association of local and provincial organizations) and then into the unified imperial association.

The progressive centralization of the trade union movement, which assembled the workers of all nations in unified imperial organizations, necessarily ultimately confronted the unions with the question of nationalities. After all, it was the same capitalist development that forced the centralist form of organization on the trade unions that also awakened national consciousness

and national sentiment among the workers. This connection revealed itself very clearly at the second trade union congress in 1896. The congress found itself simultaneously confronted with the question of the creation of unified centralist imperial organizations and the question of a split along national lines at the highest levels of the leadership of the trade union organization. In 1897, the "Czechoslovak Trade Union Commission" was founded in Prague, which was not, however, able to prevent the victory of the unified imperial organizations over the local and provincial organizations and their loose associations. Capitalist development thus, on the one hand, gave rise to the international merging of the trade unions of individual crafts and individual professional groups but, on the other, led to a split along national lines at the highest levels of leadership in the trade union movement.

The constitution of the trade union movement as a whole thus came into conflict with the constitution of the individual professional associations. Initially it seemed as if the movement as a whole would adapt its constitution to the organizational principle of the great central professional organizations. In 1904, the incorporation of the Prague Trade Union Commission into the international movement as a whole, represented in the "Trade Union Commission of Austria," seemed imminent. With the Czech party conference, which took place at Christmas in 1904 in Brünn, a reverse movement began. A section of the Czech trade unionists has since then demanded that "national autonomy" also be realized within the trade union movement as a matter of principle. A specific, autonomous trade union commission, they argue, should exist for the workers of each nation, and the imperial trade union commission should be composed of the delegates of the national trade union commissions. The constitution of the individual professional organizations should also be adapted to that of the movement as a whole. For this reason, national trade union organizations and associations should be founded. Where the international imperial organizations remain, the workers of each nationality, regardless of their domicile, should be granted full autonomy within the international organization. They should independently administer the professional journal written in their language, elect their editors, secretaries, and paid negotiators, and make decisions concerning strikes confined to colleagues of their nationality.⁷ This program was rejected with 197,202 to 2,364 votes at the Extraordinary Trade Union Congress in Vienna in December 1905, with the representatives of 30,686 trade union members abstaining. A section of the Czech trade unionists did not comply with this decision. The dispute over the form of the organization was carried into every individual professional association. A section of the Czech workers withdrew from certain international imperial organizations and founded Czech counterorganizations.

As a justification for their agitation against the international trade union movement, the Czech trade unionists cite the fact that certain imperial associations do not take into account the language needs of the Czech workers, that they, for example, even for local branches in the Czech language area,

submit German statutes to the offices of the associations and send them German membership forms. And emotions are stirred even more by the question, in itself trivial, of the representation of the Czech workers at international conferences of the trade union provincial secretaries. If the Czech comrades set such great store by this question of representation, it would almost seem that they are dominated by the opinions and ideas of the national petty bourgeoisie, which, as it does not have any serious objective in the national struggle, expresses its delusions of grandeur in vain representation and its annoyance and embitterment in empty demonstrations.

However, it would be unjust to aim to explain the aspirations of the Czech comrades to national autonomy within the trade union movement in terms of a petty bourgeois nationalist mentality. We must seek to avoid the mistake of confusing the immediate grounds for and forms of Czech agitation with the causes at work within it. If we investigate these causes, we encounter in the first instance the fact that within the multilingual region each material and geographical conflict can assume the form of a national conflict. If, for example, the metalworkers in the Czech region of Bohemia want to reduce trade union contributions, whereas their colleagues from the other industrial regions regard higher contributions as expedient, or if the miners of the Ostrau demand that the union have its headquarters in their region, whereas in the other mines the leadership wants to leave the leadership of their trade unions in German Bohemia, these are local conflicts that have nothing to do with the power struggles of the nations and that are also unavoidable within a nationally uniform trade union.

However, in Austria, where public life is filled with the din of national struggles, every dispute in which parties of different nationalities confront one another is regarded as a national dispute and is nourished by the entire ideology of the national power struggles. Thus, it is also the case in the trade union movement that many a conflict of interest, many a difference of opinion, conceals itself behind a national mask. Yet such antagonisms can never justify the splitting of the trade unions into national groups. If the comrades in a Czech industrial region are refused their own office, they have just as little right to shatter the imperial organization as, for example, the comrades in the Province [*Land*] of Saxony or the Kingdom of Bavaria have to resign from their professional organizations because the majority does not permit them to engage a paid secretary. If the Czech comrades are outvoted in regard to the level of membership contributions, they have just as little right to leave the imperial association as, for example, the comrades in East Prussia or in Rhineland-Westphalia have to splinter the German trade union organization for the same reason. No trade union struggle, no democratic organization is possible without the discipline of the minority. The minority is not relieved of this duty even if it is composed of comrades of a nationality different from that of the majority. Geographical and material antagonisms

can thus not justify the splitting of the trade unions along national lines; however, they can explain it. Trade unionists who have battled their way through a conflict of interest or a struggle between conflicting opinions within their professional association in which opponents of different nationalities have tried their strength and which has therefore been experienced and judged as a national dispute are, as a result, susceptible, even within the trade union, to national argumentation.

National arguments inevitably confronted the trade union movement as soon as the imperial association incorporated workers of different nationalities. We know that the most highly developed industrial regions of Austria are located for the most part in the areas of settlement of the German nation; consequently, the German workers were the first to join the trade unions, and they were the first to assume the leadership of most of the trade union organizations. If Czech workers now join the organization in large numbers, they encounter representatives of German nationality. Is it not inevitable that for the Czech worker who is exploited in the workshop by a German capitalist, who is overseen by German employees, over whom the class state exercises its rule through the agency of German officials, judges and officers, the German leadership of the trade union will appear to be part of the German foreign domination he detests?

It can be objected that the trade unions are autonomous democratic organizations in which every member participates equally in the formation of the collective will of the association, in which there is no domination and thus no foreign domination. Yet we cannot forget that democracy is based not only on a constitution, but also on a cast of mind! The experienced trade unionist who is familiar with the means of establishing his will in his organization does not perceive any domination. But the as-yet-inexperienced masses, which are being won over to the trade union movement every year, see in the imperial association an organized form of domination, which they join because it promises them economic advantages, but the mechanism of which they do not understand and the collective will of which they perceive as a foreign power. If it is the case that they perceive the representatives of the organization as their rulers, it is also necessarily the case that the foreign nationality of the "leader" appears to them as the embodiment of rule by another nation. It is no accident that the national dispute within the Austrian trade unions has penetrated these organizations precisely during the years of their most rapid growth, in the years in which thousands of workers still inexperienced in trade union matters have joined professional associations. If we do not wish to be unjust, we must admit that national aspirations to differentiation do not derive from the malice or the folly of those comrades who have made themselves the spokesmen of these newer members, but express the opinions and ideas of a section of the Czech proletariat, namely the thousands of workers still inexperienced in trade union matters who have been

won over to the trade unions only in recent years and those who remain to be won over to them.⁸

The aspiration to national autonomy within the trade unions is, however, further reinforced by another series of causes. The structure of the trade unions also influences their relationship to the political party. In cases where the bulk of the workers are Social Democrats as well as trade unionists, there exists a close relationship between party and trade union. Both party and trade union of course establish a particular body of representatives and officials. However, it is only in the case of imperfect democracy, only where the representatives dominate their organization, that a conflict between party and trade union is possible; where the will of the representatives is nothing other than the expression of the will of those who provide them with a mandate, the proletarian masses, there can be no conflict between party and trade union; it is, after all, the same working masses that organize themselves as a party in order to combat the class state and then subdivide into professional associations in order to confront their employers. Until now, the unity of the party and the trade unions has been realized more completely in Austria than in any other country. Over recent years, however, we have been seeing opposing developmental tendencies in the party and the trade union. The party is subdividing into autonomous national groups, which are differentiating themselves from each other ever more sharply and are increasingly becoming independent parties. However, at the same time, within the trade union movement, the local and provincial associations are merging into the great international imperial associations. National differentiation in the party, international unity in the trade union. Until now in Austria, where the political organizations embrace only a small core unit of the proletariat, whereas the great mass of the comrades is organized only in trade unions, the trade unions have been the great powerful body of the party—the trade unions have been the material, the party the form, but not the form in the sense of Hegel's "form devoid of essence" but in the Kantian sense of form as the "law of content."

As a consequence of the opposing paths of development of the political organization and the trade union organization, this arrangement is becoming impossible. The Czech Social Democratic movement is increasingly becoming an independent party; but since the Czech comrades do not have specific trade union organizations and are instead incorporated into the great international imperial associations, the Czech Social Democratic movement as an independent party does not have a mass organization; it is spirit without substance, form without matter. Thus, as a consequence of the progressive dissolution of the Austrian Social Democratic movement into independent national parties, the tendency is inevitably emerging to implement national autonomy within the trade unions as well. The bearers of this movement are no longer merely the inexperienced working masses, to whom the imperial as-

sociations led by German representatives appear as the tools of domination by a foreign nation, but precisely the core units of the Czech working class, comrades whose whole being is dominated by the thoughts and aspirations of the political workers' movement.

It is of course correct that the subdivision of the trade union movement necessarily obeys rules different from those governing the organization of the party. When the organizational statute divides the party into national groups, it thus constitutes the close communities within the party as the elements of its organization. The trade unions, on the other hand, have their own law of subdivision; they are divided according to professions, crafts, and industrial groups. Within the party, as we have seen, Germans, Czechs, and Poles naturally cut themselves off from one another, and the organizational statute must adapt itself to this fact; in the trade unions, on the other hand, the tailors must be separated from the shoemakers, the metalworkers from the woodworkers. The fact that we have implemented national autonomy within the party still does not prove that we can or should implement it in the trade union movement. It is nevertheless undeniable that where the relationship between party and trade union is as close as it is in Austria, the constitution of the party necessarily exerts an influence on the constitution of the trade unions.

Today, the Austrian workers' movement appears to be driving toward a contradictory situation: the mass of the workers organized in trade unions are to constitute the body of the party; the trade unionists are organized in imperial organizations without any national distinctions; the party, on the other hand, is gradually dissolving into a number of independent national parties. How can a unified international trade union organization simultaneously be the foundation for six independent national workers' parties that struggle often together, often side by side, sometimes even against one another? Can six souls live in one body? Can six forms constitute the law of one content? If the party remains as it was, as it still is—a unified party, albeit one divided into national groups—there will be no contradiction between the party constitution and the trade union constitution. However, if Austrian Social Democracy disintegrates into six independent parties, I see only two avenues remaining open to the Austrian workers' movement: either the trade union organization adapts itself to the requirements of the political workers' movement, the unitary professional associations disintegrate into independent national organizations, and the national trade union movement forms the body of the national workers' party within each nation, or the trade unions retain their international organization, but thereby break off their close relationship to the political workers' movement, and the unitary international trade union organization is situated outside the six Social Democratic parties.

Which of these paths will the workers of Austria take? This question should first be examined from the point of view of the trade unions. The

point of departure for our investigation is the solidarity of the economic interests of the workers of all nations. The German workers cannot win higher wages if Czech strikebreakers stab them in the back; they cannot maintain the level of wages they have secured if the lower wages of the Czech workers compel capital to flow into the Czech language area. Insofar as the capitalists in one branch of production compete with one another—that is, within a unified economic zone—the progress of the workers of each nation is tied to the progress of the workers of all nations. The workers already recognized this when they were still organized in local professional associations; for this reason, these local associations supported one another with voluntary contributions in cases of strikes. However, this unregulated system of support proved to be inadequate. A common war chest proved to be indispensable. Thus emerged the great imperial associations, which, insofar as state legislation makes this possible, embrace the whole economic zone, have unified finances, and support the comrades engaged in the struggle over wages from the common funds of the workers engaged in the same occupation throughout the economic zone.

But the trade unions not only transform the function of the unemployed into its opposite through the agency of the strike; they also transform the economic function of the unemployed by providing the unemployed with financial support. However, it is only large central associations with unified finances that can build up unemployment benefits. The smaller the sphere in which a trade union exerts its effect, the more sensitive it is to local crises, to sudden shifts in production, to the closure of individual enterprises; a trade union that can exert an effect only within a small territory or a relatively small group of people will already be rendered incapable of supporting its unemployed members by minor events of merely local significance. The same applies to other forms of support; trade unions that provide financial support in cases of displacement, illness, death, emergency, and so on must, for the same reason as insurance companies have to, strive to incorporate as broad a sphere as possible.

The first law of the trade union organization is thus the centralization of its finances. The contributions of the members throughout the whole economic zone must flow into one fund that provides benefits for strikers, unemployment benefits, and the other forms of support. The attempt has repeatedly been made to centralize finances without nevertheless entrusting a central executive with the direction of trade union policy, but instead allowing the individual local groups to remain autonomous within the trade union, that is, allowing them the right to an independent trade union policy. These attempts have always come to nothing. Webb's judgment, based on many experiences, is very instructive here: "It follows necessarily from the merging of branch monies into a fund common to the whole society, and from the replenishment of this fund by levies upon all the members alike, that no local

branch can safely be permitted to involve the whole organization in war. Centralization of finance implies, in a militant organization, centralization of administration. Those Trade Unions which have most completely recognized this fact have proved most efficient, and therefore most stable. Where funds have been centralized, the power nevertheless left, through the inadvertence or lack of skill of the framers of the rules, to local authorities, the result has been weakness, divided counsels, and financial disaster.”⁹

The indispensable centralization of finances inevitably requires a unified administration and a unified trade union policy. This realization has also not been easy for the English workers. The English workers demanded the extension of autonomous local administration within the state; the error of realizing in the trade union that which one aspired to in the state suggested itself too readily to be completely avoided. However, the English workers have finally learned through bitter necessity, through the misplacement of some of their hopes, to understand that the constitution of the trade union conforms to laws different from those governing the constitution of the state. It is no different for the Austrian workers today. They demand national autonomy within the state; but they will have to avoid the error of forcing upon the organized struggle of the proletariat a constitution befitting the enforced organization of the state.

We have thus initially defined a sphere of trade union activity from which national autonomy must remain excluded. This is constituted by the international economic tasks of the trade unions. We require international imperial associations with unified finances, a unified administrative body, and a unified trade union policy. However, this still does not represent the limits of trade unions' activity. They must also strive to educate their members. They fulfill this task through lectures, lecture series, and courses whose aim is to enable their members to acquire a piece of their national culture. Here we find tasks of the trade unions differentiated on a national basis. There is thus a place here for national autonomy within the trade unions. If German and Czech workers labor together in one place, it is certainly the case that the trade unionists of each nationality will be able to provide for their own courses and lectures independently. However, for this purpose, one requires not only specific national local branches, but even national educational sections within the unitary local branches.

Thus far there are no difficulties: for international economic tasks, unitary international trade unions, and for national educational tasks, national autonomy within the trade union. The difficulty begins only in cases where means differentiated on the basis of nationality have to be employed for the international economic tasks of the trade unions. The trade union must address the workers of each nationality in their own language, in both spoken and written form. It requires a particular journal, particular speakers and organizers. Here the question arises as to whether the Czech journal should be

the organ of the entire organization or express only the will of the Czech comrades. Should it be the entire organization or only the Czech trade unionists that provide the representatives active in the Czech language area with their tasks? The necessity of a unified administrative body, of a unified trade union policy, implicitly opposes national autonomy within the trade union. How sad it would be if the Austrian workers had to experience for themselves what many English professional associations have gone through.¹⁰

The necessity of unitary finances and unitary trade union policies implicitly excludes autonomy within the trade union administrative apparatus. The editors, officials, and paid representatives of the international trade union must be and remain its organs, must be appointed by it and be responsible to it. However, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that an official who is appointed and paid by an international trade union and who works within the Czech language area of Bohemia relies on the closest collaboration with the Czech trade unionists and can be effectively controlled only by them. It is thus in the interest of the trade unions themselves that the trade union officials be appointed, paid, and dismissed from office only by the entire trade union, but that they be supervised and controlled by the national group in whose midst they work. Not all imperial associations will be able to realize this principle to the same degree; the means of its realization are dependent on the number of members and the financial strength of the trade union and its influence on the different language areas. A large trade union will implement this principle the most easily by defining as much as possible in national terms the regions and districts of union agitation into which it divides its sphere of activity. If the trade union is in the fortunate position of being able to appoint officials or paid representatives for all or certain districts of union agitation, these officials will be appointed by the imperial association and receive their directives from it. The agitation commission of the district, which is elected by the local branch, will not have the right to remove the official from office, but it will be able to present him with tasks and monitor him. If the official cannot implement the directives of this commission of control because they contradict the directives issued by the imperial association—or the official enjoys the trust of the administrative body of the imperial association but not that of the agitation commission of his district—it will be only the congress of the trade union—the parliament of the imperial association—that has the authority to arbitrate this dispute.

By the same token, the editor of every trade union journal will be appointed by the organization as a whole and receive his instructions from it; at the same time, however, for every trade union journal a press commission will be appointed that is elected only by the comrades of the nationality for which the journal is destined. If the press commission is not satisfied with the journal because the editor, bound by the instructions of the central administrative body, is unable to conform to its wishes, the commission will present its

complaints to the parliament of the organization as a whole. In this way, the unity of trade union administration and trade union policy will be ensured; at the same time, however, the influence of each national group on the activity of the trade union in its area will be ensured. It is certain that no trade union official will be able to assert his will continually if the national group to which he answers is not satisfied with him. Such an organization will also not be able to function without frictions; but these frictions will be caused by no means by the particular nature of the national conflicts, but by the common conflict between the general interest and interest of the group.¹¹

Nothing could be further from our intentions than to suggest to each trade union the adoption of such constitutional principles. Our project does not include drawing up a blueprint for trade union statutes. Our aim here has been to derive from the trade union struggle itself the method that each trade union must employ in order to take equally into account the fact of national diversity and the necessity of a unified trade union struggle. We have thus arrived at the following demands:

Unified administration of international economic trade union tasks.

National autonomy in the sphere of the cultural educational tasks of the trade union.

Unified internal administration, but specific national control in those spheres of trade union activity in which the trade union must make use of nationally differentiated means to accomplish its international economic tasks.

If we have provided a sketch of a trade union constitution that satisfies these demands, this is intended only as an example in order to give concrete form to the general principles. It goes without saying that each individual trade union must modify these general principles in accordance with its particular working conditions. These principles are to be implemented not only in the organization of the individual professional associations, but also in the structuring of the trade union organization as a whole.

The organs of the trade union movement as a whole are the trade union commission and the trade union congress. They provide for the unitary development of the trade union organization, arbitrate the boundary disputes between the individual trade associations, ensure that the individual trade unions assist each other in important struggles, support young, still helpless organizations in both word and deed, and, in short, represent the interests of the whole trade union movement against the state and the employer associations. The concern here is exclusively with international economic tasks; the implementation of national autonomy is here not only unnecessary; it is impossible. If we have recognized that in every trade, in every industrial group, an international trade union with centralized finances, a unified administrative body, and a unified policy is required, we cannot place such a trade association under the direction of two autonomous trade union commissions, cannot subject it to the decisions of two autonomous trade union congresses.

National autonomy at the highest levels of the leadership of the trade union movement as a whole and international unification in organizations of the individual professions constitute an intolerable contradiction. The Austrian trade union movement can receive its laws from only *one* trade union congress, can be led by only *one* trade union commission.

However, wherever the unified administrative body makes use of nationally differentiated means, a nationally differentiated form of control will certainly also be expedient. Only the Czech trade unionists will be able to read the Czech publications of the imperial trade union commission, and thus they alone will be in a position to monitor these publications. The editor of the Czech organ of the trade union commission will have to be appointed either by this commission or by the general trade union congress, because this publication will otherwise be no longer the organ of the movement as a whole, but only that of a national group within the movement as a whole. But it would certainly be expedient if the Czech delegates of the trade union congress had the right to elect a specifically Czech press commission to whose control the Czech organ of the entire movement would be subjected. If the Czech editor, who is bound by the instructions of the general trade union congress and the imperial trade union commission, was not able to fulfill the wishes of the Czech press commission, the disputing parties would present the wishes and complaints to the trade union congress for arbitration.

The imperial trade union commission will divide its field of action into a number of zones of agitation that will be nationally defined where possible. The organs of these zones of agitation will be the provincial trade union secretaries appointed and paid by the imperial trade union commission and the provincial trade union commission elected by the local trade union branches of the province. The international economic functions will thus be discharged by an organ of the imperial commission according to its instructions; here the role of the provincial trade union commission will be confined to the control of the trade union secretary. On the other hand, in the field of purely local issues—which does not include the coordination of wage struggles—the provincial trade union commission will be autonomous. Thus, the provincial trade union commission of Czech Bohemia would not be able to autonomously decide on wage struggles and would be confined to monitoring the activity of the trade union secretary and reporting its observations to the general trade union congress and the imperial commission; on the other hand, it would autonomously regulate agitation activity, the choice of speakers, and the trade union education system. In multilingual zones of agitation, such tasks could also be allocated to the national sections of the provincial trade union commission.

Finally, in each district all the trade unions will constitute a single unit. They will be represented in the “plenary assembly” and, in larger districts, will perhaps constitute themselves as a trade union cartel. The resolutions of

the plenary assembly concerning international economic issues will be binding on all trade unionists in the districts irrespective of national differences. On the other hand, decisions on nationally differentiated affairs (for example, lectures, workers' schools, and so forth) will be made by national sections in which the national local branches as well as the national educational sections of the multilingual local branches are represented.

This sketch of a constitution for the trade union organization as a whole does not aim to present the trade unions with specific suggestions; we do not feel this is our mission. It aims only to provide a concrete example of how a unitary trade union organization can unify the principles of internationally unitary administration, national control, and national autonomy.

These principles, as we believe we have shown, have their roots in the conditions of the trade union movement itself. The trade unions cannot realize complete national autonomy. Even within the state, we do not seek to win for the nations complete self-administration in all spheres of state activity. No Social Democrat demands, for example, that the area of settlement of each nation within Austria form an independent customs territory, that each nation decide independently on issues of civil and procedural law. What we do demand is that each nation freely administer its educational and school system within the state and independently attend to the development of its national culture. And within this sphere our aim is to grant the nations full autonomy, even within the trade unions. The trade unionists of each nationality can independently administer their own lecture series, libraries, and educational systems; in regard to these matters, national local branches and national educational sections of mixed local branches, national district organizations within the imperial associations, national sections of the plenary assemblies (trade union cartels), and provincial trade union commissions can be completely autonomous.

The sphere of trade union activity in which national autonomy can be implemented is, to be sure, only a small one. However, this is due to the fact that the trade unions perform economic tasks and can directly devote only a small part of their resources to educational activities. For this reason, the indirect sociopedagogical effects of the trade union struggle are all the more important. By winning higher wages and shorter working hours for the workers, by overcoming despotism in the workshop and strengthening the self-consciousness of the workers, the trade unions render the workers capable for the first time of securing a share in the national culture. Wherever we demand national autonomy, it represents for us a means of the proletarian class struggle; whoever makes it an end in itself, whoever seeks, for the sake of the formal principle of national autonomy, to impose an organizational form on the trade unions that does not correspond to their conditions of struggle, is hindering the social progress of the working class and the process through which the entire people first becomes a national community of culture and is

thus pursuing an antinational policy. In aiming to elaborate a constitution of the trade unions that is adapted to the needs of the trade union struggle as completely as possible, we are opposing the national politics of forms and formulas with a politics of national evolution.

If decisions are made on the national trade union question from the standpoint of the interest of the trade union struggle, which coincides with the real national interests of the workers of all peoples, the direction of development will be not toward a national splintering of the professional associations, but toward ever-stricter centralization. The trade unions can grant the workers of each nation independent administration of their educational courses and libraries, they can concede to the workers of each nation a special right of control over the trade union publications appearing in their language and the verbal agitation conducted in their language, but they must insist that the economic struggles of the workers be uniformly led by a single authority and that the organs of the whole be allowed to have the collective funds for struggle at their disposal.

However, it is people who will decide on the problems of our trade union organization. The trade unionist is not simply an embodiment of trade union interests; he too is a "human being in all his contradictions," filled with the cultural, national, and political moods and desires of his environment. We have seen that the struggle of the Czech comrades for national autonomy in the trade unions springs from real forces that are rooted in the social and political life of the Czech working class and the power of which may not be underestimated. Will these forces be strong enough to hinder the construction of a unified Austrian trade union organization?

We have seen one of these forces at work in the fact that to the still-inexperienced Czech worker, the German leadership of his professional organization takes on the appearance of domination by a foreign nation. However, today capitalism is extending its sphere of domination over large parts of the Czech language area. On the one hand, a Czech bourgeoisie and bureaucracy is thereby emerging with the result that capitalist exploitation and political oppression no longer appear to the Czech worker in the form of domination by a foreign nation and he is therefore less sensitive to foreign leadership in his trade union. On the other hand, however, masses of Czech workers are joining the trade unions with the result that they are gradually learning to understand the mechanism of the trade union administrative apparatus, to intervene in it, and therefore see in the trade union no longer an organized form of domination, but a cooperative, in the administration of which they have an equal share. Capitalist development and, in its wake, the growing education of the masses by the trade union will thus destroy the illusion of domination by a foreign nation in the trade unions.

The Austrian trade union organization is thus not threatened by any lasting danger from this side. However, the better we understand how to satisfy

the language needs of the Czech workers, the more easily we will overcome the danger of the moment.

Far graver for our trade unions is the danger produced by the development of the political organization. Even the most expedient adaptation of the forms of trade union organization to the needs of a multilingual region cannot avert this danger. International organizations under a centralist leadership cannot constitute the foundation of six independent political parties. If the German and Czech Social Democrats form a single party, they will also be able to appoint in the trade union the most appropriate individual to the most important position; Czech trade unionists will be able to entrust a German, Germans trade unionists a Czech, with the leadership of their organization. But if the Austrian Social Democratic movement disintegrates into a series of independent national workers' parties that adopt different positions on the national issues of the day, the national struggle within the working population will inevitably be carried over into the trade union, the local branch and each workshop, and national disputes will erupt with every election, every statutory discussion, and every establishment of a local branch. Will the assembling of all the forces of the Austrian working population in a strictly centralized trade union organization under a unified leadership be possible under such circumstances?

To be sure, there still remains a way out: the complete separation of the trade unions from the political workers' movement. However, in Austria it is not only the weighty arguments brought against the neutralization of the trade unions in other states that speak against such a policy, but also other considerations. In Austria there is constantly the danger of every material and geographical conflict's assuming the form of a national struggle and thereby becoming irreconcilable. The trade unionists can overcome this danger only if they are filled with the Social Democratic spirit, are led by Social Democrats who discover the material social antagonism behind their national shell, who resolve the national questions within the working population, who want to realize the constitution of the proletariat as a class. This important service can, however, be provided for the trade unions only by a unified Social Democratic party that knows how to hold the masses back from participating in the power struggles of the national bourgeoisie, how to detach them from the ideology of the national power struggles. Workers fired by nationalism and the petty bourgeois national ideology are incapable of peaceful and effective collaboration within the trade union organization.

Our investigation thus inevitably leads to a clear series of conclusions: only the uniting of all the forces of the Austrian working class, without distinction according to nationality, in imperial organizations under a unified leadership, is adequate to the requirements of the trade union struggle. Whoever hinders the formation and consolidation of such organizations impedes the trade union struggle. But the international trade union organizations will

be able to develop undisturbed, will be able to overcome the national difficulties that confront them only if the workers of all the nations in Austria also have political representation in a single party. However, the question of whether the Austrian Social Democratic movement will remain a unified party is in turn dependent on its position regarding the national issues of the day, on its tactics at the national level. The tactics of the political party will also decide the future of the trade union organization. Should we decide on tactics that destroy the unity of the party and subject the workers to the influence of the moods and ideas characteristic of the national power struggles, we will not be in a position to prevent the splitting of the trade unions. The workers of Austria will pay for such a decision with a loss of wages amounting to millions of crowns and with thousands of hours of surplus labor. The politics of national forms and formulas will hinder the struggle of the members of the working class for greater participation in the culture of their nation and retard the integration of the working class into the national community of culture and the development of the entire people into a nation.

THE TACTICS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

The Social Democratic movement has a dual task. In the first place, it must awaken the forces slumbering within the proletariat and transform its potential energy into kinetic energy. It will accomplish this task by awakening the proletariat to class consciousness, by fashioning the dull resentment of the working masses and the revolutionary instinct of the exploited people into a clear recognition of class antagonisms, and by educating the masses to engage in purposeful class struggle. In this manner, the confused mass of the proletariat will become a collective body with a unified collective will; it will become a force. The sociopedagogical activity of the Social Democratic movement lays the foundations for the power of the proletariat.

The second task of the Social Democratic movement consists in deploying the force that is produced from the raw material of the class instinct through the movement's sociopedagogical activity in the struggle of the social forces in order to transform state and society in the interest of the proletariat and ultimately in order to win political power for the working class, and thereby to initiate the process of radical change to the social system. This is the political task of Social Democracy.

During the first stage of capitalist development, the sociopedagogical and political activities of Social Democracy coincide. The working class constitutes only a small part of the population, and the Social Democratic movement a small part of the working class. The workers' party knows no other task here than the critique of the class state and class society. Social Democracy thereby cultivates in the proletarian masses revolutionary convictions, a purposeful revolutionary desire. It is also through this sociopedagogical activi-

ty that it fulfills its political task: the fear of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat compels those in power to make initial concessions to the working class.

During the second stage of capitalist development, the working class does not yet constitute the majority, but already is the most numerous class of the population. The Social Democratic movement has already become dangerous for the bourgeois parties. The bourgeois parties must solicit the votes of the workers and, in order to avoid losing workers' votes to the Social Democrats, must therefore defend certain demands of the working class. The bourgeois parties do not form a unified mass, but are divided by the class interests they represent and the class ideologies they express. Social Democracy is not yet strong enough to win concessions for the proletariat on its own; however, its power is already so great that it can prevent the bourgeois parties, which at this moment are at their most hostile to the proletariat, from taking power, and it can help those bourgeois parties to victory that are prepared to fulfill the concrete proletarian demands of the day—a political reform, a law for the protection of workers and the like. The Social Democratic movement thus supports these bourgeois parties in the parliamentary ballot; it forms a coalition, a faction with them; it ultimately decides to form a governmental majority together with these parties and to send its representatives to government. The tactics of political revisionism thus emerge during the second stage of capitalist development from the endeavor to use the power already won by the proletariat as effectively, as successfully, as possible.

However, the working class cannot support this policy. The working class does not oppose any particular party but the class state, capitalist society in general. The fact of exploitation arouses its indignation, regardless of whether the state may have improved the lot of this or that group of workers by enacting a law. In the barracks, in every office, in every court, the worker learns to comprehend the bourgeois state as a class state, regardless of whether a democratic government has somewhat moderated administrative practices in regard to the workers. A strike during which infuriated young people desecrate that most sacred of things, property, brings the conflict out into the light of day; the capitalist class state cannot do without the protection of capitalist property; the working class cannot understand the fact that broken window panes must be atoned for with human lives. If the Social Democratic movement no longer opposes all the parties of the propertied classes but constitutes a party like any other, one moment joining forces with this and the next moment with that political group, perhaps even forming a part of the governmental majority and participating in government itself, the working masses treat it as essentially identical in character to the bourgeois parties; it appears itself to be an institution of the capitalist state; it shares responsibility for all the injustices that an official or an officer of the class state perpetrates against a worker, for all the wrongs that the laws of the class state inflict on

the working class, for all the misery and exploitation endured by the working people in capitalist society.

The development of the revolutionary instinct of the proletariat into a clear class consciousness falters: for the bourgeois parties, the competition for the votes of the workers is made easier, since, in alliance with the Social Democrats, they have conceded this or that reform to the working class. Large sections of the population turn away in disgust from political activity, which no longer appears to them to be the great struggle for the heritage of their class, but petty haggling over small partial successes for certain interest groups, and sink into complete political indifference. But the best and most energetic among the population fall into the arms of anarchism and antiparliamentary syndicalism due to the fact that the Social Democratic movement does not express their revolutionary cast of mind, does not embody their revolutionary will. Thus, in the endeavor to utilize the power of Social Democracy to as great an extent as possible, political revisionism blocks the sources from which this power issues by hindering the constitution of the proletariat as a class. And just as political revisionism emerges from the conditions of the political task of Social Democracy, the task of utilizing power, so too does the tendency to adopt intransigent tactics emerge from the conditions of the sociopedagogical task, the task of constituting power. Neither of these tendencies can die at this stage of capitalist development. Revisionism repeatedly emerges in a different form and is repeatedly defeated by intransigence. In the struggle between the two tendencies, in the fluctuating tactics of the party, the conflict is expressed between the conditions of the utilization of power and the conditions of the constitution of power of a proletarian party in a capitalist state—a conflict that is ultimately rooted in the fact that the working class must live in a capitalist class state and nevertheless finds it intolerable.

These difficulties are overcome only during the third stage of capitalist development. Here the proletariat already forms the overwhelming majority of the population. The conquest of political power by the proletariat already appears to the propertied classes to be an imminent danger. The bourgeois parties ally themselves closely with each other against the Social Democratic movement; that which once divided them seems now to be of little consequence in the face of the danger threatening their profits, their incomes, and the gains acquired through their monopolies. Thus, at the highest stage of capitalist development, as at its beginnings, Social Democracy is again locked in struggle with all the propertied classes, with the entire apparatus of organized state power. Here, political and sociopedagogical activities once again coincide. This stage of the class struggle ends with the conquest of political power by the working class.¹²

In order to comprehend the tactical problems of the Austrian Social Democratic movement, we must proceed from the fact that Austria too has already

reached the second stage of capitalist development. All the bourgeois parties must already solicit the votes of proletarian voters; they must thus also resolve to represent certain demands of the working class. Today the Social Democrats already constitute a considerable force in the parliament; as soon as they are strong enough to use their vote to provide one of the several competing groups of the bourgeois parties with a majority, they too will face the difficult problems that have for years so animated the French and Italian Social Democratic movements.

But even before the new conditions of the proletarian struggle could change the relationship of the working masses to the state, they had already altered the relationship of Social Democracy to the power struggles of the nations. The initial form assumed by political revisionism in Austria is that of national revisionism. Although national revisionism is still not embodied in a group within the party, it is already exerting an effect as one of the orientations of will that wrestle with one another in the consciousness of the individual representatives of the Austrian proletariat.

During the first stage of its development, Austrian Social Democracy had no part in the power struggles of the nations. However, the more the power of the workers' party grows, the more it becomes a representative of all the interests of the workers and thus also of their national interests, the stronger its representation becomes in parliamentary bodies, the more responsibility it therefore also bears for the grouping of parties and distribution of power within these bodies, the more it is dragged into the national power struggles. Once this is the case, the Social Democrats of each nation who are engaged in the struggle for the national interests of the working class they represent view the bourgeois parties of their own nation as their allies and all the parties of the other nations as their opponents. The Social Democrats of one nation initially vote in elections against the comrades of other nationalities who do not believe they can satisfy their national demands; they later vote with the bourgeois parties of their own nation against the bourgeoisie and workers of their national opponent; finally, they ally themselves with the bourgeoisie of their own nation in order to share power in a parish or a province, in order to share in the domination of the national minority. In the political struggle, the population divides itself no longer into classes that subdivide into national groups, but into nations that are composed of class parties. Class antagonism divides the parties within the nation, but the community of class interest and class ideology no longer links the class comrades of all nations.

Such a policy is nothing other than a specific case of revisionist politics in general. For if the essence of revisionist politics lies in the fact that Social Democracy no longer persists in its opposition to the bourgeois state and to all bourgeois parties, but allies itself with a section of the bourgeois parties to share in the domination of the bourgeois state, the policy of national revisionism can be understood as tending toward a state of affairs in which the

Social Democratic movement in each nation allies itself with the bourgeois parties of the same nationality in a common power struggle against the other nations and, if possible, in the shared domination of other nations.

National revisionism initially appears within the Social Democratic movements of the formerly nonhistorical nations. Here it attaches itself to the naive nationalism that has dominated the mood of the young proletariats of these nations. It gains strength due to the fact that the nations that are still composed exclusively or predominantly of oppressed and exploited classes are deprived of important national rights. When the thousands of Czech workers who have to seek work in the German industrial region do not find any elementary schools there for their children; when towns in which the majority of the population are members of the Czech nation are dominated—due to plutocratic parish voting rights—by the German bourgeoisie, which refuses to provide secondary schools for the children of Czech workers; when the Czech worker cannot defend his rights in his own language in administrative departments and before the courts, it is self-evident that the Czech workers' party must fight for the satisfaction of the national needs of the Czech proletariat. In this way, it comes to participate in the national power struggles; the ideology of the national power struggle penetrates the working population. The Social Democratic movement soon takes an interest not only in the national demands of the proletariat, not only in the elementary and secondary schools, but also in high schools and universities, not only in the language of official communication between parties, but also in the internal language of administration. In the internal power struggle, the Czech bourgeois parties appear to be the natural allies, all parties of other nationalities the natural opponents of Czech social democracy. And since national questions are always the order of the day in Austria, since all political problems are evaluated in national terms, the whole Czech nation soon comes to appear as a unified political body that only occasionally splits into class factions.

National revisionism also gradually penetrates the proletariat of the old historical nations. Here it attaches itself to the spontaneous hatred of the German worker for the foreigner who depresses wages and breaks strikes. This hatred is nourished by bourgeois elements, in particular by influential intellectuals who have developed from proponents of bourgeois democracy into proponents of proletarian democracy. But its most powerful driving force is the reaction against the revisionist politics of the Social Democracy of the nonhistorical nations.

The awakening of the nonhistorical nations expresses itself in political life through the continual growth of the power of these peoples. Seen from the proletarian standpoint, this phenomenon is by no means regrettable. For the nations to whom the dominant classes do not belong remain without culture and power only as long as the laboring people are excluded from the culture of their epoch and are without rights in the state. The growth in the

power of the nonhistorical nations thus reflects the social and political rise of the lower classes. However, for those naive people who are influenced by the ideology of the national power struggles, who comprehend all phenomena merely in concrete rather than conceptual terms, whose criteria of evaluation are national, not social, this interrelation is incomprehensible. The growth in the power of other nations appears to them to be a loss of power for their own people. And now the German workers see that their Czech comrades are not outside the power struggles of the Czech nation, but consciously promote the realization of the power of the Czech people. Must this not incite the German workers to do the same? Must they not decide to join in the power struggles on the German side, to ally themselves with the German bourgeois parties in the defense of the national assets of the German people?

Finally, in the case of all nations, revisionist aspirations are strengthened by the influence of bourgeois ideology. The ruling ideas in every epoch are after all the ideas of the ruling classes. And the proletariat cannot elude the power of the national ideology of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeois parties well know how to exploit this fact. They attempt to keep the section of the proletariat influenced by bourgeois nationalism at a distance from the class struggle by accusing Social Democracy of indifference to the destinies of the nation and of national treason. This accusation is the most dangerous means of struggle employed by the propertied classes in the political class struggle against the proletariat. Can we not wrest from the propertied classes their most important weapon if we decide to participate in the national power struggles? Do not the tactics of national revisionism in this way serve the most important task of social democracy, the detachment of the workers from all bourgeois parties and the constitution of the proletariat as a class?

However, just as necessarily as national revisionism issues from the political power relations in Austria, so too do countertendencies opposing it also emerge. For the tactics of revisionism endanger the power of the proletariat. National revisionism in the first instance destroys the unity of the party. When both the German and Czech comrades participate in the power struggles of their respective nations, cooperating with their bourgeois adversaries of the same nationality against the national adversary, advancing on the field of battle independent of one another and often against one another, the German and Czech Social Democrats can no longer coexist in the context of one party. However, the splitting of the party into independent national parties represents a considerable loss of power for the working class. The good reputation of Austrian Social Democracy is based in no small measure on the fact that it has understood how to overcome the national difficulties on which all bourgeois parties have foundered. Its power is based not least on the unified deployment of the proletarians of all nations, on the fact that it is able to count on the opposition to the bourgeois parties of all nations by the workers of the same nationality. Let us not forget that we have triumphed over the

German enemies of universal suffrage in Vienna and Graz, in Brünn and Reichenberg, its Czech enemies in Prague, and its Italian enemies in Trieste. It is hardly conceivable that independent national parties could also combine with one another in a unified campaign. In Austria, every political, every economic and sociopolitical question also assumes national significance. Would a Czech Social Democratic movement that was completely dominated by the moods and ideas of the national power struggles of the bourgeoisie have been able to fulfill its duty in the struggle for electoral reform, which demanded a good many sacrifices from the Czech nation?

But national revisionism destroys not only the unity of the party, but also, as we already know, the unity of the trade union movement and in all likelihood also that of the cooperative movement. When the national revisionists within the German Social Democratic movement in Austria deplore the destructive effects on the trade unions of the policies of the Czech comrades, they are confronting the inevitable consequences of their own policies. By imposing forms on the economic struggle of the proletariat that are inappropriate to its conditions of struggle, national revisionism diminishes the economic power of the working class and imposes heavy economic sacrifices on it. However, national revisionism not only impedes the effective utilization of the power of the proletariat that has already been won; it also hinders the process of extending power.

The phenomena of national development do not have an independent life outside social and political development; they express the development of the state and the society in a particular form. If Social Democracy seeks to judge national phenomena from the standpoint of the national power struggles, it will often find itself at odds with its own social and political demands. Democracy is the rule of the majority. How are decisions to be made where the power of our nation is based on the privilege of the minority? The proletariat opposes all plutocracy. How are decisions to be made where the power of our nation is based on the privilege of the great landowners and the bourgeoisie? The working class condemns a legal system that, in the power of the human being over the soil, masks the domination of the landless by the landowners. How are we to judge the domination of foreign immigrants by the native population of our nation? The progress of the working class of each nation is conditioned by the development of the proletariat of the other nations. Should we promote the cultural development of the workers of other nations or oppose it as a loss of power for our own nation? The proletariat condemns "the privileges of nations just as it does those of birth and of gender, of property and of descent." However, the ultimate goal of all national power struggles is the preservation or conquest of the power of our nation over the other peoples.

Through the use of revisionist tactics, Social Democracy thus finds itself in a curious situation. It participates in the national power struggles, but it

can never do so to the same extent as the bourgeois parties, which are founded on economic exploitation and political oppression and are therefore able to defend national violation. If the Social Democratic movement allies itself with bourgeois parties to secure a political or a social reform, it always appears to be the most radical and energetic of the allied groups, as that group that drives the others forward; if, on the other hand, the Social Democratic movement of one nation allies itself with its bourgeois compatriots in the national power struggle, the Social Democrats appear to be the most moderate of the parties in the coalition. The bourgeois parties appear to be more radical than they, being able to outdo each of their demands. Social Democracy seeks to assemble the revolutionary classes of our society under its banner, the class with "radical chains." Does it correspond to its historical situation in regard to the important questions that almost constantly dominate, almost completely fill political life, to appear to be a party like any other, distinguished from the other parties merely by its moderation and good sense?

But if our national policies differ from those of the bourgeoisie only in terms of the degree of their restraint, there will be no longer any qualitative difference between us and the national parties, but only a quantitative one; as a result, the extent to which we give our allegiance to the bourgeoisie in the national power struggle will always appear questionable in the concrete case, the point at which we and the bourgeois nationalists go our separate ways. National revisionism thus leads to vacillating, uncertain, apprehensive tactics, to a form of struggle that least befits a party of the masses that has set out to win for the exploited and the disinherited the treasures of the world.

National revisionism thus appears pernicious for the party. It is necessarily opposed by the goal of deploying tactics that are international in principle, of realizing a form of struggle that keeps the proletarian masses at a distance from the national power struggles without thereby evading decisions regarding national questions, one that rather opposes the national power struggles of the bourgeoisie with the principles of the Social Democratic nationalities program and thereby gradually makes the demands of our program the secure property of the masses.

If, for example, the demand of the Czech bourgeoisie for the use of Czech as the language of internal administration is at issue, the German and Czech Social Democrats will show that the response to this question is dependent on neither the external size nor the cultural development of the two nations, that the struggle over the language of internal administration does not at all concern the interests of the working class, but merely masks the rivalries within the intelligentsia, that the bureaucratic administrative apparatus, whatever language it employs, represents a form of foreign rule for the working class, and that it is only the replacement of bureaucratic administration by democratic self-administration that is capable of solving the national problems.

If it is the demand of the German bourgeoisie for the national definition of the administrative regions and the court districts in Bohemia that is the order of the day, the Czech Social Democrats will oppose the Czech bourgeoisie; they will confront the foolish accusation that the land is being dismembered with the far graver charge of national dismemberment, and they will show that a legal definition of the language region is a necessary precondition of national self-administration. However, the German Social Democrats will reproach the German bourgeoisie for refusing the minority in Styria and the Tyrol that which it demands itself in Bohemia; they will show that national delimitation is worthless if democratic self-administration is not implemented in the legally divided regions of settlement of the nations; they will demand that national delimitation become the basis of national self-administration, not the means of subjugation of the national minorities.

If the rights of the national minorities are disputed, the German and Czech Social Democrats will object to the bourgeoisie of their nations that it has no right to complain about the lack of rights of its own minorities as long as it continues to deprive the foreign minorities on its soil of their rights. They will condemn the bourgeoisie that yammers about the diminution of its national population as a consequence of the loss of national minorities and yet at the same time looks on while the growth of the nation is hindered by the murderous effects of capitalist exploitation. They will also show that the repression of foreign immigrants arises from the domination by the landowners of the landless, whereas, by contrast, the proletariat of every nation is favored by the progress of the working class of the other nations. Finally, they will also prove that it is only by constituting the nations as autonomous corporations that the difficult question of the national minorities can be solved peacefully and to the benefit of all peoples.

We will thus uncover the social roots of the national struggles by showing that the propertied classes disguise their class struggles and rivalries in the form of national power struggles. We will thus demonstrate the national content of the class struggle by proving that it is only the class struggle of the proletariat of all nations that is capable of gaining free self-administration, only socialism that is capable of realizing the national community of culture and implementing the principle of nationality. As a rule, we will be able to confirm the unity of the proletariat through a unanimous vote. But should it occur that the Czech comrades vote with the Czech bourgeoisie and the German comrades with the German bourgeoisie, this will no longer constitute a threat to the unity of the proletarian movement, given that the preceding discussion has clearly shown that the impossibility of a completely unified proletarian policy is merely a consequence of the intolerable character of the centralist-atomist state constitution and that which divides the proletarians of different nationalities is ridiculously small beside the enormous gulf separating the working class as a whole from the propertied classes of all nations.

Such a policy will increase the power of the proletariat. It will ensure the unity of the party, the undisturbed and unified consolidation of the trade unions and the cooperatives; it will compel the bourgeois parties to declare their position regarding our nationalities program and thereby prepare the way for the implementation of national autonomy; it will endow the masses with the idea that the growth and cultural development of the nations is far less dependent on national quarrels than it is on political, economic, and sociopolitical measures and thereby promote many a democratic and sociopolitical reform that will constitute a severe impediment to the antiworker economic policies of the cartel magnates, the landowners, and the guild members.

Such a politics of principle will also favor the development of proletarian class consciousness, thus laying the foundations for the future growth of the power of the working class. For now we will no longer be a national party like the others; our nationalities policy will appear qualitatively, not merely quantitatively, different from the bourgeois nationalities policy. This politics of principle will be assured of the approval of the laboring masses because it will correspond to the revolutionary cast of mind of the proletariat. For now we will be no longer the most moderate, but the most radical of all parties on the national field of battle. For it will be only we who can, only we who want to win for every nation the capacity to expand its community of culture, only we who want to incorporate the entire people into the national community of culture, only we who want to assure every nation of political unity and liberty.

However, just as political revisionism is ineradicable in the second stage of capitalist development and has to be repeatedly conquered anew by intransigent revolutionary tactics, so too in Austria at this developmental stage national revisionism cannot die as long as national autonomy has not been realized. The conflict between national revisionism and the international tactics of principle arises from the fact that the working class is subjected to the centralist-atomist state constitution and yet finds it intolerable. It is thus up to the representatives of the tactics of principle to be at every moment numerous and energetic enough to prevent national revisionist aspirations from destroying the proletarian movement.

We cannot guarantee the unity of Austrian Social Democracy by avoiding taking a position on national questions and masking the differences of opinion within our ranks. It is rather a case of clarifying opinions through painstaking discussion, acquainting the mass of the organized party comrades with the unresolved disputes, and calling on them to decide. Only in this manner will we be gradually able to achieve understanding among the Social Democrats of all nations.

We must fill the gaps in our nationalities program by demanding that national minorities be constituted as corporations under public law. Second, we must oblige our parliamentary representatives and our party press to conform

to the international tactics of principle. To ensure unity of action in this manner, we must also adapt our political organizations. We must see to the organic federation of the Social Democratic organizations of different nationalities in the individual districts, constituencies, and provinces: in every district, constituency, and province in which organizations of different nationalities are active there must be a collective organization in which the national organizations are represented according to the number of organized comrades. The decisions of these collective organizations concerning the activity of the party in regard to public elections, demonstrations, and so on must be binding on all party comrades irrespective of nationality. In other respects, the autonomy of the national organizations must remain inviolable. Finally, the unified centralist development of the trade union movement and the international organization of the consumer associations must be guaranteed. If an understanding can be achieved on this basis, the work initiated by the party congresses of 1897 and 1899 will be completed and the Austrian proletariat will have been forged into a powerful collective body that is ruled by the collective will and yet does not hinder the growth of its individual members, but instead energetically promotes it. However, if such an understanding is not achieved, if national revisionism actually succeeds in tearing the party into a number of independent national workers' parties, this split will be only temporary. As soon as the pernicious effects of the national revisionist policy become visible, the countermovement opposing revisionism within the individual Social Democratic parties will very rapidly increase in strength.

The trade unionists will constitute the core of this countermovement. They will very quickly see that the splitting of the party also entails the tearing apart of the trade unions. They will find allies in those who, filled with the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, cannot tolerate the prospect of the revolutionary Social Democratic movement's becoming a national party like any other, distinguished from the bourgeois parties by nothing other than the measure of its statesmanlike restraint. Among them will be those realists who see all too well that national revisionism is capable of winning national advantages for only small strata of the workers, while at the same time reducing the power of the proletariat as a whole and thereby hindering the cultural development of the whole nation. Finally, they will be joined by the educated who comprehend the petty national struggles in Austria as an insignificant side effect of the great process of social transformation being experienced by all the civilized nations of our epoch. The force of this tendency will be strengthened by the gradual development of Austria toward national autonomy, by the intensification of class conflicts with the approach of the third stage of capitalist development, and finally also by the influence of the mental universe of the proletariat abroad on the Austrian workers. For if Austrian Social Democracy were to be filled with the ideology of the national power struggles, while in

London and Berlin, in Paris and Rome, the idea of internationalism acquired an increasingly determining character in the struggle against imperialism, we would be excluding ourselves, if not formally from the society, then spiritually from the community of the proletarian International.

But the Austrian working class is not indifferent to the question of whether the unity of the proletarian movement will be maintained or whether the party and the trade unions will disintegrate and the national splinters reunified only through intense struggles. We do not doubt that the overwhelming majority of organized party comrades of German nationality desire the unity of the party and the trade unions. These comrades should consider the fact that national revisionism will unavoidably lead to the splitting of the proletarian movement. In recent decades, national revisionism also has gained strength within German Social Democracy. It found initial expression in an uncertain and fluctuating assessment of national questions in the party press, in a number of imprecise formulations. It then converted a great many comrades to the view that the struggles of the Czech workers were of no concern to the German Social Democrats; our party press thus initially ignored these struggles, and certain comrades already expressed opposition to them. If German and Czech Social Democrats act quite separately from one another, it necessarily appears quite logical when, during a public election, the German minority in a town no longer feels itself bound by the decisions of the Czech majority and excludes itself (irrespective of whether this is tactically correct or not) from the course of action upon which the majority of the Czech comrades have decided. Where this path leads has been illustrated in a number of parish elections in which the German workers voted with the German bourgeoisie against the Czech workers and the Czech bourgeoisie. It is necessary that we comprehend such phenomena, but we cannot condone them. It can be seen that there are also comrades within the German Social Democratic movement pursuing tactics that have already gained the upper hand within the Czech movement. The issue in the party is not one of a conflict between Germans and Czechs, but one of a struggle between national revisionist tactics and international tactics of principle, a struggle that must be fought out within every national group within the Social Democratic movement. We cannot effectively combat the policies of certain Czech comrades, who are tearing the party apart and splitting the trade unions, if we do not fight down the national revisionism in our own ranks! If German Social Democracy wants to defend the unity of the party and the trade unions, it must oppose the national revisionist tactics of certain Czech comrades with an international tactics of principle.

It may be that through this policy certain mandates will initially be placed in danger. But mandates are useless if they are only to be bought by the diminution of the economic and political power of the working class. But a policy that arises from the revolutionary spirit of the masses, that promotes

their class interests and expresses their class morale can be assured of the support of the masses. We will not fear the slanderous critique by those who accuse us of national indifference and even of the betrayal of national interests if we comprehend the historical task of the proletarian class struggle in the process of development of the nation.

Following the dissolution of clan communism, the nation was divided into members and tenants of the nation, separated into only loosely connected restricted local spheres. It was the development of social production that first reunited the nation as a whole in a unified community of culture. We are placing ourselves at the service of this development by expanding the national community of culture through the class struggle within capitalist society, by ultimately breaking open the shell of social production and thereby realizing the unified community of education, work, and culture.

The rule by the members of the nation of the tenants of the nation subjects the nonhistorical nations to foreign domination by the historical nations. The division of the nation into restricted local spheres provides the basis for the division of the nations by the state, for political particularism. It is the development of social production that first gives rise to the principle of nationality, the demand that the internal community become the substratum of external power. We are placing ourselves at the service of this development by already making the principle of nationality the rule of the state constitution within capitalist society, where it is still unable to establish itself as the maxim of state formation; finally, we will ensure the triumph of the principle of nationality by liberating social production from its capitalist form and thereby guaranteeing every nation an existence in a unified and free polity.

We are thus fulfilling our national task by leading the proletariat into the struggle against the class state and the class society. The principle of international policies, which constitutes a demand of the proletarian class struggle, is therefore also an instrument of our national policy. We must unite the proletarians of all nations in a powerful body pervaded by a unified will in order to make the treasures of our national culture the property of the whole nation, in order to win for our nation unity and liberty.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

I wish to thank Joe O'Donnell, Conal Condren, Michael Freeden, Laurence Davis, Gavin Kitching, Benedikte Brincker, and Grigoris Ananiadis for their comments and suggestions.

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20. Nira Yuval-Davis, "Ethnicity, Gender Relations, and Multiculturalism," in *Debating Cultural Hybridity*, ed. Pnina Werner and Tariq Modood (London: Zed Press, 1997), 198.
21. Karl Renner, "Staat und Nation," in *Schriften* (Vienna: Residenz-Verlag, 1994), 21.
22. Nicholas Stargardt, "Origins of the Constructivist Theory of the Nation," in *Notions of Nationalism*, ed. Sukumar Periwal (Central European University Press, 1995), 100.
23. B. F. Pauley, *The Habsburg Legacy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972), 23.
24. E. Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis*, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 1994), 120.
25. Manuel García-Pelayo, *El tema de las nacionalidades en la teoría de la nación en Otto Bauer* (Madrid: Fundación Pablo Iglesias, 1979); Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, 120–21.
26. James Joll, *The Second International* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 122.
27. C. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton University Press, 1994). See *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Gesamtparteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in Österreich Brünn* (Vienna: 1899). For a Spanish translation, see Conrado Ceretti, *La Segunda Internacional y el Problema Nacional y Colonial* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1978), 181–217. For an English summary, see A. G. Kogan, "The Social Democrats and the Conflict of Nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy," *Journal of Modern History* 21 (1949) 204–17, and Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism* 124–31.
28. Jurgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," in *Multiculturalism*, ed. Gutmann.
29. Fred Halliday, "Bringing the 'Economic' Back In: The Case of Nationalism," *Economy and Society* 21, no. 4 (November 1992), 487.
30. A. Rabinbach, *The Crisis of Austrian Socialism* (University of Chicago Press, 1983), 7.
31. W. M. Johnson, *The Austrian Mind* (University of California Press, 1972), 99.
32. Robert Kann, *The Multinational Empire* (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 104; G. Marramao, *Dopo il Leviatano: Individuo e comunità nella filosofia politica* (Turin:

G. Giappiachelli, 1995), 191; H. Mommsen, *Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat* (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1963).

33. Kurt Shell, *The Transformation of Austrian Socialism* (State University of New York, 1962), 11.

34. M. Sully, *Continuity and Change in Austrian Socialism: The Eternal Quest for the Third Way* (Columbia University Press, 1982), 13.

35. Mommsen, *Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage*, 175–76.

36. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 60.

37. Will Kymlicka, ed., *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 113; F. Engels, “The Democratic Panslavism,” and “The Magyar Struggle,” in *Marx and Engels: Collected Works (MECW)*, vol. 8 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977, 227, 362–68; see also Leopoldo Marmora, *Nation und Internationalismus: Probleme und Perspektiven eines sozialistischen Nationbegriffs* (Bremen: Ludinghausen: Periferia, 1983), Spanish translation *El concepto socialista de nación*, series Cuadernos de pasado y presente no. 96 (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1986).

38. J. R. Recalde, *La Construcción de las Naciones* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1982), 279. See also Rudolf Schlesinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Kegan Paul, 1945); D. Petrosino, *Stati, nazione, etnie: Il pluralismo etnico e nazionali nella teoria sociologica contemporanea* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1991).

39. N. Leser, “Austro-Marxism; A Reappraisal,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 11 (1976), 134.

40. E. Nimni, “Marx and the National Question,” in Kymlicka, *The Rights of Minority Cultures*.

41. G. Marramao, *Dopo il Leviatano*, 200–201.

42. J. Aricó, “Advertencia,” in *La cuestión de las nacionalidades y la socialdemocracia* (Spanish translation), Otto Bauer (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1979), ix–xvi.

43. John Coakley, “Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy of Non-Territorial Autonomy,” *International Political Science Review* 15, no. 3 (1994), 297–314 (p. 311 cited).

44. Renner, “Staat und Nation,” 27–31.

45. Renner cited in A. Agnelli, *Questione nazionale e socialismo: Contributo allo studio del pensiero de K. Renner e O. Bauer* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1969), 97.

46. F. Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1917). For an English translation, see *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, trans. Robert B. Kimber, with an introduction by Felix Gilbert (Princeton University Press, 1970).

47. Renner, “Staat und Nation,” 29.

48. J. Tully, *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 197–98.

49. Carlile Aylmer Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), 149.

50. Bikhu Parekh, “Cultural Pluralism and the Limits of Diversity,” 20, no. 43 (1995), 431–57 (p. 436 cited).

51. Pnina Webner, “Essentialising Essentialism, Essentialising Silence: Ambivalence and Multiplicity in the Construction of Racism and Ethnicity,” in *Debating Cultural Hybridity*, ed. P. Webner and T. Modood (London: Zed Press, 1987), 226–54 (p. 248 cited).

52. Michael Forman, *Nationalism and the International Labor Movement* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 107.
53. *Ibid.*, 108.
54. Robert Kann, "Karl Renner," *Journal of Modern History* 23 (1951), 243–49 (p. 244 cited).
55. Roni Gechtman, "Yidischer Sotsialismus," Department of Hebrew and Judaic Studies, New York University, 1998, 7.
56. U. Ra'anan, "Nation and State: Order Out of Chaos," in *State and Nation in Multiethnic Societies*, ed. U. Ra'anan et al. (Manchester University Press, 1991) 3–32.
57. Bikhu Parekh, "Dilemmas of a Multicultural Theory of Citizenship," *Constellations* 4, no. 1 (1997), 54–62 (p. 60 cited).
58. Bikhu Parekh, "British Citizenship and Cultural Difference," in *Citizenship*, ed. Geoff Andrews (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991), 194.
59. Ra'anan, "Nation and State," 25.
60. Will Kymlicka and Christine Straehle, "Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism: A Critical Review of Recent Literature," *European Journal of Philosophy* 7, no. 1 (April 1999), 65–68.
61. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition."
62. Parekh, "British Citizenship and Cultural Difference," 185.
63. Jennifer Jackson Preece, "National Minorities and the International System," *Politics* 18, no. 1 (1998), 17–23 (p. 17 cited).
64. Otto Bauer, "Was ist Austro-Marxismus?" *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 3 November 1927, 45. For an English translation, see *Austro-Marxism*, trans. T. Bottomore (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 45–46. See also G. Marramao, *Austromarxismo e Socialismo di Sinistra fra le due Guerre* (Milan: La Pietra, 1977), 11.
65. See Marramao, *Austromarxismo e Socialismo*, 13.
66. See Bottomore, trans., *Austro-Marxism*, 10.
67. *Ibid.*, *Austro-Marxism*, 45.
68. M. Walzer, commentary in A. Gutmann, ed., *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton University Press, 1994), 99.
69. *Marx-Studien* was a theoretical journal aimed at an academic audience and modeled on the influential *Kant-Studien*.
70. M. Adler, *Kausalität und Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft* (Causality and teleology in the dispute over science), *Marx Studien* 1 (Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1904). For an Italian translation, see *Causalità e Teleologia nell'Disputa sull'Scienza*, with an introduction by R. Racinaro (Bari: De Donato Editori, 1976).
71. D. Albers, ed., *Otto Bauer und die "Dritte Weg"* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1979).
72. Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1936 [1913]). Internet: http://www.lueneburg.net/privatseiten/eggerts_wolfgang/eng/est1913.html.
73. Michel Löwy, *Fatherland or Mother Earth? Essays on the National Question* (London: Pluto Press, 1998), 2. For an appraisal of the Marxist dimension in Bauer's theory and the scholastic debate that ensued from Bauer's work, see Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*.
74. Ananiadis, "Rationalism and Historicism," 171.
75. Agnelli, *Questione nazionale e socialismo*, 121–22.

76. Bottomore, trans., *Austro-Marxism*, 15.
77. For a more expansive discussion of this critique, see Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, 131–41.
78. See Adler, *Kausalität und Teleologie*, p. 167 and chap. 15.
79. Bottomore, trans., *Austro-Marxism*, 16; G. Mozetic, *Die Gesellschaftstheorie des Austromarxismus* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftlich Buchgesellschaft, 1987).
80. Adler, *Kausalität und Teleologie*, 22.
81. *Ibid.*, 176–77.
82. Bottomore, trans., *Austro-Marxism*, 65.
83. Ananiadis, “Rationalism and Historicism,” 51.
84. G. Haupt, “Les Marxistes face à la Question Nationale: l’histoire du problème,” in *Les Marxistes et la Question Nationale*, by G. Haupt, C. Weill, and M. Löwy (Paris: Maspero, 1974), 47.
85. H. Mommsen, *Arbeiterbewegung und nationale Frage* (Gottigen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1979), 75–76.
86. M. R. Krätke, “Otto Bauer (1881–1938): Die Mühen des Dritten Weges,” in *Zeitschrift für Sozialistische Politik und Wirtschaft* 98 (1997). Internet: http://www.koeln-online.de/spw/9706/otto_bauer.html.
87. Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism*, 147.
88. A. Pfabigan, “The Political Feasibility of the Austro-Marxist Proposals for the Solution of the Nationality Problem of the Danubian Monarchy,” in U. Ra’anan et al., eds., *State and Nation in Multiethnic Societies*, 53–66 (pp. 54–55 cited).
89. García-Pelayo, *El tema de las nacionalidades*, 23.
90. M. Budd, *Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology* (London: Routledge, 1989), 95.
91. Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 199.
92. H. Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” in *Nation and Narration*, ed. H. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 291–322 (p. 292 cited).
93. Ananiadis, “Rationalism and Historicism,” 160.
94. *Ibid.*, 161.
95. Bhabha, “DissemiNation”; H. Bhabha, ed. *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994).
96. Pierre Duhem, *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory* (New York: Atheneum, 1981).
97. Claudie Weill, “Introduction,” in *La question des nationalités et la social-démocratie* (French translation), by Otto Bauer (Paris: EDI, 1987), 2–20.
98. George Stack, “Nietzsche’s Earliest Essays: Translation and Commentary on ‘Fate and History’ and ‘Freedom of Will and Fate,’” *Philosophy Today* 37, no. 2 (1993), 153; Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (London: Kegan Paul, 1893).
99. García-Pelayo, *El tema de las nacionalidades*, 24.
100. Although the term *Gleichartigkeit* can also be translated as “homogeneity,” Bauer’s use of the term is in most cases more accurately translated as “similarity.” In the historical case cited here, for example, Bauer refers to similar rather than identical or homogeneous modes of existence resulting from the conditions of capitalist development. We are grateful to Grigoris Ananiadis for this insight.
101. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (English trans.) (New York: Random House, 1958), 131.

102. Agnelli, *Questione Nazionale e socialismo*, 135; García-Pelayo, *El tema de las nacionalidades*, 26.
103. U. Schöler, "Wie aktuell ist Otto Bauer?" *Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte* 42, no. 7 (July 1995), 617–21 (p. 620 cited).
104. García-Pelayo, *El tema de las nacionalidades*, 26–27.
105. Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London: Sage, 1997), 20.
106. A. Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (London: Polity Press, 1998), 130.
107. A. D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era* (London: Polity Press, 1998), 147. See also Gurutz Jáuregui Bereciartu, *Contra el Estado Nación* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1986). For an English translation of the latter, see *Decline of the Nation State*, trans. William A. Douglas (University of Nevada Press, 1994).

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

1. Bauer refers here to the fact that his work was originally published in the *Marx-Studien* (Marxist Studies) series edited by Max Adler and Rudolf Hilferding—*Trans.*
2. The use of the term *Gesamtpartei*, or "whole party," to refer to the Austrian Social Democratic Party was based on its multinational character as an imperial Austrian organization. The term derived from the definition of the party formed in 1888–89 with the uniting of the Czech and Austro-German socialist labor movements as *Gesamt-österreichisch*, or "All-Austrian."—*Trans.*

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

1. When Bauer referred to general suffrage or universal suffrage as introduced in his own time, it should be taken to mean male suffrage. However, in his normative claims about suffrage and the expansion of the national community he did not exclude women. In this latter case, universal suffrage should be understood in its contemporary meaning.—*Ed.*
2. *Der Kampf* was a Social Democratic monthly edited by Otto Bauer, Adolf Braun, and Karl Renner and published by Georg Emmerling in Vienna between 1907 and 1934. From 1934 to 1938, it was published in Prague and Brünn (Brno). — *Trans.*
3. Otto Bauer, "Ein Nationalitätenprogramm der 'Linken,'" in *Otto Bauer Werkausgabe (OBW)*, vol. 8 (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1980), 947–54. — *Trans.*
4. Otto Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution*, in *OBW*, vol. 2 (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1976), 489–866; English translation *The Austrian Revolution*, trans. by H. J. Stenning (London: L. Parsons, 1925).
5. Mikhail Ivanovitch Tugan-Baranovski (1865–1919) was a Russian economist and politician who held professorships in Saint Petersburg and Kiev and in 1917 was briefly finance minister in the Ukrainian national government. Originally a Marxist, he later adopted a revisionist position, attempting to combine Marxist ideas with the approaches of the historical-law and marginal-utility schools of thought. In the debate on the industrial development of Russia in the 1890s, he adopted the position of "legal Marxism," arguing that Russia also needed to undergo a capitalist phase as part of its progress toward socialism. For Hilferding's ideas, see Rudolf Hilferding, *Das Finanz-*

kapital (Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1910), trans. by Tom Bottomore as *Finance Capital* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985). — *Trans.*

6. Otto Bauer, "Bemerkungen zur Nationalitätenfrage," *Neue Zeit*, 26th year, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: J. H. W. Diety Nachf, 1908). [*Neue Zeit* was a German Social Democratic weekly published in Stuttgart by Paul Singer between 1883 and 1923 and edited by Karl Kautsky. — *Trans.*]

7. Pierre Duhem, *Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien*, trans. from French by Friedrich Adler (Leipzig, 1908) [*La théorie physique, son objet, sa structure* (Paris: Chevalier et Rivière, 1906); English trans. by Philip P. Wiener as *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954). — *Trans.*]

8. Duhem, *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory*, 64. — *Trans.*

9. *Ibid.*, 92. — *Trans.*

10. Kautsky, *Nationalität und Internationalität*, supplementary issues to *Neue Zeit*, 26th year, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: J. H. W. Diety Nachf, 1908). Karl Kautsky, *Die Befreiung der Nation* (Stuttgart: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf, 1917).

11. Illyrism was a Croatian movement of national and cultural awakening, 1830–50, the primary objective of which was the union of the southern Slavs. — *Trans.*

12. Wilhelm Max Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie; Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos, und Sitte*, vol. 1, *Die Sprache* (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1900).

13. Leo Jordan, *Sprache und Gesellschaft. Hauptprobleme der Soziologie. Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber*, I (Leipzig, 1923).

14. Hermann Paul, *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte* (Halle, 1886).

I. THE NATION

1. Walter Bagehot, *Der Ursprung der Nation: Betrachtungen über den Einfluss der natürlichen Zuchtwahl und der Vererbung auf die Bildung politischer Gemeinwesen* (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1874), 25.

2. *Neue Zeit*, 23rd year, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: J. H. W. Diety Nachf, 19), 464.

3. The question of whether the German worker shares more characteristics with the German bourgeois or with the French worker has nothing to do with the question of whether the politics of the German worker should be class based or nationally based, whether he should unite with the proletarians of all countries against international capital or with the German bourgeoisie against other peoples. Resolving this question entails considerations quite separate from the discussion of the strength of the different communities of character.

4. Werner Sombart, *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: G. Bondi, 1903), 128 ff. [Werner Sombart (1863–1941) was a German economist and sociologist whose chief work, *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, first appeared in 1902. Sombart divided the history of capitalism into early, high, and late periods, and he argued that it had been created by a spirit generated in the late Middle Ages chiefly associated with the Jews. — *Trans.*]

5. On the shortcomings of this view, particularly the question of the genesis of law, see Rudolf Stammler, *Wissenschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung: Eine sozialphilosophische Untersuchung* (Leipzig: Veit, 1896), 315 ff.

6. Fichte grasps this metaphysical concept of the nation more profoundly when he

writes: "A people is the totality of individuals in the society living with one another and constantly reproducing themselves naturally and spiritually, a totality that is subject to a certain particular law governing the development of the divine out of that totality. It is the fact that this particular law is common to all which unites this people as a natural totality imbued with itself in the eternal and thereby also the temporal world." (Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Reden an die deutschen Nation* [Leipzig: Reclam], p. 116.) Each human being is seen here as nothing more than one of the countless manifestations of the divine; however, the divine is subject to various laws, and it is only those manifestations of the divine that are subject to the same laws that form the nations. The spirit of the people is one of the manifestations of the divine, and the individual is one of the manifestations of the spirit of the people. Fichte adopts this metaphysics of the nation even though, earlier in the work (p. 52 in the Reclam edition), he comes very close to formulating the correct, empirical concept of the nation. It is characteristic of post-Kantian dogmatic idealism that even where it is capable of correctly grasping a phenomenon in empiricohistorical terms, it remains unsatisfied and wants to make the scientifically correctly defined empirical phenomenon into the manifestation of a metaphysical being distinct from that phenomenon.

7. Richard von Hertwig (1850–1937) was a German biologist who observed the process of parthenogenesis by artificially stimulating the development of sea urchin eggs. His brother, the embryologist Oskar Hertwig (1849–1922), was the first to recognize that the fusion of the nuclei of the sperm and ovum was the essential event in fertilization. — *Trans.*

8. August Weismann (1834–1914) was a German biologist best known as the author of the germ plasm theory of heredity, with its accompanying denial of the transmission of acquired characters, a theory that met with considerable opposition from orthodox Darwinians. — *Trans.*

9. Wilhelm Max Wundt, *System der Philosophie* (Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1897), 280 ff.

10. *Ibid.*, 285 ff.

11. The materialist conception of history does not stand in contradiction to the theory of heredity, but it certainly conflicts with national materialism, which, instead of understanding the *hereditary substance*, the germ plasm, as itself materially determined by ancestral history, believes it has solved every enigma by identifying a material substratum of the nation. This illustrates once again the inaccuracy of referring to Karl Marx's conception of history as materialist—in the sense in which the term is used in contemporary scholarship.

12. The reference is probably to the biologist Barthold Hatschek. — *Trans.*

13. Moritz Wagner (1813–17) was a zoologist and explorer who wrote on Darwin's theory of selection with reference to migration and geographical separation. — *Trans.*

14. The reference is to the "Waterkant," literally "edge of the water," region on the North Sea coast of Germany where the Low German dialect is spoken. — *Trans.*

15. *Sippschaft* or *Sippe*, translated here as "clan," refers to a relation or group defined in terms of patrilineal descent. *Magschaft*, translated here as "kin group," refers to the relations defining a descent group whose initiating point is a sibling relation—hence Bauer's later reference to the significance of the maternal uncle. — *Trans.*

16. The term *Völkerschaft* is used here by Bauer to denote the loose groupings of clans which he sees as historically preceding the emergence of clearly defined tribal units

[*Stämme*] with distinct territorial and ethnic identities, and, in Bauer's sense, distinct characters. — *Trans.*

17. Karl Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gaertner, 1891), 276 f.

18. The finds at Hallstat in Upper Austria and La Tène in Switzerland led to the association of the two sites with the Early Iron Age and the high point of Iron Age development, respectively. La Tène, in particular, revealed evidence of diverse influences by a range of peoples (Celts, Scythians, Greeks, Etruscans) on the inhabitants of this area. — *Trans.*

19. Otto Bremer, "Ethnographie der germanischen Stämme," in *Grundriß der germanischen Philologie*, vol. 3, ed. Hermann Paul (Strasbourg: Trübner, 1899), 787 f.

20. The status of "unfree," held by the *Knecht* or *Unfreie*, was given to prisoners of war, those born unfree, and those unable to pay off debts. It entailed a servile relationship to a master, who answered for the unfree in all juridical matters. The status of "semifree"—*Halbfreie* or *Minderfreie*—was held by those who had been "given their freedom," who were recognized as juridical persons with limited rights. This group also included "lites" [*Liten*], members of subjugated, usually related tribes. The semifree were not attached to a recognized clan and were thus dependent on the protection of their patron, who could in turn demand varying degrees of service in labor and kind. *Freie*, or freemen, were capable of bearing arms and possessing political rights. — *Trans.*

21. The Wends or Sorbs, a Slavic people formerly spread over northern Germany and today still forming part of the population in eastern Saxony. — *Trans.*

22. *Staufen* or *Hohenstaufen* refers to the Swabian lineage that held the German and imperial crowns from 1138 to 1254. Under Conrad III and Frederick I Barbarossa, the Staufen expanded the German Empire southward, eventually controlling most of Italy and Sicily, as well as the German duchies. The Hohenstaufen era is also associated with the cultural achievements of the High Middle Ages. — *Trans.*

23. Ministerials or *Ministeriales* were the members of an estate (ministerialage) whose common characteristic was their obligation to serve a lord. Their status varied with that of their lord, but broadly speaking they constituted a class of servile warriors and officials who remained distinct from the nobility for centuries. — *Trans.*

24. The Field of May [*Maifeld*] was the site of an annual assembly and military parade of the powerful within the Frankish Empire established at the beginning of the Merovingian dynasty, where matters of war, peace, and law were discussed. Originally called the Field of March [*Märzfeld*], it was renamed when Pepin the Younger changed the time of the assembly to May in 755. — *Trans.*

25. The *Wessobrunner Gebet* was a document from the beginning of the ninth century in Old High German. The *Ludwiglied*, the first German historical ode, was written in Old High German and celebrates the victory of the West Frank Louis III over the Normans in 881 near Saucourt. The *Waltharilied* [*Waltharius*] was a heroic epic thought to have been composed by the monk Ekehart I. Written in unrhymed Latin hexameters, it tells the story of Walter of Aquitaine. — *Trans.*

26. Laws were introduced in 1037 and 1136, during the reigns of Conrad II and Lothar III, respectively, that granted the vassal hereditary and inalienable rights to his property, ensured that vacated secular fiefs were granted to other vassals, and increased the number of allodial properties. — *Trans.*

27. Walter von der Vogelweide (1168–1228), one of the most important German poets of the Middle Ages, produced works addressing themes of politics, contemporary

life, and courtly custom and love. Bauer quotes a passage here from “Preis der Deutschen” [In praise of the Germans]. See *Deutsches Mittelalter*, selected by Friedrich von der Leyen and with an introduction by Peter Wapnewski (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel-Verlag, 1980), 272. — *Trans.*

28. Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. 1, 16.

29. The term *Hintersassen* is of medieval origin and originally denoted those living on and farming land as “tenants”—that is, persons who did not have property rights and existed in a dependent relationship to a feudal landholder. The term was used up to the nineteenth century and, in a later period, denoted the lower and poorer classes, which had only restricted rights to citizenship and property. (See Ephraim Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism* [London: Pluto Press, 1991], 223.) It is difficult to find a ready equivalent to Bauer’s frequent use of the term in association with the national community, where it denotes the opposite of “members of the nation” [*Nationsgenossen*], with associated meanings of historical, political, and above all cultural exclusion. “Tenants of the nation” is thus to be understood in this wider sense. — *Trans.*

30. Gottfried von Strassburg was one of the great German epic poets of the High Middle Ages. His major work, *Fristan and Isolde*, is a courtly epic composed around 1210. — *Trans.*

31. Wo yez die pawrn sune (*Söhne*) gewinnen / machens all zu handwercksleuten— / wer will hacken oder reuten? — *Trans.*

32. Die Fürsten twingent mit Gewalt / Feld, Steine, Wasser, unde Wald. — *Trans.*

33. This is an abbreviation of *Constitutio Criminalis Carolina*, the first universal German criminal code, which was promulgated under Charles V in 1532 and served for a long period as the basis of German penal and procedural law. Influenced by Roman law, it introduced systematic procedural principles, but retained many of the cruelties of medieval punishment. — *Trans.*

34. Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, vol. 1, 132; vol. 2, 13, 87. [English trans. *Capital*, vol. 2 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1974), 36, 119. — *Trans.*]

35. Wolfram von Eschenbach (1170–1220), epic poet and knight whose principal work is *Parzival*. The passage Bauer quotes here is from *Willehalm*. See Hanz-Friedrich Rosenfeld, ed., *Wilhelm von Wenden* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957). — *Trans.*

36. Hartmann von Aue (1168–1210), epic poet who is thought to have been a ministerial, that is, one in service to a territorial lord or a crown vassal. The passage quoted here is from *Der arme Heinrich*. See ed. and trans., Helmut de Boor, *Mittelhochdeutscher Text und Übertragung* (Frankfurt a.M. und Hamburg: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1967), 6–7. — *Trans.*

37. Georg Steinhausen, *Geschichte der deutschen Kultur* (Leipzig und Vienna: Bibliographisches Institut, 1904), 461.

38. Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. 6, 8 ff.

39. Ulrich von Hutten (1488–1523), German knight and poet who, with Franz von Sickingen, gave his support to the Reformation. The passage Bauer quotes is from *Clag und vormanung—gegen den übermäßigen unchristlichen gewalt des bapst* [Accusation and exhortation—against the excessively unchristian power of the pope]. See *Deutsche Literatur, Texte und Zeugnisse II, 2 - Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Renaissance* (Munich: Beck-Verlag, 1978), 120. — *Trans.*

40. Otto Behaghel, “Geschichte der deutschen Sprache,” in *Grundriß der germanischen Philologie*, ed. Paul, 682.

41. Hermann Paul, "Geschichte der germanischen Philologie," in *Grundriß der germanischen Philologie*, ed. Paul, 23.
42. Behaghel, "Geschichte der deutschen Sprache," 673.
43. Der Bauer ist an Ochsen statt, / Nur daß er keine Hörner hat. — *Trans.*
44. Jakob Christian Burckhardt, *Die Kultur der Renaissance*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: E. A. Seemann, 1904), 4. [English trans. published as *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), 146. — *Trans.*]
45. Cited in Steinhausen, *Geschichte der deutschen Kultur*, 540.
46. Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–66) was a poet, critic, and translator. — *Trans.*
47. À-la-mode-Kleider, à-la-mode-Sinnen— / Wie sich's wandelt außen, wandelt sich's auch innen. — *Trans.*
48. The *Haupt-und Staatsaktionen* were popular stage performances by wandering German players during the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century involving serious plots interspersed with farcical elements. — *Trans.*
49. Louis of Baden (1655–1707), born in Paris, fought as a member of the German imperial army against the Turks and the French. — *Trans.*
50. Cited in Steinhausen, *Geschichte der deutschen Kultur*, 643.
51. Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) was a professor of law in Leipzig who gave the first lectures to be held in German. Driven out of Leipzig due to his liberalism, he went to Halle, where he took part in the founding of the university there in 1690. He became known as an opponent of the persecution of witches and torture. Christian Freiherr von Wolff (1679–1754) was a professor of mathematics in Halle who was expelled in 1723 due to his liberalism and recalled in 1740 by Frederick the Great. Von Wolff propagated the ideas of Leibnitz and was influential until Kant became dominant. He was satirized by Voltaire in *Candide*. — *Trans.*
52. Martin Opitz (1597–1639) was a writer and poet from Silesia. He served as a diplomat and, from 1636, as court historian to Vladislav of Poland. — *Trans.*
53. Georg Rudolf Weckherlin (1584–1653), a lyric poet born in Stuttgart, died in London. He wrote: Ich schreibe weder für noch von allen / Und meine Verse, kunstreich und wert, / Sollen nur denen, die gelehrt, / Und (wie sie tun) weisen Fürsten gefallen. — *Trans.*
54. *Emilia Galotti* was a drama by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1772); *Götz von Berlichingen* was a drama from the Sturm und Drang period of Goethe (1773). — *Trans.*
55. Friedrich Schiller, "The German Muse," in *The Poems of Schiller*, trans. E. A. Browning (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1916), 232–3. — *Trans.*
56. Johann Wilhelm Lauremberg (1590–1658) was a poet from northern Germany who wrote in the Low German dialect and whose satires of modern fashions were widely read. He opposed changes to the German language due to foreign influences. By den Olden will ick blyven, / höger schall myn Styll nich gahn, / als myn Vaders hefft gedan. — *Trans.*
57. Heinrich Schulz, "Die Volksschule in der Manufakturperiode," *Neue Zeit*, 20th year, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: J. H. W. Diery Nachf, 1902), 172 ff.
58. L. von Jolly, "Unterrichtswesen," in *Handbuch der politischen Ökonomie*, vol. 3, ed. Gustav Friedrich von Schönberg (Tübingen: H. Lauff, 1898), 1063.
59. Schulz, "Die Volksschule in der Manufakturperiode," 172 ff.
60. Leo Verkauf, *Archiv für soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, 1903, 259.
61. In Austria, universal male suffrage was first introduced in 1907. In Germany, although the *Reichstag* (subject to veto by the Prussian-dominated Federal Council) was elected according to the principle of universal male suffrage, regional diets were not, and

they employed various franchise systems. In Prussia, for instance, the dominant force in German politics, diets were elected according to a three-class system, which entailed wealthier voters' having electoral weight vastly disproportionate to their numbers. — *Trans.*

62. The concept of productive labor is used here in the *technical* sense, referring to labor producing goods, to use values. This includes not only all labor that produces material goods, but also of course that which produces nonmaterial goods, that is, provides services that have a use value for consumers. The economic concept of productive labor is a different one. See Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1905), 253 ff. [*Theories of Surplus Value*, in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works (MECW)*, vol. 30 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988), 348–411. — *Trans.*]

63. Marx, *Kapital*, vol. 2, 217; vol. 3, 98, 2, pp. 156 f, 347. [*Capital*, vol. 2, 238; vol. 3 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977), 121, 812. — *Trans.*]

64. According to Seiffert, the population of the German Empire annually sacrifices thirty-eight million marks for the birth and support of offspring who do not survive beyond their first year of life. See Seiffert, *Säuglingssterblichkeit, Volkskonstitution, und Nationalvermögen* (Jena, 1905).

65. The question of the effect of the form of society on the productivity of labor can naturally be only briefly outlined here; an exhaustive treatment would extend beyond the limits of this study. Here it is merely to be noted that this question should not be confused with that of the tendencies of the productivity of labor in general, whether, for example, the rise in global population is accompanied by a rise or a fall in productivity. The issue under discussion here has nothing to do with whether the productivity of labor rises or falls with the size of the population, but with the question of whether, given the same population size, the productivity of labor is greater under a capitalist or a socialist mode of production. The old question of the effect of a changed mode of production on the size of the population, however, can today be considered much more calmly than was previously the case. Our least fear today in regard to greater popular wealth, which at the same time means cultural advance, is that of overpopulation.

66. Ludwig Gurlitt, *Der Deutsche und seine Schule: Erinnerungen, Beobachtungen, und Wünsche eines Lehrers* (Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben, 1905).

67. J.-G. Fichte, *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (Leipzig, Reclam), 15, 20.

68. Harry Graf Kessler seeks to define the concept of national character even more narrowly. He too separates the ability to form different points of view in relation to the same external phenomena from the possession of different conceptual frameworks. However, he sees the feature that distinguishes the nations from one another only in the different speeds of reaction to an external stimulus; the national character is for him the specific “tempo of the soul” (*Zukunft* from 7 April 1906). The differing degrees of the agility of the will certainly constitute one of the features that we include under the concept of the orientation of the will, and thus under what we propose to conceive of as the national character in a narrow sense; the agility of the French and the ponderousness of the Dutch are well enough known. However, the issue is, of course, not only one of how rapidly an external stimulus elicits a response in us, but also which direction this response takes and what degree of intensity it possesses. Kessler thus defines the concept of national character too narrowly. [Harry Graf Kessler (1868–1937) was born and died in France. He was a writer and diplomat and president of the German Pacifist Society. *Die Zukunft* was a weekly cultural journal founded by Maximilien Harden in Berlin in 1892 that appeared until 1922. — *Trans.*]

69. Louis Charles Adelaide de Chamisso (1781–1838) was a German author born in Champagne. Chamisso's family fled from the French Revolution to Germany, where he later served in the Prussian military and worked as a botanist. — *Trans.*

70. Joseph Arthur Comte de Gobineau (1816–82) was a French writer and diplomat who championed the thesis of inequality between races, not only in physical but also in intellectual terms, and attempted to justify the superiority of the “Arian” race. — *Trans.*

71. Wilhelm Schallmayer, *Vererbung und Auslese im Lebenslaufe der Völker: Eine staatswissenschaftliche Studie auf Grund der neueren Biologie* (Jena: G. Fischer, 1903), 174.

72. Georg Simmel, *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Leipzig, 1905), 84 ff. [*The Problems of the Philosophy of History*, trans. Guy Oakes (New York: The Free Press/Macmillan, 1977), 120–21. — *Trans.*]

73. Wilhelm Bölsche (1861–1939) was a populist writer who also worked in the theater and presented scientific theories, particularly evolutionism, in the form of popular poetry. — *Trans.*

74. Fichte is correct in saying: “It may be that after several centuries the language of the forefathers cannot be understood by their descendants, because the transitional forms of development in the language have been lost to them. However, there is from the outset a constant process of transition, without an abrupt leap, imperceptible in the present, made noticeable only by the introduction of new transitional forms and manifested as an abrupt leap. There has never been a moment when contemporaries have ceased to understand one another.” Fichte, *Reden an die deutsche Nation*, Reclam, 53.

75. Karl Marx, “Einleitung zu einer Kritik der politischen Ökonomie,” *Neue Zeit*, 21st year, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf, 19), 711. [“Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy,” in MECW, vol. 28 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1986), 18. — *Trans.*]

76. See Max Adler, *Kausalität und Teleologie im Streit um die Wissenschaft*. In *Marx-Studien*, vol. 1 (Vienna: Ignaz Brand, 1904), 369 ff.

77. Rudolf Stammeler, *Wirtschaft und Recht* (Leipzig, 1896), 103.

78. I am using the terms *community* [*Gemeinschaft*] and *society* [*Gesellschaft*] here in a different sense from Tönnies in his excellent work *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, 1887). I see the essence of the society in the cooperation of humans under external regulation, the essence of the community in the fact that the individual is, in terms of his intellectual and physical being, the product of countless interactions between himself and the other individuals united in a community and is therefore, in his individual character, a manifestation of the communal character. Admittedly, a community can only emerge on the condition that external regulation—at least, as Stammeler teaches us, in the form of language—and thus society exists; on the other hand, society presupposes community, at least in the sense of the community of “consciousness in general,” as Max Adler has shown. The state is ultimately only one of the forms of society, just as law based on external constraint is only one of the forms of regulation. Still more limited is the concept of the modern state, which has developed with commodity production and will disappear with it. [Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society*, trans. Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper and Row, 1963). — *Trans.*]

79. A collection of different definitions of the nation can be found in Friedrich Julius Neumann, *Volk und Nation: Eine Studie* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1888).

80. *Ibid.*, 54.

81. Language, of course, is not only a means of transmitting the elements of a culture, but is itself a cultural element. The Frenchman is not different from the German

only because his language transmits a different type of culture, but because his language is itself a cultural element that has been transmitted to him, one that, through its specificity, determines his speech, his thought, and his character. If French rhetoric differs from German rhetoric, this is certainly due in part to the difference between the languages.

82. Talk of a Swiss nation is based either—where the focus is merely on the affiliation of the Swiss to a state—on a confusion between what constitutes the people of a state and what constitutes the nation or, where the speaker is claiming that a community of character exists between the German, French, Italian, and Rhaetian Swiss, on the mistaken opinion that every community of character is already a nation.

83. Gustav Rümelin (1815–89) was a writer, university professor, member of the Frankfurt Parliament, and director of the Ministry of Culture in Württemberg (1856–61). — *Trans.*]

84. Das ganz Gemeine ist's, das ewig Gestrige, / Was immer war und immer wiederkehrt / Und morgen gilt, weil's heute hat gegolten. / Denn aus Gemeinem ist der Mensch gemacht / Und die Gewohnheit nennt er seine Amme. / Weh dem, der an den würdigen alten Hausrat / Ihm rührt, das teure Erbstück seiner Ahnen! / Das Jahr übt eine heiligende Kraft, / Was grau vor Alter ist, das ist ihm göttlich. — *Trans.*

85. Heinrich Heine, "Die Wahl-Esel," in Heinrich Heine, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Ernst Elster, vol. 2 (Leipzig and Vienna), 197 (verses 10, 14, 16). — *Trans.*

86. National evaluation arises from national sentiment; it is explicable in psychological terms, but cannot be justified philosophically. Nevertheless, the attempt has recently been made to establish a philosophical foundation for national evaluation by Heinrich Rickert in his well-known work, *Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* (Tübingen, 1902). In this work Rickert attempts in the first instance to justify an individualistic ethic. He replaces the celebrated formula of the Kantian categorical imperative with the assertion: "If you wish to act well, you should, through your individuality and on the individual place in reality where you stand, accomplish that which only you can accomplish, for no other in what is everywhere an individual world has exactly the same task as you; and in addition you should shape your whole life such that it forms a teleological development, which can be regarded in its totality as the accomplishment of your life's mission, which is never repeated" (716 f). Rickert himself then attributes national significance to this individualistic ethic. For under "individual" Rickert understands not only the concrete individual human being, but also the concrete community of individuals, the nation. Every nation has an individual task, and the fulfillment of this task, the elaboration of national specificity, is a moral duty (722). This attempt to justify an individualistic and at the same time national ethic is of great interest because it makes clear for us the historical roots of the present movement in philosophy. A detailed critique of this ethic is not possible here and perhaps no longer necessary following the critique of its epistemological bases by Münsterberg and Max Adler. My intention here is merely to point to the clear circularity of Rickert's thinking.

87. Karl Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelischen Rechtsphilosophie," in F. Mehring, *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, und Ferdinand Lassalle* (Stuttgart, 1902), vol. 1, 386. ["Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law," in *MECW*, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), 175. — *Trans.*]

88. *Ibid.*, 397. [English trans. modified. — *Trans.*]

89. Some might be surprised by my calling the proletariat the embodiment of rationalism on the grounds that it is precisely the rationalism within the social sciences that the theory of the proletariat—Marxism—opposes, teaching us to comprehend everything

in terms of its historical determination. However, it is important here to make a precise distinction: Marx has shown science how to comprehend that which exists and that which is in the process of becoming in terms of their historical dependence, their historical determinedness. However, this does not mean that tradition can no longer be an object of rationalist critique, that Marx sees tradition as justified because he has shown it to be a historical product. No one has more energetically opposed this nonsense argued by the “historical school of law” than Marx. It is rather the case that Marx has taught us to understand proletarian rationalism in historical terms, in terms of its genesis.

90. Of course, the word *evolutionary* here does not at all represent an opposition to *revolutionary*. Revolution, radical transformation, is only a particular method, a means of development, a phase of evolution.

91. Hans Sachs (1494–1576) was a poet and shoemaker and a Meistersinger in Nuremberg. — *Trans.*

2. THE NATION-STATE

1. In 936, Otto I gave Hermann Billunger the task of guarding the border area in eastern Saxony and representing imperial interests in the region. The Billunger margraves subsequently became a duchy, which the family held until 1106, when the male line died out. — *Trans.*

2. Ernest Renan, *Qu'est qu'une nation?* (Paris, 1882) [in *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. 1 (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947), 887–901]; Alfred Kirchhoff, *Zur Verständigung über die Begriffe “Nation” und “Nationalität”* (Halle a.S.: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1905).

3. We can now group the theories we have discussed in the following way: (1) *meta-physical* theories of the nation: national spiritualism and national materialism; (2) *psychological* theories of the nation: psychological-intellectualist and psychological-voluntarist; (3) the *empirical* theory of the nation, which is content to enumerate the elements essential to the nation. We oppose these theories with our own theory of the nation, which is based on the materialist conception of history, as the community of character arising from the community of fate.

4. František Palacký (1798–1876) was a Czech historian and politician who participated in the revolution of 1848, but declined as a Czech to take part in the Frankfurt Parliament. He was director of the Pan-Slavic congress in Prague in 1848 and leader of the Slavic party in the Austrian *Reichstag* (imperial diet) of Kremsier (1848–49). Later he served as leader of the party of the Old Czechs in the Austrian House of Lords. — *Trans.*

5. Concerning the difference between people and nation, cf. the previously cited work by F. J. Neumann.

6. Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769–1860) was a theologian, historian, and philosopher who fled to Sweden in 1806 after publishing anti-Napoleonic writings on the rights of peoples and nations. He continued to write nationalist pamphlets and poems calling for German unity and was a member of the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848–49 (center-right). Max von Schenkendorf (1783–1817) was a lyric poet and a civil servant in Königsberg. He was the author of poems and songs and a patriot who took part in the war of liberation against Napoleon. — *Trans.*

7. Heinrich von Trietschke (1834–96) was a historian, journalist, professor, and deputy for the National Liberals in the *Reichstag* (1871–84). He became the historian of

the Prussian state after Ranke's death and opposed socialism and its intellectual exponents. His major work, *Deutsche Geschichte des 19 Jahrhunderts*, influenced German nationalism and anti-Semitism. — *Trans.*

8. It should be noted that we are not asking whether the productivity of labor increases due to the fact that more is produced on the same soil, but whether the productivity of labor is increased through the unification of several regions to form a single economic region. Therefore, the law of the diminution of the soil yield, for example, or the examination of the effects of increasing ground rents does not concern us here.

9. Richard Schüller, *Schutzzoll und Freihandel: Die Voraussetzungen und Grenzen ihrer Berechtigung* (Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1905), 247.

10. Friedrich List (1789–1846) was an economist and politician who was a professor of political science in Tübingen. List supported the creation of a German customs union and, as a consequence, lost his university post. His campaign for democratic administrative reform led to his arrest and emigration to America, from whence he later returned as American consul. As an economic theorist he opposed the “theory of value” with the “theory of productive forces”—a forerunner of modern development theory. For a recent work on his discussion of nationalism see Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List* (New York: Oxford University Press), 1988. — *Trans.*

11. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit*, book 9, IV. [*Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*, trans. J. Churchill (London, 1800, rpt. New York: Bergman Publishers), 249. — *Trans.*]

12. In Herder's interpretation, nature is seen in a narrow sense: the nation is for him a community of descent. However, in principle this line of thought remains intact if we regard the nation as causally emerging from the human struggle for existence not merely by way of natural heredity, but also by way of the transmission of culture.

3. THE MULTINATIONAL STATE

1. Gustav Strakosch-Grassmann, *Geschichte der Deutschen in Österreich-Ungarn*, vol. I (Vienna: C. Konagen, 1895), 312 ff.

2. Cited in F. Palacký, *Geschichte Böhmens* (Prague: Kronberger und Weber, 1854), vol. 3, part 3, 293.

3. The Přemyslids were a Bohemian dynasty that established hereditary kingship under Ottokar I in 1198 and died out in 1306. Rei(n)mar (von) der Zweter was a thirteenth-century author of political, religious, and ethical aphorisms who resided at a number of courts, including that of the Bohemian king Wenzel I. Tannhuser (Tannhäuser) was a thirteenth-century poet who became a knight hero of popular legend that was used as the subject matter for a number of later works, including most famously an opera by Wagner. Ulrich von der Türlin was a thirteenth-century epic poet and burgher born in Carinthia. — *Trans.*

4. The Jagiellons were a Lithuanian-Polish dynasty that ruled in Poland from 1377 or 1386 to 1572, in Bohemia from 1471 to 1526, and in Hungary from 1440 to 1444 and from 1490 to 1526. During certain periods, they were the Habsburgs' strongest rival for political leadership in Christian eastern Europe. — *Trans.*

5. Maximilian I (1459–1519) was a Holy Roman king and emperor who ruled all Habsburg lands and established Habsburg succession in Hungary following the Peace of Pressburg. — *Trans.*

6. The old terminology of the Austrian Chancery includes under *Inner Austria* the duchies of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola and under *Lower Austria* the archduchies above and below the Enns and the three Inner Austrian lands.

7. For detailed information on how the Turkish threat drove the Croats into a close affiliation with the empire, see Herman-Ignaz Bidermann, *Geschichte der österreichischen Gesamtstaatsidee* (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1867–84), vol. 2, 198 ff.

8. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, 5 ff.; vol. 2, 93 ff.

9. In 1231, a verdict of the imperial tribunal stipulated: “The sovereign may only with the consent of the *meliorum et maiorum terrae constitutiones vel nova iura facere.*”

10. Georg Anton Hugo von Below, *Territorium und Stadt: Ansätze zur deutschen Verfassungs-, Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Munich-Leipzig: R. Oldenbourg, 1900), 248.

11. Georg Jellinek, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Berlin: O. Häring, 1905), 317.

12. Arnold Luschin von Ebengreuth, *Österreichische Reichsgeschichte* (Bamberg: Buchner, 1896), 277.

13. *Ibid.*, 464 ff.

14. *Ibid.*, 336.

15. Bidermann, *Geschichte der österreichischen Gesamtstaatsidee*, vol. 2, 25, 101, 167.

16. The Czech language triumphed not only over German, but also over Latin. This constitutes a parallel phenomenon to the almost concurrent advance of the German language in relation to Latin in Germany as a consequence of the development of the bourgeoisie. As in Germany, this development in Bohemia was fostered by the victory of the Reformation and the Catholic Church.

17. Cited in Richard Andree, *Tschechische Gänge. Böhmishe Wanderungen und Studien* (Bielefeld-Leipzig, 1872), 190. [The term *Saint Wencislaw*, a play on *Saint Wenceslas*, would seem to refer to the spirit of Bohemian Slavic independence confronting the colonial settlers during this period. Wenceslas I (903–929 or 935) was a member of the Bohemian Přemyslid dynasty, which united the Bohemian tribes in the ninth century. He was later proclaimed a national saint. — *Trans.*]

18. The significance of trade with Venice is illustrated clearly in the case of Vienna by the ordinance of 1432, which distinguished the merchant from the petty trader by the fact that the former traveled to Venice: “Any petty trader who wants to travel to Venice to trade is a merchant and not a petty trader, and by the same token, that merchant who does not travel to Venice to trade, but wishes to pursue petty commerce, is a petty trader and not a merchant.” Helene Landau, *Die Entwicklung des Warenhandels in Österreich* (Vienna, 1906), 12.

19. Max Adler, *Die Anfänge der merkantilistischen Gewerbepolitik in Österreich* (Vienna, 1903), 16.

20. Karl Grünberg, *Die Bauernbefreiung und die Auflösung des gutsherrlich-bäuerlichen Verhältnisses in Böhmen, Mähren, und Schlesien* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1894).

21. For example, the Grand Burgrave answered the taxation demands of the royal and imperial estate commissioners in the Czech language, and the highest judge in the land invited the assessors of the provincial tribunal to meet for consultation in the district with the words “*Rače sestoupiti.*” On the other hand, the actual negotiations were conducted and reports issued in the German language. Alfred Fischel, *Das österreichische Sprachenrecht* (Brünn: F. Irrgang, 1901), 28.

22. Christian d’Elvert, *Zur Geschichte des Deutschtums in Österreich-Ungarn mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die slavisch-ungarischen Länder* (Brünn: C. Winiker, 1884), 474.

23. *Ibid.*, 445.

24. Even the more considered of the Czech authors are commonly mistaken in this regard. Masaryk, for example, declares the idea of humanity to be a specifically Czech one, because he identifies it as a guiding concept in the Czech Reformation (fraternities) as well as in the first reawakening of the Czech nation in the nineteenth century—in the work of Kollár, Jungmann, Šafařík, Palacký. However, this proves nothing more than a serious misunderstanding of historical interrelations. The concept of humanity was engendered within the awakening Czech bourgeoisie by virtue of its position in the society just as necessarily as it was within the intelligentsia and petty bourgeoisie of all other European nations at the same stage of development. Insofar as a connection was drawn between this concept and the thought of the Czech Reformation—all but forgotten over centuries—this occurred only to the extent that ideas were rediscovered in the nation's history that were related to the ideas of the present epoch. It was their own spirit that these men found in the spirit of a long-forgotten era. Moreover, when Masaryk believes himself to have amply justified the concept of humanity by virtue of its allegedly Czech character rather than comprehending it in terms of its development or as a goal, and then measures the program and means of struggle of the Czech parties against it, he provides a good example of the national form of evaluation with which we are already familiar. [Tomas Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937) was a Czech sociologist and statesman who was deputy of the Young Czech party and after 1900 leader of the small, moderately left liberal Realist party and president of the first Czech republic. — *Trans.*]

25. Even today, Austrian statistics, in order to avoid any ambiguity, must speak of a Bohemian-Moravian-Slovak colloquial language. It would not occur to anyone, on the other hand, to speak of a Bavarian-Franconian-Swabian colloquial language instead of a German one.

26. When, in 1749, the estates in Carniola refused to agree to an increased military contribution over a number of years, Count Chotek explained to them that “the Court expressly commands that the estates should grant it voluntarily,” whereupon the estates obeyed. A year before, when the estates in Carinthia refused to increase their military contribution, the revenue of the land was sequestered and the contributions levied by the officials of the prince. See Luschin, *Österreichische Reichsgeschichte*, 532.

27. On the reasons for the protection of the peasantry, see Grüneberg, *Die Bauernbefreiung und die Auflösung des gutsherrlich-bäuerlichen Verhältnisses* chap. 1, sec. 3.

28. *Ibid.*, chap. 3, sec. 4.

29. Par. 18 of the “Letters patent concerning the subjects” of 1781; sec. 97 of the “Letters patent” of 17 June 1788; imperial decree of 30 November 1787. See Fischel, *Das österreichische Sprachenrecht*, 36.

30. *Ibid.*, 28 f. and 39.

31. On the influence of Herder on the “awakeners” of the Czech nation, see T. G. Masaryk, *Česká otázka* (Prague: Čas, 1895); Josef Kaizl, *České myšlenky* (Prague, 1896), 21 ff.

32. Gustav Strakosch-Grassmann, *Geschichte des österreichischen Unterrichtswesens* (Vienna: A. Pichlers Witwe und Sohn, 1905), 110 ff.

33. Fischel, *Das österreichische Sprachenrecht*, 36.

34. D'Elvert, *Zur Geschichte des Deutschtums in Österreich-Ungarn*, 510.

35. The one-year *Trivialschule* provided instruction in the “trivium”: reading, writing, and arithmetic. The *Hauptschule*, established in every district, taught history, geometry, and drawing, as well as providing some more advanced instruction in German and

some vocational training, The *Normalschule* served as a terminal school for urban middle-class children and as a teachers' training institution for elementary education. — *Trans.*

36. Strakosch-Grassmann, *Geschichte des österreichischen Unterrichtswesens*, 130. This rapid growth by no means ends here. In 1837, the number of children attending school in Bohemia already numbered 493,229. See Johann Springer, *Statistik des österreichischen Kaiserstaates* (Vienna: Beck, 1840).

37. Fischel, *Das österreichische Sprachenrecht*, 30.

38. The "metric hundredweight," equal to 50 kg, was the unit of weight adopted by the German *Zollverein* (customs union) in 1840. — *Trans.*

39. *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Gewerbe und Erfindungen in Österreich*, ed. by Exner (Vienna, 1873). *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Industrie in Böhmen* (Prague, 1893).

40. E. V. Zenker, *Die Wiener Revolution 1848 in ihren sozialen Voraussetzungen und Beziehungen* (Vienna, 1897).

41. In the year 1816, Bernard Bolzano declared in his lectures "On the Relations between the Two Ethnographical Groups in Bohemia" [*Über die Verhältnisse der beiden Volkstämme in Böhmen*], published in Vienna in 1849 by Michael Joseph Fesl: "Are not the German-born and those who have attached themselves to them given preference in a hundred important matters? Is it not the German language that is the language of all higher sciences in the land? Which has been elevated to the status of the language of business in all public affairs? . . . And, moreover, are not the great and the distinguished of the land, the wealthy and the propertied of the people, all, all only one of two things, either German born and therefore foreigners or persons who, because they have long abandoned the language and customs of Bohemia, are numbered among the Germans? Does not the Bohemian-speaking portion of the people generally live only in a deplorable state of poverty and oppression? And, most scandalous, is it not true that everywhere people indicate as their superiors Germans or those who belong to the Germans?" (p. 25).

42. Here Bauer appears to refer to the international Slav Congress convened in Prague in 1848 and chaired by Palacký. — *Trans.*

43. Anton Heinrich Springer, *Protokolle des Verfassungsausschusses im österreichischen Reichsrat 1848 bis 1849* (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1885), 316. See also T. G. Masaryk, *Karel Havlíček* (Prague: J. Laichter, 1896).

44. Josef Dobrovsky (1753–1829) was a Czech Slavist and Jesuit, the founder of Slavic theology and philology, who wrote on Slavic languages and Bohemian history and literature. Jan Kollár (1793–1852) was a Slovak poet and representative of mystic humanitarian Panslavism. Pavel Josef Šafařík (1795–1861) was a Slovak historian, translator, and ethnographer associated with the Czech renaissance movement. — *Trans.*

45. Josef Jungmann (1773–1847) was a translator and historian of literature who was instrumental in the introduction of Czech as a secondary school subject. — *Trans.*

46. Fischel, *Das österreichische Sprachenrecht*, 42.

47. Alexander Freiherr von Bach (1813–93) was an Austrian statesman who became justice minister in 1848 and interior minister in 1849. After the death of Prime Minister Schwarzenberg in 1852, he became the most influential member of the government and built on the administration of his predecessor to establish a system of government that was clerical, centralist, and absolutist (the *Bachsche System*). — *Trans.*

48. The Ruthenians were Ukrainians originally based in the southern ranges of the Carpathians (after 1918, Carpatho-Ukraine). The acquisition of Galicia in 1772 and Bukovina in 1775 by the Habsburg Empire involved the incorporation of substantial

Ruthenian minorities, the majority of which were living as peasants under the Polish nobility (Szlachta). Johann Philipp Graf von Stadion (1763–1824) was an Austrian politician who became minister of foreign affairs in 1805. He planned a new uprising against Napoleon and to this end attempted to establish ties between the people and the state through reform and the founding of a popular army. After military defeat in 1809, he was replaced by Metternich. He became finance minister in 1816 and founded the national bank. — *Trans.*

49. Albrecht Eusebius Wenzel Wallenstein, Duke of Friedland and Mecklenburg, Prince of Sagan (1563–1634), was a military commander in the Thirty Years War who acquired large domains in Bohemia. — *Trans.*

50. Heinrich Rauchberg, *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1905).

51. The extent to which the whole presentation of the German nationalist case is steeped in the bourgeois spirit is indicated by the following sentence: "196,750 Czech employees are directly maintained by the Germans of Bohemia as workers and officials, the cost of which amounts to 193.8 million crowns. This means, taking into account the families of these Czech employees, that at least seven hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand Czechs live directly from the Germans, a figure that represents a good fifth of all Czechs in Bohemia." (*Deutschböhmen als Wirtschaftsgroßmacht* [Reichenberg, 1903], I, 22.) Are the workers really *maintained* by the capitalists? Is it not rather the case that the labor of the workers maintains the whole society and that it is only the private ownership of the means of production that gives the capitalists the power to appropriate a part of the product of the workers' labor?

52. Karl Lueger (1844–1910) was an Austrian politician and lawyer who championed the interests of the crafts, small-scale commerce, and small peasants. He brought together various antiliberal associations to form the conservative and anti-Semitic Christian Social Party in 1891. Though he was elected mayor of Vienna in 1895, the emperor refused to accept him in the position until he was elected again in 1897, and it was during his period in office that Vienna developed into a modern metropolitan city. He favored equality among nationalities, but was hostile to Austro-Hungarian dualism. — *Trans.*

53. Kremsier was a town in eastern Moravia to which the newly convoked Austrian constituent assembly (*Reichstag*) moved in 1848 during the uprisings in Vienna. In Kremsier, work continued on the drafting of a permanent constitution, one that was to have taken prevailing nationalities questions into account. The victory of the counterrevolution resulted in the dissolution of the Kremsier Assembly in March 1849. — *Trans.*

54. Rudolf Springer (pseudonym of Karl Renner), *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* (Vienna: Deuticke, 1902), 10 ff.

55. See Jellinek, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, 311 ff.

56. Otto Friedrich von Gierke, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1868), 645.

57. Rudolf Springer, *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat*, 28 ff.

58. See Rudolf Springer, *Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie* (Vienna-Leipzig: I. Deuticke, 1906).

59. Anton Ritter (Knight) von Schmerling (1805–93) was an Austrian politician who, as a representative of the Austrian Germans in the Frankfurt National Assembly, was a leading advocate of the Great German (*grossdeutsch*) concept, which envisaged the inclusion of German Austria in a German Empire. He was appointed minister of the interior following the introduction of a new Austrian constitution (October Diploma) in 1860

and had a dominant influence on the centralist-liberal constitution (February Patent) promulgated in 1861, which introduced a bicameral system of government. He resigned in 1865 in the face of federalist demands by non-German national groups. — *Trans.*

60. Karl Sigmund Graf (Count) von Hohenwart (1824–99) was appointed prime minister in 1871 and presided over the drafting of the so-called Fundamental Articles, which proposed special status for the “three lands of the Bohemian crown”—Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia—along federalist lines. He also presided over the drafting of a nationality law that provided for the establishment of nationally homogeneous administrative districts in Bohemia and Moravia and gave the Czech language almost equal status with German. The program was defeated by antifederalist Germans and Hungarians. — *Trans.*

61. The Schwarzenbergs were of Franconian lineage and acquired land in southern Bohemia, Carniola, and Styria and the status of imperial princes in 1670. As prime minister, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg (1800–52) dissolved the Kremsier assembly and led the attempt to restore state authority following the events of 1848. — *Trans.*

62. Alfred von Skein, *Entstehung und Entwicklung der slavischen Nationalbewegung in Böhmen und Mähren im 19. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1893), 55.

63. Josef Matthis Graf von Thun-Hohenstein, *Der Slavismus in Böhmen* (Prague: Calve, 1845). Masayrk remarks that the sentence quoted cannot be translated into Czech because the Czech language designates the Czechs (the nation) and the Bohemians (the inhabitants of the land) with the same word.

64. Rudolf Springer, *Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie*, 67.

65. Kasimir Felix Badeni (1846–1909) was an Austrian statesman who became governor of Galicia in 1888 and prime minister and minister of the interior in 1895. He attempted to settle the language conflict in Bohemia with two language ordinances in 1897 that required that all public officials be able to speak both Czech and German within three years. The resulting outcry led to his dismissal. — *Trans.*

66. Ernest von Koerber (1850–1919) was an Austrian politician who was trade minister in 1897–98, interior minister in 1899, and prime minister in 1900–1904. His attempt to solve the Bohemian nationalities conflict by constitutional means and the resulting Czech opposition led to the fall of his cabinet. — *Trans.*

67. Engelbert Pernerstorfer (1850–1918) was a prominent representative of moderate German national trends in the social-democratic movement. In 1882 he participated in drawing up the so-called Linz program with a group of German liberals, including Social Democratic Party founder Victor Adler and radical nationalist Georg von Schönerer. He left the movement founded by Schönerer due to the latter’s anti-Semitism and from 1896 represented the German-national wing of the Social Democrats in the *Reichsrat*. — *Trans.*

68. The Wimberg Hotel in Vienna was the site of the biennial congress of the *Gesamtpartei* in 1897, when, due to Czech demands, the party decided to transform itself into a federative organization of six national parties (Ukrainian, Czech, Polish, German, Italian, and Slovene) with a common executive committee. The next biennial congress, held in the Moravian city of Brünn (Brno) in 1899, saw the adoption of the Social Democratic nationalities program, which Bauer discusses in detail in chapter 7. See Ephraim Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism* (London: Pluto Press, 1991), 126. — *Trans.*

69. Synopticus and Rudolf Springer were pseudonyms used by Karl Renner (1870–1950) while he was working as a parliamentary librarian and, as a state official,

unable to overtly acknowledge his socialist politics. He became one of the leaders of the Austrian social democratic movement and a deputy in the *Reichsrat* in 1907. He was later chancellor of the first and second Austrian republics and subsequently head of state. — *Trans.*

70. The *Arbeiter-Zeitung* was the central organ of the Austrian Social Democrats, first published in 1889. — *Trans.*

4. NATIONAL AUTONOMY

1. See Ludwig Schlesinger, *Die Nationalitätsverhältnisse Böhmens* (Stuttgart, 1886), 25 ff.

2. Eduard Herbst, *Das deutsche Sprachgebiet in Böhmen* (Prague, 1887), 32.

3. Springer, *Kampf der österreichischen Nationen*, 98.

4. Franz Martin Pelzel, *Geschichte Böhmens* (Prague: Hagen, 1779), 643.

5. On Styria, see Richard Pfaundler, "Die nationalen Verhältnisse in Steiermark," *Statistische Monatsschrift*, 1906, 401 ff.

6. Franz von Meinzingen, "Die binnenländische Wanderung und ihre Rückwirkung auf die Umgangssprache," *Statistische Monatsschrift*, 1902, 693 ff.

7. Fischel also draws attention to the connection between the question of schools for minorities and the continual movement of Czech workers in and out of the German industrial regions. However, it is precisely for this reason that he wants to deny the Czech minorities schools or to make the establishment of schools more difficult. I am unable to understand this logic. Insofar as the Czech workers really do move out of the German districts with every shift in economic trends, Czech schools in the German language region cannot do any harm. Since the Czech workers do not remain in the German language region, they cannot be Germanized through their children's being forced to attend a German school. On the other hand, the German school harms the Czech workers, since for their children, who do not remain long enough in the German language region to master the German language, the denial of Czech schools amounts to nothing less than the denial of schooling itself. See Alfred Fischel, *Die Minoritätsschulen* (Brünn, Verlag des Deutschen Vereins, 1900), 8.

8. Michael Hainisch, *Zukunft der Deutsch-Österreicher* (Vienna: F. Deuticke, 1892).

9. Heinrich Herkner, *Die Zukunft der Deutsch-Österreicher* (Vienna: L. Weiss, 1893). "The parish financing of, for example, the delivery of sterilized milk to poor mothers in Soxleth seems to us, even from a national standpoint, to be of far greater merit than putting the city police in uniform *à la prussienne*, placing signs on public baths, "No Czech to be spoken here," and, through similar measures, placing the autonomy of the city in still more danger" (p. 20).

10. Law of 27 November 1905, no. 1 and no. 2, *Landesgesetzbuch*, ex 1906.

11. The establishment of the minority schools constitutes a particular problem. The minorities will themselves no doubt demand that their children also learn to speak the majority language fluently in the schools.

12. Karel Kramár, *Anmerkungen zur böhmischen Politik* (Vienna: E. Stülpnagel, 1906), 122 f.

13. The development of the Jewish nation under the domination of the capitalist mode of production did not proceed in any linear manner. Early capitalism initially widened the gulf between the Jews and the Christian nations in that it created new antago-

nisms: competition between Jewish and Christian capitalists, clashes of interest between Jewish commercial and investment capital and Christian industrial capital, between Jewish capital and Christian crafts, and so on. However, here we are concerned only with the effects of modern capitalism. Early capitalist development and its consequences constitute only an episode—albeit one lasting centuries and causing much pain for the Jewish people.

14. Karl Marx, *Zur Judenfrage: Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, und Ferdinand Lassalle*, ed. Franz Mehring, vol. 1, 430. ["On the Jewish Question," *MECW*, vol. 3, 174 (trans. modified). — *Trans.*]

15. *Ibid.*, 426. [*MECW*, vol. 3, 170. — *Trans.*]

16. "Today's fighters for freedom are no longer acquainted with Judaism, do not hate it because they never loved it, remain indifferent to it because it no longer has a place in their lives . . . When I was still a boy one of the old assimilants, a champion of the "Out-of-the-Ghetto Movement," told me that to smoke a cigar on a Saturday was a courageous act, a real experience. And it was one of my major sources of fun on Friday evenings to carry a lit cigarette when I met the hunched Reb Nuchim in the street on his way home from the synagogue. My son no longer knows that one isn't allowed to smoke on a Saturday. The world has become so simple for him." This report does not come from any western or central European center of assimilation, but from Wilna, the "Jerusalem of Lithuania," and we do not quote any assimilant newspaper, but the Zionist *Welt* of 10 August 1906.

17. The Bund was a union of Jewish workers from Russia, Poland, and Lithuania that was founded in 1897. It participated in the founding of the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Russia in 1898 and left it at its second congress due to disagreements regarding the national organization of the party. Reintegrated in 1906, the Bund was closer to the Mensheviks than the Bolsheviks. Eventually absorbed by the Communist Party in Russia and the Ukraine, it continued to exercise influence in Poland during the two wars, where the Jews constituted an important minority. It paradoxically advocated the principles of national-cultural autonomy supported by Bauer and Renner. — *Trans.*

5. THE DEVELOPMENTAL TENDENCIES OF THE NATIONAL STRUGGLES IN AUSTRIA

1. The Austrian part of the dual-state entity resulting from the Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867 with Hungary was officially referred to as "the kingdoms and lands represented in the *Reichsrat*," and the Hungarian part, where the Habsburg monarch had the status of king, as "the lands under the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen." See Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 336. — *Trans.*

2. Paul Baron Gautsch von Frankenthurn (1851–1918) was an Austrian politician. A specialist on schooling issues, he was minister of education several times, prime minister 1897–98, and changed the controversial language regulations introduced by Badeni. He took office for a second time in 1904–06, a period dominated by the issue of electoral reform and the introduction of universal suffrage. He was forced to step down due to differences with Hungary. — *Trans.*

3. Gustav Eim (1849–97) was a Czech journalist and politician. Josef Kaizl (1854–1901) was an economist, politician, and professor at the Czech university in Prague.

In 1885 he became a deputy in the *Reichsrat* as a member of the Old Czech Party, but gave up his mandate to join the Young Czechs, whom he represented several times. He was finance minister in the Thun cabinet. Karel Kramár (1860–1937) was a member of the Young Czechs who was elected to the *Reichsrat* in 1891 and the Bohemian provincial diet in 1894. He was the leader of the Czech national movement and championed the unification of the Bohemian provinces under Czech leadership. Kramár was sentenced to death for high treason in 1916, but pardoned by the emperor in 1917. In 1918 he became the first prime minister of the Czech Republic. — *Trans.*

4. This is possibly a reference to Karl Brockhausen, *Die österreichische Gemeindeordnung (Grundgedanken und Reformideen)* (Vienna: Manz, 1905) or to *Studien und Vorschläge zum Verwaltungsreformpläne vom 25 Juli 1906* (Vienna, 1906). — *Trans.*

5. Springer, *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen*, 129.

6. *Ibid.*, 120.

7. Springer, *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen*, 121.

8. Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776–1831) was a historian and one of the founders of critical historiography. — *Trans.*

9. Heinrich Prade (1853–1927) was a deputy in the *Reichsrat* in 1885–1911. As a member of the Popular German Party, he defended the interests of the Sudeten Germans. He was a supporter of social policies, but opposed a universal franchise. Bedřich Pacák (1846–1914) was a Czech jurist and politician who was a deputy in the *Reichsrat* in 1891–1911 and president of the Czech parliamentary group. He was appointed as Czech minister in 1906, but replaced in 1907. Pacák supported the reconciliation of the national groups in Bohemia. — *Trans.*

10. Louis Eisenmann provides a vivid description of the national character of Hungarian culture: “Magyar and noble were almost synonymous concepts; the state spoke Latin; the society spoke German, Latin, Slavic, and Magyar; yet the state nonetheless had a pronounced Magyar national character. From the cultivation of national tradition and national rights, the practice of public life in the imperial diets and even more from the daily administration of the counties [*Komitate*], from the study of the Hungarian laws this nation created the vitality and strength that rendered it impervious to foreign influences.” Eisenmann, *Le compromis austro-hongrois: Étude sur le dualisme* (Paris, 1904), 547.

11. Verböczy declares: “*Nomine autem et appellatione populi hoc in loco intellige solummodo dominos praelatos, barones et alios magnates atque quoslibet nobiles, sed non ignobiles. . . . Plebis autem nomine soli ignobiles intelliguntur.*” That is: The “nation” is constituted by the gentlemen prelates, barons, and the other magnates and various nobles; the others do not belong to the nation, but constitute the plebs, the mob. [Istvan Verböczy (1148–1541) was a Hungarian lawyer who formulated the Tripartitum, the Hungarian code of public law of 1514. — *Trans.*]

12. Karl Grünberg, “Die Bauernbefreiung in Österreich-Ungarn,” in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, ed. J. Conrad, L. Elster, W. Lexis, F. Loehning (Jena: G. Fischer, 1890–94, rpt. 1898–1901).

13. Adolf Beer, “Die Zollpolitik und die Schaffung eines einheitlichen Zollgebietes unter Maria Theresia,” *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, vol. 14, 50. [Count Heinrich Blümegen (1715–88) was the supreme chancellor of the United Court Chancery, in charge of supreme administrative-financial matters and in part also military and judicial matters. — *Trans.*]

14. Ludvig Láng, *100 Jahre Zollpolitik* (Vienna, 1906), 172.

15. The official title of the territory controlled by Hungary as stipulated in the Compromise of 1867. It included Hungary itself, Transylvania, and Croatia-Slavonia. Stephen I (997–1038) was a king of Hungary and its patron saint. — *Trans.*

16. Láng, *100 Jahre Zollpolitik*, 171.

17. Ferenc Kossuth (1841–1914) was the son of Louis Kossuth, the nationalist leader during the 1848 revolution. The younger Kossuth led the National Independence Party, which formed the numerically strongest group in the coalition elected in 1905. — *Trans.*

18. Springer, *Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie*, 219.

19. Under absolutism, it was of course precisely the Hungarian estates that aspired to a common customs area. This was refused them on the basis of the argument that the nobility did not want to forego its exemption from taxation. It was only after the revolution that the Schwarzenberg ministry eliminated the customs border. In the meantime, the individual demands of the estate struggle have been forgotten; all that remains is the general tendency to perceive a complete separation from Austria as the goal of the national struggle.

20. Cf. Springer, *Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie*, 64.

21. *Ibid.*, 153.

22. Ernst Schneider was a precision engineer who founded the “Society for the Protection of Artisans” in 1881, which became the “Austrian Association of Reform” in 1882, an organization that played a role in politicizing the masses. Schneider distinguished himself, however, through his particularly virulent anti-Semitism, from which both Schönerer and Lueger distanced themselves. — *Trans.*

23. Franz von Deák (1803–76) was a Hungarian politician, lawyer, and county official who was a liberal deputy in the Hungarian *Reichstag* in 1833–36 and leader of the liberal opposition in 1839–40. During the 1848 revolution, he supported the demand for immediate independence and was briefly justice minister. In 1861, as leader of the moderate nationalists, he called for recognition of the 1848 constitution and became one of the main architects of the *Compromise of 1867*. — *Trans.*

24. Friedrich Naumann (1860–1919) was a German pastor and politician active in the field of social policy. He favored a national and Christian socialism and in 1896 founded the National-Social Association with the aim of reshaping the state and the economy along democratic and social lines. — *Trans.*

25. Friedrich Naumann, *Deutschland und Österreich* (Berlin, 1900).

26. Jozsef Kristoffy (1857–1928) was a member of the governing party in 1896. In 1905 he was minister of the interior in the government of Fejervary. When the Hungarian parliament refused to confirm Fejervary’s appointment by the emperor, Kristoffy considered proposing universal suffrage as a way of winning allies among the Social Democrats against the National Independence Party, the leading party in the nationalist coalition dominating the parliament. He negotiated with Garami, the Social Democratic leader, promising the abolition of police surveillance and the authorization of the rural socialist movement. However, the Social Democrats preferred instead to put pressure on the nationalist coalition, of which they themselves were members, to adopt universal suffrage as part of their program.

27. Geza Fejervary (1833–1914) was an army general faithful to the Habsburg army tradition who headed a nonparliamentary interim government in Hungary during the

standoff between the emperor Francis Joseph and the Hungarian coalition over revisions to the Compromise of 1867. *Honved*, literally “defender of the fatherland,” was a term coined during the 1848 revolution and later used to designate Hungarian soldiers. — *Trans.*

28. The coalition elected in 1905 refused to take office and demanded a revision of the Compromise of 1867, particularly in regard to the issue of Hungarian military autonomy. Emperor Francis Joseph responded by proposing the introduction of general equal franchise in Hungary, which would have meant an end to Magyar dominance. The coalition backed down and took office in 1906, with Alexander Wekerle as prime minister and Kossuth as minister of commerce. Count Albert Apponyi (1846–1933) was a Hungarian aristocrat and one of the leaders of the Independence Party. As minister of education he was responsible for the Education Act of 1907, which furthered the process of Magyarization. — *Trans.*

29. Black and yellow were the colors of the imperial flag in 1848. Josef Jelačić de Bužim (1801–59) was a nationalist Croatian officer in the imperial army who was appointed by the emperor in 1848 as banus of Croatia in order to reconcile Croat resentment toward concessions to the Magyars and who commanded the Croat troops loyal to the emperor against the Hungarian revolution. — *Trans.*

30. This idea can already be found in Adolf Fischhof, *Österreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes* (Vienna: Wallishäuser, 1869), 33. Elsewhere, the following sentences can be found, written by a Romanian: “In the beginning, the North American union merely consisted of thirteen individual states. Today, it consists of forty-five! And all of these subsequently added states, each of these thirty-two individual states joined of their own free will. Why? Because the natural force of attraction exerted by the freedom, the autonomy, and the possibility of development of the United States proved irresistible. . . . We must grant and assure the nations living in our empire all the conditions beneficial to their political-national and economic development. We must do everything within our power to offer them the possibility of actually feeling more comfortable within the framework of the great power of Austria than within any other state system. . . . It can then surely be expected that trust in our policies and sympathy for our monarchy will increase among all the small eastern nations outside Austria.” Aurel C. Popovici, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich* (Leipzig: B. Elischer, 1906), 407 ff.

6. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

1. F. Palacký, *Österreichs Staatsidee* (Prague 1866), 85.

2. F. Engels, “Gewalt und Ökonomie bei der Herstellung des neuen Deutschen Reiches, *Neue Zeit*,” 14, no. 1, 687.

3. Karel Havlíček (1821–56) was a Czech journalist and satirist who used the pseudonym Havel Borovsk. — *Trans.*

4. Rosa Luxemburg, *Die industrielle Entwicklung Polens* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot 1898). [*The Industrial Development of Poland*, trans. Tessa DeCarlo. (New York: Campaigner Publications, 1977.) — *Trans.*]

5. Stanisław Koszutski, *Rozwoj ekonomiczny krolestwa Polskiego* (Warsaw 1905), 201.

6. Production capital is the capital active in the production process, that is, the capital invested in the instruments of labor and the raw and auxiliary materials used in production and for the purchase of labor power. Commodity capital is the capital embodied

in stocks of finished products awaiting buyers. The turnover time for capital is the total duration of the circulation of capital from the moment the capitalist “advances” his money until the time at which the money paid for the finished product flows back to him. It is divided into the production time, during which the capital is active in production, and the circulation time. The circulation time is constituted by the sale time (from the moment the product is finished until the moment it changes into money) and the purchase time (from the moment in which the deployed capital flows back to the capitalist until the time at which he again employs it to purchase instruments of labor and labor power). See Marx, *Capital*, vol. 2, part 1.

7. The following concepts are equivalent: limitation of production (technical); reduction of the quantity of social labor executed (economical from the standpoint of the sphere of production); prolongation of the purchasing time of industrial capital, increase of the monetary capital brought to a standstill (economical from the standpoint of the sphere of circulation).

8. Rudolf Hilferding, “Der Funktionswechsel des Schutzzolles,” *Neue Zeit*, 21, no. 2, 274 ff.

9. The term *navalism* apparently was first used by A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire: 1793–1812* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1892), 2 vols. It refers to the use of navies to control the world. — *Trans.*

10. It is perhaps useful here to refer to the different meanings of the word *cosmopolitanism* we have encountered. In the first place, there is cultural cosmopolitanism: each nation is to overcome the traditional limitedness of its national specificity and to learn from all peoples what is true, good, and beautiful. Cultural cosmopolitanism thus opposes the national with the rationalist mode of evaluation. We already know that this basic mentality has its roots in the nature of the human being. It gains strength wherever the old values of a nation are undermined by a revolutionary development: for example, in Hellas in the age of the Sophists, in Rome in the time of the Stoics and of Christianity, in Italy during the Renaissance, and finally, wherever modern capitalism radically changes the old form of society. Today it is the working class that is the bearer of this cultural cosmopolitanism. Very different from it is the economic cosmopolitanism of the free trade–supporting capitalist class, which serves the expansionist aspirations of capital. The working class has nothing to do with this doctrine. Of a quite other nature again is the naive cosmopolitanism of the youthful proletariat of the historical nations. These three different concepts of cosmopolitanism are not only to be clearly distinguished from one another, but also must not be confused with internationalism, the meaning of which we have yet to encounter.

11. Richard Cobden (1804–64) and John Bright (1848–51) were British industrialists and statesmen and members of the Manchester School of economic liberalism. They created the Anti-Corn Law League in 1838 and, while strictly maintaining the principle of *laissez faire*, advocated public education, pacifism, tolerance, and electoral reform. — *Trans.*

12. Franz Grillparzer (1791–1872) was a celebrated Austrian dramatic author of the Biedermeier period and for a time a civil servant in the finance ministry. — *Trans.*

13. Joseph Chamberlain (1836–1914) was a British industrialist and leader of the Liberal Party and in 1895–1903 was minister of colonies. He promoted expansion of the British empire and its cementation with an imperial federation of the “white” colonies united by the Crown, a common language, and economic privileges. Cecil Rhodes

(1853–1902) was prime minister of Cape Colony in 1890–96 and led British expansion in southern Africa. — *Trans.*

14. George Armitage-Smith (1844–1923) was the author of a number of works on free trade, and in particular *Principles and Methods of Taxation*. — *Trans.*

15. Sir Robert Giffen (1837–1910) was an English economist. — *Trans.*

16. *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Seeinteressen im letzten Jahrzehnt* (documents collected in the Imperial Navy Office, Berlin, 1905), 173.

17. Kurt Eisner (1867–1919) was one of the leaders of the German Social Democratic movement and prime minister of the socialist government in Bavaria during the 1918–19 revolution. He was assassinated on 21 February 1919. — *Trans.*

18. Max Schippel (1859–1928) was a German Social Democrat and contributor to the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. — *Trans.*

19. Arthur James Balfour (1848–1930) was a British statesman and the leader of the conservatives in the House of Commons; he became prime minister in 1902 and associated the conservatives with imperial protectionism. He was the author of the celebrated declaration written in 1917 supporting the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. — *Trans.*

20. In English in the original. — *Trans.*

21. Gerhart von Schulze-Gävernitz, *Britischer Imperialismus und englischer Freihandel zu Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1906), 79.

22. In the Turkish vilayets in Europe, there are only twelve Bulgarian doctors and six Bulgarian lawyers, that is, almost no members of the Bulgarian intelligentsia. However, this state of affairs is gradually changing. In the principality of Bulgaria there are already living some four hundred academically educated Bulgarians who originally came from Macedonia. D. M. Brancoff (pseudonym of Dimiter Mishek), *La Macédonie et sa population chrétienne* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1905).

23. *Vilayets* were administrative divisions within the Ottoman empire. — *Trans.*

24. Anyone wishing to study the foolishness of Austrian politics during the last decades is strongly recommended to give their attention to Austria's relationship to its Italians. The Italians are not a nonhistorical nation, but a historical nation, and are therefore still today given political preference over the Southern Slavs. However, since 1866, their numbers have been too small for them to have had a share in the great partition pact between the historical nations at the expense of the nonhistorical nations. And since the centralist-atomist constitution grants only those with power satisfaction of their cultural needs, and since the Italians are excluded from power due to their small numbers, Austria fails them in regard to the satisfaction of important cultural needs. This is tolerated with a great deal more difficulty by a people that has a bourgeoisie and an intelligentsia than it is by a peasant nation. Austria has thus hit upon the trick of privileging a nation in relation to other peoples and nevertheless engendering in it a passionate hostility to the state. And this hostility to the state is now becoming the most important tool of imperialism in the kingdom of Italy, which is inciting the masses with exaggerated tidings of the national struggles of the Austrian Italians in order to exploit the resulting hatred for the purpose of a war of conquest.

25. In 1875, the population of the German empire numbered 42.7 million, in 1900, 56.4 million inhabitants. The population of France in 1876 numbered 36.9 million, in 1901, 39 million inhabitants.

26. Protesting the "peaceful penetration" of Morocco by France, Kaiser Wilhelm visited Tangiers on 31 March 1905. — *Trans.*

27. Rohrbach reproaches the Pan-Germans in the empire for proclaiming the wrong idea that the zone of German political interests corresponds to the territory of dissemination of the “German-national Diaspora in Europe and overseas.” Paul Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern; Materialien zur Auswärtigen Politik* (Berlin: Hilfe, 1903), 80. Rohrbach wants a purely capitalist expansionism, whereas the Pan-Germans, even if they do not really comprehend it, have at least a vague feeling that capitalist expansionism is capable of rousing the working masses within the German people only if clothed in the policy of national unity. This opposition is fundamentally the same as that between Balfour and Chamberlain.

28. *Burschenschaft* was an association of students, the first of which was established at Jena in response to the “Metternich system.” Members adhered to the motto “Honour, freedom, and fatherland.” — *Trans.*

29. F. Engels, *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums, und des Staates* (Stuttgart, 1900), 105 ff., 149 ff., 177 ff. [Friedrich Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,” *MECW*, vol. 26 (1990), 213–56. — *Trans.*]

30. Geduld! Es kommt der Tag, da wird gespannt / Ein einzig Zelt ob allem deutschen Land! — *Trans.*

7. THE PROGRAM AND TACTICS OF AUSTRIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

1. Bauer does not supply the source for this information, but it appears to be “Protokoll über die Verhandlung des Gesamtparteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in Österreich Brünn,” Vienna, 1899. — *Trans.*

2. Seliger said: “It was already said yesterday that the word *protection* does not entirely comprehend that which must be accorded the national minorities. The issue is not merely one of granting the national minority protection for its national activity and cultural development in relation to the majority, but also to ensure that this national minority is accorded certain rights. For, of course, it is not our intention to destroy the parishes that already exist. This minority surely also has a particular interest in the parish administration, and it must be established here which rights it is to enjoy within this narrowest of spheres in relation to the regulation of its most immediate public interests.” *Verhandlungen des Gesamtparteitages der Sozialdemokratie in Österreich, abgehalten zu Brünn* (Vienna, 1899), 105.

3. Apparently taken from “Protokoll über die Verhandlung des Gesamtparteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in Österreich Brünn,” Vienna, 1899. — *Trans.*

4. Antonín Němec (1858–1926) was a metalworker, leader of the Czech Social Democratic Party, and editor-in-chief of its organ *Pravo Lidu*; delegate to the committee of the Socialist International; *Reichsrat* deputy from 1907 to 1918; then member of the Czechoslovakian parliament until 1925. — *Trans.*

5. Apparently taken from “Protokoll über die Verhandlung des Gesamtparteitages der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in Österreich Brünn,” Vienna, 1899. — *Trans.*

6. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Theorie und Praxis der englischen Gewerkvereine* (Stuttgart, 1898), 1 ff., 64 ff. [English edition: *Industrial Democracy* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965, reprint of the 1920 edition), 3 ff., 72 ff. — *Trans.*]

7. See the declaration of the Prague Trade Union Commission at the joint conference in Brünn on 15 October 1905. The documentation of the dispute is collected

in the *Protokoll des außerordentlichen österreichischen Gewerkschaftskongresses* (Vienna, 1905).

8. Previous experience in other lands has been similar. For a long time, the Scottish and Irish workers in many trades refused to join the English trade unions because they did not want to have themselves “governed by England.” Only since 1889 have all the large professional associations of England been able to extend their sphere of activity over Scotland and Ireland. See Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, 83 ff.

9. *Ibid.*, 94.

10. On the experiences of the English engineers, stonemasons, and bricklayers with the principle of autonomy within the trade union, see Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, 94 ff.

11. This conflict exists in spite of the solidarity of all proletarian interests. All miners, indeed all workers in Austria, have an interest in the fact that the miners of Ostrau receive high wages. It is therefore the wish of all Austrian workers that the trade union agitators and organizers active in Ostrau be as numerous and as efficient as possible. Nevertheless, it can occur that at a particular juncture the organization of all miners regards it as more expedient to concentrate the most valuable forces of the Union of Miners in another mining region, whereas the miners of Ostrau, perceiving their immediate local interests more vividly than the general interest, which is of course indirectly also their interest, consequently would like all the forces of the organization as a whole to be concentrated in their region. In logical terms, the interests of all workers are identical; in psychological terms, there exist diverse conflicts of interest between them due to the fact that the momentary local interest is always perceived more vividly than the general interest, which proves to be the real local interest of every local (or national) group only after a long passage of time.

12. The differentiation of the three stages that so well schematizes the determinant character of the developmental stage of the capitalist mode of production for the tactics of the proletariat has been taken from Rudolf Hilferding’s excellent article, “Parliamentarismus und Massenstreik,” *Neue Zeit*, 23rd year, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 19), 804 ff. The position of the social democratic movement regarding the state and the bourgeois parties is of course determined not only by the developmental stage of capitalist society, but also by other factors, in particular by the state constitution to which the proletariat is subjected and by the particular character of the traditional ideology of the nation. It would certainly be false to seek to completely explain the specificity of the proletarian movement of a land on the basis of merely one component; however, only if one wishes to abstain from the scientific investigation of social phenomena in general can one avoid breaking up the resulting movement into its components. In the German Empire, for example, revisionist tactics were not possible during the second stage of capitalist development because this was prevented by the lack of political rights for the working class. Today, however, the third stage has already been reached in north Germany: the number of workers is so large and is growing so rapidly, the class consciousness of the workers is so lively, that every political concession to the working class quite directly threatens the rule of the propertied classes, the incomes of the Junkers, and the monopoly gains of the cartel magnates. The Prussian workers cannot pursue revisionist policies as long as they do not participate fully and equally in Prussian legislation; the propertied classes cannot grant them this because a Prussian assembly elected on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage would have a Social Democratic majority within a short time. At the time when political revisionism was possible in Germany, the German working class was under the Anti-Socialist Law; today it is no longer possible because it is no

longer the individual demands of the proletariat, but power over the state itself, that is at issue. In England, an inverse situation prevails: Great Britain is economically already at the third stage, but politically still at the second stage; since the English working masses are still giving their allegiance to bourgeois parties, the class rule of the propertied classes is not under threat; struggles concern only specific economic and sociopolitical demands of the proletariat. On the other hand, France and Italy exhibit the economic and political character of the second stage.

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